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Abstract 
This thesis takes the form of a line-by-line commentary on the Peri Hermeneias ascribed to 
Apuleius with an introduction and has two main aims: To provide more detailed analysis of 
the Latin terminology than has been carried out previously and to examine the textual 
issues in order to highlight the need for a new critical edition of the text. Neither the 1908 
Teubner edition of the work, which has been used for previous scholarship, nor the more 
recent 1991 Teubner by Moreschini take into account the full manuscript evidence, which 
means that this scholarship has not been able to adequately explain some of the more 
opaque parts of the work. In my commentary, therefore, I suggest a number of textual 
variants with a view to correcting such points. The introduction is divided into eight 
sections; the first two sections provide (1) a review of the previous scholarship on this text 
and (2) brief details about its intellectual background. The introduction then focuses on 
topics which have not been given a satisfactory treatment in the available scholarship: (3) 
A review of scholarship regarding the manuscript tradition of the text. (4) The relevance of 
Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentaries in positing more plausible readings and a 
discussion of possible Greek sources for the text. (5) An analysis of the Latin terminology 
compared to its Greek counterpart and of the introduction of neologisms compared to 
those introduced in the authentically Apuleian texts is carried out with a view to 
contributing to the authenticity debate. (6) The language and method of exposition are then 
used to highlight the didactic purpose of the work, which has not been examined previously. 
(7) I present new arguments for both sides of the debate surrounding the authenticity of 
the work by considering the stylistic aspects as well as the content of the text. (8) The 
purpose of this commentary is described as providing detailed evidence for the conclusions 
drawn in each of these introductory sections before suggestions are made as to how work 
on this text may usefully proceed in the future.  
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1) Previous Scholarship on the Peri Hermeneias and the present study  
The Latin Peri Hermeneias is a text which is mentioned frequently but briefly in general 
histories about the development of logic,1 as a point of comparison to texts concerning 
logical theory which are better known, or as a testimonium to the thoughts of a particular 
figure or particular philosophical school about an aspect of logic.2 A comprehensive 
bibliography for the text is given in Lustrum 34 of works published between 1940 and 1990.3 
Since then a number of works have been published about Apuleius’ philosophical works 
more generally;4 such works tend to treat the Peri Hermeneias only from the point of view 
of its authenticity and how it might plausibly fit into the Apuleian philosophical canon. Such 
discussions are usually centred around the text’s stylistic and stylometric aspects but 
neglect to engage with the logical content in any serious way. No new scholarship which 
focusses specifically on this text and its logical content has been published since the 
Lustrum bibliography. 
There are, in fact, only four main works to date which are concerned specifically with the 
Peri Hermeneias and which treat the text in its own right.5 The aims, scope, and overview 
of the contents of these will now be discussed briefly before I situate my own thesis among 
them and explain the selection of topics presented in this introduction. 
Sullivan’s monograph presents a mostly clear and systematic account of the logical theory 
expounded in the text, and he is duly cautious about the areas which are affected by 
lacunae. The main goal of his study is to ‘focus attention on the distinct and decisive 
influence which Apuleius’s treatise exercised on the thought of later logicians’.6 He follows 
Bocheński7 in using symbolic formulae to represent the inference schemes set out in the 
text and, after mentioning the fact that the terminology used in this text ‘was not 
incorporated into the traditional logical language,’ he indicates that ‘when interpreting the 
meanings of the more unusual and difficult words ... we have tried to point out the 
problematic or tentative character of our constructions’.8 I have dealt with this problem in 
                                                          
1 For example, Bocheński, 1951; Kneale and Kneale, 1962.  
2 For example, Bocheński, 1947; Mates, 1961; Frede, 1974b.  
3 Bajoni, 1992. 
4 Most notable are Sandy, 1997; Harrison, 2000; Moreschini, 2015. Dillon, 1977, which is missing 
from the Lustrum inventory, includes discussion about this text in relation to Apuleius’ education. 
5 Sullivan, 1967; Lumpe, 1982; Baldassarri, 1986; Londey and Johanson, 1987. 
6 Sullivan, 1967: 5. 
7 1951. 
8 Sullivan, 1967: 3. 
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my own thesis by establishing that the idiosyncratic terminology used throughout the text 
serves the didactic purpose of the work and that the meaning of such terms is always made 
clear by the use of their established cognate verbs to define them in each case. For this 
reason, I use the standard Aristotelian terminology throughout in order to make it clear 
how each part of this text relates to the original Aristotelian counterpart. Sullivan’s main 
conclusion is that the Latin Peri Hermeneias, which he considers to be by Apuleius, exerted 
a substantial influence on the development of logic in the Latin West based on the indirect 
influence it had through Boethius’ treatises on the categorical syllogism. The problems 
associated with this conclusion, and with Sullivan’s assumption that the work is tied to the 
second century A.D. by being written by Apuleius, are discussed in sections 2 and 5 of this 
introduction.  
Lumpe is the only one out of the four authors to treat the question of the authenticity of 
the work with the caution which is due. As well as discussing this aspect of the text, after 
which he concludes that an otherwise unknown fourth-century grammarian is likely to be 
its author,9  his monograph deals with the purpose of the work, which he sees as fulfilling 
the intention of Apuleius to write a third book to the De Platone;10 the issues surrounding 
this supposition will be discussed in section 7 of this introduction. Lumpe also discusses the 
title of the work11 as it is presented in the manuscripts, possible sources for the work and 
the history of views on this matter,12 the place of logic in philosophy13 and, throughout the 
rest of his work, outlines the logical theory. His work contains a useful review of previous 
views on these matters. 
Baldassarri presents an Italian translation of Thomas’ 1908 edition and includes a 
commentary which discusses the logical content of the text in rather general terms as well 
as a glossary14 of the Latin terms used throughout the text with Greek equivalent terms. As 
will be discussed in section 5 of this introduction, his rationale behind the choice of some 
of these Greek terms is not always clear and is not explained in his introduction. My analysis 
of the Latin terminology throughout this text in light of clearly parallel passages from 
                                                          
9 Lumpe, 1982: 19. 
10 Lumpe, 1982: 20-21. 
11 Lumpe, 1982: 19-20. 
12 Lumpe, 1982: 22-26. 
13 Lumpe, 1982: 26-27. 
14 Baldassarri, 1986: 101-107. 
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Alexander of Aphrodisias has allowed me to correct Baldassarri’s glossary on a number of 
points. My own glossary of terms is included in Appendix B. 
Londey and Johanson consciously aim to build upon the work carried out by Sullivan in their 
own book. They correctly establish that studies carried out on this text ought to focus on 
‘both the logical content of the work and the language in which it is presented’15 and aim 
to facilitate further research on the text by ‘the provision of a complete {English} translation 
together with the Latin text’.16 The problems associated with providing a translation of this 
text, which are mostly due to its instability, will be discussed in section 3 of the introduction. 
In light of these, I offer variant readings as possible solutions to a number of textual issues 
but I do not provide my own version of the text or a translation. My commentary is based 
on Moreschini’s 1991 edition, and my suggestions of textual variants are listed in Appendix 
A. Furthermore, Londey and Johanson ‘avoid translating the technical terms into the 
conventional and familiar ones of traditional syllogistic logic ... because it would be too easy 
to impose a particular, and possibly mistaken, interpretation’.17 Their approach in this 
matter has led them towards some errors in their assessment of the terminology which are 
indicated in their glossary; for example, they identify some terms as being entirely 
synonymous when it is clear from the context that a distinction is intended. Such cases are 
discussed throughout my commentary, and the definitions of various technical terms are 
collected in my glossary in Appendix B. The most valuable parts of their work are found in 
Appendices B and C, where they discuss the origins of the Square of Opposition diagram18 
and the way in which the author, whom they consider to be Apuleius, presents the moods 
of the Stoics.19 It is their comparison to Alexander of Aphrodisias’ treatment of Stoic 
arguments which led me to investigate the similarities between his commentaries and the 
Latin Peri Hermeneias further. Their own analysis of the background against which the 
author was writing would have benefitted if they had taken this comparison further; 
instead, they ‘review, rather briefly and from an elementary standpoint, the three major 
strands discernible in the history of formal logic before Apuleius’ time’ -20 the Peripatetic, 
the later Peripatetic and the Stoic strands – and choose to ‘pay much more attention to 
Aristotle’s logic than to the other two strands’.21 Whereas Sullivan considers the text based 
                                                          
15 Londey and Johanson, 1987: 6. 
16 Londey and Johanson, 1987: 6-7. 
17 Londey and Johanson, 1987: 7. 
18 Londey and Johanson, 1987: 108-112. 
19 Londey and Johanson, 1987: 113-118. 
20 Londey and Johanson, 1987: 20. 
21 Londey and Johanson, 1987: 20. 
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on its contribution to logic after it was written and Londey and Johanson discuss 
developments in logic which occurred before the time of Apuleius, my aim is to situate the 
text, based on its content, within a milieu which also contained Alexander of Aphrodisias. 
The vagueness of the term ‘milieu’ is appropriate for this context due to the lack of 
complete certainty over the date of the Latin Peri Hermeneias; I use it to refer strictly to 
what is shared in terms of intellectual content between the two texts and do not intend for 
it to carry any implications of a shared geographical location or time period. 
The overall aim of this thesis is to build upon what was carried out by these four main works. 
The principal way in which my thesis differs and improves upon all of these works is that I 
take into account the greater textual evidence which has become available since they were 
published. Baldassarri’s work is the only other commentary on this text but is more 
thematic and synoptic in its content than my own. The methodology of line-by-line analysis 
of the text which this thesis adopts is the main factor that has allowed the significant textual 
issues to be brought to light. By highlighting the features the Peri Hermeneias shares with 
Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on the Prior Analytics 1-7, I present a new method 
of elucidating the author’s treatise which is frequently clouded by the very dense mode of 
expression; such similarities have been alluded to in passing and taken for granted by those 
working on ancient logic as a whole but have not been taken into account to this extent by 
those dealing with the Latin Peri Hermeneias.  
The following section presents a brief overview of the intellectual background of the text; 
its title, content, and structure and a description of the position it is usually considered to 
occupy in the history of logic. The rest of this introduction is not comprehensive but aims 
to deal with a number of major issues concerning the work for which satisfactory 
conclusions have not been reached in previous scholarship. The introduction is framed by 
the two topics which tend to attract the most attention for the Peri Hermeneias. It is 
important to begin with a discussion on the textual tradition of the text as it has previously 
been underestimated, or even overlooked, as a factor which affects our understanding of 
its content. Although a new text is not offered to accompany this commentary, a number 
of divergences from the most recent edition by Moreschini22 are suggested. This is the first 
contentious topic to be discussed because this aspect of the work is fundamental to the 
                                                          
22 1990. 
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way in which each of the other topics throughout the introduction, and in the commentary, 
are considered and treated.  
The authenticity of the text is another topic which does not have a coherent account in 
modern scholarship. The conclusion that this text is not by Apuleius is tentatively reached 
in introduction section 7. It is for this reason that any account of Apuleius’ intellectual 
character and how this text fits in with his overall philosophical output is omitted.23 This 
conclusion is based on the factors discussed in the intermediate sections of introduction (4, 
5, 6), which have lacked a full treatment in previous scholarship. 
Throughout this thesis I use the chapter division for the text (1-14) which was put in place 
by Thomas in his 1908 edition but the page and line references refer to Moreschini’s 1991 
edition; this is the case for references to the Peri Hermeneias but also for the De Platone et 
eius dogmate and the De deo Socratis where reference is made to these texts. Dictionary 
information is predominantly gathered from Lewis and Short rather than from the Oxford 
Latin Dictionary since much of the unusual terminology from this text, which may be seen 
to be symptomatic of its date, is not included in the latter.  
The theme of each of the sections discussed in this introduction reflects the common 
strands which are present throughout the commentary. This particular collection of themes 
has not been discussed as part of one, single work before. The didactic purpose of the text 
has not, to my knowledge, been discussed at all and a comprehensive account of the logical 
terminology used within the text is absent from previous scholarship. The set of topics 
presented in this introduction, which draw on the evidence presented in the commentary, 
serves to provide a more coherent view of this work as a whole, its purpose, and its 
character. The problematic state of the text makes it necessary to seek guidance from a 
comparable text dealing with the same topic (3). The use of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ 
commentary on Prior Analytics 1-7 for this purpose highlights a number of other similarities 
between these works (4). One such similarity is their use of terminology, which leads into a 
discussion about the use of language throughout the Peri Hermeneias more generally (5). 
The language of the text highlights its didactic purpose which, in turn, serves to explain a 
number of the features of the author’s method of exposition (6). Each of these factors is 
then considered in terms of how they contribute to the debate surrounding the authenticity 
of the text (7). Although these topics as they are presented in this introduction are 
                                                          
23 Such accounts may be found in Moreschini, 2015: 15-27; Harrison, 2000; Dillon, 1977: 306-338; 
Sandy, 1997; the most comprehensive account is found in Hijmans, 1987: 395-475. 
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intrinsically linked and reflect the commentary of the text which follows they have tended 
to be treated in isolation from each other in the past, if at all. As such, a literature review is 
given for the scholarship to date on each section where this is available. 
This thesis claims to make advances in our understanding of the logical content of the Peri 
Hermeneias only insofar as it provides clarification and correction to the presentations of 
this aspect of the work found in the aforementioned studies; the elementary level of the 
logical content of the Peri Hermeneias means that this material is likely to be familiar to 
experts in logic. It is hoped, however, that the analysis of the textual issues and the Latin 
language used within the text will present the material in a more coherent way than 
previously and that this analysis will be of use to those interested in the development of 
Latin technical terminology in philosophical texts. In addition to this, the other aim of this 
thesis is to make the text more accessible to those who are aware of it in relation to 
Apuleian studies by providing an introduction to its logical content. 
  
16 
 
2) The text and its background 
 
i) The title of the work  
 
This work is always ascribed to Apuleius in the manuscripts and is always referred to by the 
Greek title, Peri Hermeneias.24 It shares this name with the text belonging to Aristotle’s 
organon of the same title, but which is more commonly referred to by the Latin equivalent, 
De interpretatione. Just as Aristotle’s work of the same name is customarily divided into 14 
chapters,25 modern editors of the Peri Hermeneias ascribed to Apuleius split this work into 
the same number of sections. The first five chapters of this text deal with the same topics 
as those which arise in chapters 1-7 of Aristotle’s De interpretatione – nouns and verbs are 
shown to form the simplest type of propositions, these vary in terms of quantity and quality, 
and are either true or false – but this is where the similarities between the two works end. 
The rest of the Latin Peri Hermeneias sets out the Aristotelian theory of syllogisms, 
conversion and proof per impossibile. In terms content, therefore, the work bears more 
resemblance to Aristotle’s Prior Analytics than to the De interpretatione.  
Lumpe points out that the Peri Hermeneias is not alone in having a Greek title even though 
its content is written in Latin; Boethius also uses the Greek rather than the Latin title for his 
commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione.26 The reason behind Boethius’ title is far 
clearer than it is for the text with which this study is concerned; Boethius’ work is a 
commentary on that particular Greek work whereas the title of our text represents only a 
small part of its content and it is not a translation or a commentary on the other work with 
the same title. Lumpe also, however, points out that it is not unusual for ancient texts to be 
assigned a title which represents only the first part of the work and mentions Xenephon’s 
Anabasis as a comparable example.27 It is likely that title for our text was originally assigned 
based on a review of the contents of the first few chapters, which would make it seem that 
the Peri Hermeneias was the most appropriate option. This is the way in which the work is 
referred to throughout antiquity28 and in modern scholarship.29 
                                                          
24 With very slight variation. See Moreschini’s apparatus criticus (1991: 189).   
25 Seel, 2001: 133 notes that this division ‘can probably be traced back to Julius Pacius’ 1584 edition 
of the Organon’.  
26 Lumpe, 1982: 20. 
27 Lumpe, 1982: 20. 
28 For example, Cassiodorus, Inst.2.3.12; Isidore of Seville, Etym.2.28.22. 
29 See, however, Moreschini, 2015, who refers to the work by the Latin title, De interpretatione. 
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ii) Contents and structure 
 
As mentioned above, the first five chapters of the Peri Hermeneias handbook present 
material which ultimately derives from Aristotle’s De intepretatione 1-7. In Chapter 130 the 
author explains that the topic of the work is ‘ars disserendi’31 and mentions 17 different 
types of speech act before presenting the proposition (propositio) as the focus of his 
handbook. Chapter 232 presents the two types of proposition; categorical, which is the focus 
of this work, and hypothetical. In Chapter 3,33 the author presents the differences which a 
proposition may have in terms of its quantity and quality. The differences in quality are 
universal (omnis), particular (quidam), and indefinite (no quantifier); the last of these is not 
referred to again throughout the work because they can be treated as the same as 
particular. The quality of a proposition may be either affirmative or negative. After giving 
examples of these types of propositions the author explains and criticises the Stoic view 
that a proposition can only be truly negative if the negating particle prefixes the entire 
proposition rather than just one term within it. In Chapter 434 the author explains that the 
subject part of a proposition is always expressed by a noun and the predicate part by a verb. 
He uses ‘Apuleius disserit’ as an example of this and presents ‘philosophum Platonicum 
Madaurensem’ as an alternative way of representing ‘Apuleius’ and ‘uti oratione’ as an 
alternative to the verb because both the subject and predicate parts can be formed by more 
than one word. The author then says that the predicate part is always larger than the 
subject and this is one way to tell them apart regardless of the order in which they appear 
in a proposition. At the end of the chapter, he also mentions indefinite terms such as non 
homo and non animal as those which indicate that the subject is ‘something other than 
this’. 
After showing that there are four different types of propositions – universal affirmative, 
universal negative, particular affirmative, and particular negative – the author explains how 
each of these relate to each other in Chapter 5.35 He describes the formation of a square 
diagram to demonstrate which propositions can be simultaneously true, which cannot, and 
which propositions, when true, make their alternate in both quality and quantity false and 
                                                          
30 189.1-190.8. 
31 189.4. 
32 190.9-16. 
33 190.17-191.15. 
34 191.16-193.13. 
35 193.14-196.14. 
18 
 
vice versa. Based on the attribution to Apuleius, the diagram described here is considered 
to be the earliest extant example of the Square of Opposition.36  
After explaining the relation between each of the types of propositions, the author is able 
to describe the process of conversion in Chapter 6.37 He explains that universal negative 
and particular affirmative propositions are convertible because the truth value of these 
remains the same even if their subject and predicate parts are switched. This is not the case 
for the universal affirmative or the particular negative. However, conversion which retains 
the truth value of these propositions is possible if the predicate term has equal scope to the 
subject, that is to say, if it is a definition (definitio) or a property (proprium). If the scope of 
the predicate is either a genus (genus), a difference (differentia), or an accident (accidens), 
it is not equal to the subject and so conversion is not possible. In this chapter the author 
also mentions another type of conversion whereby the terms within a proposition are 
changed from definite (e.g., homo) to indefinite (e.g., non homo) and vice versa. 
In Chapter 738 the author introduces the concept of the middle term (communis particula) 
in order to describe how pairs of premises form different syllogistic combinations from 
which a conclusion is inferred. Based on the position of this middle term in the combination, 
there come to be three figures; the first gives conclusions of all kinds because the middle 
term is the predicate in one premise and the subject in the other. The second has universal 
conclusions but they are only ever negative because the middle term is always the 
predicate. The third can only give particular conclusions because the middle term is always 
the subject. He explains that a conclusion is inferred from the combination directly 
(directim) when the subject and the predicate terms are in the same position in the 
premises and the conclusion and that it is inferred conversely (reflexim) when they switch 
positions in the conclusion. This chapter also contains a quotation from Aristotle’s Prior 
Analytics39 which sets out the definition of a syllogism. Although the Peri Hermeneias is a 
handbook to Aristotelian syllogistic which summarises and paraphrases the theories 
presented by Aristotle rather than engaging with the text directly, his treatment of this 
quotation is remarkably similar to the sort found in commentaries on Aristotle.40 
                                                          
36 Londey and Johanson, 1987: 111, cf. Lumpe, 2982: 35-36. For an image of the diagram as it 
appears in the oldest manuscript of the text see Radiciotti, 2008: 123. 
37 196.15-198.17. 
38 198.18-202.15. 
39 24b18-20. 
40 See commentary notes on 200.9-12; 200.13-16; 201.2-4; 202.1-3. 
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Chapter 8,41 which is the shortest of the text, gives the number of valid moods in each of 
the three syllogistic figures; nine in the first, four in the second, and six in the third. Moods 
(modi) are paradigms for types of syllogisms; each has a pair, or combination, of premises 
(coniugatio) which leads to a conclusion, the quality and quantity of which depends on 
those of the two premises. The author also gives the number of combinations in each figure; 
six in the first, three in the second, and five in the third. There are more moods in each 
figure than combinations because some combinations can give more than one conclusion. 
Chapters 9 – 1142 are concerned with setting out the valid moods in each of the three figures 
in turn before proof per impossibile is explained with an example in Chapter 12.43 In Chapter 
13,44 the author gives some historical background information on the way in which 
syllogisms have previously been presented by the Peripatetics and the Stoics as well as 
differing views about the number of valid moods in each figure. 
Finally, in Chapter 1445 the author systematically explains why the remaining combinations, 
which were not discussed in the previous chapters, are not valid in any of the three figures. 
He conclusively states at the end of the work that out of the 48 possible combinations of 
the four types of premise only 14 are valid. The author’s decision to present the valid 
combinations all together and then to group the invalid ones is in contrast to Aristotle’s 
method of systematically listing every possible combination. This structure most likely 
reflects the purpose of the work, which is to deliver guidance in ars disserendi; only the 
valid combinations are useful for this purpose.46 The reason for the invalidity of the 
remaining combinations is no doubt clearer when they are presented collectively. 
 
iii) The place of the work in the history of philosophy  
 
The Peri Hermeneias is frequently presented as the earliest extant logical handbook of its 
kind in Latin; in some cases, the work is also the sole testimonium to certain views held by 
philosophical figures.47 The ascription of the work to Apuleius, which the majority of 
                                                          
41 202.16-203.10. 
42 203.11-209.1. 
43 209.1-212.3. 
44 212.4-213.10. 
45 213.11-215.12. 
46 See Sullivan, 1967: 19. 
47 See commentary notes on 209.11-14 and 213.5-9. 
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scholars dealing with the text accept, means that the work has thus far been tied to a date 
within Apuleius’ lifetime. As such, it is usually considered to occupy the same place in the 
history of logic as the other handbooks belonging to the second century A.D.,48 such as 
those of Galen49 and Alcinous.50 Although the sixth chapter of Alcinous’ handbook does 
discuss the syllogistic figures and ascribes them to Plato, this text is more similar in scope, 
overall content, and style to the De Platone than it is to the Peri Hermeneias. Furthermore, 
as Dillon notes, Alcinous ‘confines himself to the Theophrastean formulations, adopting 
nothing distinctly Stoic in his account of syllogistic’.51 Londey and Johanson see the mention 
of Apuleius’ varied education and ability for versatility in Florida 20 as enough evidence to 
accept that the Peri Hermeneias was a product of the intellectually charged Second 
Sophistic period to which Apuleius belonged.52 Chapter 6 of Sullivan’s study aims to 
describe the significant role the Peri Hermeneias played in later antiquity from Martianus 
Capella onwards in establishing a Latin logical tradition.53 Figures such as Cassiodorus and 
Isidore of Seville did not doubt that the work was authentically Apuleian as they refer both 
to the work and the author by name;54 and so this provides us with a firm terminus ante 
quem for the work. 
The discussions about the place of the Peri Hermeneias in the history of logic have been 
discussed in previous scholarship without a great deal of variation or disagreement. The 
rest of this introduction and the commentary which follows aim to discuss the following 
questions about the text which have been dealt with less satisfactorily in order to place the 
text with more certainty:  
What types of sources were used to compose the text? 
What sort of audience was it aimed at? 
Was Apuleius the author? 
The last of these three questions is the most widely asked but is the most inconclusive. In 
order to answer these questions, comments must first be made on the state of the text as 
it is presented in the modern editions. The previous comparisons with texts from the second 
                                                          
48 Kneale and Kneale, 1962: 181-182. 
49 Kieffer, 1964. 
50 Dillon, 1993. 
51 Dillon, 1977: 104. 
52 Londey and Johanson, 1987: 9-11; 14-15. 
53 Sullivan, 1967: 170-208. 
54 See n.28.  
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century A.D. and with Latin texts from Late Antiquity have not significantly help us to 
understand the dense and often syncopated content of the Peri Hermeneias. As will be 
discussed in introduction section 4, it is unclear where the Peri Hermeneias stands 
chronologically in relation to Alexander of Aphrodisias’ in Analytica Priora and, of course, 
these two texts represent two distinct kinds of philosophical texts – a handbook and a 
commentary – but the fact that they share a number of similarities and frequently use the 
same stock examples allows us to see that the setting in which the Peri Hermeneias belongs 
is different to the second-century A.D. texts mentioned above and that, therefore, its 
position in the history of philosophy requires re-examination. Another aspect of the text 
which is important in helping to respond to this question is the Latin terminology which is 
used to present the logical content; this aspect of the text has lacked a full treatment in 
previous scholarship, accordingly, it is dealt with in detail in section 5, prior to the final two 
questions which are dealt with in sections 6 and 7.  
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3)  The textual tradition of the Peri Hermeneias 
 
This section gives an overview of the studies which have been carried out on the textual 
tradition of the Peri Hermeneias and of the way in which scholarship has approached the 
text in light of its current state. The aim of this section is to highlight the fact that scholars 
commenting on the Peri Hermeneias in the past have had to rely on a text which, as it is 
presented, is at times opaque and which lacks the guidance of a comprehensive apparatus 
criticus. In a number of cases, this has led to significant misunderstanding of the author’s 
meaning. In this section, I discuss some passages which demonstrate this and, in doing so, 
justify my methodology for selecting different readings to Moreschini and, in some cases, 
suggesting plausible conjectures to certain passages. 
It would appear that the Peri Hermeneias does not receive the attention it requires when it 
is edited as part of a collection of Apuleius’ philosophical works and is written off as an 
anomaly, owing to its separate textual tradition, and not given full treatment. Reynolds, for 
example, discusses the manuscripts of the opera philosophica of Apuleius but points out 
that ‘the spurious Περὶ ἑρμενείας has its own tradition’ and omits this separate tradition 
from his discussion.55 Similarly, Thomas, in his Étude sur la tradition manuscrite des oeuvres 
philosophiques d'Apulée,56 discusses Goldbacher's use and description of the manuscripts 
containing Apuleius' philosophical works but omits any discussion about the tradition of the 
Peri Hermeneias. 
Moreschini’s 1991 Teubner edition of the collected philosophical works of Apuleius is the 
most recent, after that of Thomas published in 1908, which contains the Peri Hermeneias 
ascribed to Apuleius. The major modern works which deal with this text as their main 
focus57 predate Moreschini’s edition and therefore, use Thomas’ text. However, scholars 
whose work has been published since Moreschini’s edition and who therefore had access 
to his text are not dealing with a significantly different version to that used by earlier 
scholars; Moreschini’s text, unfortunately, does not make much progress beyond that of 
Thomas. He includes a number of additional manuscripts not found in Thomas but he also 
omits some which Thomas included. In an article58 which came out prior to his edition he 
                                                          
55 Reynolds, 1983: 16. 
56 1907. 
57 Sullivan (1967), Lumpe (1982), Baldassarri (1986), Londey and Johanson (1987). 
58 1990, 61-73. 
23 
 
claims that the manuscripts containing the text can be split into an earlier family and a later 
one. He emphasises the importance of using the readings contained in the earlier family as 
far as possible and only taking into account the later group when the earlier one is clearly 
unsustainable; the apparatus criticus of his subsequent edition reveals that this is not his 
method in practice.59 He also says, however, that the second family presents a text which 
is more correct, one which is ‘closer to the truth’, and is more ‘normal’ and easier to read.60 
He repeats this assertion in the introduction to his edition61 and it seems that this is the 
view which guided his editing of the text as it appears to be largely based on readings from 
what he considers to be a second, later tradition. In this respect, his edition does not differ 
in any significant way from those of Goldbacher and Thomas; any changes are minor and 
do not alter the sense of the text in a significant way. At any rate, the problems associated 
with assuming distinct families of manuscripts based on their dating, as Moreschini has 
done, have been highlighted by Reeve, who says that ‘he starts from Goldbacher’s potior 
and deterior families of 1876 and continues in the same vein by adding a third family that 
‘mediam … viam inter duas illas … tenet’’. He also describes Moreschini, in light of the select 
number of manuscripts he has consulted, as ‘uninformative about the extent of the 
tradition.’62 
Winterbottom points out the same issue with Moreschini’s method in his review of the 
edition in which he notes that ‘he has drawn on L. Minio-Paluello’s Index63 but not, it would 
seem, on Munk Olsen’s L’Étude des auteurs classiques latins,64 a glance at which shows six 
further manuscripts from the period up to 1200’.65 Even more recently, Klibansky and 
Regen’s census of the manuscripts containing the Peri Hermeneias66 ‘makes an advance in 
completeness and accuracy over Munk Olsen’,67 since they count a total of 35. The text as 
it currently stands, then, is not fit for purpose; when Barnes mentions that Chapter 13 of 
our text is the only surviving witness to the indeterminate moods which Aristo counts 
alongside the four indemonstrables,68 he describes the text as ‘wretchedly corrupt’.69 As a 
                                                          
59 1990: 66. 
60 1990: 65. 
61 1991: x. 
62 Reeve, 2000: 201. 
63 1961. 
64 1982. 
65 Winterbottom, 1993: 431. 
66 Klibansky and Regen, 1993: 139-155. 
67 Victor, 1996: 435. 
68 See commentary note 213.5-9 
69 Barnes, 2012: 693. For a similar comment, see Bocheński, 1951: 104 n.1. 
24 
 
result of this unfortunate state of the text, scholars dealing with it have often perceived 
problems with its logical content or have concluded that the author himself is mistaken or 
confused when coherence can be achieved simply by suggesting a variant reading. One 
notable example occurs in Chapter 12 where Sullivan70 has misinterpreted the rules the 
author sets out for the ranking of moods71 and another in Chapter 14 where Londey and 
Johanson find confusion in the text due to the choice of the readings put in the text by 
Thomas.72 
I have been able to consult seven of the 35 manuscripts named by Klibansky and Regen 
which are digitised.73 No attempt has been made to suggest any relation between any of 
these manuscripts in the way that Moreschini and others have done because I do not 
believe that such a task could be effected in any useful way without, first of all, dismissing 
the preconception of the existence of an earlier and a later family, and then, consulting all 
of the known manuscripts containing the text. The readings of these seven digitised 
manuscripts are included in the relevant lemmata of the commentary. The variant readings 
I have suggested otherwise are based on conjecture, having established that, due to the 
striking and numerous similarities both of content and of language between this text and 
Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, this text more often 
than not lends plausibility to certain readings over others where the meaning of the text is 
doubtful.  
A comparison between Moreschini’s apparatus criticus and the seven manuscripts available 
digitally makes it clear that, in a number of cases, readings not used by Moreschini present 
a text which is similar, in terms of both terminology and context, to works belonging to the 
Aristotelian commentary tradition and to works from Aristotle’s own Organon. In his article, 
Moreschini repeats Goldbacher’s view that, although there are numerous manuscripts 
containing the Peri Hermeneias, they are endlessly corrupted by arbitrary conjectures due 
                                                          
70 Sullivan, 1967: 124-126. 
71 See commentary notes 209.5-6, 6-7. 
72 See commentary note 214.13-16. 
73 Bamberg (B); Corpus Christi Cambridge 206 (C); Paris 6288 (F), Paris 6638 (A), 7730 (D); St Gallen 
64 (S); Valenciennes 406 (W). See Klibansky and Regen, 1996: 139-155 for descriptions of these and 
the other manuscripts containing the text. The sigla correspond to those given by Klibansky and 
Regen according to those used by the editors. Of these seven Moreschini has consulted only DWS. 
However, his apparatus criticus is not reliable in every case; for example, the digitised version of D 
shows the reading cui rather than an (197.9) but this reading is not recorded in his apparatus criticus. 
A similar situation occurs at 213.5; the reading viiii & xx, ‘29’, is recorded in W as the total number 
of valid syllogisms if an indefinite mood is added for every particular but is omitted by Moreschini. 
See commentary note on 213.2-5. 
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to the fact that the work was read and interpreted with such frequency in the Medieval 
period.74 This is surely strong grounds for relying as much as possible on the earliest 
manuscripts. However, as mentioned above, this does not appear to be Moreschini’s modus 
operandi. Moreschini singles out M as being the most interesting owing to its unusually 
early date but he is more interested in this manuscript for what it tells us about the history 
of the Peri Hermeneias than what it tells us about the text since it was written, according 
to him, ‘in modo particolarmente scorretto’.75 
Three notable examples which collectively provide strong grounds for accepting readings 
other than those followed by Moreschini and Thomas are as follows. 
In Chapter 6 the author introduces five variable types, or predicables, as a way of testing 
the convertibility of the four different types of premises. The text in Moreschini’s edition 
says: nec universe verae sunt istae, sed quinque solae,76 which Londey and Johanson 
translate as: ‘It is not the case that such expressions are suitable in general – but there are 
only five kinds [of such expressions]’.77 This rather opaque phrase has not been considered 
to warrant comment in any of the main works but the apparatus criticus to Moreschini’s 
edition suggests that the phrase caused some confusion to copyists; there are a total of ten 
variants. The reading, unum verae not only makes good grammatical sense but also has 
support from external sources. Specifically, it can be supported by Aristotle’s use of μίαν 
when discussing the role of the four predicables in a comparable context.78 The possibility 
of our author having direct access to this work becomes irrelevant in light of Alexander of 
Aphrodisias’ discussion of the same topic in his commentary on this work in which he argues 
against the view, presumably held by others, that the predicables can be treated by ‘one 
single method’ (μίαν).79 
A similar problem with the text arises in Chapter 7 and is similarly solved with the help of 
Alexander of Aphrodisias. This passage concerns the order and ranking of the three 
syllogistic figures and the reason behind this order. There are eight different readings for 
non numeri ratione80 as Moreschini’s edition has it; the five oldest manuscripts are entirely 
                                                          
74 Moreschini, 1990: 63. 
75 Moreschini, 1990: 64. The contents and palaeography of this manuscript have been discussed in 
detail by Radiciotti, 2008. See also Kristeller, 1992: 193 col. b. 
76 197.9-10. 
77 Londey and Johanson, 1987: 91. 
78 Top.1.6.102b37-38. 
79 in Top.55,23-26. For a fuller discussion of this see note on 197.9-10 in the commentary. 
80 199.4. 
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varied in their readings, as is often the case, which no doubt accounts for Moreschini’s 
predominant use of, what he considers to be, the later family. However, Alexander of 
Aphrodisias’ more comprehensive treatment of the same topic provides much needed 
guidance. In his own discussion about the ranking of the figures, he repeatedly makes note 
of the number of moods which each contains.81 This, along with the references made by 
our author to the number of moods within each figure later in the work,82 and the fact that 
the author counts more moods in the first figure than in either the second or third,83 makes 
a strong case for the reading ‘non tantum enumeratione’ which the editor Colvius has 
followed.84 This reading conveys the idea that the order is not only due to a counting up of 
the moods which places the first figure first but also due to the worth of the conclusions 
which the moods in this figure produce.85  
The final example arises at the end of Chapter 9; the author has just enumerated and 
described the nine moods in the first figure and is clarifying what he means by saying that 
the first four of these are ‘indemonstrable’ (indemonstrabiles).86 It is hard to see what 
exactly the intended distinction between ‘may not be demonstrated’ (non demonstrentur) 
and ‘not able to be demonstrated’ (demonstrari nequeant) is meant to be in the way that 
is implied by Moreschini’s text. Londey and Johanson translate this as follows:  
‘The first four are called indemonstrables, not because they cannot be proved, like 
the evaluation of the whole sea, or because they may not be proved, like the 
squaring of a circle, but because they are so simple and evident that they do not 
need proof’.87 
When the analogy of the squaring of the circle used here is considered in light of a passage 
from Aristotle’s Categories concerning the objects of knowledge, and the various ancient 
commentaries on this work which follow, the correct reading becomes clear. All of the 
modern editors have printed non here when manuscripts in Moreschini’s apparatus criticus 
are unanimous in having nondum. This clearly links the passage to the tradition of discussing 
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85 See commentary note on 199.4. 
86 206.1-4. 
87 Londey and Johanson, 1987: 99. 
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the squaring of the circle in antiquity as something which is not yet known, where οὐδέπω 
is used in Greek.88 
These three examples provide strong grounds for relying on the earliest manuscripts and 
for seeking comparable passages in works such as those by Alexander of Aphrodisias as a 
means of weighing up the plausibility of a reading in a given context. These are the bases, 
therefore, upon which my own methodology for choosing readings is formed. In a recent 
chapter, Thomsen-Thörnqvist has discussed the principles of editing Latin logical texts 
belonging to the Medieval period and the way in which these are likely to differ from the 
methodologies applied to editing texts of any other genre due to the specific characteristics 
of these technical texts.89 Her discussion is centered around the process of editing Boethius’ 
De syllogismo categorico90 and Introductio ad syllogismos categoricos91 as it will be applied 
to the Anonymous Aurelianensis III in Aristotelis Analytica priora. She also claims that De 
syllogismo categorico has a very high number of errors due to its stylistic uniformity, and 
that in spite of this, such errors would be easily corrected ‘due to the limited variation in 
exemplary terms used, modelled on Aristotle’s Greek examples, the sterile language, and 
the schematic structure of the syllogism and its premises’.92 She explains this in relation to 
a scribe’s ability to make such emendations.93 The same factors are present in our own text, 
and although conducted at a number of levels removed from scribal transmission, I have 
been able to apply the same principles for suggested corrections. 
My own suggested variants are discussed in the relevant lemmata throughout the 
commentary as well as listed in Appendix A. This thesis was begun with the aim to provide 
a commentary on the text, and the need for a renewed analysis of the manuscripts did not 
come to light until an advanced stage. It is for this reason that the variant readings I suggest 
come from only seven manuscripts and the conjectures I propose are provided on the basis 
which Reeve describes as characteristic of commentaries, as opposed to editions, ‘in the 
light not of collation but of reflection’.94 In light of the usability of Moreschini’s edition and 
the number of manuscripts which neither I nor anyone else has taken into account when 
dealing with this text, the divergences from Moreschini I have suggested are based on 
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exactly this, reflection rather than collation; they are suggested here with the 
understanding that more extensive evidence from the manuscripts will either prove them 
correct or reveal the need for a different interpretation. It is clear from the above, however, 
and from the number of variants and conjectures I suggest which present a more coherent 
text, that a new edition of the Peri Hermeneias, which takes into account all of the known 
manuscripts as they are listed in Klibansky and Regen in a way which Moreschini has not is 
much to be desired. 
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4) The Peri Hermeneias and Alexander of Aphrodisias 
 
As demonstrated by way of a number of examples in the previous section, Alexander of 
Aphrodisias’ commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics 1-7 has proved to be a useful source 
in deciphering and unpacking the more opaque parts of this text. In this section, I aim to 
justify my use of Alexander for explaining points in my own commentary further by 
highlighting a number of other similarities, as well as some differences, of other sorts 
between these two texts. My aim is also to make it clear that these similarities should not 
lead to the assumption that one author was making direct use of the other author’s text, 
but rather, that both belonged to the same well-established and formulaic tradition. 
Alexander’s logical texts have received more, and more thorough, attention95 than the Peri 
Hermeneias, no doubt due in part to their established authorship. The close analysis of 
Aristotle’s texts found in his commentaries is considered to be exemplary.96 This makes 
them an invaluable tool for shedding light on Aristotle’s originals and they have been used 
to this end by both ancient and modern scholars. Lee’s treatment compares the in Analytica 
Priora to the commentaries of Ammonius and Philoponus, whose own works were no doubt 
influenced by those of Alexander. One of the criticisms Maconi97 makes against this study, 
which is otherwise laudably rigorous, is the lack of justification for Lee’s choice of texts; he 
points out, in this regard, that Ammonius and Philoponus are separated from Alexander by 
approximately three centuries and, therefore, Lee represents two distinct phases in the 
history of logic.98 He also mentions the unexplained omission of a number of texts which 
are chronologically closer to Alexander, one of which is the Latin Peri Hermeneias.99 The 
only author with whom a detailed comparison of the Peri Hermeneias has been carried out, 
to my knowledge, is Boethius. Sullivan’s study contains a detailed comparison between the 
Peri Hermeneias and Boethius’ texts concerning the categorical syllogism100 and Thomsen-
                                                          
95 Most notable is the English translation with commentary notes on in An.Pr. by Barnes et al.: 1991, 
to which I refer very frequently throughout my own commentary. Similarly, Van Ophuijsen: 2001 on 
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97 Maconi, 1985. 
98 Maconi, 1985: 93. 
99 loc. cit. He also mentions Galen’s Institutio Logica and suggests that Boethius would also have been 
a useful point of comparison. 
100 De syllogismo categorico and Introductio ad syllogismos categoricos. See Sullivan, 1967: 209-227. 
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Thörnqvist critiques this comparison in her discussion about the Greek commentary 
tradition more generally in the introduction to her editions of these texts.101 Whereas the 
use of Alexander by Ammonius and Ammonius by Philoponus is known and acknowledged 
in Lee’s study, Sullivan conducts his comparison in order to argue for Boethius’ direct use 
of the Peri Hermeneias. 
This section of my introduction, which goes some way towards filling the gap identified by 
Maconi in Lee’s work, aims to highlight the similarities in content between the Peri 
Hermeneias and Alexander’s commentary on the Prior Analytics.102 This study differs from 
those of both Lee and Sullivan in that Alexander’s use of the Peri Hermeneias, or our 
author’s use of Alexander’s commentary, is not known in the way that the interrelation of 
the texts in Lee’s study is known, nor is it my intention to demonstrate the direct use of one 
work in the composition of the other as is the purpose of Sullivan’s argument. The potential 
chronological proximity of these two texts means that they provide a valuable point of 
comparison in pinpointing a particular stage in the development of Peripatetic logic of 
which Alexander’s commentaries can be considered to be representative. This comparison, 
therefore, serves as a new method of testing the likelihood of the hypothesis that the Peri 
Hermeneias did, in fact, belong to the second century A.D. and, therefore, to Apuleius. 
In the context of considering the influences on the Peri Hermeneias Sullivan treats the text 
in relation to Aristotle’s Organon as a whole and is particularly preoccupied with comparing 
the text to Aristotle’s work of the same name, the De interpretatione; he says that it is like 
this treatise ‘in that the first five chapters of Apuleius’ work deal with the nature of 
propositions and of their oppositions’ but that ‘very little of what is found in the rest of 
Aristotle’s On interpretation (Chapters 8-14) has any direct counterpart in Apuleius’ logic 
book’.103 Londey and Johanson’s approach to the sources for this work is similar but more 
vague; they refer only to the ‘background against which the Peri Hermeneias was written’ 
as one which included ‘the Aristotelian, the later Peripatetic, and the Stoic strands’;104 they 
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also Correia, 2011, who similarly disagrees with Sullivan and argues that these works, as well as 
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103 Sullivan, 1967: 144ff. 
104 Londey and Johanson, 1987: 20. 
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discuss the developments made by Theophrastus after Aristotle105 but otherwise do not 
refer to any named individuals or possible texts. At any rate, the general consensus with 
regard to the sources for this text is summed up succinctly by Sandy, who says that it 
demonstrates the use of a patchwork of sources.106  
Sandy is not necessarily incorrect to suppose that a number of texts were used in the 
composition of the Peri Hermeneias but his reference to ‘the patchwork methods of 
composition evident in the Peri Hermeneias’107 is misleading. As will be discussed 
throughout this introduction section,108 the exposition of syllogistic logic is extremely 
formulaic and the same stock examples are often found in a number of texts dealing with 
the same topic.  
Although Sandy states that ‘the framework is Aristotelian, derived principally from his 
Topics’, the following comparison with Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on Aristotle’s 
Prior Analytics shows that it is from this latter work which the Peri Hermeneias is principally 
derived, at the very least in terms of its content. The rest of this introduction section serves 
to show the ways in which it is helpful to consider the author of the Peri Hermeneias as 
belonging to the same milieu as Alexander of Aphrodisias.  
Before going any further, it is important to point out a number of ways in which the Peri 
Hermeneias as a handbook to Aristotelian syllogistic logic differs from in Analytica Priora as 
a commentary to one particular work by Aristotle – Prior Analytics: 
Alexander’s in Analytica Priora and the Peri Hermeneias represent the two distinct kinds of 
literature which characterise logical scholarship from the second-century A.D. onwards; 
these are described by Bocheński as ‘big commentaries, mainly on Aristotle, and 
handbooks’.109 Baltussen describes the development of the philosophical commentary and 
uses Alexander’s many commentaries on Aristotle as examples of this type of text in its 
mature, or ‘full form’.110 A key feature of Alexander’s running commentary is the way in 
which he structures his comments; each section is introduced by roughly three or four lines 
of the original Aristotelian text and is then followed by detailed comments ‘on almost every 
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aspect of the arguments and language’.111 The handbook format of the Peri Hermeneias 
mostly provides a synopsis of a particular point of Aristotle’s syllogistic theory and then an 
example to demonstrate it. There is, however, one passage in the Peri Hermeneias which 
seems to follow the same format as Alexander’s commentary; the author cites Aristotle’s 
definition of a syllogism word-for-word in Latin112 in the same way as Alexander begins a 
new section of his commentary, and then comments on the choice of words used within 
this definition in order to fully analyse its meaning.113 This could indicate that, although our 
author’s work takes the form of a handbook, it is possible that he was making use of 
commentaries, which follow this structure throughout, when composing the Peri 
Hermeneias.  
Running commentaries, like in Analytica Priora, are clearly intended for an audience who is 
familiar with the original text114. This is not expected of the audience of the Peri 
Hermeneias; this handbook contains very little in-depth analysis of the sort which Alexander 
presents in his discussion of Aristotle’s text. Instead, the structure of the Peri Hermeneias 
follows this standard pattern: a given topic in syllogistic logic is named; a general definition 
of the name of the topic is provided; examples of this are given; sometimes, some historical 
background information is given about former treatments of the topic. We can assume, 
then, that this kind of handbook was intended for a more elementary audience than that 
of the commentary prepared for use with the original text.  
In spite of these differences, this introduction section serves to show the way in which the 
more advanced and detailed account of syllogistic theory found in Alexander’s commentary 
on the Prior Analytics helps us to understand the wider context of the theory the author of 
the Peri Hermeneias is putting forward in his handbook. As mentioned previously, the 
formulaic nature of logical texts means that any number of logical texts could be used to 
elucidate the obscure parts of the Peri Hermeneias in the way that I use Alexander’s 
commentary. My reasons for choosing Alexander of Aphrodisias for this purpose is twofold; 
firstly, there are a number of features of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ exposition which are 
considered to be the earliest extant evidence we have of their kind. Similarly, if the Latin 
Peri Hermeneias is of authentic Apuleian authorship115 this would make the Peri Hermeneias 
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the earliest Latin text of this kind. Secondly, Londey and Johanson have already pointed out 
one striking similarity between the author of the Peri Hermeneias and Alexander of 
Aphrodisias without following it up.116  
The most obvious feature of a running commentary as opposed to a standalone handbook 
is that its order of presentation follows that of the original text from start to finish; the 
lemmata with which Alexander’s commentary is structured make it clear that this is the 
case in his work. The order of topics presented in the Peri Hermeneias, however, does not 
deviate greatly from those presented in Alexander’s in Analytica Priora other than a small 
number of differences:  
Page and line 
reference 
Alexander of 
Aphrodisias 
In Analytica Priora 1-
7117 
Chapter, page, 
and line reference 
Peri Hermeneias 
1,3-6,13 The status of logic - an 
instrument or part of 
philosophy? The value 
of logic 
1. 
189.1-190.8 
Logic as a type of 
philosophy, types of 
speech, the term 
propositio 
6,14-9,24 The goal of the Prior 
Analytics 
2. 
190.9-16 
Types of propositions, 
simple, or predicative, 
and compound 
9,25-16,17 Propositions, terms, 
subjects and 
predicates, 
 
3. 
190.17-191.15 
Quantity and Quality 
of propositions 
16,19-21,9 Syllogisms, premises 
and conclusions 
4. 
191.16-193.13 
Nouns and verbs, 
subjects and 
predicates 
21,10-23,14 Non-syllogistic 
arguments 
5. 
193.14-196.14 
 
How the four types of 
propositions affect 
each other 
23,15-24,19 Perfect syllogism 6. 
196.15-198.17 
Conversion, the five 
types of predicables 
24,20-26,24 Kinds of proposition, 
universals, modality 
7. 
198.18-202.15 
Syllogistic 
combinations, 
Aristotle’s definition of 
the syllogism, criticism 
of Stoic non-differently 
and duplicating 
arguments, example of 
induction 
                                                          
116 See n.164. 
117 This is a condensed version of the contents page found in Barnes et al., 1991, 37-39. 
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26,25-28,30 Quality and quantity 8. 
202.16-203.10 
Number of 
combinations and 
moods within each of 
the three figures, 
position of the 
common term 
29,1-41,29 Conversions 9. 
203.11-206.6 
First figure moods 
41,30-70,21 The first figure 10. 
206.7-207.15 
Second figure moods 
70,24-93,31 The second figure 11. 
207.16-209.1 
Third figure moods 
94,1-108,32 The third figure 12. 
209.1-212.3 
Proof per impossibile 
109,1-112,3 Further reflections – 
syllogisms with non-
standard conclusions 
13. 
212.4-213.10 
Historical points: 
Aristotelian letters, 
Stoic numbers, beliefs 
about the validity of 
subaltern moods 
112,4-119,6 Reduction – all 
syllogisms are reduced 
to the first figure, final 
remarks 
14. 
213.11-215.12 
Invalid combinations in 
each of the three 
figures 
Table 1. 
As seen from the table above, our author begins by referring to the three parts of 
philosophy, of which logic is one,118 which is comparable to the way in which Alexander 
opens his work with a more detailed discussion about logic as an instrument or part of 
philosophy and discusses its use.119 Both authors then include details from Aristotle’s De 
interpretatione which are relevant for laying the groundwork for an exposition on the 
syllogism; the noun and verb distinction which is presented in the De interpretatione is 
referred to before being mapped onto the distinction between subject and predicate terms 
which form the propositions which, in turn, form syllogisms. The formation of a syllogism 
from a combination of premises and a conclusion is then described and discussed based on 
an analysis of Aristotle’s definition of a syllogism. In our text this comes after the chapter 
concerned with conversion but in Alexander’s commentary it precedes the discussion about 
types of conversion. This leads onto the inventory of the combinations and moods in each 
of the three figures. Whereas our author describes each of the valid moods which belong 
to each figure and counts up the invalid moods in the final chapter,120 Alexander 
systematically works through every possible combination and points out for each whether 
                                                          
118 189.1-2. 
119 in An.Pr.1,3-6,13. 
120 For the didactic purpose which this method of presentation serves, see introduction section 6. 
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it is valid or invalid in the same way as Aristotle. Our text ends with a descriptive list of the 
invalid combinations, after explaining proof per impossibile and discussing the ways in 
which Peripatetics and Stoics represent syllogisms. At this point, the author also criticizes 
those who count an additional subaltern mood for every universal.121 Alexander, on the 
other hand, ends with some remarks about syllogisms with non-standard conclusions; it is 
here that he discusses the moods which our author refers to as the eighth and ninth moods 
of the first figure.122 Alexander then explains the possibility of reducing all syllogisms not 
only to the first figure but, more specifically, to the two first moods of this figure. 
As well as a similar set of topics, which appear in a similar, but not identical, order there are 
numerous other features of the content of the text and its delivery which are characteristic 
not only of Alexander but of logical texts more widely. This makes it seem far more likely 
that the author was mainly drawing on these rather than on a number of Aristotle’s originals 
in the way that has previously been supposed.  For example, the list of types of speech at 
the very beginning of the work, although not replicated exactly elsewhere, is a format found 
in a number of other works on the same topic.123 There is also the commonplace analogy 
of parts of speech such as particles and conjunctions to pitch and glue124 and the use of the 
stock example for demonstrating induction in which the conclusion that ‘Every animal 
moves its lower jaw’ is inferred from the premises which say that particular species within 
the genus ‘animal’ move their lower jaw.125 The author’s analysis of Aristotle’s definition of 
a syllogism also follows an established pattern; Sullivan’s main piece of evidence for the 
commonality of the Peri Hermeneias and Boethius’ texts is the comparable way in which 
the two authors analyze and explain Aristotle’s definition of the syllogism.  As explained by 
Thomsen-Thörnqvist, however, this exposition also ‘shows close parallels to the 
corresponding passages in the commentaries of Alexander (16,21-23,13), Ammonius (26.2-
32.22), and Philoponus (30.24-36.13) and, in this respect also, it is evident that Boethius is 
following a conventional model found with the Greek commentators’.126  From this, the fact 
that these two texts are both drawing on a well-established tradition of explaining 
                                                          
121 See commentary note on 213.5-9. 
122 See commentary note on 204.19-205.2. 
123 Boethius Introd. ad. syll. cat.767B lists the Peripatetic five as opposed to the Stoic ten; see 
Thomsen-Thörnqvist, 2008b: 128 n.20.11 who cites Ammonius In de int.2.26-3.6 as a comparable 
example as well as Porphyry In cat. 71.19 and Boethius De syll. cat. 14.11. See also Schenkeveld, 
1984: 299-300 and commentary note on 189.4-8. 
124 For a discussion about the popularity of this example and for other examples of its use see Barnes, 
2007a: 231-235. 
125 See Barnes et al., 1991: 104 n.12. See also commentary note on 202.4-8. 
126 Thomsen-Thörnqvist, 2008a: xxv.  
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Aristotle’s logic in an extremely formulaic manner is clear. In one case, there is a very clear 
example of use of material common to a number of commentaries which we do not find in 
any of Alexander’s extant works: Aristotle’s explanation about knowledge of things which 
exist and of things which do not exist in his Categories is frequently discussed by the Greek 
commentators and by Boethius, who was following Porphyry.127 The numerous other 
features which our text shares with the Greek commentaries provide strong support to a 
particular set of manuscripts with the reading nondum rather than non in the context of 
defining indemonstrabilis.128 This piece of evidence, which has not been considered by 
scholars previously, contributes significantly to the case for the author’s direct use of the 
Greek commentary tradition.  
The features discussed above which the Peri Hermeneias and Alexander’s commentary on 
the Prior Analytics share are also in fact shared with the Greek commentary tradition more 
generally. Therefore, just as Sullivan is mistaken in arguing for Boethius’ direct dependence 
on the Peri Hermeneias, for the same reasons, we cannot argue for a direct link between 
the Peri Hermeneias and Alexander’s commentary on Prior Analytics 1-7 because both texts, 
as well as Boethius’ texts, belong to the same tradition. As Barnes et al. point out, there are 
no points at which Alexander indicates that he is innovating, either in terms of 
terminology,129 or in terms of content130 which suggests that much of what he presented in 
his own study was not new at the time but rather that he was drawing on a well-established 
tradition. This means that it is likely that the same resources would have been available to 
an author composing the Latin Peri Hermeneias in the second century A.D., even if they did 
not have direct access to Aristotle’s Organon. Barnes et al. explain that Alexander’s lecture 
audience ‘was expected to have a text of Aristotle’s Prior Analytics to hand’.131 The way in 
which our author presents his material makes it clear that he did not expect his audience 
to have access to any other texts in the same way as Alexander or any prior knowledge of 
logic or logical terminology.132 In addition, whereas Alexander has designated technical 
terms for the subalterns (ὑπάλληλοι), that is, each particular proposition in relation to the 
universal proposition of the same quality, our author refers to them in a distinctly non-
                                                          
127 Chadwick, 1981: 149. 
128 For a discussion about the textual issues surrounding this passage in our text see introduction 
section 3 and commentary note on 206.3-5. 
129 Barnes et al., 1991: 11 n.72. 
130 Barnes et al., 1991: 12 n.73. 
131 See n. 114. 
132 See Barnes et al., 1991: 10. See also introduction section 6. 
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technical way as simply ‘its particular’ (particularis eius).133 The clarity and economy of 
expression which is evident from the text throughout suggest that he may have deemed it 
unnecessary to establish terminology for subalterns, which he considered to be superfluous 
and unnecessary.134  
It is clear, and it is discussed in more detail in section 6, that this text was intended for 
complete beginners in logic and, furthermore, for a Latin audience. Gellius, who can be 
considered to be roughly contemporary with Apuleius,135 writes one passage in which he 
describes his own foray into logical education and mentions the need to return to Greek 
texts.136 Elsewhere, he sets out Aristotle’s definition of a syllogism and translates it into 
Latin137 but does not offer any further discussion or analysis. In light of these passages, it is 
possible that the Peri Hermeneias was not available to him and, therefore, came after this 
part of his Noctes Atticae.138 
There are a number of linguistic features of the Latin Peri Hermeneias which have a 
particularly close parallel in Alexander’s in Analytica Priora. For example, just as Alexander 
has uses for both δείκνυμι and ἀποδείκνυμι, the first of which means merely ‘to show’ 
whereas the latter has the specific meaning of ‘to demonstrate’, our author uses probo and 
approbo with a similar distinction.139 Also common between the two texts is the practice of 
defining nouns in their works by using the cognate verb in the definition. With regard to 
language more generally, it seems that, in some ways, our author was a more steadfast 
follower of his Greek sources than Boethius; for example, whereas Boethius uses the 
common Latin adjective risibilis to denote ‘laughing’ as a property of man, our author uses 
cachinnabilis, from the verb cachinno, which is etymologically closer to the Greek καχάζω 
than risibilis. 
These similarities provide the grounds for using Alexander’s text to unpack a number of 
points of our text which are overly terse or opaque.140 The formulaic nature of logical texts 
                                                          
133 See commentary note on 194.15-16. 
134 See commentary note on 213.5-9. 
135 For similarities between Gellius and Apuleius, see, for instance, Holford-Strevens, 2003: 22-26; 
Dillon, 1977. For their shared education at Athens see Sandy, 1997: 27-41. 
136 N.A.16.8.4. 
137 N.A.15.32.13. 
138 See Holford-Strevens, 2003: 18, who, based on internal evidence of the Noctes Atticae, concludes 
that ‘publication could hardly have much preceded 170’. 
139 See commentary note on 194.13-15 and Appendix B. 
140 Textual issues which may be solved with the help of Alexander’s commentaries were discussed in 
introduction section 4. Here, I discuss matters of content which do not appear to be contentious in 
the manuscripts. 
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of this kind makes Alexander’s commentary on Prior Analytics 1-7 a suitable point of 
reference for this purpose and, in addition, does not carry the assumption that by doing so, 
we must also subscribe to the view that this particular work was a source for our author, 
but simply an example of what such a source may have been like. From such a comparison 
we can infer that our author was making use of a more comprehensive work since 
Alexander’s commentary provides the level of detail needed to unpack a number of our 
author’s points which are hard to follow without the guidance of a fuller treatment on the 
same topic. Three such examples follow: 
The author of the Peri Hermeneias does not explicitly state that the quantity of a 
proposition141 plays a more important role than its quality142 in the way in which he ranks 
the moods. Alexander, on the other hand, makes the priority of universals clear; knowledge 
about this rule allows us not to be misled by the author’s comments about the ranking of 
moods in the same way as Sullivan.143 
Our author does not refer to terms within a premise as either major or minor.144 
Nevertheless, the criteria according to which each syllogistic figure holds its validity, which 
relies upon either the major or the minor, or both of these, being determined, is clearly at 
play in his syllogistic theory. Alexander explains these criteria,145 which can be summarised 
as follows: 
In the first figure, the major premise146 must be universal and the minor premise 
must be affirmative. 
In the second figure, the major premise must be universal. 
In the third figure, the minor premise must be particular. 
                                                          
141 Universal and particular. 
142 Affirmative and negative. 
143 See commentary note on 209.3-5 for a full discussion on this point. 
144 The closest he comes to this is to say that the subject term is usually smaller (minor) than the 
predicate term which is usually bigger (maior) in Chapter 4 (192.13). This description, however, falls 
within the discussion about the material aspect of subjects and predicates; see commentary note on 
192.13. The comparative terms are never used in this text with the sense of characterising the 
premises containing either the major or minor term as they are traditionally used in formal logic. 
145 in An.Pr.95,14-24. 
146 By which I mean the premise containing the major term and by minor premise I mean the premise 
containing the minor term. See Thomsen-Thörnqvist 2008a: 172 n.51.5 for the post-Aristotelian use 
of the Greek terms ἐλάττων and μείζων to denote the premises containing the major and minor 
terms as well as the terms themselves. 
39 
 
Our author only describes reduction to the first figure indemonstrables by way of 
converting either the first premise or the second premise. In his systematic presentation of 
the premises within the moods, the minor premise customarily comes before the major 
premise in moods with direct conclusions. There is nothing in his text to explain why 
converting either the first or second premise is a logically valid way of reducing a given 
mood to an indemonstrable; it is only Alexander’s passage discussed above which makes 
this clear.147 
Another puzzling aspect of this text is the way in which the author explains the validity of 
the eighth mood of the first figure; this becomes clearer when considered in light of the 
mode of presentation of syllogisms in Alexander. The otherwise unexplained use of the 
pluperfect verb converterat in the context of the formation of the eighth and ninth moods 
in the first figure148 is likely to be a residual feature of the fuller treatment of the same point 
given by the source which the author was using. As discussed above, in the exposition of 
the three syllogistic figures, Alexander systematically works through every possible 
combination and points out for each whether it is valid or invalid whereas our author 
presents the valid moods first and then the invalid moods altogether at the very end of the 
work. Towards the end of his commentary, Alexander explains how the first non-syllogistic 
pair in the first figure, consisting of a universal affirmative and negative, can be made to 
conclude something if these premises are converted; this conversion of the universal 
negative gives another universal negative,149 and the universal affirmative converts to a 
particular affirmative; this combination matches that of the eighth mood in the first 
figure.150 Our author describes this process in reverse order to reduce the eighth mood of 
the first figure to the fourth indemonstrable so as to demonstrate its validity. He also treats 
this reduction as evidence that the eighth and ninth moods are generated by the fourth 
indemonstrable. This highlights an important distinction between the views concerning 
generation and reduction held by Alexander and those presented in our text.151 
                                                          
147 See commentary note on 207.17-20. 
148 205.3-5. 
149 See 196.16-19. 
150 See 198.3-4. 
151 This topic, according to Themistius, Max.184, was introduced by ‘the more recent Peripatetics’ 
and was not treated by Aristotle, Theophrastus or Eudemus. For general accounts on reduction and 
generation in logic see Barnes et al., 1991: 109 n.41; Thomsen-Thörnqvist, 2008a: xxviii-ix; Lloyd, 
1990: 21-3. 
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Maconi points out a serious error in Lee’s analysis of the way in which Alexander treats the 
relation between reduction and generation. As Maconi describes,152 Lee sees the use of 
πάλιν in the following passage to indicate that Alexander considered generation to have 
some kind of ontological priority over reduction:153 
‘For each of these figures is generated from the first figure by the conversion of a 
premise; and when this premise is again (πάλιν) converted, the figures are analysed 
into and reduced to the first figure – and by the analysis they are proved to be 
syllogistic’.154 
Lee also ascribes this view to Themistius,155 which, according to Lloyd seems to be an 
accurate ascription.156 Maconi, however, points out that this view is erroneous and that Lee 
is incorrect to ascribe it to Alexander. In commenting on the same passage, Barnes et al. 
accuse Alexander of a lesser error; they say that, ‘here, Alexander, in trying to correlate 
generation with analysis, conflates figures with syllogisms: the figures, properly speaking, 
are generated but not analysed or proved (it makes no sense to speak of proving a figure); 
the syllogisms, properly speaking, are analysed or proved but not generated’.157 In spite of 
this conflation of terminology, there is no indication that Alexander was guilty of actually 
conflating figures and syllogisms in this way throughout the rest of his commentary. 
However, conflating their designations in this way would appear to be exactly the sort of 
comment which has misled our author into thinking that reduction and generation is an 
entirely reciprocal relationship. Our author makes the mistake of referring to the 
‘generation’ of certain moods.158 Furthermore, he is alone in affirming that the eighth and 
ninth moods in the first figure are generated from the fourth indemonstrable.159 I discussed 
above the way in which he demonstrates the reduction of the eighth mood to the fourth; 
based on the rules for the conversion of each type of premise set out by our author in 
Chapter 7160 this is a perfectly valid example of logical conversion in which the universal 
negative premise simply swaps its terms161 and the universal affirmative converts 
                                                          
152 Maconi, 1985: 96. 
153 Lee, 1984: 121-122. 
154 Alex. in An.Pr.97,28-30. 
155 Lee, 1984: 122. 
156 Lloyd, 1990: 21-23. See also Badawi, 1968. 
157 Barnes et al., 1991: 171 n.24. 
158 See, for example, 205.13-21; 206.5-6. 
159 205.13-21. 
160 196.15-198.17. 
161 See 196.16-21. 
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particularly, that is, into a particular affirmative.162 The generation of the eighth mood from 
the fourth which he describes, however, is not possible; the combination of this mood 
consists of a particular affirmative and a universal negative. It is not logically possible for 
the fourth mood to generate the eighth in the way our author describes because its 
particular affirmative cannot convert to the universal affirmative of the eighth mood; 
particular affirmatives, like universal negatives, convert into themselves.163 It seems clear 
from this example that the author considered generation and reduction to be entirely 
reciprocal with each other and, in this regard, based on Alexander’s conflation of 
terminology discussed above, it seems that our author was erroneously led astray by this 
kind of comment. 
Another feature which links this text with Alexander’s commentary more closely than any 
other is the treatment of Stoic doctrine. Londey and Johanson say that ‘Peripatetic criticism 
of Stoic logic is to be found later than Apuleius in Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. early third 
century A.D.), in his commentaries on Aristotle. Alexander’s targets included the single-
premise arguments, the duplicated arguments, and the first undemonstrated argument. 
We suggest that Apuleius’ attacks in P.H.VII (as well as his remarks on negation in P.H.III, 
which had rather more point for his exposition) are simply a part of this Peripatetic 
tradition. Their appearance in P.H.VII would then have to be seen as an attempt to preserve 
the Aristotelian syllogism as the only proper kind of deductive inference. We must admit, 
of course, that, if this is correct, it would count against our conjectural suggestion that the 
Apuleian collection was a wider concept than the Aristotelian syllogism’.164 It has been 
demonstrated above, and throughout the following commentary, that our author took a 
similar stance to Alexander, which suggests that Londey and Johanson are correct to want 
to reserve the right to revise their position. In their treatment of the logical background of 
the text165 they propose to review the three distinct strands of formal logic before Apuleius’ 
time – Aristotelian, later Peripatetic, and Stoic. Without justification, they say that they will 
‘pay much more attention to Aristotle’s logic than to the other two strands’.166 The only 
‘later Peripatetic’ they take into account is Theophrastus, and their main focus here is on 
aspects of his contribution to logic which are not relevant to this text, such as modal 
syllogistic. Their account of the author’s presentation of Stoic logic is rather bizarre in that, 
                                                          
162 See 198.3-7. 
163 See 196.16-19. 
164 Londey and Johanson, 1987: 118. 
165 Londey and Johanson, 1987: 20-33. 
166 Londey and Johanson, 1987: 20. 
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as seen above, they acknowledge the critical attitude towards the Stoics which pervades 
the text but still try to argue that the material presented in Chapters 1 and 2 of the text is 
‘consistent with his having begun with a plan to deal first with Aristotelian logic and then 
to go on to treat propositional logic’;167 this is, presumably, what they mean when they say, 
as quoted above, that the ‘Apuleian collection was a wider concept than the Aristotelian 
syllogism’.168 Barnes et al. say that Alexander marks the midpoint of the development of 
Aristotelian syllogistic logic;169 the similarities discussed in this section and the previous 
section show that our author can, like Alexander, be considered to be representative of this 
midpoint in the development of logic. It is strange that Londey and Johanson did not 
consider taking this similarity between the author of the Peri Hermeneias and Alexander 
further in light of these parallel criticisms of the Stoics which they have identified. 
In conclusion, in terms of the content, the presentation of the material and, in a number of 
respects, the method of exposition, it is clear that the Peri Hermeneias belonged to a 
broadly similar milieu to Alexander’s commentary on the Prior Analytics. There is not 
enough evidence of Alexander’s own sources to allow us to distinguish between his original 
contributions to his commentary and what he was reiterating from others. He may not be 
a chronologically possible source for Apuleius but those who taught him could be; one of 
his teachers, Herminus, is known to have also written a commentary on the Prior 
Analytics170  which, we can assume, followed the same formulaic pattern as that of 
Alexander and this cannot have been the only such text of its time. Lumpe, in fact, suggests 
Herminus as a possible source specifically for the author’s exposition of the five predicables 
due to its differences from that of Porphyry.171  This is an entirely plausible possibility but it 
cannot be put forward as anything more than a possibility without the backing of more 
concrete extant evidence. We cannot, therefore, ascertain with any certainty whether the 
Peri Hermeneias came just before or just after Alexander’s commentary or even at roughly 
the same time, nevertheless, a terminus ante quem of the late fifth century is given by 
Cassiodorus’ Institutiones, in which, the Peri Hermeneias is referred to by name.172 This will 
be taken into account in the discussion about the authenticity of this work alongside other 
evidence such as the use of Latin language within the text.  
                                                          
167 Londey and Johanson, 1987: 36. 
168 See n.164. 
169 Barnes et al., 1991: 11. See also Maconi, 1985: 92. 
170 See Von Arnim, 1912. 
171 See commentary note on 197.10-13. 
172 Inst.2.3.12. 
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5) The introduction and use of logical language 
 
The style of terminology used in this text is a valuable aspect to investigate when 
considering this work in comparison to the genuinely Apuleian philosophical works from 
the point of view of its authenticity. It is equally valuable, however, for considering the 
types of Greek sources the author may have used which provide the origin for this 
terminology. Consideration of the style of the terms, and the way in which they are 
introduced, is useful for indicating the type of audience at whom this text was aimed. This 
section of the introduction is divided into five parts: 
Firstly (i) I shall discuss the way in which the author introduces new logical terms alongside 
their already established cognate verb in order to define them. Following on from the 
previous section, this is a feature of the text which it has in common with Alexander of 
Aphrodisias’ commentaries. Then (ii) I shall explain the methods which are used in the 
authentic Apuleian texts to introduce new terminology compared to the way in which terms 
are introduced in this work. I shall also compare the characteristic types of terms introduced 
in these texts. The comparison in this section will be focused upon our text against the De 
Platone since the technical nature of that text makes it the best point of comparison for this 
purpose. The following section (iii) is concerned not with logical terminology which is 
unique to this text, but with more common Latin terms, the frequency of the use of which 
is unique to Apuleius.173 Consideration of the style of the terminology is then used (iv) to 
determine that this text is of an elementary nature which further confirms its didactic 
purpose before this purpose is discussed more fully in the next section of my introduction. 
Each of these aspects will be considered in terms of how they make clear the didactic 
purpose of the work and also how they contribute to arguments for and against the 
Apuleian authorship of this text. In the final section (v) I shall discuss the aspects of the 
terminology and syntax used within the text which are symptomatic of the author’s heavy 
reliance on a Greek source. 
                                                          
173 Stover, 2015: 38 identifies three ‘function words’ which he has shown to be used in Apuleius’ 
authentic works with a higher than average frequency. This, he has demonstrated, provides strong 
grounds for considering the Expositio to be by Apuleius since these terms are also present in this text 
with a high frequency. 
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i)  New nouns and their cognate verbs 
The method the author uses most frequently for bringing neologisms into this text is to 
introduce the new term alongside its already established and familiar cognate verb which 
defines it and explains its meaning. This philological method of definition is also employed 
by Alexander of Aphrodisias; he uses the verb ‘to determine’ as a way of defining a ‘term’: 
‘The parts of propositions are called terms (ὅροι) because propositions are 
determined (ὁρίζονται) by and compounded from them’ (Alex. in An.Pr.15,1). 
Alexander also comments on the fact that Aristotle feels the need to define this term, which 
he suggests, indicates that it was not in common use or well known in its application to a 
part of a proposition.174 The table below shows similar instances in this text where a 
neologism is made familiar and is defined by its already established cognate verb:175  
New term Cognate verb  
substitutiva substituis 190.11-13 
indefinitae non definit 190.20-21; 193.11-12 
dedicativae dedicant 191.1-2 
abdicativae abdicant 191.3-4 
declarativa declarat 192.8 
revictio revincit 194.9-10 
conversibiles possunt semper inter se versare vices 196.15-18 
  convertis 196.20 
illatio infertur 199.9-11 
indemonstrabiles demonstrari nequeant 206.1-2 
Table 2. 
Although the majority of these verbs have uses in various technical contexts,176 all of them 
have well established general uses outside of a logical context. This means that when they 
                                                          
174 in An.Pr.14,25-26. Barnes et al., 1990: 61 n.48 also mention Ammonius in An.Pr.14,13-22 and 
scholium to Aristotle, 146a9-18 where this point is also made. 
175 This method is sometimes also used to explain an established term which is being applied to this 
logical context, perhaps for the first time. For example, significatio (197.8) is closely followed by 
significaveris (197.14) in an explanation about the five types of predicate. Similarly, propositio which 
is first introduced in Chapter 1 (190.7-8) and used throughout is explained and defined in Chapter 7 
using the verb propono (199.11-12). See also collectio (200.8) and colligitur (199.10-11). 
176 All but definio, versare, and revinco have uses as technical terms according to Lewis and Short; 
dedico is used in religious language to mean ‘consecrate’ (s.v. IIA); converto (s.v. I2A) and infero (s.v. 
IB4) are used in military contexts; converto is also used in rhetorical contexts to mean ‘transpose or 
interchange words’ (s.v. I2b). substituo (s.v. IIB), dedico (s.v. IIB), abdico (s.v. IIA), declaro (s.v. IB), 
and demonstro (s.v. IB) are all used as technical terms in legal or juridical language. The relatively 
large number of these terms which belong to a legal context suggests that further research could 
usefully be done comparing the use of these terms in such legal texts with their use in the Peri 
Hermeneias. Such a comparison could provide a way of determining the extent to which familiarity 
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are used to define the terms above as they are applied in the logical context of this work, 
their meanings are easily made clear to beginners in logic. This suggests that the text was 
pitched at an introductory level. 
The rather conservative approach to linguistic innovation, which is clear from the table 
above is in contrast to the types of terms introduced in De Platone. This text, like the Peri 
Hermeneias, tends to be described as being extremely dry and technical in comparison to 
other Apuleian texts177 such as the Metamorphoses, the Apologia, or the De deo Socratis. 
Nevertheless, it still bears signs of Apuleius’ idiosyncratic linguistic creativity through the 
types of terms which are introduced. For example, there are those which demonstrate his 
fondness for Plautine archaisms such as lucricupidinem,178 which is likely to be an imitation 
of Plautus’ turpilucricupidum,179 and feminine abstract nouns ending in -trix which have a 
poetic feel and which appear to be coined only for the sake of agreeing in gender with the 
feminine anima which they describe, when masculine equivalents which already exist 
would suffice to convey the meaning.180 These characteristics are, on the whole, absent 
from the Peri Hermeneias; Harrison identifies only five ‘Apuleian-type colourful usages’ in 
the text.181 Stylistic features such as these are often used as evidence of authorship. 
Apuleian style in the form of a number of items of terminology does not provide strong 
enough grounds to argue in favour of Apuleian authorship. The style of terminology 
introduced, however, can be used to demonstrate the didactic purpose of the work; to 
judge from the comparable example found in Alexander of Aphrodisias mentioned above, 
introducing terms of this sort in this way would appear to be a common practice in logical 
exegetical texts.    
The author is equally methodical in the way he forms his syntax. The first of two noteworthy 
examples would be the way in which he describes the relationship between the two 
propositions which have particular as their quantity in the context of the square of 
opposition diagram; the term revictio is used as the subject of the verb confirmo, the 
                                                          
with this field was an expectation of its audience and could, therefore, be indicative of the possible 
use of this text in legal education.       
177 See, for example, Harrison, 2000: 203-204. 
178 De Plat.2.241 
179 Trin.100. This imitation is pointed out by Beaujeu, 1978: 299 n.248.1. 
180 agitatrix: De Plat.199; captatrix: De Plat.231; diiudicatrix: De Plat.228; ducatrix: De Plat.225. 
181 Harrison, 2000: 12 n.45: quispiam (192.16); hinnibilis (192.17, 22; 193.1); supervacaneus (201.4; 
212.15); hicce (205.21); perquam (213.9).  
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cognate verb of the antonymous term confirmatio before the statement is inverted so that 
confirmatio becomes the subject of revinco, the cognate verb of the noun revictio.182 
The second example would be the extremely systematic way in which he presents the 
moods within each figure. There is virtually no variation in the syntax of these parts; the 
number of every mood is introduced with est before a relative clause, introduced by qui 
conducit, describes the combination of types of propositions which produce a direct 
conclusion. This is always indicated by the adverb ‘directim’, and the example of the 
syllogism is set out with the same range of common terms.183 Each of them is then 
introduced by ‘ut’.184 Where there is another possible conclusion from the same 
combination, this is introduced by ‘at si reflexim inferas’. 
Collectively, these examples demonstrate the extent to which the author was extremely 
careful and formulaic in his introduction and use of his logical terminology. 
 
ii) Apuleian methods of introduction 
A large number of the neologisms introduced into the De Platone are third declension 
adjectives formed in -bilis and adverbs in -biliter. These terms are usually used to denote 
concepts which would more typically be circumscribed by a relative clause in the Classical 
Latin of, for example, Cicero.185 Nevertheless, Apuleius’ use of such coinages in this text 
does bear resemblance to the way in which Cicero sometimes tentatively offers such 
coinages himself.186 However, whereas Cicero appears to regret using such terms and 
makes it clear that they will only suffice until a more suitable way of conveying the concept 
becomes apparent, Apuleius liberally applies his own new terms to describe Platonic 
                                                          
182 194.9-11 cited below. 
183 iustum, honestum, bonum, malum, and turpe.  This particular set of terms adds to the moralising 
tone of the text. This tone is also exemplified by the use of the verb recusant for those propositions 
which, once converted, must be rejected for stating falsity (197.7-8) and by the use of the adverb 
impudenter to describe those who foolishly deny a conclusion which is drawn from premises which 
they have accepted (209.18). 
184 But sometimes ‘velut’ as in the case of 205.7; 206.9, 14; 207.5. 
185 Compare, for example the coinage innominabilis by Apuleius, De Plat.1.92: ‘quem quidem 
caelestem pronuntiat, indictum, innominabilem et, ut ait ipse, ἀόρατον, ἀδάμαστον, cuius naturam 
invenire difficile est’ with the way in which Cicero describes the same concept using verbs, N.D.1.30: 
‘qui in Timaeo patrem huius mundi nominari neget posse’.  
186 For example, the introduction of qualitas is prefixed by quasi which conveys uncertainty and is 
accompanied by an apology for using such an unusual word at Acad.24 and pronuntiatum is used to 
render ἀξίωμα only for the time being: ‘utar post alio, si invenero melius’ at Tusc.1.7.14. For further 
such examples see Powell, 1995: 255ff. 
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concepts in a way that suggests they are intended to be definitive, often when a suitable 
established Latin term already exists.187  
There is one example of a coinage in the Peri Hermeneias which displays Apuleius’ 
characteristic concern for linguistic style. When describing the relation between the two 
particular propositions, he says that if one is refuted, the other is confirmed, but when one 
is confirmed the other is not necessarily refuted. He explains this using the following 
balanced expression:188 
‘utriusvis harum revictio confirmat alteram, non tamen et utriusvis confirmatio 
revincit alteram’.189 
The use of the hapax legomenon, ’revictio’, can be seen to be more Apuleian in style; it 
would appear to convey the same meaning as the established term refutatio.190 Its use here, 
therefore, can only be explained as a way of creating balance with the antithetical phrase 
which follows in which the cognate noun of the verb confirmo is used alongside the cognate 
verb of revictio, ‘revinco’.  
Another method of introducing neologisms which we find in Apuleius’ De Platone and which 
appears to be shared by this work is the use of a particle such as vel or the enclitic -que to 
join two terms. In the authentic texts, this usually serves to link a new term with another, 
synonymous term which is already established. In De Platone, for example, atque serves 
this purpose for joining lucricupidinem and accipitrem pecuniae191 and the coinage 
diiudicatrix is linked to spectatrix by the enclitic -que.192 Although the noun spectatrix is not 
particularly common, it is found in various works of Ovid193 and is therefore already 
established. This is similar to the way in which the neologism irritabilitas is introduced; it is 
appended to the term excandescentia by vel. The term excandescentia is already in 
                                                          
187 For example, Apuleius chooses to coin rationabiliter (De Plat.1.97) in the context of the seven 
spheric motions of the world when rationaliter is already in existence having been used by Seneca 
(Ep.109.11). There is no indication in the context of Apuleius’ introduction of the new term that its  
-bilis suffix was intended to convey the idea of capability in a way which rationaliter does not; these 
two adverbs appear to have entirely synonymous meanings (cf. L&S rationalis s.v. II B2 and 
rationabilis s.v. 1). 
188 See commentary note on 194.8-11. 
189 194.9-11. This phrase was discussed above in relation to the author’s formulaic syntax and his 
method of consciously forming neologisms as cognates of already established verbs. 
190 Used to mean a ‘refutation’ in rhetorical contexts, e.g., Cic.Top.25, 93; Quint.5.13.1; 3.9.5; 4.3.15, 
see L&S s.v. 
191 De Plat.127.6-7. 
192 But see Moreschini, 1991 who, unlike the earlier editors, has omitted -que. 
193 Am.2.12.25; Her.18.91; Met.9.359. See also Luc.3.128. 
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existence, having been coined by Cicero.194 In this instance, the use of the particle vel, like 
-que in the example above, creates the impression that the two nouns are natural partners 
for each other and it disguises the fact that one is a less traditional synonym of the other. 
In this way, whereas Cicero draws attention to his neologisms with an often emphatic 
apology or hesitation, Apuleius’ practice for the same purpose is more subtle; his method, 
if indeed it can be called a method, is to sneak them in unnoticed by appending them to an 
already established Latin word. It may be argued that we cannot know for sure that these 
are Apuleius’ own coinages since he does not introduce them as emphatically as Cicero 
introduces his coinages. However, there are many terms which appear for the first time in 
Apuleius’ De Platone, which do not appear elsewhere. Since there is no evidence for their 
use elsewhere in Latin outside Apuleius,195 this strongly suggests that they are Apuleius’ 
own coinages and also shows categorically that they did not succeed in becoming 
established Latin terms.  
We see terms joined by particles like vel or velut in a similar way in the Peri Hermeneias. 
For example, when defining the subject term in a proposition, the author refers to this part 
as ‘subiectiva velut subdita’.196 The first term, subiectiva, is the new term and is used 
throughout the rest of the text as the standard way of referring to the subject term whereas 
subdita does not appear outside of Chapter 4 where it is first used; 197 it is clear that its sole 
function is to qualify subiectiva at its point of introduction. The use of two terms to denote 
a subject places focus on the sub- prefix which is shared by both words and thus makes it 
clear that this is its defining aspect; the point being made is that many subjects may be 
contained ‘under’ one predicate. In a similar way, illativum rogamentum is used once, 
where it is linked to illatio by vel, in order to make clear the definition of this neologism, 
illatio, which the author uses to denote a conclusion throughout the text.198 rogamentum 
is used elsewhere in the text199 in a way which indicates that its meaning should be obvious 
to the audience. It is qualified by the adjective, illativus, the meaning of which is clear from 
the cognate verb infero which is used to define it. As a more convenient one-word synonym 
for this, the author coins the new term, illatio, to denote the conclusion of a syllogism, the 
                                                          
194 Tusc.4.7.16; 4.9.21. Apuleius is next to use this term in De Plat.109.6. 
195 For example, diiudicatrix 117.6; honoripeta 126.24; incommobilitas 115.8; irascentia 103.9, 
109.15, 127.5; irritabilitas 109.6; lucricupido 127.6. 
196 192.7. See commentary note on 192.6-7. 
197 192.19, 20, 21; 193.5. 
198 199.9-11. See commentary note on 199.9-11. 
199 190.7; 193.4. 
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meaning of the familiar cognate verb, infero, makes the process which is required for it to 
come about entirely clear.    
Sometimes, however, vel is used in this text to introduce a more specific example of that 
which is denoted by the term which precedes it. In this way, the second term which comes 
after vel is used to give a specific example or to refer to the relevant function of the concept 
denoted by the first term in its given context. That this is the author’s method in such cases 
is clear from the fact that often the second term will then not be used again outside of this 
context. This is the case for substitutiva vel condicionalis.200 These terms denote compound 
propositions as opposed to the categorical sort which are the subject of this text; 
substitutiva denotes their general feature, that one proposition is ‘placed next to’201 
another and condicionalis is one example of this type of proposition, a conditional, as 
opposed to disjunctive proposition. The terms collectio and conclusio are used to define 
‘syllogism’.202 Both terms already exist but whereas collectio is used here (200.8-9) and then 
once more (200.16) in Chapter 7, conclusio is the term the author uses throughout to 
denote a syllogism. The supplementary use of collectio, I would suggest, is in keeping with 
the formulaic method of providing a definition through a pair of cognate terms; although 
less frequently than concludo, the verb colligo is used in some places to express the action 
of drawing a conclusion,203 and might be considered to be the less technical and therefore 
more familiar counterpart to concludo.204 
The above has shown that the introduction of new terminology in this text differs in a 
number of respects from the practice displayed in the De Platone. These differences 
between the two texts outweigh the similarities to such an extent that they are hardly likely 
to belong to the same work. 
 
 
                                                          
200 190.11-12. 
201 L&S s.v.1. 
202 The author uses the term illatio to refer to ‘conclusion’ and conclusio to refer to ‘syllogism’ For 
this, see commentary note on 200.7-9. Compare Londey and Johanson, 1987: 75 and Sullivan, 1967: 
78. 
203 199.10-11; 201.7, 10; 209.13, 14, 18; 212.14-15. 
204 There is one technical sense of colligo listed in L&S s.v. I Bb meaning ‘to thicken’ in a medical 
context. Compare L&S concludo s.v. II D, a philosophical technical term meaning ‘to conclude’ or ‘to 
infer’ as is its sense in this text. 
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iii) Function words as indicators of authorship 
In his recent critical edition and commentary on the third book of the De Platone Justin 
Stover205 presents a convincing case for the authentic Apuleian authorship of this work 
which he refers to as Apuleius’ Expositio. In support of this argument, among other factors, 
he identifies three ‘inconspicuous particles and conjunctions’;206 alioquin, enimvero, and 
necnon as words which Apuleius uses with unusually high frequency; their regular presence 
in this work which has been revealed by computational analysis of the text,207 he says, 
suggests that it ‘matches the profile of Apuleius’.208 Carrying out a similarly detailed analysis 
of the frequencies of common words in the Peri Hermeneias would be the next logical step 
to add to the arguments concerning authenticity. Arguments based on stylistic grounds 
have thus far tended to focus on the prose rhythm of the text which differs from the 
authentic works209 and also on the more creative and innovative aspects of Apuleius’ 
linguistic style which, of course, could be easily imitated, rather than the more subtle and 
less imitable use of common words. As Stover says, ‘the frequency and combination of the 
most common Latin words hold considerable promise for the analysis and attribution of 
Latin texts. Research has shown that their frequencies are surprisingly reliable indicators of 
authorship’.210 
Of the three ‘function words’ which Stover tests, neither alioquin nor necnon are used in 
the Peri Hermeneias. The conjunction enimvero occurs twice in the Expositio which is 
around 5000 words in length. Stover says that ‘there is no other author besides Apuleius 
from whom we would expect two instances of this word in so brief a text’ and concludes 
that, ‘at most we can say that it suggests a particular Apuleian usage’.211 For those who are 
convinced of the Apuleian authorship of the Peri Hermeneias, the fact that the conjunction 
enimvero appears once in this text,212 which is even shorter in length than the Expositio, 
would not come as a surprise in light of Stover’s analysis. However, for those who are more 
sceptical about the text’s origins and refer to reserve judgement on its authorship, like 
myself, this single use of enimvero is insufficient to make any claims about authenticity or 
                                                          
205 Stover, 2015. 
206 Stover, 2015: 38. 
207 The details of this study are discussed in Kestemont, Koppel, Stover, and Winter, 2015. 
208 For these statistics see Stover, 2015: 37-38. 
209 See, for example, Harrison, 2000: 178-179. See also introduction section 5 iii for further discussion 
about the use of this method for testing the authenticity of texts. 
210 Stover, 2015: 38. 
211 Stover, 2015: 38. 
212 194.13. 
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even Apuleian style, particularly since neither of the other two function terms appear in 
this text; this sort of evidence is effective collectively but the single use of one term which 
Apuleius is fond of using is not significant enough to be worth taking into account. 
Nevertheless, Stover’s method has provided valuable evidence for arguing in favour of the 
authenticity of the Expositio as the third book to Apuleius’ De Platone. This would be a 
worthwhile exercise to carry out on the Peri Hermeneias. About the authenticity of this text, 
Stover concludes that ‘whether it is authentic or not remains an open question: under no 
circumstances, however, should it be considered part of De Platone and not a separate 
monograph’.213 This conclusion is reached, not through a study of the Peri Hermeneias itself, 
but through the study of the Expositio which, as Stover effectively argues, contains the kind 
of material that we would expect to find in the third book of a handbook on Platonic 
philosophy which satisfactorily refutes all of those who claim that the Peri Hermeneias 
originally served as this third book.214 This is an important development in the study of the 
authorship of the Peri Hermeneias even though it did not arise from the study of the text 
itself. 
Moreschini, who has edited this text as well as the other genuinely Apuleian philosophical 
works,215 has identified a number of expressions and terms which he says make it unlikely 
that this text was written before the fourth-century A.D. His examples are as follows: 
‘The use of abdicare with a meaning of to deny (here and in Nonius); hinnibilis (here 
and in Caelius Aurelianus); paucus for parvus; incongruus, which is only found 
beginning in the fourth century; aequipollens, which is only in the De 
interpretatione and the works it influenced; subiectivus, which is only here and in 
the Grammarians, in the surveyors, and in Augustine; conversibilis, which is in the 
De interpretatione, in Calcidius, Marius Victorinus, and Augustine; particulariter, 
which is used from Augustine on; quadtratura, which is witnessed to here and in 
the surveyors; and the connection certum est quod.’216 
Moreschini concludes by saying that ‘there is no (non-technical) term that can be 
considered typical of Apuleius’ period or of Apuleius himself,’217 but this is not entirely true; 
                                                          
213 Stover, 2015: 46. See also Moreschini, 2015: 213. 
214 Cassiodorus (Inst.2.3.12) and Isidore of Seville (Etym.2.28.22) described the text as such in their 
own works. Those who accept this view in modern scholarship are Baldassarri, 1986: 7; Londey and 
Johanson, 1987: 19; O’Brien, 1991: 49 n.10; Sandy, 1997: 40; Harrison, 2000: 196; Huby, 2007: 61.  
215 Moreschini, 1990. 
216 Moreschini, 2015: 216-217. 
217 Moreschini, 2015: 217. 
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for one thing, the use of the (non-technical) enimvero, although it appears only once, is, as 
Stover has argued, representative of typical Apuleian usage. Furthermore, on a more 
modest scale than the study of Stover, I have identified another common term which, when 
compared to a number of other authors, is used by Apuleius with a higher than average 
frequency: quippe appears in the Peri Hermeneias seven times.218 A search on the Library 
of Latin texts indicates that it is used a total of 118 times throughout the Apuleian corpus; 
this is in comparison to 21 times in Plautus, whom we know Apuleius is fond of imitating, 
68 times in Cicero, whose style and terminology is frequently emulated by Apuleius in his 
De Platone,219 five times in Quintilian, and 20 times in Gellius. As a roughly contemporary 
source to Apuleius, the last of these can be considered as representative of the time at 
which Apuleius was writing; the fact that his use of this particle is so much less prominent 
than that of Apuleius, and that this can be said of the other authors listed here, suggests 
that this is another term whose frequent use is indicative of Apuleian style. However, as 
mentioned above, a particular style is not enough evidence for a particular authorship. This 
evidence, therefore, will be weighed up against more significant factors pertaining to 
authenticity in section 8 of this introduction. Overall, however, the linguistic aspects of the 
text discussed in this section make it likely that this text was written by an author other 
than Apuleius.  
 
iv) Non-technical logical terminology 
Some of the ways in which our author refers to particular features of syllogistic logic are 
distinctly non-technical when compared to the way in which they are referred to in other 
texts dealing with this topic.  
Attention has been drawn to the author’s terminology for referring to the qualities of 
propositions, abdicativa and dedicativa, on a number of occasions220 but a satisfactory 
explanation for his use of these terms rather than the sort which become established as 
                                                          
218 192.19; 197.17; 199.5; 202.10, 18; 204.19; 207.20. 
219 For details about the similarities between the philosophical exposition of these two authors see 
Harrison, 2000: 205-207. 
220 For example, by Sullivan, 1967: 172ff; 224 and Londey and Johanson, 1987: 53-58. ‘dedicativus is 
one example of the words which show the author’s dependence on Greek sources, rendering as it 
does kataphatikos’ see Huby, 2007: 69. 
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technical terms in texts such as those of Boethius has never been reached.221 There are a 
number of features of this text which point towards its didactic purpose; these are 
discussed fully in section 6 to this introduction. I suggest that the author’s use of his own 
terms which do not belong to an established logical vernacular, but which are coined from 
generic and well-known verbs of the sort set out in Table 1,222 is another indicator of the 
didactic purpose of this text which is aimed at a non-specialist audience. Furthermore, the 
specific technical term which Alexander has for the particular propositions in relation to 
their universal counterpart, ὑπάλληλοι, compared to our author’s way of describing such a 
proposition as simply ‘its particular’,223 was discussed above where the difference was 
explained by the fact that our author would likely have considered such a term to be 
superfluous since he considered these subaltern forms themselves to be superfluous.224  His 
method of carefully selecting appropriate terminology and omitting unnecessary technical 
terms in this way also suggests that he was writing an elementary text. 
In a number of cases, a non-traditional distinction is made between two items of 
terminology which serve to elucidate differences. There is, for example, the nuanced 
difference between the use of the participles comprobata and probata;225 the complete 
power with which a universal premise, when proved, can, in turn, prove its particular 
counterpart is represented by the intensifying prefix co- on the former verb as opposed to 
the latter, which has as its subject a particular premise which does not have the power to 
prove its universal counterpart in the same way. In addition, the verb approbatur is used 
exclusively for proof which is carried out per impossibile.226 A similar type of variation occurs 
between the verbs conduco and infero according to whether the conclusion of a syllogism 
is drawn directly or conversely.227 Another similar case is the distinction between suppar 
and subneutra to describe the relationship between contradictory propositions.228 Whereas 
Londey and Johanson present these two terms as synonyms in their glossary,229 I argue that 
the author uses each for a different circumstance which depends upon which of the pair of 
                                                          
221 Boethius uses negativus and negatio to denote the Greek ἀποφατικóς and ἀπóφασις and uses 
affirmativus and affirmatio for καταφατικóς and κατάφασις throughout his Introd. ad syll. cat. and 
his De syll. cat. 
222 p20-21. 
223 particularis eius. See 195.4-5; 205.5 and n.113 above. 
224 See n.121. 
225 See commentary notes on 194.13-15, 194.17-18. 
226 See 207.13-14; 208.27. 
227 See commentary note on 204.8-13. 
228 Universal affirmative with particular negative and universal negative with particular affirmative. 
229 1987: 74-79. 
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contradictories is true.230 The author introduces the term acceptio and explains its meaning 
only in order to describe the procedure of dialectic, which relies upon the acceptance of 
questions posed, but he keeps things simple by using the more common term ‘propositio’ 
even though, based on his explanation, this is not technically accurate. He does, however, 
use this term once more in the context of proof per impossibile. In this context, the term 
acceptio is more appropriate and makes the point clearer than propositio because this 
method of proof was invented against those who foolishly do not accept a conclusion based 
on premises they accepted.231 
 
v) The Greek style of the text 
There are a number of features of this text which are rather unusual in Latin but which 
would be more naturally expected in Greek language. These points, which come up at 
various points in the commentary, are worth reporting here since I would argue that 
collectively they provide support to the argument presented in introduction section 8, that 
they indicate that our author heavily relied upon a Greek text when composing his own 
work. Both the style of terminology introduced and the syntax of parts of the text support 
this view. 
Firstly, the terminology is frequently formed as a direct calque of a Greek term in which 
each unit of the term is taken into consideration and accounted for in the calque rather 
than the overall sense of the word. The following table gives four examples of new terms 
which are representative of this practice alongside the equivalent, original Greek term. The 
Latin terms of Boethius are also presented for comparison: 
New term   Greek equivalent Term used by Boethius 
de-dicat-ivus 191.1-2 κατα-φατ-ίκος affirmativus 
ab-dicat-ivae 191.3-4 ἀπο-φατ-ικóς negativus 
de-clarat-iva 192.8 κατ-ηγορ-ικóς praedicativus 
in-demonstra-bilis 206.1-2 ἀν-απóδεικ-τος indemonstrabilis 
          Table 3. 
The hyphens which break up the new Latin terms and their respective Greek counterparts 
serve to show the systematic way in which the author created his new terms based on a 
                                                          
230 See commentary note on 195.4-6. 
231 See commentary note on 209.17-18. 
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calque for each part of the original Greek term. Our author consistently uses a form of the 
verb dico where parts of the verb φημί are used in the Greek term, whereas Boethius uses 
terms formed from affirmo and nego which are more natural in Latin. He also consistently 
uses the prefix de- to represent words beginning with κατα- in Greek. Both authors match 
the adjectival suffix -ίκος with -ivus. Boethius, however, just as often uses the substantive 
forms affirmatio and negatio.232 Baldassarri’s work, as well as an Italian translation and 
commentary, contains a glossary in which he suggests, often with a degree of doubt,233 an 
equivalent Greek term. In many cases, Baldassarri’s rationale behind citing certain Greek 
terms is not obvious.234 For example, it seems clear that the use of the diminutive modulus 
to denote a mood is unique to this text. Nevertheless, Baldassarri suggests the Greek 
diminutive τροπάριον which, belonging to Byzantine Greek Orthodox vernacular, refers to 
a piece of ecclesiastical music235 and is not even listed in LSJ. Another example would be his 
suggestion ἀσύμβατος236 for incongrua. This term denotes one of the two universal 
propositions in relation to the other, of which it is the contrary; this clearly corresponds to 
Alexander’s use of ἐναντίος.237 By analogy, Alexander uses the term ὑπεναντίος to refer to 
the same type of contrary relationship between the two particulars which are ‘nearly equal’ 
but Baldassarri considers πάρισος or even παρόμοιος238 to be the equivalent term. In my 
own glossary in Appendix B I offer more appropriate parallels which are mapped onto uses 
found mainly in Alexander of Aphrodisias, with whose work, as discussed in the previous 
section, this text is closely associated. In this way, my glossary provides correction to 
Baldassarri on a number of points.239   
There are places in the text where the use of et is unexpected.240 This use of et is, in many 
cases, comparable to the way in which the same particle is used in the Expositio.241 This 
text, which serves as a reference to Plato’s dialogues with a summary of their contents, was 
                                                          
232 See n.221. 
233 His doubt is indicated by a question mark. 
234 Nor is it explained in his introduction. For a review of this commentary, see Pieters, 1988. 
235 Dalmais, 2002. 
236 His doubt about this suggestion is indicated by a question mark. 
237 in An.Pr.45,21. 
238 Again, accompanied by a question mark. 
239 Londey and Johanson, 1987: 74-79 also include a glossary of terms with their English translation 
and a definition. In some cases, they identify two terms as being synonymous when it is clear from 
the author’s use that a distinction is intended. For example, their conflation of suppar and subneutra 
which was discussed above. 
240 See commentary note on 191.8-10. See also 190.17; 192.15; 198.9; 202.3, 7; 204.5; 205.3; 209.9; 
211.5. 
241 For uses of et in this work which are comparable with those found in our text see Expositio 1.13; 
3.27; 4.7; 13.23, 27; 17.11; 30.3, 4, 9, 23; 32.8, 15. 
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evidently formed from the direct use of Greek sources as it demonstrates Apuleius’ close 
familiarity with the original Platonic dialogues throughout.242  The same may be said for our 
author. Although the Latin particle et may be used to connect two separate or two 
complementary expressions in a similar way to its Greek counterpart καί,243 its position as 
the second word in the sentence as we find in this text makes it difficult not to treat its 
meaning in a way which is more characteristic of common uses of καί244 than for et.  
Another way in which the Greek style of the author’s source has carried over into this text 
is the use of the pronoun id which, in one case, is unusually forward-looking rather than 
referring to an antecedent.245 There is also the use of the balancing particles ‘quidem’ and 
‘autem’ which is modelled on the Greek μέν – δέ.246 
According to Moreschini, ‘Sullivan correctly maintains that Meiss’ attempt to support the 
hypothesis that the De interpretatione is the translation of a Greek work is completely 
indemonstrable’.247 Sullivan criticises this view of Meiss since he ‘appears to base this view 
on the fact that a few Greek words and examples occur in the Peri  Hermeneias and on the 
fact that a number of the Latin words found in the treatise appear to be transliterations of 
technical Greek logical terms’248 and presents a three-pronged refutation of this claim as 
follows: 
i) There is no extant Greek text which fits the profile of being the original work 
from which the author translated. 
ii) The author, whom he considers to be Apuleius, is more than likely to have 
picked up the Greek terms and examples during his studies in Athens, which 
are well documented, rather than from the sort of text described above. 
                                                          
242 Stover, 2015: 66-73 explains that the doctrinal, textbook presentation of the De Platone is not a 
result of direct use of Plato’s dialogues, but rather, ‘the indexed arrangement of the Expositio 
provided the intermediary... out of which Apuleius fashioned his treatise’. He suggests that Apuleius 
made direct use of Plato’s dialogues in order to compose the Expositio, saying that ‘Apuleius clearly 
knew his Plato very well’. 
243 See, e.g., L&S s.v. II A, F, H. 
244 See Denniston, 1934: 289, whose explanation about the force of καί could just as well apply to 
the force of the uses of et discussed here: ‘Like δέ, it is used both as a connective and as a responsive 
particle... This includes the meanings ‘also’ and ‘even’; while in some cases, the idea of responsion 
receding into a dim background..., καί conveys little more than pure emphasis, ‘actually’. 
245 193.8. See commentary note on 193.8-12. 
246 For which, see commentary note on 190.17-18. 
247 Moreschini, 2015: 211. Copies of Meiss’ study are not readily available as pointed out by Sullivan, 
1967: 9 and Moreschini, 2015: 208 n.106. The section in which he deals with the authenticity of the 
text is made available as an appendix to Sullivan’s work, 235-242. 
248 Sullivan, 1967: 13-14. 
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iii) Too little is known about the Latin language of the period to make judgements 
about how well established or not the terminology which is used within the text 
was. 
Although Sullivan’s first assertion is technically correct, the prolific evidence for such 
texts249 cannot be ignored and therefore the author’s use of such a text cannot be 
discounted. As discussed in this section, my close reading of the text has brought to light a 
number of features which are reflective of Greek syntax; these, more so than simply items 
of terminology, are strongly suggestive of a written Greek source. Sandy claims that ‘the 
patchwork qualities of the Peri Hermeneias are blatant’ and that ‘Apuleius has failed to 
integrate the multiple sources he has consulted’.250 Contrary to this claim, which was 
discussed previously, the similar order of exposition to that found in Alexander of 
Aphrodisias’ commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics strongly suggests that the author 
was using a single source which belonged to this tradition. With regard to the third point, 
more about Latin language is known than when Sullivan’s work was published in 1967, and 
the type which we find in the Peri Hermeneias is still hard to place in the second century 
A.D.251  
 vi) Final remarks 
The form of the terms and the way in which they are introduced throughout the text 
suggest that rather than introducing new Latin logical terminology as a way of 
demonstrating linguistic creativity, in the way that is clear from the De Platone, their 
function in this text is to introduce logic to Latin speakers who were new to the topic. The 
concepts rather than the terminology are the priority. In some places, the formulaic nature 
of the author’s writing has provided the grounds for preferring one manuscript reading over 
another.252 More than anything else, however, it is indicative of the didactic purpose of the 
work. Although the introduction and use of terminology show a great deal of care and 
thought, the fact that its primary purpose is to facilitate understanding of syllogistic logic 
                                                          
249 This was discussed in section 4 of my introduction. 
250 Sandy, 1997: 40. 
251 Huby, 2007: 61, for example, comments on the fact that the Greek equivalent term for modus, 
τρóπος ‘is not found with the sense of ‘mood’ until it appears in pseudo-Ammonius in the sixth 
century... It is tempting to suppose that the work is not by the second century Apuleius, but much 
later.’ See also Moreschini’s list of words which date the work later than the second century cited 
above p39.  
252 For example, the emendation of dedico to dico, for which, see commentary notes on 191.7-8; 
209.3-5 and the change from immutationibus to mutationibus discussed in commentary note on 
211.12-16. 
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for beginners rather than to demonstrate linguistic creativity and skill sets the Peri 
Hermeneias in contrast to the authentically Apuleian philosophical texts. 
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6) The didactic purpose of the text  
 
It is clear from the subject matter of this work, a handbook to syllogistic logic, that it was 
intended for educational purposes.253 In this regard, it is not dissimilar to other texts which 
are also concerned with the exposition of syllogistic logic. Such texts were discussed in 
section 4 of this introduction, where the differences between the handbook style of the 
Peri Hermeneias were compared to the format and the more detailed content of Alexander 
of Aphrodisias’ commentaries. These differences in style are also likely to reflect the 
differing levels of education at which the two texts were pitched. For example, Alexander’s 
commentaries ‘presumably represent the substance of Alexander’s lectures on Aristotle’,254 
although the way in which he frequently presents more than one explanation for the same 
point without indicating which is to be followed ‘hardly suggests that the commentaries 
formed part of a programme of teaching, at least not at any introductory level’.255 The 
‘disposition and content’ of Boethius’ De syllogismo categorico make it clear that his aim 
with this work is ‘to give a compendious account of the doctrine of the categorical 
syllogism’.256 Owing to its content, the Peri Hermeneias may be grouped alongside texts 
such as these; they all share the same educative purpose. There are, however, a number of 
features of this text which suggest that it ought to be categorised more specifically as 
didactic. Since this text is composed in prose, and the term ‘didactic’ is more often applied 
to poetry rather than to prose, I shall begin with some clarification about the way in which 
I qualify the text as being didactic. The following ways in which didactic poetry is broadly 
defined represent a number of characteristics which are present in our text: they ‘aim to 
instruct the reader in a particular subject-matter ... didactic poems are normally addressed 
to a particular individual who is seen as the primary object of instruction and acts as a model 
for the reader’. Specifically didactic elements ‘include specific forms of address, transition 
and argumentation, often crystallized in quasi-formulaic expressions’.257   
The aim of this section is to give an overall view of the various and varied ways in which the 
author makes the material he presents suitable for an educational purpose using these 
                                                          
253 Sandy, 1997: 38, however, considers it simply as a scholastic record in the form of a collection of 
notes, which demonstrates what Apuleius can remember from his own education at Athens. 
254 Barnes et al., 1991: 4. 
255 Sharples, 1990: 97. 
256 Thomsen-Thörnqvist, 2008a: xviii. 
257 Schiesaro, 2012: 448-449.  
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didactic tropes. This aspect of the text has not been given such treatment in the major 
works of either Sullivan or Londey and Johanson.258 It is, however, an important aspect of 
the text to consider as it helps us to understand the author’s rationale for, among other 
things, choosing the vocabulary that he does and for presenting the topics in the order in 
which we find them. In some cases, it also exonerates the author from errors which have 
been perceived by modern scholars who believe that he gives undue weight to the order of 
premises within a syllogism; in the third section below I shall argue that this consistency is, 
in fact, due to the didactic purpose of the work.  What follows, therefore, is a discussion of 
the three main features of the text which point towards this purpose and which reflect 
aspects of the didactic elements described above: the formulaic language and forms of 
address used within the text, the way in which transitions from one topic to the next are 
signposted, and the method of exposition used to present the logical content. 
 
i) Didactic language 
This aspect of the text was discussed in detail in section 5, where I concluded that the 
extremely formulaic and systematic way in which the author coined new terminology and 
presented it alongside more familiar language which elucidates its meaning has a clear 
function as an educative tool. This is in contrast to Alexander of Aphrodisias, whose use of 
technical and semi-technical terminology in his commentary on the Prior Analytics makes it 
clear that his audience ‘have a general competence in Peripatetic philosophy and in its 
terminology’.259 I also highlighted the points at which the author draws a distinction in his 
terminology so that when something is expressed using a different word or with a different 
form of expression, it is clear that the process being described is different to what has gone 
before. Another example to add to this list would be the way in which the phrase tam 
directim quam reflexim (207.17-18) is used to describe the way in which the combination 
of the first mood of the third figure produces two different conclusions, one direct and one 
converse. This is in contrast to the way in which the author normally presents the syllogism 
with the direct conclusion by saying conducit directim and the indirect conclusion which 
comes after with the phrase at si reflexim inferas.260 This difference in expression is due to 
the fact that our author considers this to be one mood which has two possible conclusions, 
                                                          
258 See, however, Huby, 2004 where it is considered briefly. 
259 Barnes et al., 1991: 10.  
260 See discussion in introduction section 6 about the formulaic way in which the author presents the 
moods within each figure. 
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not two different moods as Theophrastus thought, and in this respect it is different to the 
combinations which produce two different moods and which are presented using the 
standard expression.261 
Another more general feature of the language which characterises the text as didactic is 
the very frequent use made of second person singular262 and first person plural verbs.263 
Lehoux comments that, as a scientific author, Lucretius’ use of these types of verb is 
unparalleled, and he says that this is most likely due to his work being composed in verse.264 
Although the Peri Hermeneias lacks a named addressee in the way that De rerum natura 
has, the same use of second person singular verbs is a technique which is present not only 
in this text but also throughout Apuleius’ philosophical works of confirmed authenticity 
which are, of course, written not in verse but in prose. Similarly, the imperative form of the 
verb is often used to encourage participation and active involvement on the part of the 
audience.265 To the same end, the author sometimes ends a chapter by suggesting ways in 
which the audience could complete a paradigm for themselves based on the information 
he has just presented.266 Sometimes passive verbs are used which dictate the type of 
activity our author wants his audience to engage in and teach them the rules for working 
things out for themselves.267 
There are two examples in the text of rules for logical validity which are presented in the 
form of a maxim which share a similar syntactical structure. The first, which appears in 
Chapter 3, concerns the reason why indefinite propositions are considered to be equal to 
particulars but not to universals: 
‘tutius est id ex incerto accipere, quod minus est’268 
The second example occurs in Chapter 13 and also concerns a rule about the quantity of 
propositions; after noting that Aristo of Alexandria and ‘some more recent Peripatetics’ 
count five more moods than the total 28 because they count an extra mood with a 
                                                          
261 See commentary note on 207.23-24. 
262 aias (190.11-12); dicas (192.11-12); explorabis (198.16-17); convertas et subicias (205.4). 
263 meminisse debemus (204.3-6); dicamus (190.10-11); dicemus (207.14-16). 
264 Lehoux, 2013: 137, n.5. 
265 iunge (199.16-17); puta (202.4; 210.9, 10). Compare the use of the future imperative locato in 
DdS (120). Harrison, 2000: 146 points out that this type of archaic imperative is ‘particularly common 
in didactic contexts’. 
266 See, for instance, 212.1-3; 209.17-18. See also commentary note on 196.13-14. 
267 agnoscitur (193.3-4); discernitur (193.7-8). 
268 190.22-191.1. See commentary note on 190.21-191.1. 
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particular conclusion for every mood with a universal conclusion,269 the author points out 
the futility of this practice: 
‘ineptum est, cui plus concessum sit, minus concludere’270  
Another way in which the author encourages his audience to participate is through the use 
of direct, rhetorical questions.271 At one point, the author provides an explanation about 
the way in which dialectical argument takes place; he says that a question is posed, once 
the interlocutor agrees to it, the question becomes a proposition, this is joined to another, 
similarly formed proposition to form a combination which produces a conclusion. This 
technique of introducing direct questions into his exposition, therefore, not only serves to 
enhance the didactic aim of the text but also actively brings the topic of discussion, dialectic, 
to life.  
ii) Signposting techniques 
Just as the way in which the topic of predicative propositions is justified as the topic of this 
text because it is prior to and therefore a part of compound propositions,272 the transitions 
from one topic to another within the text are very clearly signposted; the language used to 
mark these transitions conveys that the points at which they occur are justified based on 
what has gone before. For example, having described the ways in which propositions vary 
in terms of quantity and quality in Chapter 3 and the subject and predicate parts in Chapter 
4, the ways in which the four different types of proposition relate to each other is set out 
in Chapter 5; the logical progression of this next step is marked out by the emphatic nunc 
with which this chapter begins and the justification for this being the correct route of 
progression is indicated by the gerund verb ‘dicendum est’.273 The same conjunction is 
coupled with the gerund ‘tradendum est’ at the beginning of Chapter 8 to introduce the 
number of combinations and moods there are in each of the three figures.274 This naturally 
follows directly after the concept of combinations ‘coniugationes’ is described in general 
terms in Chapter 7. This chapter, which also examines and explicates Aristotle’s definition 
                                                          
269 213.5-9. 
270 213.9-10. See commentary note on 213.9-10. 
271 See commentary notes on 191.7-8; 199.11-15 for the explanation about propositions which are 
based on questions which have been accepted and on 199.12-13; 201.8-11 for examples of direct 
questioning in the text. 
272 quia natura priora est ac velut elementum substitutivae (190.15-16). 
273 193.14. 
274 202.16. 
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of a syllogism,275 is brought to a close using the formulaic expression ‘ac de his satis 
dictum’276 variations of which are also found in other texts laying out logical theory.277  
 
iii) Presentation of the logical content 
The way in which the author orders the premises within each example of a syllogism is 
consistent throughout the text; in a mood with a direct conclusion, the subject term in the 
first premise appears as the subject term in the conclusion and the predicate term of the 
second premise appears as the predicate term of the conclusion. This is the opposite way 
round in a mood with an indirect conclusion. This consistency has led to criticisms from 
modern scholars; on the one hand, that the author has altered what was considered to be 
the standard order for the presentation of the premises in a syllogism,278 whereby the major 
comes before the minor, and on the other, that the author misinterprets the point he 
presents because he fails to take into account the order of premises as a factor which 
determines the different possible combinations and moods.279 Both of these criticisms are 
unfounded in terms of the way in which these modern scholars have interpreted the 
original material from which our author is drawing. For example, Patzig makes it clear that 
the order of premises as they are presented by Aristotle has no bearing on the validity of 
the syllogism, but only serves to make this validity evident.280 These criticisms are also 
unfounded because, although the author makes use of the way in which he orders the 
premises for the purpose of demonstration,281 he also makes it very clear that he does not 
consider the order of the premises within a syllogism to have any bearing on its logical 
validity.282 In light of the other factors which point towards the didactic purpose of the text, 
                                                          
275 200.10-12. 
276 202.14-15. 
277 See commentary note on 202.14-15 for examples. 
278 This view is held by Waitz as reported by Lukasiewicz, 1957: 33. See commentary note on 204.3-
6. 
279 This is a view held by Sullivan, 1967: 106. See commentary note on 208.19-23 and Rose 1966 for 
a statistical analysis of Aristotle’s presentation of the premises within syllogisms throughout the Prior 
Analytics. 
280 Patzig, 1968: 60. See commentary note on 204.3-6. 
281 For example, he describes the way in which the premises of the fourth mood also swap positions 
when they are converted to equipollent premises e.g. 204.20-205.2.  
282 This is most clear from the expression ‘licet ante abdicativa enuntietur’, which refers to the fact 
that in the combination for the sixth mood of the first figure, which consists of a universal affirmative 
and negative, the affirmative is ‘considered’ (aestimandam) first because the subject term of the 
conclusion is taken from this premise, even if the negative premise is uttered first. This phrase seems 
to be left without comment by scholars dealing with the text. See commentary note on 204.3-6; 
204.6-7. 
64 
 
the obvious reason for his consistency in this order of presentation, coupled with his 
assertion that the order does not matter, is that he is striving to present the logical doctrine 
in the most lucid way possible. The double use of second person singular verbs,283 
‘convertas et subicias’284 in this context shows that swapping the position of the premises 
while carrying out conversion, although not necessary for logical validity, is a reliable 
method for his audience to use in order to proceed with the process of conversion without 
error. 
The complete list of valid moods in each of the three figures laid out in Chapters 9-11 is 
prefaced by some general rules for logical validity in Chapter 8 for which the audience are 
prepared with the emphatic ‘demonstrabo praefatus’.285This phrase acts almost in the same 
way as the ‘signposting’ terminology described in the section above. In a similar way, the 
author forewarns his audience of his intention to discuss proof per impossibile,286 but only 
after setting out all of the valid moods in each figure. This technique of alluding to more 
complicated material, which is relevant to the point, but withholding a fuller discussion until 
a suitable point is reached is highly indicative of the elementary level of the text. As 
discussed in introduction section 6, to the same end, our author presents all of the valid 
moods in each of the three figures and then does not bring up the invalid ones until the 
final chapter where he goes through the remaining combinations and explains in each case 
why a valid conclusion does not result from these. This is in contrast to the way in which 
Aristotle, and Alexander of Aphrodisias, systematically work through all of the possible 
combinations indicating for each one whether it brings about a valid syllogism or not; in this 
way, the valid and invalid syllogisms are presented altogether. 
The above has made clear the didactic purpose of this text. Furthermore, identifying the 
text’s purpose in this way has served to explain features of the text which have been left 
unexplained in previous scholarship and for which the author has been subject to criticism; 
namely, the idiosyncratic terminology which is elucidated by the author’s method of 
defining such terms with their established cognate verbs and also the particular way in 
which he refers to and orders the premises within a syllogism, which allows the validity of 
the syllogism to be made as clear as possible in every case. 
                                                          
283 For the use of such verbs in a didactic context see n.223 above. 
284 205.4. 
285 203.3-8. 
286 207.13-15. 
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7) The debate surrounding the authenticity of the text 
The authorship of the Peri Hermeneias is the aspect of this text which has attracted the 
most attention. In spite of this, a satisfactory conclusion with regard to its authenticity is 
yet to be reached. In this section, after describing the history of this debate and its current 
state, I shall attempt to place the text within a very broad timeframe. Once this background 
has been laid out, I aim to consider the question of authenticity in light of the factors which 
have been addressed in the previous introductory sections. Although it has not been 
possible to reach a completely watertight conclusion as to whether or not this text was 
written by Apuleius I shall contribute new evidence pertaining to both sides of the debate 
which has come about as a result of preparing this commentary before making suggestions 
for how the examination of this aspect of the text may proceed with more certainty in the 
future.  
i)  The history of the debate 
As recorded by Sullivan287 and, more recently, by Moreschini,288 Hildebrand was first to 
express doubt that the Peri Hermeneias was authentically Apuleian in his edition of the 
text.289 His three main objections to the authenticity of the work can be summarised as 
follows: 
• The text has a manuscript tradition which is separate to both strands of the 
authentic Apuleian works. 
• The jejune style of the work is at odds with the authentic works. 
• The treatise presents Peripatetic and Stoic logic rather than Platonic, which we 
would expect from a Middle Platonist such as Apuleius.  
Goldbacher, who produced a subsequent edition of the text,290 agreed with Hildebrand’s 
objections and added that the use of Apuleius’ own name within the text was in bad taste 
and, therefore, serves as a further piece of evidence of its spurious origins.291 In his PhD 
thesis, Meiss provides counter-arguments to each of these points292 and argues that the 
                                                          
287 1967: 9-14. 
288 2015: 205-218. 
289 1842. 
290 1885. 
291 See commentary note on 191.18, where I discuss the reasons why this is not a valid piece of 
evidence for either side of the debate. 
292 See n.247 for the availability of Meiss’ study. 
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Peri Hermeneias is by Apuleius and ‘is a copy of a Greek original’. After Sullivan has 
presented a comprehensive account of the history of the debate up until his own time, he 
refrains from coming down on either side, but announces that he will ‘treat the Peri 
Hermeneias as if it had been written by Apuleius of Madaura’.293 Moreschini points out the 
error in holding such a contradictory position because of ‘the historical importance of 
whether or not the De interpretatione is a work of Apuleius’.294 
Since Sullivan’s book, the main works concerned with the Peri Hermeneias, and with 
Apuleius’ philosophical works more generally, continue to display a divide in opinion on this 
matter: Beaujeu, who omits the text from his edition of the philosophica, believes that ‘la 
pauvreté du contenu et surtout de notables particularités de langue interdisent d’attribuer 
ce texte à Apulée’.295 Lumpe’s view that the text is spurious is evident from the title of his 
work, Der Logik des Pseudo-Apuleius.296 Baldassarri says that ‘sembrerebbe che l'autore 
dell'opuscolo sia Apuleio e che esso debba essere considerato come il terzo libro del De 
Platone et eius dogmate’.297 Similarly, Londey and Johanson conclude ‘that there are no 
worthwhile reasons for saying… that Apuleius did not write the Peri Hermeneias’298 and cite 
a number of linguistic features of the text which they consider to be typically Apuleian in 
support of this view.299 Like Baldassarri, they also consider it to be the third book of the De 
Platone as does Sandy.300 In Harrison’s view, ‘Apuleian authorship of the Περὶ Έρμενείας is 
not … absolutely impossible’301 although he points out the difference in prose rhythm302 in 
this text compared to the authentic works and notes the distinctly smaller number of 
Apuleian-type coinages in this work compared to the others.303  Lee thinks that ‘we should 
not necessarily reject Apuleian authorship’ but that ‘the case is far from closed’.304 Fletcher 
‘agree{s} with the consensus that the Asclepius and Peri Hermeneias … are not authentic 
                                                          
293 1967: 14. 
294 2015: 211 n.118. 
295 Beaujeu, 1973: vii-viii. 
296 1982. 
297 1986: 7. 
298 1987: 19. 
299 1987: 15-17.  
300 1997: 40. 
301 2000: 12. 
302 2000: 11 n.44, see also 178-9. 
303 See n.181. 
304 2005: 11. 
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works’305 and says that his study ‘could provide some momentum to arguments that would 
reopen the authenticity debate of either work’.306 
More recently, Stover’s work on the Expositio has played a significant role in quelling 
assumptions made by previous scholars, mentioned above, that the Peri Hermeneias 
formed the third book of the De Platone.307 Although Stover does not deal with this text 
directly, he successfully proves that it definitely did not form the third book of De Platone 
since he provides a very convincing case that the text of which he has produced the first 
critical edition and commentary fits the identity of the lost third book.308 As a result, it is 
not possible that the Peri Hermeneias formed the third part of the De Platone. This is an 
important advance in the dispute surrounding the authenticity of this text. However, it does 
not preclude the possibility, as Stover acknowledges, that it was a separate treatise which 
was also written by Apuleius.  
The most recent discussion about the authenticity of the Peri Hermeneias is Moreschini’s 
study on Apuleius’ Platonism as a whole309 in which he argues that it cannot be dated before 
the fourth-century A.D.,310 and therefore, by implication, cannot be ascribed to Apuleius. 
Moreschini, who has edited the Peri Hermeneias,311 says that ‘its technical nature makes it 
inadvisable for those – like us – who are not experts to deal with the problems of content: 
for these problems, we limit ourselves here and elsewhere to what scholars of logic have 
proposed, while we will confront certain questions that do not regard the understanding of 
the work, but have considerable importance for its history’.312 This limited approach has, 
unfortunately, led Moreschini to make a number of erroneous generalisations:  
First of all, Moreschini says that ‘the logical doctrines of the De interpretatione are not those 
of the Didaskalikos of Alcinous’313 and, as further proof that it could not belong to the 
second century A.D., says that ‘the logical works taken into consideration by the Middle 
Platonists contemporary to Apuleius were the Categories of Aristotle, always read in a 
                                                          
305 2014: 1 n.2. 
306 ibid. 
307 For those who hold this view, see n.214. 
308 For the discussion on this matter see introduction section 7. 
309 2015. 
310 Moreschini, 2015: 217ff cf. Moreschini, 1966: 10, where he does not take up a position on this 
matter. 
311 For a discussion about this edition, see introduction section 3. 
312 2015: 205. 
313 2015: 204. 
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polemical light’.314 This view about the treatment of the Categories, however, is based only 
on a ‘few remaining fragments’.315 Furthermore, there is a part of this text which contains 
an allusion to the Categories and its commentary tradition in an indirect way.316  
Moreschini goes on to say that, ‘if the De interpretatione is of Apuleius, he is not interested 
in the Categories, but in Aristotle’s Περὶ Έρμενείας’.317 This assertion betrays a lack of 
familiarity, either with the contents of the Latin Peri Hermeneias or with the contents of 
Aristotle’s work of the same name. In light of the fact that Moreschini has edited the former, 
the case must be that he is unfamiliar with the contents of the latter; as discussed in section 
2 of this introduction, the contents of our text are more in line with the subject matter of 
Aristotle’s Prior Analytics than his De interpretatione, aspects of which are only briefly 
mentioned in order to lay the groundwork for the exposition of syllogistic theory and the 
topic of conversion which Aristotle discusses in the Prior Analytics. This is also exactly the 
sort of material that we find in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on Aristotle’s Prior 
Analytics 1—7. 
Lastly, Moreschini says that the author interpreted this topic ‘outside of strict Aristotelian 
exegesis, that is, with ample inclusion of Stoic logic’.318 It was demonstrated in section 4 of 
this introduction, in complete contrast to this supposition of Moreschini’s, that the Latin 
Peri Hermeneias is written in a manner which is perfectly in line with the Peripatetic 
tradition of commentaries on Aristotle’s texts. Just as we find in Alexander of Aphrodisias, 
any inclusion of Stoic logic within the text is presented with a view to refuting it. In places, 
terminology is used which may have been introduced by the Stoics but it has clearly been 
appropriated into the context of Peripatetic logic.319 
Moreschini’s study, then, represents one angle of the disparity in the treatment of this text 
as a whole; those dealing with the authenticity do not concern themselves with the subject 
matter and those dealing with the subject matter have little interest in the authorship of 
the text; the authenticity of the text is not an aspect which tends to concern those who 
come across it when dealing with other, better known texts on syllogistic logic or with logic 
                                                          
314 2015: 205. 
315 2015: 205. 
316 See introduction section 4, and commentary note on 206.3-5. 
317 2015: 205. 
318 2015: 205. 
319 For example, indemonstrabilis (206.1-2), which corresponds to the, originally Stoic, Greek 
ἀναπóδεικτος, for which, see Barnes et al., 1991: 21. 
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as an area of philosophy. In works such as these, it is usually simply noted in the briefest 
terms for providing an example which is comparable to a variety of other texts which is 
representative of the main topic of discussion. The authenticity of the work, however, an 
aspect which preoccupies those who deal with Apuleius’ work more generally, but such 
studies largely neglect to include a detailed discussion about the text itself due to its highly 
technical subject matter.320 It is also considered by those who treat the text itself but in 
isolation from comparable texts dealing with the same topic.321 As discussed in section 4 of 
this introduction, however, the numerous similarities between the text and the 
commentary on the Prior Analytics by Alexander of Aphrodisias have made it possible to 
suggest, albeit in rather broad terms, the milieu to which the text belonged. 
 
ii) The possible timeframe for the composition of the work 
It was previously suggested that the text must have been composed after Gellius’ Noctes 
Atticae owing to the way in which Gellius talks about his own experience of learning logic, 
which suggests that a text like the Latin Peri Hermeneias was not in existence at this time.322 
We must also conclude that the text has to have been written before Cassiodorus’ time in 
the sixth century since he mentions Apuleius and the Peri Hermeneias by name in his 
Institutiones.323 Martianus Capella is one of the six authors included by Sullivan in his 
discussion about the influence that Peri Hermeneias had on later authors and their works.324 
Since I am less certain than Sullivan about the appropriateness of attributing the work to 
Apuleius and since the above has shown that it is possible that Peri Hermeneias may have 
been composed later than the second century A.D., in this section, I aim to explore the 
possibility that, not only was Peri Hermeneias not written by Apuleius, but also that it was 
not written in the second century A.D. at all. In this way, rather than Martianus Capella 
borrowing from the Peri Hermeneias when composing De Arte Dialectica, as has been 
                                                          
320 For example, Harrison, 2000: 12; Fletcher, 2014: 1 n.2; Moreschini, 2015: 205. 
321 This is the case for Sullivan, 1967 and Londey and Johanson, 1987. 
322 For an estimation of the date of publication of Noctes Atticae see n.138. 
323 Inst.2.3.12. 
324 Sullivan, 1967: 170-208. He also discusses the influence the work had on Cassiodorus, Isidore of 
Seville, Alcuin and Charles the Great, Dunchad, Pseudo-John Scotus Erigena, and Remigius of 
Auxerre. He then discusses the text more generally in the ninth and tenth centuries. My own 
discussion in this section is limited to Martianus Capella, whose work, being the closest possible in 
terms of chronological proximity to the Peri Hermeneias, serves my purpose of setting this text within 
a plausible timeframe. 
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assumed by Sullivan, I explore the possibility that this work was a source for Peri 
Hermeneias.  
The first, face-value, factor which raises suspicion that Peri Hermeneias does not predate 
Martianus Capella is that, as Sullivan himself points out, ‘Martianus does not acknowledge 
Apuleius’s treatise as his source; but that, and how he takes much of his doctrine from the 
Peri Hermeneias, or an intermediate work, can be shown through a brief description of the 
middle of De Arte Dialectica.’325 In response to the first part of this statement, it seems to 
me that this is an unexplained exception; Martianus is very much in the habit of crediting 
his other sources.326 
The main factor which is indicative of the chronological differences between the two texts 
is their differences in terminology, some of which will now be discussed. 
Sullivan points out that Martianus ‘uses proloquium instead of propositio to denote a 
proposition’ and that ‘this is one of the relatively few differences in terminology between 
Martianus and Apuleius.’327 Sullivan goes on to list three more differences in the 
terminology used in each of the works: ‘Martianus uses forma instead of formula, 
syllogismus for collectio, in quo conficitur in place of qui conducit, etc.’328 His use of ‘etc.’ 
indicates that this is not an exhaustive list, indeed, sumptum is a term which is used by 
Martianus but which does not appear anywhere in Peri Hermeneias, and there are also 
differences in the way in which the term illatio is used in each of the texts. What follows is 
a discussion about the use of each of these terms in Martianus Capella and, where there is 
one, their corresponding term in Peri Hermeneias. 
proloquium for propositio: Martianus, in fact, uses both proloquium and propositio a similar 
number of times.329 He uses propositio 18 times.330  proloquium is also mentioned in the 
                                                          
325 Sullivan, 1967: 171. 
326 See for instance, Aristotle 327, Stoics 327, Cicero passim. It is not, of course, common practice for 
ancient authors to always credit their sources. Apuleius himself, for instance, neglects to refer to any 
named source in the philosophical works more firmly attributed to him. It is significant however that, 
in this work at least, Martianus’ practice is to cite authors from whom he has drawn heavily. 
327 Sullivan, 1967: 171 n.7. 
328 Sullivan, 1967: 172. 
329 According to the Library of Latin Texts, there is a total of 20 uses of proloquium and 18 of 
propositio.  
330 Twice in 414; 416; five times in 422; 506; 544; 553; 554; twice in 555; 561; 562; 563; and 716. 
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Peri Hermeneias as the term which Varro chooses to express ‘quae pronuntiabilis 
appellatur’.331 
forma for formula: Martianus also uses formula twice in 328. This use, however, falls 
outside the middle portion of De Arte IV in which, according to Sullivan, Martianus is 
borrowing from Peri Hermeneias.332 Ferré however, suggests that Martianus ‘joue sur le mot 
‘formula’, ‘petite forme’ ou ‘statuette’, et aussi ‘formule’ de syllogisme,’ and cites 
d’Auxerre’s comment on the same passage, ‘potest et ita accipi ut per formulas intelligatur 
propositio.’333 Cassiodorus334 and Boethius,335 who both post-date Martianus Capella, both 
use formula rather than forma, in the same, technical sense as it is found in Peri 
Hermeneias, and use forma in a more general sense. The author’s choice of formula over 
forma in Peri Hermeneias could be an indication of the intended audience of the piece;336 
this is one of a number of examples of terminology in the piece which is also found in a legal 
context.337 
syllogismus for collectio: syllogismus is used frequently by Aulus Gellius338 showing that it 
was a familiar term in the second century A.D. It does not, however, appear anywhere in 
Peri Hermeneias, which we could reasonably expect it to; collectio, which is the alternative 
term used throughout, is, as Ferré points out, a direct calque from syllogismus.339 
sumptum: The use of this term as a substantive is unique to Martianus according to Ferré340 
and appears to mean a ‘premise’ which has been accepted by the interlocutor.341 The 
cognate verb form of the term is used in Cicero’s De Inventione;342 Martianus refers to this 
work explicitly by name343 which, as mentioned above, makes it clear that he is using it as a 
source. It is often clear in the authentically Apuleian philosophical works that, despite 
leaving him unacknowledged, Apuleius is borrowing from Cicero for his own work as there 
                                                          
331 190.2-3. 
332 393-413. See note 286. 
333 Ferré, 2007: 69 n.19. 
334 See esp. Inst.2.3.12. 
335 See esp. In Arist. Peri Herm. 1.1.30-33. 
336 L&S s.v. esp. IV ‘formula for regulating judicial proceedings’, B1 ‘a lawsuit’, ‘action’, ‘process’. 
Similarly, Boethius uses formula in a legal sense (in Cic. Top. 1.9; 4.33-34) as well as in a logical sense.  
337 See introduction section 5 n.176 for a comment about the use of legal language in this text. 
338 N.A.1.2.4; 5.11.8; 5.15.32; 15.26.1,2; 15.32.13. 
339 Ferré, 2007: 113 n.251. See also Quint.Inst.9.2.103, in which he shows that collectio is the 
standard Latin term for syllogismus. 
340 Not to be confused with sumptus-us which means ‘sum (of money)’. 
341 404: cum concessa fuit, ‘sumptum’ dicitur. cf. the definition of acceptio in our text (199.11-14). 
342 ‘quod pro credibili sumptum erit.’ De inv.1.80. 
343 399: ‘Hac conversione usus est in Rhetoricis Cicero’. 
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are a number of philosophical terms coined in Cicero which do not appear elsewhere until 
Apuleius.344 The author of Peri Hermeneias refers to that which is labelled sumptum in 
Cicero and Martianus Capella as acceptio. This is one of only two terms from this work which 
is also found in Cicero’s writing on logic.345 In light of this, if it is the case that Apuleius did 
write Peri Hermeneias, this work would be an unexplained exception to his standard 
practice of using Ciceronian vocabulary freely. 
illatio: Martianus uses the term only six times, including an occurrence where he clarifies 
the difference between this term and sumptum. Since this word appears very frequently in 
Peri Hermeneias,346 it seems strange that if, as Sullivan maintains, Martianus was using this 
work as a source, the term illatio should appear so infrequently. This is particularly the case 
since Martianus’ rather minimal usage of this term is starkly contrasted by that of 
Cassiodorus in Institutiones. Cassiodorus explicitly states that he is using Peri Hermeneias347 
and uses the term more or less as many times as it appears in our text.348 
The similarities in language used at the beginning of Peri Hermeneias Chapter 8 and in De 
Arte 4.410 show quite clearly either that a direct borrowing is taking place or that they are 
sharing a common source. 
‘Nunc tradendum est, quibus modis et coniugationibus fiant intra certum numerum 
praedicativi generis verae conclusiones. quippe in prima formula novem soli moduli, 
sex autem coniugationes reperiuntur ; in secunda quattuor moduli, tres 
coniugationes ; in tertia sex moduli, coniugationes quinque.’349 
‘Nunc dicendum est singulae formae quot modos recipiant. Nam recipiunt intra 
certum numerum, extra quos modos quicquid conclusum fuerit non est temere 
concedendum.  Recipit autem prima novem modos, secunda quattuor, tertia sex.’350 
                                                          
344 For example, medietas, excandescentia, universa virtus, modice temperatum, ille heros (Plato), 
conservatrix, meditullio, fatuitas. For further details about the similarities between Cicero and 
Apuleius and the way in which the latter borrows from and emulates the former, see introduction 
section 5ii. 
345 Top. 37. The other Ciceronian term, negatio, appears in Chapter 5. For which, see commentary 
note on 196.9-11. 
346 30 occurrences listed in the Library of Latin Texts. 
347 See n.172. 
348 There are 28 occurrences recorded in the Library of Latin Texts. 
349 202.16-203.3. 
350 De Arte 4.410. 
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The choice of the verb ‘trado’ in Peri Hermeneias suggests that this information did not 
originate with the author who is delivering it here, but that he is handing down something 
which existed previously; 351 this is in contrast to the use of dico in the corresponding 
passage which tends to have a more general meaning, and is more commonly used when 
the information which is being delivered ‘belongs’ to or originated with the subject.352 This 
nuance hints towards the possibility suggested above that the author of Peri Hermeneias is 
relaying information which has already been stated by Martianus Capella. Note, however, 
that our author and Alexander of Aphrodisias distinguish combinations from full moods or 
types of syllogisms whereas Martianus Capella simply counts the complete moods. 
The differences between these two texts discussed here lead to the same conclusion as 
Moreschini reached after highlighting some anachronistic vocabulary in the Peri 
Hermeneias;353 the specific terminology used throughout the Peri Hermeneias is more in 
line with a date later than the second century A.D. As demonstrated in the previous section, 
this text shares so many striking similarities in terms of content and exposition with 
Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics that the two texts must 
have belonged to the same broad milieu. It was not possible, however, to say whether our 
text came before or after Alexander’s commentary; the linguistic evidence which has been 
analysed here suggests that it came after. 
iii) New arguments concerning the authenticity of the text 
Thus far, arguments concerning the authenticity of the Peri Hermeneias have tended to 
focus on the linguistic style of the text. The prose rhythm of the text has been treated as a 
reason for disputing its authenticity; Peri Hermeneias shows the cursus technique unlike De 
Platone and De Mundo, in which the cursus mixtus is employed.354 As Oberhelman and Hall 
have shown, however, this is not a reliable method of determining the authenticity of any 
given work as a number of authors employ different rhythms in different works.355 In some 
                                                          
351 OLD s.v. trado, esp. sense 4: ‘To hand down, bequeath,’ and sense 10a: ‘To hand down or pass on 
(information etc.), ‘relate’; ‘tell of’ cf. L&S s.v.2a, b ‘To hand down or transmit to posterity by written 
communication.’ See Cic. De inv. 2.1.3 for an example of the term being used in a similar context. 
352 OLD s.v. dico all senses. 
353 See n.216.  
354 Harrison, 2000: 11 n.44. 
355 1985: 224, ‘While our research so far sheds no light on the question of the possible spuriousness 
of the De mundo and the De Platone, we can at least discount a reservation about their authenticity 
which is based solely on the argument that the genuine works of Apuleius employ a purely metrical 
system for we have detected differing rhythmical styles in the works of Lactantius, Jerome, Ambrose, 
and Augustine’. 
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cases, as mentioned in relation to Hildebrand’s view above, the technical and perceived dry 
style of the work has been used to argue against authentic Apuleian authorship. In other 
cases, particular features of the text have been picked out as being representative of 
Apuleius’ style and used as evidence that the work was his.356 In section 5 of this 
introduction in which I discussed the introduction and use of terminology in this text, I 
argued that style cannot be used as evidence of authorship because this is something which 
could be easily emulated. Furthermore, the style of a logical text such as this is bound to be 
more reflective of its content than of any particular author.357 
Since arguments which have proceeded in this way have thus far proved to be unfruitful, I 
now aim to consider the authenticity of the text from the point of view of content rather 
than style; this is an aspect which has been neglected by those concerned with the 
authenticity of the text in the past.358 Although this approach will not allow a definitive 
conclusion to be made about Apuleian authorship, it will highlight previously unexplored 
features which allow us to weigh up the possibility that such a text could have been 
composed against a Middle Platonist background of the second century A.D.  
The identity of the character ‘Sergius’, introduced in Chapter 1, is the first aspect of the 
text, chronologically speaking, which invites speculation about the dating of the work.359 
The best known Sergius, as far as modern scholarship is concerned at least, is the late fourth 
or early fifth-century grammarian. There is also, however, the first-century ‘Sergius Plautus’ 
who is referred to as ‘Plautus’ in Quintilian.360 The term the author ascribes to Sergius has 
its first appearance in Cicero: 
‘ubi est illa definitio, effatum esse id quod aut verum aut falsum sit?’361 
                                                          
356 For example, see commentary note on 189.4-8 which points out Prantl’s view that the lengthy list 
of gerunds at the beginning of the work is characteristic of Apuleian style. See above for other 
features of the text which Londey and Johanson claim to be evidence of Apuleian authorship. 
357 I have identified a number of other points in the text which could be construed as Apuleian in 
style, for which see commentary notes on the use of hair as an analogy for useless parts of speech 
(192.4); the use of language which is also found in the De mundo (192.5-6); the use of litotes (193.15-
16); and the use of diminutives (201.4-5). However, I do not wish to use these examples towards an 
argument for or against authenticity for the reasons already mentioned. 
358 Moreschini, 2015: 205. 
359 See commentary note on 190.4-5. 
360 Inst. 2.14.2; 3.6.23; 10.1.124. 
361 Luc. 95.  
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Seneca also uses the term effatum as one of a number of synonyms for something which is 
‘enuntiativus’: 
‘Non corpus' inquit ‘est, quod nunc loquor, sed enuntiativum quiddam de corpore, 
quod alii effatum vocant, alii enuntiatum, alii dictum’.362 
It is possible that Seneca could be referring to ‘some Stoics’ and ‘other Stoics’ here. It seems 
strange that a ‘Stoic philosopher of the first-century A.D.’363 would not be mentioned by 
Seneca at all. However, it is entirely possible that Sergius’ life post-dates Seneca’s death in 
65 A.D; if this is the same Sergius Plautus, to whom Quintilian refers, usually simply as 
‘Plautus’, he would surely have to belong to the second half of the first century A.D.364 In 
Quintilian’s work, Sergius is only once referred to as ‘Sergius Plautus’ and not even on the 
first occurrence of his name. It is possible that, if the author is referring to the same person 
here, he used his nomen rather than his cognomen to avoid confusion with Titus Maccius 
Plautus. This confusion surrounding the identity of Sergius in the Peri Hermeneias could 
easily be avoided if he qualified Sergius as a Stoic as Quintilian does. Elsewhere in this text, 
authors who are mentioned are explicitly associated with their philosophical school.365  
There is a similar passage in Noctes Atticae where Aulus Gellius lists the terms used by 
certain Latin writers for the Greek term ἀξίωμα;366 as in Peri Hermeneias Cicero and Varro 
are mentioned alongside their respective terms but Sergius is not. The exact extent of ‘all’ 
the evidence to which Barnes refers when he says that ‘Sergius Plautus is generally dated 
to the first century A.D.; but in truth all our evidence is consistent with a date in the first 
century B.C.’,367 is unclear, that is to say, whether he has identified more than the 
references from Quintilian mentioned above. We can only speculate on the identity of 
Sergius in this context as the limited evidence is far from conclusive. The possibility that this 
Sergius is entirely unknown to us ought not to be discounted.  
                                                          
362 Ep. 117.13. 
363 Londey and Johanson, 1987: 76. 
364 Quintilian 35-c.90 A.D (OCD). 
365 See e.g. ‘licet Antipatro Stoico,’ (200.16-17), ‘Aristoteles… Theophrastus et ceteri quinque 
enumerant.’ (212.12-13), and ‘Aristo autem Alexandrinus et nonnulli Peripatetici iuniores’ (213.5-6). 
The example ‘Apuleio … philosophum Platonicum Madaurensem’ (192.11) is also a case of this. 
366 N.A.16.8. 
367 Barnes, 1997: 4 n.14. 
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As described above, both Gellius and the author ascribe the term proloquium to Varro but, 
whereas in Peri Hermeneias Cicero is said to have called the same thing enuntiatum, Gellius 
says the following: 
a M. autem Cicerone, “pronuntiatum,” quo ille tamen vocabulo tantisper uti se 
adtestatus est, “quoad melius,” inquit, “invenero.” (NA.16.8.8). 
pronuntiatum is not a Ciceronian coinage, although he is the first to use the term in this 
context, which accounts for his dissatisfaction with it. The anecdote to which Gellius is 
referring occurs in Tusc.1.14 where Cicero offers the term as a makeshift translation of 
ἀξίωμα. It is worth pointing out here that Gellius is only dealing with the term ἀξίωμα and 
its Latin equivalents, not πρότασις as our author is: ‘Graeci πρότασιν tum ἀξίωμα’.368  
In the context of describing the tripartition of philosophy, the author uses the phrase 
‘plerisque videtur’369 which suggests that by this time, whether in the second century A.D. 
or later, this tripartition of the areas of philosophy was no longer exclusive to the Stoics. 
This is in contrast to the division of philosophy, which is accompanied by the emphatic hinc 
ordiemur in the De Platone.370 This suggests that either the order of philosophical topics no 
longer held any significance by the time the Peri Hermeneias was written, or that the author 
of this work did not feel the need to associate himself strongly with a particular division. 
Whatever the case may be, this evidence suggests that it is doubtful that this was written 
by the same author as the De Platone, or even around the same time. 
Where the author gives an example of the way in which either the subject part or the 
predicate part of a proposition may be extended into multiple words, he represents 
‘Apuleius’ as ‘philosophum platonicum Madaurensem’.371 The use of this epithet is present 
in epigraphical evidence in the form of the base of a statue which, according to its location 
and date and the absence of a more obvious candidate, is presumed to be dedicated to 
Apuleius. Gaisser suggests that it was erected ‘either in his lifetime or not long afterward’.372  
In terms of textual evidence, this lengthy designation is more similar to descriptions of 
Apuleius found in later works by other authors than in Apuleius’ own texts, for example, he 
                                                          
368 190.5-6. 
369 189.1-2. 
370 92.1. See also commentary note on 189.1-3. 
371 192.11. See also commentary note on 192.11. 
372 Gaisser, 2014: 55. 
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is called ‘platonicus Apuleius’ by Augustine,373 ‘Apuleius Madaurensis’ by Cassiodorus374 and 
he is referred to as ‘platonicus philosophus Apuleius’  in the Anonymi Contra philosophos.375 
Collectively, these references suggest that the epithet used here is an amalgam of all those 
by which Apuleius has been known but after his own lifetime. 
Sandy has commented that the kind of education Gellius and Apuleius would have had at 
roughly the same time, whether actually both under Calvenus Taurus or not, would have 
been ossified and would have been based on a rather standardised curriculum: it is implied 
that this curriculum contained logic in some form. In terms of this area of their education, 
he comments that ‘the impression that emerges is that of two enthusiastic but puzzled 
amateurs doing their best to combine the difficult and imperfectly understood lectures that 
they attended in Athens with equally confusing and even contradictory written treatises 
and attempting to produce a coherent amalgam from these divergent sources’.376  Gellius 
in fact describes his experiences studying logic rather briefly at N.A.16.8. That the respective 
works of each author are the results of a similar education is reflected in the number of 
similarities in language the two authors share when discussing matters related to physics 
and ethics. Three examples of this would be their use of the terms disparilitas,377 
inconcinnitas378 and incorporeum;379 the last of these is a particular point of interest in 
terms of the development of Latin philosophical language since Gellius uses this term as an 
example of a Latin coinage from a Greek term: 
‘vetus atque perpetua quaestio inter nobilissimos philosophorum agitata est, 
corpusne sit vox an incorporeum. hoc enim vocabulum quidam finxerunt proinde 
quod Graece dicitur ἀσώματον’ (NA.15.5.1-2). 
In light of the examples above and the fact that both authors supposedly studied the same 
topics in a similar way, it is striking that, other than the introductory section of Peri 
Hermeneias,  there is no such similarity between the parts of the works ascribed to each 
author which deal with logic or dialectic. It is also interesting that, whereas Gellius says that 
                                                          
373 C.D.8.14; 10.27. 
374 Inst.2.3.18; 2.4.7; 2.5.10. 
375 Disp.4.542. 
376 See n.106. 
377 De Plat. 115.1; N.A.3.1.15; 6.3.47. 
378 De Plat.115.1; N.A.2.26.4. 
379 De Plat.92.8; 93.9; 101.7; N.A.5.15.1. 
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Cicero called an axiom, ‘pronuntiatum’,380  our author says ‘Cicero enuntiatum’.381 This was 
the improved term found in De Fato, which Cicero promised in the earlier Tusc.1.14. Gellius 
cites ‘quoad melius…invenero,’ in our text, Cicero actually says, ‘si…’: ‘if he could find a 
better one.’ It is possible that the author of Peri Hermeneias was aware that enuntiatum 
was the improved form of the term which Gellius cites. Also, as discussed in the previous 
section, Gellius’ initiation into logical study is distinctly Stoic in its roots382 to such an extent 
that it seems that a text like the Latin Peri Hermeneias was not available to him. Even if the 
text itself was not available to Gellius, if the Peri Hermeneias were written by Apuleius, the 
ideas contained within the text themselves would surely have been available to Gellius but 
there is no sign in his Noctes Atticae that they were. 
As discussed above, Moreschini says that the presentation of logic in this text and in 
Alcinous’ Didaskalikos is at odds and therefore suggests that the two texts are not 
contemporary with each other in the way that the Didaskalikos is with the De Platone.383 At 
this point, I wish to highlight a number of features of the text which, to my knowledge have 
not been previously discussed collectively, and could be considered to have their origins in 
the Middle Platonist tradition. 
The most explicit of these is the reference to Plato’s Theaetetus at the beginning of Chapter 
4.384 The passage concerned385 also brings to mind a passage from the subsequent dialogue, 
the Sophist, in which the same noun and verb distinction is discussed but in more detail.386 
Londey and Johanson have suggested that the author was confusing the Theaetetus with 
the Sophist, in which Theaetetus appears as a character, assuming that he must have meant 
to refer to the more comprehensive discussion of the topic found in the latter.387 Dillon, 
however, has discussed the importance of the Theaetetus to the Middle Platonists with 
regard to logical doctrine;388 the anonymous commentator on the Theaetetus, for instance, 
                                                          
380 N.A.16.8.8. 
381 190.5. 
382 His main points of reference in N.A.16.8 are Varro and Aelius Stilo who, Cicero tells us (Brut.206), 
belonged to the Stoic school. 
383 A comparative study of these two texts with a view to identifying a common source has been 
carried out by Göransson, 1995. 
384 191.16. 
385 Theaet.206d. 
386 Soph.261-262.  
387 1987: 84 n.2. 
388 Dillon, 1993: 61; 172. For details see commentary notes on 191.16; 191.16-17. See also Fletcher, 
2014: 28, 254, who also discusses the significant role held by the Theaetetus in Middle Platonic 
doctrine; cf. Tarrant, 1983, who argues that the date of the anonymous commentary on the 
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recognises the use of the third syllogistic figure in this dialogue.389 These factors suggest 
that referring to the Theaetetus at this point was not necessarily accidental as Londey and 
Johanson suggest; it could be indicative of the Platonic leanings of the author of our text. 
The similarities and differences between Martianus Capella’s book on syllogistic theory and 
the Latin Peri Hermeneias were described above. There is, however, another difference to 
mention which puts our text closer in line with the Platonic tradition than with Martianus’ 
text: in the context of the description of indefinite terms, after saying that they do not 
define what something is, our author describes them in the following way: 
‘sed tantum ostendunt aliud praeter hoc esse’390 
 Martianus only says that indefinites say what something is not, and not what it is.391 The 
way in which our author adds that they show that the designated term is ‘something other’ 
than this corresponds to the analysis of the negative particle ‘not’ in the Sophist. In the 
same way as indefinite terms in our text designate ‘something other’, the negative 
(ἀπόφασις) is described as indicating only ‘something different’ to the words to which it is 
prefixed and not ‘the opposite’.392 
In light of these Platonic examples, the author’s use of pugna in the context of propositions 
which are contrary or contradictory393 is worth pointing out in terms of how this type of 
language fits into a Platonic setting. Londey and Johanson believe that the term pugna 
reflects a ‘Stoic way of viewing relations between propositions’.394 Although Londey and 
Johanson have acknowledged the polemical way in which the author treats the Stoics 
throughout the rest of the work elsewhere,395 they do not attempt to justify this 
uncontroversial use of what they perceive to be Stoic language here.396 Of course, it must 
be taken into account that the nomenclature of argument and of battle inevitably has 
overlaps, but in light of the Platonic allusions described above in relation to the Theaetetus 
                                                          
Theaetetus must be before the second century A.D. because the interests reflected in its fragments 
are more in line with earlier philosophical activity.  
389 Dillon, 1977: 279 n.1. 
390 193.13. 
391 399. For which, see commentary note on 193.12-13. 
392 Soph.257b9-4c2. See commentary note on 193.12-13. 
393 194.4-5. 
394 1984: 172. 
395 1987: 113-118. 
396 See commentary note on 194.4-5. 
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and the Sophist, it is tempting to see the use of pugna in this text as picking up on the 
metaphors of fighting which are present throughout this pair of dialogues.397  
It is clear from the above that the treatment, both direct and indirect, of Platonic material 
found in the Peri Hermeneias, which does not appear to have been considered before, could 
well have fitted into a Middle Platonic context. The next question to ask based on this is 
whether or not it could reasonably belong to Apuleius. There is no conclusive evidence, 
either in this text or in any other, to entirely discount this possibility. One minor piece of 
evidence which has recently come to light which could support Apuleian authorship in light 
of these Platonic features arises in the newly edited Expositio; a synopsis of the Sophist 
appears in this text illustrating Plato’s treatment of dialectic in which it is said that ‘definit 
deinde orationem et ait complecti eam nomina et verba’.398 This, of course, matches the 
citation not to the Sophist, but to the Theaetetus in Chapter 4 discussed above even in terms 
of the use of the verb ait referring to Plato. This, however, is far from conclusive and cannot 
usefully be added to any other evidence to form a strong case for Apuleian authorship. 
iv) Conclusions 
The factors which I have taken into consideration when examining the authenticity of this 
text have not provided a completely conclusive account but they have, nevertheless, 
provided some new angles to the debate. The main outcome is that the linguistic evidence 
and the content of the work present opposing cases; the linguistic evidence is better placed 
to argue against Apuleian authorship and for a composition date later than the second 
century A.D., but before the mid sixth century A.D. On the other hand, the Platonic aspects 
of the text described above show that it is not beyond the realms of reason to date the 
work to the second century A.D. 
It was shown in section 4 of this introduction that the nature of the similarities between 
Alexander and Peri Hermeneias are not such that they can be suggestive of a date for our 
work; as was discussed in this section, it is chronologically possible that the wealth of 
material upon which Alexander was drawing would also have been available to an author 
in the second century A.D., whether Apuleius or not. It is also possible, however, that the 
Peri Hermeneias was composed after Alexander’s commentary. Although this aspect of the 
                                                          
397 For a detailed discussion about Plato’s elaborate use of combat and battle as a metaphor in the 
Theaetetus and in the Sophist see Herrmann, 1995. 
398 Expositio 30.16. 
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work has not given us a clear view about the date of the work, it has given us a very clear 
view about the milieu to which it belongs which has not been the case in the previous major 
works on the text.  
Although my conclusion regarding the authenticity of the text has resulted in aporia, the 
above analyses have provided a clear idea about the way in which the study of this aspect 
of the text ought to proceed. The success with which Stover has ascertained the Apuleian 
authorship of the Expositio using computational analysis399 suggests that the same 
procedure could effectively be carried out on the Peri Hermeneias. My attempt at such an 
analysis on a much more modest scale, which was discussed in section 5, I hope has shown 
that this would be a worthwhile endeavour. Affirming or denying authenticity in this way 
ought to provide greater support for assessing manuscript readings when taking into 
account all known manuscripts of the text as I suggested in section 3 of this introduction. 
Thomsen-Thörnqvist discusses the loss of features of Boethius’ style due to inexpert scribal 
copies of his works;400 knowledge about the authorship of the Peri Hermeneias, one way or 
another, ought to assist in the restoration, of any currently covert stylistic features and 
therefore help this text to avoid suffering the same fate. Having said this, it may be the case 
that the text will require the editorial work described above before undergoing such 
computational analysis in order for this to be carried out effectively. It is not clear to me at 
this stage which of these tasks should be undertaken next; it would seem to be the case 
that, in fact, each one would benefit the undertaking of the other. At any rate, it is clear 
that establishing the text and examining its language through computational analysis are 
the next logical steps in ascertaining its authenticity.  
  
                                                          
399 See introduction section 5. 
400 2016: 373. 
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8) The aim of this commentary  
 
The initial aim of this commentary was to explore the use of Latin logical terminology 
throughout this text as a means of determining its place in the development of logic more 
accurately than has been done previously. In this respect the intended outcome was to 
verify and, where necessary, to correct the generalisations and hypotheses which had been 
proposed by the four previous studies.401 Broadly speaking, these hypotheses relate either 
to the meaning of the content of the text, or to the meaning of the author’s particular use 
of terminology, or even to the authorship of the text; the authors of three out of four402 of 
the main works take it for granted that this work was written by Apuleius and therefore 
that it is necessarily fixed to a date of composition in the second century A.D. Furthermore, 
these works are all presented in monograph form which rely on the earlier of the two 
modern editions of the text, Thomas’s 1908 Teubner edition. For my own commentary, I 
have used Moreschini’s 1991 Teubner edition, which, in fact, other than including readings 
from a handful of manuscripts omitted by Thomas, does not differ from the earlier edition 
in any significant way.403 The close reading of the text which was necessary for the 
commentary form of this thesis allowed the conclusions presented throughout this 
introduction to be brought to light. This commentary, therefore, serves to provide detailed 
evidence for these conclusions which, in summary, are as follows: 
i) The number of similarities between Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentaries 
and this text very strongly suggests that the author made use of a Greek source. 
The order of composition matches Alexander’s commentary on Aristotle’s Prior 
Analytics so closely that it is more than likely that he was following a single 
source and not using, ‘a patchwork method of composition’ as Sandy and 
others suggest.404 I do not firmly propose that the author of the Peri 
Hermeneias used Alexander of Aphrodisias as his source; a small number of 
differences between the two texts could be considered to be indications that 
each text represents a slightly different stage in the development of logic. 
Nevertheless, in the absence of greater evidence, I would not discount it as one 
                                                          
401 See p6-9. 
402 The exception is Lumpe, 1982: 18-19, who believes that the work was more likely to have been 
written by a fourth-century grammarian. 
403 This matter was discussed in introduction section 3. 
404 See n.106 and n.107. 
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possibility. Another possibility would be that the author was using a source 
which predated Alexander but which Alexander made use of himself, such as 
the works of his teacher Herminus, who is known to have written similar 
commentaries on Aristotle’s texts.405 In which case, it is perfectly possible that 
the author of this text was Apuleius. At any rate, in light of the comparable 
order of exposition in Alexander and in our text, it is preferable to posit one 
source which is no longer extant rather than a number of such sources. 
ii) The introduction of new terminology throughout the text is extremely well 
thought out and is very formulaic in its presentation. The style of terminology 
itself differs from that which we find in the De Platone; a text of a similarly 
technical nature which is considered to be genuinely Apuleian. In the Peri 
Hermeneias the purpose of the neologisms is always clear and is rarely added 
purely for variatio or any other kind of literary display. It could be said to be 
Aristotelian in that it shares common features with Alexander of Aphrodisias, 
who can be treated as representative of the Aristotelian commentary tradition. 
The non-technical style of much of the new terminology introduced is indicative 
of the didactic purpose of the text. Based on these findings, a glossary of terms 
is included as Appendix B. My examination of the way in which the author 
sometimes uses two different terms for different aspects of the same logical 
feature has allowed me to correct parts of Londey and Johanson’s glossary 
where they consider two such terms to be entirely synonymous. Furthermore, 
the numerous close parallels which I have identified between this text and 
Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on the Prior Analytics have provided 
strong grounds in many cases for positing a more suitable Greek equivalent to 
the Latin terms than Baldassarri has given, thus making it clearer how this text 
relates to the Greek tradition. 
iii) The main purpose of this text is didactic as opposed to literary display. This 
is in contrast to the Apuleian De Platone which shares some didactic features, 
but linguistic creativity is an at least equal consideration in this text whereas in 
the Peri Hermeneias this holds a less significant role than the purpose of 
educating beginners in logic. The examination of this aspect of the text, which 
                                                          
405 Lumpe, 1982: 24 suggests Herminus as a possible source for the author’s treatment of the five 
types of predicables. See commentary note on 197.10-13. 
84 
 
has not, to my knowledge, been considered before, has provided a satisfactory 
explanation for the author’s use of idiosyncratic terminology and for his 
particular method for ordering premises within syllogisms in his work neither, 
of which have previously been accounted for in a satisfactory manner. 
iv) The factors which may be considered in relation to the authorship of the 
text present a divisive conclusion. Whereas those considering the authenticity 
of the text in the past have tended to focus on stylistic aspects of the text, such 
as language which may or may not be seen as typically Apuleian, I have worked 
on the assumption that this is not a reliable indicator of authorship as such 
stylistic features would be easily imitable. The discussions in sections 2 and 5 
of this introduction concluded that the material covered in the text could 
plausibly have belonged to the second century A.D. and that, therefore, 
Apuleian authorship is not entirely impossible. On the other hand, I agree with 
Moreschini’s conclusion406 that the language used in this text is more in line 
with a date later than the second century A.D. It is surely the case that evidence 
of this nature carries more weight than the content of the work when 
establishing its date and that arguments based on content cannot be made with 
as much authority. It is possible that the logical material available to an author 
writing in the fourth-century A.D. would also have been available to an author 
in the second century A.D. but the same cannot reasonably be said for the 
language used to compose the text. Examination of the work with regard to its 
authenticity has suffered in the past due to the fact that, often, those dealing 
with this question do not fully take the logical content into account407 and those 
who have examined the content in the past have had to rely on an insufficiently 
coherent text. Since my comparison with Alexander of Aphrodisias’ 
commentary has served to make the text more coherent and since I have 
considered the question of authenticity from the point of view of both language 
and content, the following tentative conclusion about this aspect of the work 
has been reached: the Middle Platonic content of the work could plausibly have 
its origins in a Greek text from the second century A.D. which served as a source 
for our text.408 Although there are certain features of this text which are 
                                                          
406 See n.216 and n.217. 
407 See n.320. 
408 Herminus was suggested as a possible source above.  
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considered to be Apuleian in style, their use in this context, I would argue, is 
un-Apuleian and is more likely to be an example of imitation of Apuleian style 
rather than Apuleius writing himself. Moreschini’s analysis of the language 
used within the text complements these two factors in showing that the text 
was composed after the second century A.D. and, therefore, by an author other 
than Apuleius. In light of Stover’s recent, successful use of computational 
analysis on the Expositio to determine that this text was written by Apuleius 
with more or less complete certainty, I suggest that this is the next logical step 
to take with the text of the Peri Hermeneias to provide more certainty for this 
conclusion. 
Such conclusions could not have been reached without the close reading of the text 
required by a line-by-line commentary which is the form that the rest of this thesis takes 
and is, to my knowledge, the first such commentary on this text to be produced.409 As well 
as these conclusions, this particular methodology has also led to another outcome; it has 
become clear that the state of the text as it has been presented in the two modern editions 
is not fit for purpose but there is scope for it to be rehabilitated into a more coherent form. 
This commentary takes guidance from Greek sources, such as Alexander of Aphrodisias, in 
order to suggest more plausible readings and conjectures to the most opaque parts of the 
text. Its aim, therefore, is to lay the groundwork for such an edition to be completed in the 
future.410  
  
                                                          
409 Baldassarri, 1986 provides a commentary and Italian translation of the text but his commentary 
is rather more synoptic in form and does not contain any substantial discussion of linguistic matters 
or the question of sources. Londey and Johanson, 1987 have given an English translation of the text, 
which is preceded by an introduction which describes, among other topics of a general nature, the 
logical background to the Peri Hermeneias, its technical terminology, and the outline of the logical 
system, all of which is based on the assumptive premise that this text is definitely by Apuleius.   
410 Intentions to produce such an edition have been made known by scholars in the past but so far 
none have come to light. Bianchi, for example, announces her intention to produce her own edition 
of the text in her 1995 article about the indirect tradition of the Peri Hermeneias through Martianus 
Capella, Cassiodorus, and Isidore of Seville. See also Harrison, 2000: 12 n.46, who reports that 
Susanne Bobzien was working on a commentary on this text at the time his own work was published.  
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Commentary 
The commentary is divided into the same 14 chapters by which Thomas (1908) divides the 
text. Each section begins with a brief synopsis of the contents of the chapter411 and gives 
the page and line references for where it appears in Moreschini’s 1991 edition. The page 
and line references for the lemmata also refer to Moreschini. 
The type of comments made are of a similar variety to that found in Alexander’s 
commentary on the Prior Analytics 1-7 as described by Barnes et al.: ‘there are textual 
notes; there are explications of points of language; there is much explanatory paraphrase 
of {the author’s} argument’.412 In many cases, Alexander’s commentary has provided the 
means by which the author’s argument is made clear in my own commentary. Also in the 
manner of Alexander, I aim always to make my own judgement plain and only very 
occasionally ‘set out the different possibilities without indicating a preference’413 for a 
particular point of view. 
  
                                                          
411 For a table which outlines the full contents of the text as it compares to Alexander of Aphrodisias’ 
in Analytica Priora 1-7 see p20-21. 
412 Barnes et al., 1991: 9. 
413 Barnes et al., 1991: 9. 
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Chapter 1 
189.1-190.8 
 
After the text opens with the tripartite division of philosophy and the author explains that 
the part of philosophy to which this exposition belongs is the logical part he gives a list of 
different types of speech before introducing statements or ‘statemental utterances’ as the 
topic of his work. The author also lists the various ways in which the Greek terms ἀξίωμα 
and πρότασις have been rendered by Latin writers in the past before settling on the term 
propositio as his preferred equivalent term. 
189.1   Studium sapientiae … vocamus: This definition of philosophy, which appears to have 
been coined by Cicero (De off.2.5; Tusc.1.1. See also De inv.1.4; Off.2.57; Tusc.1.1), is 
intended to capture the full meaning of the Greek noun φιλοσοφία; studium for φιλο- and 
sapientia for σοφία. The expression tends to be used thereafter only by philosophical 
authors or in texts of a technical nature (e.g. Sen. Vit. Beat.24.1; 3; Cels. 1.2.14; Quint. 
Inst.1.14.5; 12.1.19; 12.2.8. See also Expositio 27.30 in which Plato’s views about the 
education of the youth are summarised from Epinomis 991c in the following way: 
dialecticam nominat, cui subiungit studium sapientiae, id est philosophiam). A case may be 
made for reading quam (BFDSW) instead of quod (A). The relative pronoun would then 
agree with philosophiam rather than studium making this a clear example of attraction of 
the relative pronoun whereby, as Langslow describes, the relative pronoun agrees with its 
predicate in the relative clause rather than its antecedent in the main clause, in which the 
relative is ‘in the accusative as object of a verb of naming’ (Langslow, 2000: 83-89), here, 
vocamus. One of the examples cited by Langslow is comparable to this instance in that the 
relative pronoun agrees in gender with the Greek term rather than with the Latin 
antecedent: non omnis enuntiatio, quod ἀξίωμα dialectici appellant, aut vera aut falsa erit 
(Cic. De fat.20). The fact that the author of Peri Hermeneias circumscribes studium 
sapientiae with ‘quam philosophiam vocamus’ suggests that he is setting his vocabulary at 
a level to initiate an audience which is new to this discipline. 
189.1-3   plerisque videtur … rationalem: The tripartition of philosophy into these three 
parts is ascribed to the Stoics by Diogenes Laertius (VII 39) whereas Gersh says that ‘the 
ancient evidence unanimously declares that the formal tripartition of philosophy stems 
from the early Academy’ (Gersh, 1986: 75; cf. Baldassarri, 1986: 68). The order of the 
division here, Physics, Ethics, Logic, is the same as that found in Cic. Tusc. 5.68, Luc. 116; 
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129; 142, Diogenes Laertius 3.56, Alcinous, Didask.3.1 (Gersh, 1986: 74). The order Physics, 
Logic, Ethics is found early on in Apuleius’ De Platone (1.187) where biographical details 
about Plato are given; the three topics are described in association with the Pythagoreans, 
the Eleatics and Socrates respectively and in the chronological order in which Plato is said 
to have encountered them. Another order, Ethics, Physics, Logic, is found later in De Platone 
1.189. This second list is accompanied by ‘hinc ordiemur’; the first person plural verb 
suggests that this was the order to which Apuleius subscribed even though the structure of 
his De Platone (Physics, then Ethics) is in keeping with the more frequently found order 
described above. The fact that a different order of the division is found here in Peri 
Hermeneias to the order accompanied by ‘hinc ordiemur’ in De Platone is not sufficient to 
make judgements about the authenticity of the work since Cicero also lists the topics in a 
different order in different works; as well as the order described above, Ethics, Physics, 
Logic is found in Acad.15-19 and De leg.1.60-62, Physics, Logic, Ethics in De fin.5.10-11 and 
Ethics, Logic, Physics in De fin.4.5ff (Gersh, op. cit.: 75-76 n.83). The elementary nature of 
the text suggests that the mention of the tripartition is simply part of the general definition 
and description of philosophy with which he begins the work and that there is nothing to 
be read into the order in which the topics are presented here. 
189.3   de qua nunc … rationalem: Some scholars have perceived the use of nunc as a way 
of introducing this text as the third book of the De Platone, whether by Apuleius, or as a 
later addition by another author thereby accounting for the missing but projected third 
book (see, for example, Prantl, 1855: 580, who considers this work to be incomplete). 
Hildebrand believes that 'a grammarian of the third or fourth century made up for this lack' 
after Apuleius did not carry out his intention to do so (see Sullivan: 1967, 10). The Lewis and 
Short Latin Dictionary also refers to the Peri Hermeneias as 'De Dog. Plat. 3' (see 
introduction section 7 on the authenticity of the work). This implies that nunc is being used 
with the sense of contrast to what has gone before (L&S s.v. A1). Although logic was clearly 
considered to be part of Plato’s philosophy from the Hellenistic period onwards (for this see 
Dillon, 1977: 49-51 and Gersh, 1986: 75 n.82), the two books of De Platone are very 
different in style and scope to the Peri Hermeneias, which makes it seem unlikely that they 
all belonged to one treatise. The two books of the De Platone give a handbook-style 
overview of Physics and Ethics without going into much specific detail whereas the Peri 
Hermeneias gives a comparatively detailed account of one particular area of logic, the 
categorical syllogism. It is more likely therefore nunc here is being used without the sense 
of contrast to these texts and simply refers to the text in its own right (L&S s.v. A3) and that, 
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therefore, the Peri Hermeneias ought to be considered as an entirely separate work (see 
introduction section 7 i).  
189.4   qua continetur … disseramus oratione: Prior to this text, the expression ‘ars 
disserendi’ is used, and was most probably coined, by Cicero to render the Greek διαλεκτική 
in Latin (Cic. De fin.1.8.26; De orat.2.157). Baldassarri also mentions De fat.1.1, where 
Cicero states that what the Greeks refer to as λογική he calls ratio disserendi (Baldassarri, 
1986: 68). The phrase ars disserendi becomes the standardised label for the practice of 
dialectic, which is evident from around the twelfth century onwards e.g., Adam 
Balsamiensis’ Ars Disserendi (1132). There is a notable shift between the way in which the 
author of the Peri Hermeneias uses the term oratio here and elsewhere in the text (191.17, 
19-20, 20; 192.4, 5, 12; 200.10, 13). It is clear from the list of species which follows that here 
the term is referring to the practice or skill of oratory as a whole (OLD s.v. 9; L&S s.v. II). The 
passages listed above however, show the term being used to refer to a sentence or 
statement, which is particularly clear from the translation of Aristotle’s definition of the 
syllogism (An.Pr.24b19-21, see also Top. 100a25-26) found in Chapter 7 (200.10-12), where 
oratio is the equivalent Latin term for Aristotle’s λóγος (see note on 189.4-8). That this was 
a common usage of the term and that this Latinised definition of Aristotle’s syllogism was 
in circulation is shown by Gellius N.A. 15.26: ‘”Syllogismus est oratio, in qua concensis 
quibusdam et concessis, aliud quid quam quae concessa sunt, per ea quae concessa sunt, 
necessario conficitur”’. Our author renders Aristotle’s definition of a syllogism into Latin in 
a similar way in Chapter 7, for which see note on 200.9-12. 
189.4-8   variae species … metum incutiendi: Prantl (1855: 579 n.1) considered this 
rhetorical flourish in the form of an extended list of gerunds to be characteristic of Apuleius 
and therefore evidence of authentic Apuleian authorship (see note on 190.12 for the use 
of aias which Londey and Johanson, 1987: 16 see as typically Apuleian). There is a 
comparable list of gerunds in DdS 6.134 (16.4-7). It cannot, however, reasonably be taken 
as anything more than evidence for Apuleian style (for which, see introduction section 5iii 
n.356 and n.357). When listing types of things, the author usually gives the total number of 
items contained in a particular list, for example, the four types of propositions (193.14-15), 
the five predicables (197.8-10), the three figures (199.2), the number of combinations and 
moods in each figure (202.18-203.3). The use of variae here is distinctly vague in 
comparison, which suggests that he was not sure of the exact number of the types of 
speech. Indeed, Nuchelmans comments that ‘among the many controversies between the 
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Peripatetics and the Stoics there was one concerning the exact number of kinds of speech: 
the former preferred a canon of five, while the latter kept to a canon of ten ‘(Nuchelmans, 
1973: 98). It must be a coincidence that the total number of types our author lists here is 
fifteen; it cannot be the case that this list is simply a combination of the types listed by the 
Peripatetics and the Stoics; apart from anything else, none of these fifteen types directly 
corresponds to the type which is pronuntiabilis, which is introduced on the following 
Teubner page as the topic of this work  (190.2-3). In which case, rather than creating a 
confusing list of fifteen types in the way that some have suggested (e.g. Schenkeveld, 1984: 
300, Thomsen-Thörnqvist, 2008b: 128), it may be the case that the author is simply 
intending to draw a twofold distinction, in a similar way to the original distinction drawn by 
Aristotle between λóγοι in general and ἀποφαντικὸι λóγοι in De interpretatione 17a1-8; in 
the same way as Aristotle categorises the study of λóγοι which are not propositional as 
belonging to the study of rhetoric or poetry, our author gives examples of modes of 
expression which properly belong to oratio as a discipline (189.4); this list of fifteen variae 
species is therefore intended to be a list of examples of one kind rather than a list of fifteen 
distinct kinds of speech which, in itself is separate from statements which are pronuntiabiles 
and which are veritati aut falsitati obnoxia (190.2-4). This, in turn, explains the anomalous 
use of the term oratio mentioned above (see note on 189.4). Ammonius, in his commentary 
on Aristotle’s work (in De Int.5,1ff), maps the five Peripatetic types of speech onto the two 
sets of capacities of the soul, ‘intellectual (gnôstikai) and life-sustaining (zôstikai) or 
appetitive (orektikai)’ (trans., Blank, 1996: 14). ‘The four types of sentence other than the 
assertoric proceed from the appetitive capacities… Only the assertoric sentence proceeds 
from the intellectual capacities’ (loc. cit.). The tradition described here is analogous to the 
distinction drawn by our author; all of the fifteen types of speech listed here relate to the 
appetitive capacity of the soul in that they are concerned with evoking an emotion of some 
sort as opposed to the type of speech listed among the Peripatetic λóγοι or the Stoic λέκτα 
and among which a proposition is classified and which proceed from the intellectual 
capacity of the soul.  
189.8-190.1   in quibus … genus plurima: This lengthy description of the skills associated 
with excellent orators is similar in form, if not in length or precise content, to Cicero's 
Platonic ideal of an orator: 
 
91 
 
Is est enim eloquens qui et humilia subtiliter et alta graviter et mediocria temperate 
potest dicere… Is erit igitur eloquens, ut idem illud iteremus, qui poterit parva 
summisse, modica temperate, magna graviter dicere (Orat. 100-101). 
 
Unlike this Ciceronian description in which the mark of an ideal orator is one whose style 
suitably fits the subject matter, our author’s description of an excellent orator is one who 
can subvert his content to make it seem to be the opposite of what it is, that is to say, 
presenting what is false as true and vice versa. This type of inversion of the truth described 
by the author is a skill more associated with the Sophists than recognised as a skill in oratory 
itself as it is defined by Cicero. The purpose of the list, however, is to set up the topic of this 
work as that of categorical propositions (sola ex omnibus veritati aut falsitati obnoxia 190.3-
4) in complete contrast to these. 
189.10-190.1   lata anguste … posse efficere: Moreschini follows Thomas and Colvius in 
positing a lacuna between usitata nove and extenuare magna. The only phrase in this list 
which is not presented alongside a counterpart in reverse order is vulgata decenter which 
suggests that a phrase such as ‘decentia vulgariter’ is also missing. This is similar to the 
proposed vulgata recenter, recentia vulgate as Meiss and Goldbacher have in their texts 
but decenter would be a more likely antithesis of vulgata. This may appear to be strange 
advice but it simply forms a direct antithesis of what has gone before in exactly the same 
way as the other antithetical pairs and it is also an example of the type of sophistical 
practice described in the note above (189.8-190.1). Taking into account Meiss’ proposal to 
include brackets around ‘nova usitate, usitata nove’ opens up the possibility that the lacuna 
occurred after decenter and that the hypothesised antithetical phrase to ‘vulgata decenter’ 
formed part of the missing text. It seems unlikely that the verb extenuare just after the 
proposed lacuna could apply to anything other than magna given the contrasting phrase 
which follows. In which case, it is likely that another infinitive has also fallen out along with 
the opposite phrase to vulgata decenter. It would then appear that ‘nova usitate, usitata 
nove’ is misplaced. Therefore, I suggest that it ought to be placed between angusta late and 
vulgata decenter (see Appendix A). This arrangement suggests that the lacuna contains a 
phrase to contrast vulgata decenter, of the sort suggested above, and an infinitive, such as 
proferre as Colvius suggests, to apply to the preceding adverbial statements.  
190.2-3   quae pronuntiabilis appellatur: This is the first of only two uses of the term 
pronuntiabilis which is unique to this text (see also 200.13-14). It is one of a number of 
92 
 
instances of the author attempting to Latinise a term, perhaps from a Greek source, in a 
similar way to the two terms rendered verbum e verbo below (190.6-7. See introduction 
section 5 for the author’s method of introducing new Latin terminology). The suffix -bilis 
suggests that the most appropriate translation for this new term would be ‘sayable’ with 
the corresponding suffix in English. The Greek term λεκτός has the same meaning in its 
general uses (LSJ s.v. II ‘capable of being spoken’) and could, therefore, be used to refer to 
all of the speech acts listed at the beginning of this chapter. It is unclear why the author 
chooses such a general term to refer only to the type of speech which is either true or false; 
it is possible that he intends for pronuntiabilis to convey propositio and the Greek ἀξίωμα 
only when it is qualified by ‘absolutam sententiam comprehendens’ and ‘veritati aut falsitati 
obnoxia’ (see Bobzien, 2003: 85, who describes the way in which the Stoics defined 
ἀξίωματα as ‘self-complete’ sayables and op. cit.: 87 for the added qualification that they 
are either true or false. See also Diogenes Laertius 7.65). 
190.3-4   sola ex … falsitati obnoxia: Londey and Johanson perceive a shift in the use of the 
term ἀξίωμα, between earlier Greek use, for which they cite evidence from Sextus 
Empiricus and Diogenes Laertius, and the way in which Latin writers, such as Cicero, Gellius, 
and Apuleius, render the term. The latter, they say, incorporated truth and falsity into the 
definition of an axiom whereas for the earlier Greek authors truth or falsity was a feature 
of an axiom but not part of its definition (Londey and Johanson, 1988: 331). They include 
Apuleius among the Latin authors who give evidence for this conceptual change (op. cit. 
332). Whether or not this is the case here, however, depends on the sense in which obnoxia 
is taken: all senses in the OLD apart from 1 and 2 imply liability but not necessity (cf. OLD 
s.v.3 ‘liable, exposed to harm, danger’, s.v.4 ‘subject to harm, punishment etc’, s.v.5 ‘liable 
to fall (into an undesirable form of behaviour etc.)’. Later on in Chapter 4, however, the 
author implies through the use of the particle ideo that being true or false is in fact a 
defining feature of a proposition (191.18). Similarly, Cicero shows an awareness that being 
true or false is not an original defining feature of an axiom, but one which Chrysippus tried 
hard to convince people was part of its definition (De Fat.21) nevertheless he says that this 
is a defining feature in Luc.95. Aristotle defines a proposition (ἀποφαντικὸς λόγος) at the 
beginning of De interpretatione as the only type of sentence (λογός) that has truth or falsity 
in it (De int.17a1-5). At the beginning of the Prior Analytics, on the other hand, he defines a 
premise (πρότασις) as a universal or negative statement which is either universal, particular 
or indefinite but having truth or falsity does not form part of its definition (An.Pr.24a16-22). 
The distinction between ἀποφαντικός λὸγος and πρότασις is clear enough in Aristotle from 
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the fact that each is treated in a separate work and, of course, that they are referred to by 
two different terms. Alexander discusses these two separate accounts at the beginning of his 
commentary (in An.Pr.10,11-11,14). Our author conflates the two into the single Latin term 
propositio which, on the one hand, he uses to refer to the kinds of statements which are 
discussed in Aristotle’s De interpretatione and which occupy the first four chapters of his own 
work, and on the other, to refer to the types of premises which form combinations and 
syllogisms as are demonstrated throughout the other 10 chapters of his work. For the 
difference between πρóτασις and ἀπóφανσις in other works see, for example, Ammonius in 
An.Pr.13,17-14,4; 15,30-16,9; Philoponus in An.Pr.11,25-36 (see also Lee: 1984, 32 whose 
work includes discussion about Alexander of Aphrodisias, Ammonius and Philoponus but not 
this text and Maier 1990 II 2 360-63). 
190.4-5   quam vocat Sergius effatum: See Londey and Johanson, who say that ‘effatum is 
attributed to Sergius, a Stoic philosopher of the first century A.D., for whom it was almost 
certainly a Latinisation of Greek ἀξίωμα. The term is also used in Cicero, Luc.95; and it 
occurs, without attribution, in Seneca Epistulae Morales 117.13’ (Londey and Johanson, 
1987: 76). The identity and date of Sergius, however, is debatable (for a discussion on the 
identity of Sergius see introduction section 7 iii).  
190.5   Varro proloquium: See Gellius (N.A.16.8) who confirms this subscription to Varro 
and who indicates that the term was also used by Varro’s teacher L. Aelius Stilo (see Londey 
and Johanson, 1987: 77). Varro’s use of the term is not evident from any of his extant works. 
190.5   Cicero enuntiatum: Londey and Johanson say that enuntiatum is Cicero’s preferred 
Latin term for ἀξίωμα (1987: 76) in De Fato but, in fact, this term only occurs twice in this 
text (Fat.19; 28); he uses his other own coinage enuntiatio more frequently, which is 
introduced in the way typical for his neologisms (De fat. 20) See Londey and Johanson, 
1988: 328-329 for other Ciceronian coinages based on the verb nuntio. There are only four 
examples of the substantive enuntiatum cited in the TLL (Sen. Ep.117.13; the two uses in 
Cic. Fat. cited above, and here in this text). enuntiatio is far more common (OLD s.v.2b) and 
is used elsewhere in this text rather than enuntiatum (196.6; 207.2). 
190.5-6   Graeci πρότασιν … tum rogamentum: πρότασις is the standard term used 
throughout Prior Analytics to denote either premise of a syllogism (LSJ s.v. II.1) and a pair 
of πρότασεις denotes a syllogistic combination of premises. Frede makes this point and says 
that while πρότασις became the standard Peripatetic term after Aristotle, ἀξίωμα was 
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adopted into Stoic terminology (1974b: 32 n.1. He cites the following passages as examples 
of Aristotle’s use of both terms: Top.155b15; 156a23; 159a4; 179b14; An.Pr.62a13. He also 
cites Diogenes Laertius 2.112 in which the mention of Clinomachus the Megarian, he says, 
points toward the possible Megarian rather than Stoic origins of the expression). 
Distinctions are drawn between the Peripatetics and Stoics later in the work, most notably 
in Chapter 13, where the different ways in which they express syllogisms are described 
(212.4-12), but no such distinction is made here. The non-differentiating way in which our 
author treats these two Greek terms, which is highlighted by the single use of tum (L&S s.v. 
B1) with the non-specific Graeci, could either indicate that he was making direct use of 
Aristotle’s texts in which both terms are used, or it could represent a fusion of Peripatetic 
and Stoic terminology and, in this way, can be compared to Galen’s treatment of the same 
terms; ‘he never mentions any difference of denotation’ (Nuchelmans, 1973: 89-90). 
Nuchelmans says that ‘while Varro, Cicero, and Sergius translated ἀξίωμα, Apuleius tries to 
translate protasis’ (1973: 120), the use of tum perhaps suggests that the author considered 
these two Greek terms to be synonymous with one another (for the difference between 
these two and also a problem and an assumption see Alex. in An.Pr.44,20-25. There is a 
comparable passage in our text which provides clarification on the use of syllogistic 
terminology, for which see 199.9-15).  
The term propositio is also used by Cicero in Orat.3.203 to mean ‘a statement of facts or 
substance of a case’ (OLD s.v. 3b) and in De inv.1.62 to mean ‘the major premise of a 
syllogism or epichirema’ (OLD s.v. 4b). Martianus Capella makes a direct reference to De 
inv. (399) and he consistently uses propositio in the same sense as Cicero does in this work 
(414; 416; 422), which Ferré translates as ‘la première prémisse’. Martianus Capella’s use 
of the term propositio does not coincide with any passages in which he discusses truth and 
falsity; he uses the term proloquium in this sense instead i.e., proloquium dicitur, ita ut iam 
necessario aut verum sit aut falsum aut dubium (390). Ferré’s translation of proloquium in 
Martianus Capella as ‘la proposition’  demonstrates the influence of the use of propositio 
with this sense in Peri Hermeneias on later logical terminology. Boethius’ definition of 
propositio shows that, in his time, various terms with the same meaning were used 
interchangeably: ‘propositio est oratio verum falsumve significans, ut si quis dicat "caelum 
esse volubile"; haec et enuntiatio et proloquium nuncupatur’ (De top. diff.1.2.1). The term 
propositio is used with different meanings even within the Peri Hermeneias, in Chapter 7, 
for example, the author explains that a question posed (propono) to an interlocutor is called 
a propositio, if the interlocutor accepts the question, the propositio, although it continues 
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to be referred to by this name, becomes an acceptio (199.12-15. See Barnes et al., 1991: 22 
for a similar conflation made by Alexander in his use of the term πρότασις, which he uses 
to mean both a ‘proposition’ and, in the more specific sense, ‘premise’. They say that ‘it is not 
always clear when protasis means ‘premise’ rather than ‘proposition’). 
Aristotle’s De interpretatione is concerned with propositions (ἀπóφανσις), which are, by 
definition, either true or false (17a1-5). Premises (πρóτασις) in the Prior Analytics are not 
defined in this way but are said to be members of pairs ‘of contradictory statements’ if they 
are demonstrative and to be the ‘answer to a question which of the two contradictory 
statements is to be accepted’  (An.Pr.24a22-25). Our author uses propositio to refer to both. 
In which case, Londey and Johanson are correct in saying that the author’s term propositio 
‘is a Latinisation of protasis’, but not in saying that protasis ‘is the standard Aristotelian term 
for a proposition’ (Londey and Johanson, 1987: 78). Since the Peri Hermeneias combines 
elements from two different works of Aristotle, the De interpretatione in the early chapters 
(1-4) and the Prior Analytics in the later chapters (5-14), the use of the single term, 
propositio, to convey both a proposition and a premise may simply be an attempt to avoid 
confusion among his audience. It may also, however, reflect a more widespread conflation 
of these two terms. The modern English term ‘proposition’, for example, is used to mean a 
statement which is either true or false but also simply an opinion (see McGrath, 2014). 
190.6-8   ergo verbum e verbo … dicetur propositio:  Here, protensio is given as a verbum e 
verbo translation of the Greek πρότασις; a substantive formed from the established verb 
protendo in the same way as πρότασις is formed from προτείνω. 
It is less obvious how rogamentum was derived from ἀξίωμα if this was the intention. The 
LSJ compares the verb ἀξιόω to the Latin verb postulare, which could be seen as a synonym 
of rogare. The author may simply have in mind the very first stage of dialectic exchange 
where the interlocutor is first presented with a question which he must accept in order for 
it to become a premise of the syllogism. This seems likely in light of the fact that author 
clarifies his use of propositio later where he makes it clear that a question is being posed 
which must then be accepted as true by the interlocutor in order for the syllogism to 
proceed (see 199.11-15).  
The phrase verbum e verbo was introduced by Cicero who demonstrated the method itself 
in his philosophical Latin writing (see Powell, 1995: 276-8). He usually concludes that this is 
an undesirable way of turning philosophy into Latin from Greek; for example, in Luc. 17 he 
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gives perceptio and comprehensio as Latinisations of the Stoic term κατάλειψις, the latter 
being a more literal translation (si verbum e verbo volumus), and by implication, a less 
appropriate rendering as it is a direct calque of the Greek. In Luc. 31 comprehensio is also 
introduced as a literal translation of κατάλειψις with the same expression. In De fin. 3.15, 
translating verbum e verbo is said to be the mark of a clumsy translator (interpretes indiserti 
solent). In a similar way to this passage from Peri Hermeneias a more familiar term with the 
same meaning is to be preferred, ‘cum sit verbum quod idem declaret magis usitatum’. In 
De fin. 3.52, Cicero again emphasises that verbum e verbo translations are to be avoided 
where possible (re enim intellecta in verborum usu faciles esse debemus). The term 
‘producta’ is given as a literal translation of the Greek προηγμένα (id erit verbum e verbo) 
but then a series of more familiar Latin terms are offered, ‘promota et remota vel... 
praeposita vel praecipua’ (note the use of vel which is similar to the way in which our author 
uses the same particle to introduce new terminology e.g., 200.8-9. See also introduction 
section 5 on terminology). In a similar way to this passage, veriloquium is given as verbum 
e verbo in Cicero’s Topica 35 for the Greek ἐτυμολογία. This type of translation is our 
author’s preferred method for rendering Greek logical terms into Latin (see Table 3 in 
introduction section 5 v for examples), hence ego (W2 Moresch.) although ergo is a possible 
lectio difficilior (BCFADSW). Unlike the rest of the verbum e verbo Latin terminology 
introduced and used throughout the text, protensio does not appear again and this is only 
one of three uses of rogamentum in the text (in 193.4 and 199.10 it is qualified by illativum 
and is given tentatively as an explanatory definition of illatio). propositio is the term used 
throughout because it is familiarius; it also appears frequently thoughout Cic. De 
Inventione, in Varro L.L, Seneca and Quintilian and also in Gellius 2.7.21 and 14.2.19. 
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Chapter 2 
190.9-16 
 
The author explains that there are two different types of propositions and conclusions, 
categorical (praedicativa) and conditional (condicionalis), and gives an example of each 
kind. He then announces his intention to talk about the categorical kind since these are 
prior to conditionals of which they form a part. Although he gives an example of a 
conditional proposition, these are not covered in this work.  
 
190.9-10   Propositionum igitur … duae species: Here, the author is drawing a distinction 
between propositions (propositionum), which were introduced in the previous chapter 
(190.5-8), and the conclusions (conclusionum) which follow these. In his later discussion 
about syllogistic combinations, however, he uses the term illatio to refer the conclusion 
(see 199.9-11) and  conclusio to refer to a whole syllogism (see, for example, 200.8-9 where 
it is defined as such). Cicero also uses conclusio to mean the whole syllogism rather than 
just the conclusion. For example, it is clear from what follows Socratica conclusione 
(Tusc.5.47) that he is referring to an argument as a whole, similarly the phrase, conclusio 
Stoicorum (Tusc.5.82) seems to refer to an entire argument. Furthermore, rationis apta 
conclusio (De orat.3.203) implies the use of a logical syllogism as a whole (Mankin, 2011: 
294). He also uses the verb concludo to mean ‘to express something as a syllogism’ (De 
fin.2.104. Compare Luc.26 where conclusio is given as a translation of ἀπόδειξις). See note 
on 200.2-9 for a fuller discussion on our author’s use of this term. 
190.10-11   altera praedicativa … si dicamus:  The use of praedicativa corresponds to 
Alexander’s general use of κατηγορικός to mean simple (simplex), or uncompounded, 
propositions (the Greek term is also used specifically to mean affirmative propositions, for 
this see Barnes et al., 1991: 30-31). The first person plural verb dicamus suggests that this 
work was intended for instructional purposes (for other examples which are suggestive of 
the didactic purpose of this work see introduction section 6).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
190.11   Qui regnat, beatus est: This example is very similar to a number of passages in 
Cicero, where the views of the philosophical schools on happiness are frequently presented 
in syllogistic form. For example, in Tusc. 5.43 Cicero tries to show that virtue as sufficient 
for happiness is a view shared by the three main schools, although each school defined 
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happiness in a different way. Luc.134 shows that the specific view that a man who is wise 
is happy had its origins in Theophrastus or was at least held by him: ‘praesertim 
Theophrasto multa diserte copioseque contra dicente. Et hic metuo ne vix sibi constet qui 
cum dicat esse quaedam et corporis et fortunae mala, tamen eum qui in his omnibus sit 
beatum fore censeat si sapiens sit’  (cf. De Plat.136.24-137.5; 2.253). The difference, 
Moreschini says, between vita beata which is defined by virtues (of the soul) and vita 
beatissima which is defined by external goods  in addition is a distinction made by Aristotle 
and which Antiochus adopts, as described in De finibus 5.81 (Moreschini, 1966: 99). 
Beaujeu, who cites this observation by Moreschini, points out that, although this idea is 
found in Cicero (De fin 5.65, 81; Acad.22; Luc.134; Tusc. 5.21), it had already been outlined 
by Speusippus and Xenocrates (Beaujeu, 1973: 303, n.6).  
 
190.11-12   altera substitutiva ... si aias: The earliest extant uses of condicionalis are found 
here and in Gaius, where it is used to describe the condemning of a defendant 
(condicionalem condemnationem), which would be carried out only under certain 
conditions (Inst. 4.119. See introduction section 5 n.176 for other examples of legal 
terminology in this text). This is the first recorded use, however, of substitutiva. Its 
introduction here is similar to the way in which the new terms protensio and rogamentum 
(190.6-7) are introduced alongside propositio (190.7-8) and is also typical of the way in 
which new terms are often introduced in Apuleius’ De Platone whereby they are placed 
alongside an established term, often joined by an enclitic or a particle denoting comparison 
which elucidates the meaning of the new term (for examples of this see introduction section 
5). This new term is formed from the verb substituo used in the sense ‘to set’ or ‘to place 
next to’ viz. another statement (L&S s.v. 1.; cf. OLD s.v.1, which shows that this use is post-
Classical), hence the use of the cognate verb, substituo below (190.13-14). The use of a 
newly coined substantive alongside its cognate verb is another frequently used method of 
introducing neologisms in this text (for other examples see 191.1-2, 3-4; 196.15-21; 199.9-
11, 11-12). However, the verb is used in a legal context with the preposition and noun 
phrase sub condicione by Gaius (Inst. 2.179. See also OLD s.v. 5 meaning ‘to substitute (an 
heir), i.e., to arrange that he will inherit if the person first named as heir is unable or 
unwilling to do so’). In the same way that protensio is derived from πρότασις above (190.6-
7), substitutiva is a direct calque of ὑποθετικóς; sub- for ὑπο- and -stitutiva formed from 
the verb statuo just as -θετικóς is from τίθημι. Baldassarri suggests that ὑποθετικóς is the 
equivalent Greek term for both condicionalis and substitutiva (Baldassarri, 1986: 102, 107) 
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but it is clear that, rather than being entirely synonymous, condicionalis is one example of 
substitutiva; ‘a hypothetical proposition is either a conditional (‘implication’) or a 
disjunction (‘conflict’)  (Barnes et al., 1991: 56 n.25. See also Barnes, 2007a: 523). Based on 
the description and the example of a conditional statement which follows, it seems that, in 
this case, as well as joining a less well-known term with an already established one as 
described above, the particle vel also serves to introduce a particular example of 
substitutiva rather than a synonymous term for it  (L&S s.v. C: ‘In adding an instance 
implying that other instances might be mentioned at will’). The example of a ‘substitutive’ 
statement which follows is specifically a conditional statement, as the gloss-like explanation 
in brackets explains (190.13-14. See Thomsen-Thörnqvist, 2008b: 130 n.21.9: ‘With 
Boethius, as with Apuleius, the only type of compound sentences mentioned is the 
conditional’). ‘composita est’ (190.12) and ‘praedicativa … est … velut elementum 
substitutivae’ (190.14-16) are descriptions more similar to Aristotle’s explanation of 
compound statements in De int. 17a20 ff. Here, Aristotle’s explanation of a compound 
statement ‘is one made up of simple statements joined together’ and there is no suggestion 
of a conditional element. Ammonius’ analysis of this passage provides a close parallel to 
our text, in which he says of simple and compound statements that:  
 
‘one of them is the simple assertion and the other is a compound of several, not of 
several words (lexeis) but of several sentences, i.e. the sentence which has its unity 
by a conjunction, either predicatively or hypothetically, calling it a compound of the 
simple sentences, that is, of two affirmations, or two negations, or an affirmation 
and a negation’ (in De int. 78,1-5). 
 
Boethius similarly defines a compound statement in general terms: ‘wherever a sentence 
has more terms and its parts exceed the number of two terms, they are said to be combined 
sentences’ but then, like our author, gives a conditional statement as one example of a 
compound statement, ‘’if it is day there is light’; ‘for it is day’ and ‘there is light’ are two 
simple sentences which when joined make one combined statement (in De int.115.25ff. See 
Blank, 1996: 156 n.264). 
 
Londey and Johanson cite aias as one of a number of examples of the use of archaisms 
which give evidence for Apuleian authorship (Londey and Johanson, 1987: 16). At best, this 
could only be evidence of Apuleian style, not of authorship. The third person singular form 
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of the same verb is used elsewhere in the text with Plato and later Aristotle as its subject 
(191.16; 213.14). Given that uses of this verb are by no means limited to archaic Plautine 
comedy or Apuleian works but are in fact found in a wide variety of genres, both poetry and 
prose, more or less continuously from Plautus to Apuleius, it is a strange choice to cite as 
evidence of Apuleian style. It can be said, however, that the use of the second person 
singular form of aio is rare and is nearly always paired with the verb nego, as in Plautus Rud. 
430; 1329. Gellius also pairs it with nego and the two verbs seem to be used in a technical 
sense in this dialectical context meaning ‘to affirm’ and ‘to deny’ respectively (N.A.16.2.1; 
5; 9). The same antithesis is created by Gaius (Inst. 4.17a; b). The combination of this second 
person singular ‘aias’ and the first person plural ‘dicamus’ above (190.10-11) suggests that 
this text was used for educational purposes and represents a dialogue of sorts, imagined or 
otherwise, between a teacher and student (for other examples of this sort see introduction 
section 6). 
 
190.13-14   substituis enim … non sit beatus: For the introduction of the neologism 
substitutiva alongside its cognate verb and for other examples of this sort see note on 
190.11-12 above and introduction section 5. 
  
190.14-15   nos nunc … dicemus: Some have understood the sense of nunc here to be one 
which creates a contrast between the present and a future discussion and that, therefore, 
the author had intended to treat conditional as well as predicative propositions and that 
some of the text is missing (compare the use of nunc at 189.3, for which see note on 189.3). 
The introduction to the Peri Hermeneias sets out its agenda in a similar way to Aristotle’s 
work of the same title (De int. 17a1-11, see also 17a21-24). In light of this, it is clear that 
rather than referring only to a section of the work which is missing, nunc refers to the work 
at hand as a whole which is concerned solely with categorical syllogisms. In addition, quia 
introduces the author’s rationale for speaking about categorical statements and not 
conditional statements and suggests that the author did not intend to treat the latter type 
of statement in this work. Elsewhere in the text, signposting techniques are often used to 
indicate the introduction of a new topic and to indicate when he is deferring more 
complicated information until a later stage, for example, per impossibile moods are 
mentioned at the end of Chapter 10, but the author promises to deal with them later on: 
de qua propositione dicemus expositis modis tertiae formulae (207.14-15). 
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190.15   natura prior est: Alexander poses the question, ‘which syllogism is first, the 
categorical or the hypothetical?’ (in Top. 218,4-5) but does not offer his own opinion on this 
matter (see Frede, 1974a: 30-32 for further discussion about the history of the debate 
surrounding the priority of categorical over propositional logic and vice versa). Our author’s 
comment here is similar to one made by Galen (Inst.17,9-14) who says that ‘in a sense, 
categorical syllogisms are prior because hypothetical syllogisms presuppose the categorical 
premises they are made up of’ (Frede, 1974a: 32. See also note on 190.15-16 below). 
 
190.15-16   velut elementum substitutivae: velut suggests that elementum is intended to 
be taken metaphorically rather than as the established technical term for a part of a 
‘substitutive’ statement. The velut particle may be comparing this idea to the way in which 
the term is commonly used in philosophical contexts (its first uses are found in Lucretius, 
where the noun elementum is coined as an equivalent for the Greek στοιχεῖον (compare 
Quintilian who often refers to Aristotle’s categories as elementa, e.g., Inst. 3.6.23). It is rarer 
for the noun elementum to be found in the singular as it is here. This also appears to be the 
only instance where the noun is used to denote a part of something which is itself also 
divisible into parts. Τhis may also account for the use of the particle velut, that is to say, a 
predicative statement is an element of a conditional statement, but a categorical statement 
is itself made up of individual parts or elements, namely a subject and a predicate. 
Alexander of Aphrodisias describes the formation of such a statement, not as one 
statement placed alongside another but as ‘continuous or conditional statements’ (in An.Pr. 
17,30). Elsewhere Alexander says that continuous (συνεχής) was the word used by the 
earlier thinkers (i.e., probably by the early Peripatetics) for conditional propositions (in 
An.Pr.262, 32-5; 390, 3-4). About this terminology, Barnes et al. say that ‘the idea is that a 
conditional proposition links two things together and so makes them continuous’ (Barnes 
et al., 1991: 65 n.79. This matches, for example, Boethius’ explanation of such a statement 
in De int.116.3-5). ‘It is true that there were different views about conditionals in antiquity’ 
(Barnes, 2007a: 399).  
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Chapter 3 
190.17-191.15. 
 
This chapter focuses on ways in which propositions vary in terms of quantity, universal 
(universalis), particular (particularis) and indefinite (indefinita) and in terms of quality, 
affirmative (dedicativa) and negative (abdicativa). The author also points out that the Stoics 
create a paradox for themselves by asserting that a proposition cannot be truly negative 
without having a negative particle which is prefixed to the whole proposition. 
190.17-190.18   sunt et aliae ... quantitatis quidem: The use of quidem followed by autem 
(191.1) in order to introduce quality and quantity suggests imitation of a Greek source (L&S 
s.v. autem: II A b ‘Preceded by quidem, as in Grk. μέν – δέ’ (for other examples of this see 
194.6-7; 196.1-2; 213.17-18)). qualitas is introduced explicitly as a new coinage in Cicero 
Acad. 1.22 as an equivalent for the Greek ποιóτης.  quantitas appears to have been 
introduced in a similar way by Vitruvius (1.2.2) as an equivalent for ποσóτης. The author of 
Peri Hermeneias and Martianus Capella (340; 363; 373; 396) appear to be the first to use 
the Latin terms to denote the difference in quality and quantity a given premise may have 
in this logical sense. The use of the terms for this purpose has remained in the traditional 
terminology (see Cook: 2009, s.v., 235-237).  
190.18-19   aliae universale … spirans vivit: Sullivan points out that ‘the expressions which 
Apuleius uses to signify universal quantity (omnis, omne; nullus, nulla, nullum) are 
employed by him almost always in the singular number – indicating clearly that the term 
which these expressions modify is to be taken in a distributive, and not in a collective, sense’ 
(Sullivan, 1967: 32). There are, in fact, no instances in the text where the author uses the 
universal quantifier in the plural number in his examples of moods, nor is the particular 
quantifier used with a plural verb throughout the examples of moods. In fact, the only 
instance of a particular quantifier being used in the plural is the example of a particular 
proposition in this chapter (see note on 190.19-20). Every example of a mood containing a 
particular proposition throughout the rest of the work is singular. I can find no instance 
where aliquis or any of its various forms are used to express particular quantity in examples 
of propositions or of moods and their conclusions in the way that Sullivan suggests (1967: 
32).  
Mates points out that Stoics do not have a universal quantifier in their statements (Mates, 
1961: 32). Sedley and Long also point out that Stoic propositions are limited to particulars: 
103 
 
‘”Something” is the highest genus, including as it does incorporeals and fictional entities as 
well as bodies… Despite its supremacy for some Stoics… one class of items, universals, is 
excluded from it or belongs to it only in a ‘quasi’ sense (Long and Sedley, 1987: 164). This 
aspect of Stoic logic is not relevant to an introductory discussion about the kinds of 
premises which are used to form the sort of Peripatetic syllogisms which are the focus of 
this work, and so it is unsurprising that it is not mentioned by our author here.  
190.19-20   aliae particulares … non spirant: In light of the form the rest of the example 
propositions and premises take throughout the work (see note on 190.18-19) the reason 
for the plural quaedam animalia and the plural verb spirant here is not entirely clear. It is 
perhaps the case that the author simply wished to draw a sufficiently clear distinction 
between the particular premise and the example of an indefinite one which follows. 
Furthermore, as mentioned above, the author always uses the two quantifiers in the 
singular number in order to make it clear that the statement is to be imagined in a 
distributive rather than collective sense (see note on 190.18-19); ‘omnis voluptas bonum 
est’ would mean ‘every pleasure is a good (thing)’ (193.17-18) and ’quaedam voluptas 
bonum est’ means ‘a certain pleasure is a good (thing)’ (193.20-21). At this preliminary stage 
in the work, a particular statement expressed in the plural number was perhaps considered 
to sound more natural. 
190.20-21   aliae indefinitae … an aliquod: The adjective indefinitus-a-um is first found in 
Gellius with the general meaning ‘unlimited, endless’, in which sense it is used to describe 
a discussion which is hard to follow (16.2.3), and in the grammatical sense, ‘belonging to 
the infinitive mood’ (1.7.6 and 1.7.13). It seems that the author is attempting to introduce 
this established term indefinitus into a logical context here based on the explanatory 
definition using the verb definio with the negative particle non to represent the prefix in- of 
the term (see note on 191.1-2 for other examples of this method of defining terms in this 
chapter and introduction 3). In the same technical and logical sense with which the term is 
used here, Martianus Capella and Boethius use the term to define an indefinite proposition 
as one which is not quantified or qualified in any way. Baldassarri (1986: 103) gives 
ἀδιόριστος as the equivalent Greek term for eight out of the 11 uses of the term in the text 
(190.20; 193.9; 196.7; 212.14, 15; 213.1; 213.4 bis.). ἀδιόριστος is listed as a logical, 
technical term used exclusively in contexts such as this, and mainly by Aristotle (LSJ s.v. See 
e.g. An.Pr.26b23; An.Post.639a22). Baldassarri gives ἀόριστος as the equivalent for 
indefinitus where it is used in Chapter 4 (193.11) and twice in Chapter 6 (198.11). This term 
is also mainly found in philosophical contexts but it has a broader variety of uses than 
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ἀδιόριστος (e.g. LSJ s.v. A2 limitless e.g. Epicur.Fr.202,203; s.v. II indeterminate e.g. 
Pl.Leg.643d; Arist.Met.1087a17), it is used by Chrysippus to mean ‘indefinite’ with 
reference to propositions (e.g. Stoic.2.5). Bobzien points out that this was the standard term 
for an ‘indefinite assertible’ in Stoic logic (Bobzien, 2003: 90). The fact that in this context it 
is being used to describe terms, rather than propositions, as indefinite demonstrates the 
use of originally Stoic terminology for originally Peripatetic concepts (compare the use of 
indemonstrabilis for which see notes on 205.21-206.2). In this regard, it is notable that in 
the three instances where Baldassarri has suggested that indefinitus is being used to mean 
ἀόριστος as opposed to ἀδιόριστος, the author is describing the Stoic concept of 
‘indefinite’, that is, ‘one that consists of an indefinite word or words and a predicate 
(aoristos), e.g. “Some one is walking,” or “There is some one walking”; “He is in motion” 
(DL. 7.68-70), as opposed to the Aristotelian concept of indefinite (adioristos) which entails 
a complete lack of any type of quantifier (An.Pr.24a20-21). The author’s examples of 
indefinite terms, non homo, non animal (193.11), more closely resemble denials which 
contain ‘a negative part or particle and a predication: such as this, “No one is walking”’ (DL 
VII.70). 
Augustine (De dialectica 2.5.15; 2.6.4; 3.6.10) Martianus Capella (396) and Boethius in his 
commentary of Aristotle’s Peri Hermeneias (passim) all give the same example of an 
indefinite proposition, ‘homo ambulat’. Alcinous also uses a similar example, Socrates is 
walking (Didask.6.1). Dillon comments that ‘“Socrates walks” is not a Platonist example, but 
becomes normative in later Platonist and Aristotelian commentary’ (Dillon, 1993: 78). The 
example our author provides, ‘Animal spirat’, is unique, which suggests that these texts 
share a common tradition of which Peri Hermeneias is not a part. Mates notes that ‘what 
the Peripatetics called “indefinite” propositions (e.g., “An animal is breathing”) would be 
“intermediate” propositions according to the Stoics. cf. Apuleius, In De Interp., ed. Oud. 
266’ (Mates, 1961: 30 n.18). Mates also describes the way in which, according to the Stoics, 
definite and indefinite propositions are related, that is, ‘the indefinite proposition cannot 
be true unless the corresponding definite proposition is true … Similarly, the intermediate 
and definite propositions are said to be related in such a way that if an intermediate 
proposition is true, then for some particular person the corresponding definite proposition 
is true’ (Mates, 1961: 30). As Alexander points out, Aristotle ‘does not discuss 
indeterminate propositions because they are not useful for syllogisms and because they are 
equivalent to particular propositions’ (in An.Pr.30, 31). Aristotle is concerned with the 
quantity of a proposition, or rather, of the subject within a proposition, only in terms of 
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how this affects the outcome of a syllogism as shown in An.Pr. 29a27-29: ‘It is obvious also 
that in all the figures if the particular affirmative is replaced by the indefinite the result will 
be the same syllogism.’ See also, 26a29-30: ‘Thus we shall have a perfect syllogism. Similarly 
too supposing the proposition BC to be indefinite, provided that it is affirmative; for we 
shall have the same syllogism whether BC is indefinite or particular’. Aristotle’s definition 
of an indefinite proposition is as follows: 
‘a statement which applies or does not apply without reference to universality or 
particularity’ (An.Pr.1.24a20-21).  
Based on this definition, it seems that the author has demonstrated Aristotle’s explanation 
of such a statement perfectly, that is, one which simply does not make reference to 
universality or particularity and which bears no significant relation to any other statement 
of a different quantity. tutius est and ex incerto (190.22) show that the author was aware 
of this uncertainty from a linguistic point of view. Sullivan points out that from the point of 
view of linguistic usage, an indefinite proposition can be interpreted either as being true 
for a particular proposition or as being true for a universal one but rightly concludes that 
the main point of concern is logical usage (31). non enim definit utrum omne an aliquod 
(190.21) makes it clear that the meaning the author intended can be translated into English 
without a definite or indefinite particle or any other kind of quantifier, as in, ‘Animal 
breathes’. 
190.21-191.1   pro particulari … quod minus est: This maxim-like statement conveys a 
didactic tone (the point is repeated at 213.1. For another example of this sort of pithy 
statement see note on 213.9-10. See also introduction section 6). Baldassarri points out 
that the author does not identify ‘singular’ as a type of quantity and suggests that he 
considers this to be understood in the same way as ‘particular’ but also that, more likely, 
he does not follow ‘l’empirismo gnoseologico fondante’ of the Stoic doctrine involving 
singular terms (Baldassarri, 1986: 70). Sullivan similarly comments that singular 
propositions are missing from our author’s treatise and says that he gives no indication why 
this is so’ (Sullivan, 1967: 32). As much as criticism of Stoic views forms a significant part of 
the early chapters of the Peri Hermeneias (see for example, 191.6-12; 200.16-19; 201.4-8), 
it is unlikely that here the author simply missed an opportunity to refute the Stoics; the 
disagreement described by Baldassarri above is of a more epistemological than logical 
nature and would therefore not be appropriate to the context of this short logical treatise. 
It is more than likely that, at the time our author was writing, singular terms would be 
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considered to count as a particular in terms of quantity without the need for further 
comment, that is to say, their omission is due to the same reason for the omission of 
indefinites in Alcinous’ handbook (Dillon, 1993: 78). It is important to remember that the 
equivalent concept in Aristotle’s syllogistic would not refer to propositions as singular (or 
universal or particular) but to the terms within the propositions as singular etc. In this 
respect, Lukasiewicz’s suggestion as to why singular terms were omitted from Aristotle’s 
syllogistic theory is more plausible than Baldassarri’s conjecture: ‘Syllogistic as conceived 
by Aristotle requires terms to be homogenous with respect to their possible positions as 
subjects and predicates. This seems to be the true reason why singular terms were omitted 
by Aristotle’ (Lukasiewicz, 1957: 7). Lukasiewicz has previously pointed out that, as 
described in Prior Analytics (Lukasiewicz, 1957: 4), premises vary in terms of quantity, but 
the terms within them are always universal (op. cit.: 4. See also Patzig, 1968: 4-8). It is 
Alexander (in An.Pr.100, 11 cf. 65,26) who points out that ‘the very definition of the premise 
given by Aristotle has application to universal terms alone and is not suitable to individual 
or singular’ (ibid. n.4). Aristotle himself does not mention singular propositions when he 
lists the ways in which a premise can differ in terms of quantity at the beginning of 
An.Pr.24a18-23. In light of this, the lack of mention of singular propositions in this text and 
the lack of indication as to why this is so is unsurprising. 
191.1-2   qualitatis autem … aliquid de quopiam: For autem, which corresponds to quidem 
(190.18), see note on 190.17-190.18. The new term dedicativae is closely followed by the 
verb from which it originates, dedico, in order to make its meaning clear. The same method 
is used for the introduction of the term abdicativus (191.4-5. See also substitutiva 190.13-
14. A full list of neologisms which are introduced in this way is provided in Table 1 in 
introduction section 5). Martianus Capella also uses these adjectival forms (passim, but see 
esp. 329; 396; 397) but does not use the verb forms. At 409, he uses the rare adverbial 
forms ‘dedicative’ and ‘abdicative’. The former also appears in Augustine, Contra Iulianum 
4.768 and Julian of Eclanum, Ad Turb. 4.2.272 (both from fifth century A.D.), the latter is a 
hapax legomenon.  
 
191.2-3   Virtus bonum est: The same example of an affirmative premise is found in 
Quintilian (Inst.5.14.21) as an example of a major premise and in Martianus Capella (407), 
where it forms part of a conclusion which is inferred as part of a conditional syllogism, 
confinis conclusio, as opposed to a conclusion which follows from the premises and which 
forms a predicative syllogism. It is notable that this example of affirmative premise and the 
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example of a negative premise which follows (191.4-5) are, according to the categories of 
quantity stated previously (190.20-21), indefinite statements in that they lack a quantifying 
particle. In this respect, the types of examples which appear in the introductory chapter of 
the Peri Hermeneias closely resemble those given in Aristotle’s De interpretatione. The 
examples which appear in the later chapters of the Peri Hermeneias, which demonstrate all 
of the moods in each of the three figures, are more similar to the examples from the Prior 
Analytics which contain quantifying particles, omnis, nullum, quoddam, quoddam … non as 
Ross describes: 
 
‘In De Int. 7a … entities are divided into ta katholou and ta kath’ekaston, and 
propositions are divided into (1) those about universals, (a) predicated universally, 
(b) predicated non-universally ; (2) those about individuals… The treatment of the 
matter in the Prior Analytics is, by comparison, more formal. It ignores the question 
whether the subject of the judgement is a universal or an individual, and classifies 
judgements according as the word ‘all’, or the word ‘some’, or neither, is attached 
to the subject’ (1949: 289 n.17). 
191.3   dedicat enim … inesse bonitatem: For the definitory use of dedicat see note on 
191.1-2. The use of the compound verb inesse (191.3, 5) shows that the author has grasped 
the essential point of predication in Aristotelian syllogistic; that a given predicate is in the 
subject of which it is predicated (L&S s.v. ‘to be in or upon.’ II Trop., ‘of abstract things, ‘to 
be contained in, to be in, to belong or appertain to’). In this way, it corresponds to the Greek 
verb ὑπάρχειν which Aristotle uses throughout Prior Analytics to denote the same concept. 
The Latin verb also avoids the possible ambiguity carried by the verb esse which can either 
be used as the copula or on its own to mean ‘to exist’ (L&S s.v. 1 A 1). Seneca uses this verb 
of things which possess e.g., life: placet enim satis et arbustis animam inesse (Ep.58.8). 
191.3-5   aliae abdicativae … inesse bonitatem: The formulaic way in which the author 
explained the function of affirmative premises (dedicativae 191.1) by using the cognate 
verb of the new term (dedicat 191.3) is mirrored precisely in the way in which he introduces 
the term abdicativae alongside abdicant to refer to negative premises. See note above on 
191.3 for the use of inesse. 
 
191.6-7   at Stoici hanc … non esse: Alexander also discusses the form of negation described 
here although he does not specify, in the way that our author does, that it is a Stoic view: 
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So Aristotle says that ‘Socrates is not white’, and not ‘Socrates is not-white’ is the 
negation of the affirmation ‘Socrates is white’. But there are people who think that 
not even a proposition taken in this way is a negation. For they think that one 
should not just posit what negates before ‘is’ or before the predicate; rather a 
negation has what negates placed before the entire affirmation or proposition. And 
they think that the negation of ‘Socrates is white’ is ‘It is not the case that Socrates 
is white’ and not ‘Socrates is not white’ (in An.Pr.402,1-7). 
With ‘evenit cuidam … non esse’ the author rephrases and unpacks the statement which 
has just been given (hanc) in order to make clear what the first statement implies about 
existence from a Stoic point of view (for the way in which the use of cuidam alters the type 
of statement see note on 191.7-8 below). The sharp transition to the Stoic view indicated 
by at and the author’s refutation of the Stoic view at the end of this section create distance 
between their views and his own. 
191.7-8   ergo dedicat … quid sit: I suggest reading dicit (BCFW) rather than dedicat (AS) as 
it fits the sense better (see note on 209.4 for a comparable change from the same two 
variations at 209.4). The affirmative quality of this statement is implied by the fact that 
something has happened to it; from a Stoic point of view, a statement which begins with 
anything other than a negative particle, is always affirmative and never negative. Bobzien 
explains that ‘each time the first word of the sentence indicates to what type a simple 
assertible belongs’ (Bobzien, 2003: 88); the nominative case of voluptas (191.4) in the first 
example suggests that this statement would be considered to be a ‘predicative’ 
(κατηγορικός) assertible although, as Bobzien points out, examples of this sort ‘are 
extremely rare in Stoic logic’ (Bobzien, 2003: 89). The use of cuidam (191.7) in the second 
example, on the other hand, indicates that this statement should be categorised as an 
‘indefinite’ (ἀόριστoς) assertible according to the Stoic division (for other examples of this 
type see Bobzien, 2003: 90. See also Diogenes Laertius 7.70). However, as Cavini says, 
‘Apuleio non mostra di conoscere il repertorio degli enunciati stoici, o, in ogni caso, 
preferisce la più tradizionale classificazione peripatetica’ (Cavini, 1985:81). 
‘quid sit’ recalls Seneca’s attempt to render the Greek τὸ ὄν, ‘that which exists’ by quod est 
because there is not a suitable equivalent Latin noun (Ep. 58.7); to predicate something of 
a subject using the copula est is, therefore, to say what it is (id est) and to affirm that it 
exists. The quod est referred to in this letter, Caston says, ‘is not Stoic but Middle Platonic’ 
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in that it is setting up a Platonic six-way division of being (Caston, 1999: 151 n.10. See also 
Mansfeld, 1992: 84-85).  
It is clear from the use of the interrogative pronoun, quid, and the use of inquiunt which 
create direct speech that a dialectical situation is to be imagined. ‘The Stoic view of 
argument had a dialectical background in which each premise was posed as a question to 
an interlocutor and required his agreement’ (Long and Sedley, 1987: 218, see also 189). 
Compare ‘si qui ita rogaverit’ below (191.12-13 and also 199.12-14 and note on 201.8-11). 
191.8-10   idcirco dedicativa … non videtur esse: et makes better sense of the passage than 
ei (191.9) which Colvius first suggested. The particle et in this way acts as this particle 
frequently does throughout this work, taking the second position in the clause: ‘For which 
reason, it is affirmative, they say, because in that which it denied it was, it also affirms what 
does not seem to be’ (for comparable uses of et see introduction section 5). 
191.10-11   solum autem … praeponitur: In referring back to abdicativum, the relative 
pronoun cui makes it clear that the scope of the negative particle (negativa particula) covers 
the premise as a whole. This may not have been clear from the prefix of the verb 
praeponitur alone; without the reference to the whole premise (abdicativum) it may be 
understood mistakenly that the negative particle applies only to the subject term, the first 
word in the premise. In this way, the author’s explanation adequately represents the scope 
of the negative particle which, in Sextus Empiricus’ comparable explanation of Stoic 
negatives (M VIII 89), is represented by the verb κυριεύω (Mates, 1961: 134). 
191.11-12   verum hi quidem … ita rogaverit:  in aliis looks forward to the refutations of 
the Stoics found in Chapter 7 where, firstly, Antipater the Stoic is criticised for accepting 
syllogisms with a single premise (200.15-18) and then the Stoics are collectively refuted on 
account of their moods which contain conclusions which do not differ in any way to what 
has been accepted in the premises (201.4-8). The use of the verb rogo recalls the newly 
coined substantive in Chapter 1, rogamentum (190.7), which was offered as a verbum e 
verbo Latinisation of the Greek ἀξίωμα. This coinage is reflective of the question and answer 
style of dialectic (see note above on 191.7-8). In this context, therefore, the verb rogo 
means something like ‘to claim or to put forward a statement which is to be accepted’. Its 
use with this sense in a logical context appears to be unique to this work. It is cited as a 
technical term in L&S (s.v. B1, 3) but only in a legal and publicist context meaning ‘to 
propose a new law’ or similar. In this way, it corresponds to the Greek verb ἀξιόω, in the 
same way as the substantive rogamentum corresponds to ἀξίωμα. Aristotle uses this verb 
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in a similar sense (An.Pr. 37a10 cf. 41b10). It is unclear why Baldassarri has suggested the 
middle/passive form of the verb, ἀξιοῦσθαι, as the Greek equivalent (1986: 106).  
191.12-13   Quod nullam substantiam habet, non est: This statement summarises the Stoic 
view presented more fully by Seneca that there are things which are, or which exist but 
which have no substantia: 
‘“In rerum,” inquiunt, “natura quaedam sunt, quaedam non sunt. Et haec autem, 
quae non sunt, rerum natura complectitur, quae animo succurrunt, tamquam 
Centauri, Gigantes et quicquid aliud falsa cogitatione formatum habere aliquam 
imaginem coepit, quamvis non habeat substantiam’ (Ep. 58.15). 
In the passage above, Seneca has used substantia to mean physical material. Elsewhere, 
however, his uses of substantia are not limited to that of a corporeal substance; he often 
uses the term to render the Greek οὐσία as well, meaning ‘being’, not necessarily in a 
materialistic sense. ‘He proposes to render ousia by essentia’ but this ‘translation remains 
isolated, and Seneca resorts more often to materia or substantia’ (Armisen-Marchetti, 
2014: 218 n.4). In light of the use of aliquam in the passage cited above, nonnullam, which 
I suggest as a variant for non below (see note on 191.14-15), could be intended to carry the 
same import as a way of referring to the quasi-existence of incorporeals which, although 
they are not ὄντα, are ‘somethings’. Brunschwig’s discussion shows that the Stoics counted 
λεκτά, examples of which we are dealing with here, as one of four such incorporeals 
(Brunschwig, 2003: 212-213). 
191.13-14   cogentur enim … quod non est: The author argues that the Stoic criterion for a 
premise to be genuinely negative contradicts their criterion for what qualifies the existence 
of something and therefore, when the ontological doctrine is presented as a logical 
proposition it creates a paradox: ‘Quod nullam substantiam habet non est’ (212.12-13. See 
note below on 191.14-15 for the textual variation which more clearly demonstrates the 
author’s analysis of this paradoxical statement). secundum quod dicunt reminds the 
audience that the primary concern here is logical validity, whereby a conclusion must follow 
from a given pair of premises, rather than any other kind of truth. In this way, it looks 
forward to the description of proof per impossibile throughout Chapter 12 (209.10-212.3), 
a form of argument which, according to the author, is designed to refute those who reject 
a conclusion resulting from premises which they accepted (209.17-18). In this way, the verb 
cogentur here serves a similar purpose to compelluntur in the passage from Chapter 12 
(210.1). Similarly, the verb confiteri conveys an accusatory tone (L&S s.v. all senses) in the 
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way that impudenter does in Chapter 12 (209.18). It also draws attention to the fact that 
the author is refuting the Stoics and distancing himself from their views in the same way as 
the use of at (191.6) above. In a similar way to this Plutarch intentionally presents the Stoics’ 
views on ‘being’ as paradoxical (Comm. Not. 1073D-E. See Caston, 1999: 151-52, who 
identifies and disambiguates the two distinct senses which the Stoics apply to being, that 
which is ontologically marked, meaning ‘to exist’, and the copula, meaning ‘to be’, which 
exonerates them from this perceived paradox). The following passage shows that, 
according to the Stoics, a proposition can be made up of corporeal and incorporeal entities: 
‘Of these (viz. the signification, the signifier, and the name-bearer) , two are bodies 
- the utterance and the name-bearer’; but one is incorporeal – the state of affairs 
signified and sayable, which is true or false.’ (Sext. Emp. M.8.70- SVF 2.187). 
As Long and Sedley explain, ‘the nouns, conjunctions etc. are commonly treated as parts of 
the complete sayable. Yet although the complete sayable, like its incomplete counterpart, 
is itself an incorporeal ‘signification’ it does not follow that every one of its constituent parts 
is, taken individually, an incorporeal signification’ (1987: 201). This creates a strong case for 
nonnullam as the correct reading which, I suggest, ought to be accepted rather than nullam 
(see also notes on 191.12-13, 13-14). 
191.14-15   quod nullam substantiam habet: As described above, the author perceives a 
paradox between the Stoic rule for negation (191.10-11) and the proposition which denies 
the existence of something which has no substance (191.12-13) but which is not preceded 
by a negative particle. Sullivan, however, argues that it is unlikely that the Stoics could be 
refuted in the way that the author of the Peri Hermeneias is suggesting here; he says that, 
‘we know that in the sort of proposition which the denoted by the term “negation” the 
Stoics had a means whereby they could deny the existence of a thing without committing 
themselves to that thing’s existence, simply by prefixing a negative particle to the 
proposition which positively asserts the existence of thing’ (Sullivan, 1967: 48). It seems 
that the author has a different way of understanding the effect of the negative particle to 
the way in which it was intended by the Stoics; Goulet proposes two hypotheses about the 
way in which this Stoic method of negation might be understood: ‘si la négation précède 
tout l’affirmative correspondante, est-ce parce qu’elle nie à la fois l’existence du sujet et le 
prédicat ou qu’elle nie la réalité du rapport entre le sujet et le prédicat? La première 
interprétation correspond à la theorie stoïcienne exposée par Apulée et attribuée à ses 
adversaires par Alexandre d’Aphrodise, la second correspond à la conception d’Aristote, 
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rappelée d’ailleurs par Alexandre 404,35-36’ (Goulet, 1978: 185). The example proposition 
used here by our author, which has ‘quod nullam substantiam habet’ as the subject, 
indicates clearly that, as Goulet points out, he follows the first of these two interpretations 
of the Stoic rule for negation. Goulet argues that it can’t be the first hypothesis that the 
Stoics had in mind because this makes it impossible to categorise this type of proposition 
to any one of the particular types. He says that the second hypothesis must be the correct 
one; it is the author of the Peri Hermeneias, therefore, who is mistaken. Goulet goes on to 
say that ‘les stoïciens pouvaient exiger que la négation soit placée devant toute la 
proposition sans pour autant que le problème de l'existence actuelle du sujet ait été soulevé’ 
(Goulet, 1978: 185. Bobzien, 2003: 90 makes the same point). It is clear, then, that the 
problem which our author identifies with this rule as it is applied to the proposition he sets 
out to refute is not one which the Stoics would have considered relevant themselves; Cavini 
points out that the author of the Peri Hermeneias and Alexander of Aphrodisias had 
different concerns regarding the existential import of the subjects of propositions to the 
views reported by Diogenes Laertius and Sextus Empiricus: ‘Le testimonianze di Apuleio e 
Alessandro di Afrodisia integrano quella di Diogene relativamente agli enunciati semplici, 
suggerendo un diverso criterio, quello della distinzione tra affermazione e negazione e 
relative presupposizioni esistenziali, semantiche e temporali’ (Cavini, 1985: 84). Our 
author’s misinterpretation of the existential import of Stoic negation lends plausibility to 
the reading nonnullam (BAS2) over nullam (191.14); the use of nonullam makes his criticism 
of the Stoics explicit: ‘they are forced to admit that what is not (quod non est) does exist 
(esse), because it has some substance (quod nonnullam substantiam habet)’. The 
elementary level of the text has already been established (see introduction section 6), 
which makes the latter reading, ‘nonnullam’, which serves to explain his interpretation of 
Stoic negation, seem far more likely than ‘nullam’, which simply reiterates the point made 
above without providing any further clarification. The point may, then, be boiled down in 
the following way: they say that what has no substance does not exist. It is the case that 
there is something which has no substance and which therefore does not exist. By qualifying 
the substance in this way its existence is acknowledged, in which case, it does have some 
quality of being (nonnullam substantiam).   
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Chapter 4  
191.16-193.13     
 
In this chapter the author distinguishes between the subject and the predicate parts of a 
proposition, both of which may be composed of one or several words, and describes two 
ways in which the parts can be distinguished from one another – predicates encompass 
more things than subjects and predicates are always defined by a verb rather than a noun. 
When a property of the subject serves as the predicate this forms a proposition which is 
equipollent since both parts can be interchanged without the meaning of the proposition 
being altered. The author also states that, just as whole propositions can either be definite 
or indefinite, subjects and predicates are also either definite, e.g. man, animal or indefinite, 
e.g. not man, not animal.  
191.16   ceterum propositio: The way in which Chapter 4 begins with ceterum (L&S s.v. II A 
3) and then by introducing the authority of Plato suggests that the criticism of the Stoics, 
which began in Chapter 3 (191.6-15), continues. For the introduction of the term propositio 
as an equivalent for the Greek terms πρότασις and ἀξίωμα see 190.5-8. 
191.16   ut ait … Theaeteto Plato: Moreschini’s apparatus fontium points us towards 
Theaet. 206d for this reference. Londey and Johanson suggest that the author is confusing 
the Theaetetus with the discussion at Sophist 261-262, ‘in which the noun verb analysis of 
the proposition is treated in more explicit detail’ (Londey and Johanson, 1987: 84 n.2, cf. 
Baldassarri, who adds Crat.431B as another Platonic passage dealing with the same topic 
(Baldassarri, 1986: 71 n.10). Since the character, Theaetetus, is involved in this discussion 
about ὄνομα and ῥῆμα in the subsequent dialogue, the Sophist, this would be an 
understandable slip to make on the part of the author. In the Theaetetus passage, Plato 
says that part of rational explanation is to express one’s thought through speech by means 
of verbs and nouns but he does not explain that a combination of one of each of these two 
units forms a proposition which is either true or false in the way that the author of the Peri 
Hermeneias suggests: 
 
τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἴη ἂν τὸ τὴν αὑτοῦ διάνοιαν ἐμφανῆ ποιεῖν διὰ φωνῆς μετὰ ῥημά
των τεκναὶ ὀνομάτων (Theaet.206d). 
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There may, however, be a significant reason behind the author’s reference to the 
Theaetetus, rather than to the Sophist, in this text. When Arius Didymus discusses the topic 
of the final good for man (τέλος) in terms of its ‘answering to the tripartite division of 
philosophy, he sees the subject being dealt with from the logical [perspective] in the 
Theaetetus (176a-e)’ (Dillon, 1993: 172). Alcinous prefaces his discussion on dialectic (ch.5) 
and syllogistic (ch.6) with a description of the kritērion as the tool for acquiring knowledge 
(ch.4) and, ‘the Theaetetus, as we are informed by the Anonymous Theaetetus 
Commentator (2.11ff), was declared by some Platonists to be concerned with the kritērion’ 
(Dillon, 1993: 61). In addition to providing a preliminary for the exposition of logic, 
Theaetetus (152d) has been seen by some commentators, e.g. the Anonymous 
Commentator, as employing Aristotle’s Categories (ibid. 85). The author may indeed have 
both the Theaetetus and the Sophist in mind. 
191.16-17   duabus paucissimis … partibus constat: Martianus Capella provides a similar 
definition for what he calls proloquium (393), the term which our author ascribed to Varro 
in Chapter 1 (190.5). Varro (L.L.8.4.11) gives a definition for partes orationis which is similar 
to the definition given by the author for propositio. It is unclear why the author refers to 
the parts of speech as paucissimis and what he means by this. Moreschini equates the 
meaning of paucus with parvus and says that such a use is indicative of fourth-century 
authorship (see introduction section 5 n.216). Stover translates paucissimis hominibus 
(Expositio 13.18-19) as ‘special men’ which lends support to Londey and Johanson’s 
translation as ‘very special’ (Londey and Johanson, 1987: 84). This meaning is not, however, 
supported by any entries in L&S or OLD and leaves the sense with which the author is using 
it here in this passage quite opaque. Londey and Johanson’s suggestion that the author 
means to refer to the Sophist rather than to the Theaetetus at the beginning of this chapter 
begins to have more weight when this passage is examined closely. Our author appears to 
be unique in referring to the noun and the verb as the ‘smallest’ parts of speech; this is 
unsurprising given that, in practice, neither the noun nor the verb is necessarily the smallest 
part of speech. Since he has the dialogue Theaetetus and perhaps also the character 
Theaetetus from the subsequent dialogue, the Sophist, in mind at the beginning of this 
chapter (191.16) he may also have the same passage from the Sophist in mind, in which the 
combination of a noun and a verb form the first and shortest form of discourse: τῶν λόγων 
ὁ πρῶτός τε καὶ σμικρότατος (Soph.262c4). Another meaning of the superlative form of the 
adjective in the ablative plural is ‘in just a few words’ or ‘very briefly’ (OLD s.v. 6b) which 
would fit the context well. Apuleius uses the comparative form of the adjective with this 
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meaning in Apol.89. The surrounding context, however, suggests that what the author 
means to say is that ‘a proposition consists of at least two parts of speech, a noun and a 
verb’ (see OLD s.v. 1b ‘at the fewest’ or ‘at the least’ e.g., Plin. Nat.10.62). This is the most 
plausible meaning for the superlative since, after this definition, he first of all lists the other 
types of words which may be included in a statement (192.1-3) and then he goes on to 
describe the way in which each of these parts may be extended into more words (see 9-
12). 
The verb constat (191.17) is most frequently taken with the ablative (L&S s.v.B5) but it is 
also found with the genitive (L&S s.v. B6). Whether the author confused the reference, or 
the text is incorrect, it would make sense, based on the passage from the Sophist for the 
meaning to be: ‘A proposition consists of two parts of speech at least.’ The co- prefix of the 
verb is more resonant of the idea of the ‘co-mingling’ of the noun and the verb as it is 
expressed by the words κεράσῃ and συμπλοκή in the Sophist 262c than the simple 
explanation of speech by means of ‘μετα’ nouns and verbs in the Theaetetus 206d. Similarly, 
Martianus Capella describes the way in which nouns and verbs iuncta sint (395). 
191.17   nomine et verbo: The terms here are being used in the strictly grammatical sense; 
nomen to mean ‘noun’ corresponding to the Greek ὄνομα rather than simply ‘name’, and 
verbum to mean ‘verb’ (OLD s.v. 2) to correspond to the Greek ῥῆμα (rather than the non-
technical use of verba as it is used later to mean ‘words’ in a general sense at 192.10). 
Alexander has a similar explanation about the formation of a simple proposition using a 
noun and a verb: 
 
‘He deals first with propositions (περὶ προτάσεως) because he is going to give his 
account of terms by way of propositions. The terms in a simple (ἐν ἁπλῇ) 
proposition are noun and verb’ (in An.Pr.14,27). 
 
About this passage Barnes et al. say that ‘this grammatical analysis of propositions is at odds 
with the standard logical analysis into subject term and predicate term: the predicate term 
is not a verb – it has the same logical syntax as the subject term, with which it is 
interchangeable’ (1991: 61 n.25). Indeed, nowhere in the Prior Analytics does Aristotle 
analyse premises (πρότασεις) in this way. It is however, the way in which the propositions 
(ἀπóφανσεις) are described in De interpretatione (De int.16a1-3). After defining noun and 
verb (ὄνομα and ῥῆμα), it is established in Aristotle’s De interpretatione that a statement 
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(λογός) consist of these and a statement which has either truth or falsity in it is specifically 
called a proposition; the majority of the examples of such propositions which can be broken 
down into the parts noun and verb contain the verb εἶναι. Then, in the early stages of the 
Prior Analytics, he makes clear the transition between considering statements in terms of 
noun and verb and in terms of a subject term and a predicate term:   
 
By a term ( Ὅρον) I mean that into which the premise (πρότασις) can be analysed, 
viz., the predicate and the subject, with the addition or removal of the verb to be 
(εἶναι) or not to be (μὴ εἶναι)’ (An.Pr.24b16-18). 
 
The passage above, which has been considered to be controversial by both ancient and 
modern interpreters (Barnes et al.: 61 n.52) makes it clear that in premises which form a 
syllogism, the verb is always εἶναι, which can be taken as read and omitted, and is paired 
with a term which can be interchanged with the subject term. In this respect, the subject 
term and the predicate term are, to borrow Barnes’ phrase, ‘syntactically symmetrical’ 
(1983: 280 n.2). By saying this, Aristotle makes it clear that the analysis of a proposition in 
terms of the practice described in the Prior Analytics is no longer concerned with a noun 
and a verb but with a subject term and a predicate term, which, in normal parlance are 
linked by a verb, usually ‘to be’ εἶναι but sometimes also by ὑπάρχω (see note on 212.6-7), 
but since it is the function of the terms and not of the verb in this work which is the concern, 
the verb can be omitted. In the examples of syllogistic moods with real terms rather than 
the letters which Aristotle usually uses, these are the same types of sentences as were 
discussed in the De interpretatione but they are now being considered from a logical rather 
than grammatical point of view (see, however, Alexander’s explanation of this passage in 
which he suggests that Aristotle advises the removal of the verb ‘to be’ so that it is not 
misinterpreted as a third term 15,5-16).  
Baldassarri also comments that Apuleius has different terminology for the grammatical 
aspect of a proposition and the logical aspect of a proposition, namely, noun/verb and 
subject/predicate (1986: 72 n.12). This isn’t exactly surprising since, in this chapter, the 
author is paving the way for the transition between the exposition in Aristotle’s De 
interpretatione, which treats sayings formed from nouns and verbs in a proposition, and 
the exposition in the Prior Analytics which presents the relationship between two terms 
within a premise and how these are combined with another premise to form a syllogism.  
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191.18   Apuleius disserit: The use of Apuleius’ name in this example of a proposition has 
been treated by scholars, such as Zeller (1881) and later Meiss (1886), as evidence that the 
work is authentically by Apuleius (for this argument, and others, for and against the 
authenticity of the Peri Hermeneias see Sullivan, 1967: 12ff. See introduction section 7). 
Apuleius does use his own name in Apol. (9; 17; 27; 48; 53; 82; 83; 102) but in every case in 
this speech he is quoting someone else who is referring to him or addressing him. He also 
uses his own name in an extract from Florida where he is describing the particular skills of 
Empedocles, Plato, Socrates, Epicharmus, Xenophon and Xenocrates based on the ‘cups’ 
they have drunk from (20) and ends with his own name, ‘Apuleius vester’. The instance of 
sphragis in our text, however, has also led others to think that such use of his own name 
excludes the possibility that he is the genuine author of the text (e.g. Hildebrand and 
Goldbacher, for which see Sullivan op. cit; Londey and Johanson, 1987: 13). Indeed, as 
frequently as Apuleius uses his own name in his own works, other authors use names other 
than their own for the purpose of giving examples. For instance, Martianus Capella, in his 
passage which deals with this topic, uses Cicero’s name as an example: ‘Cicero disputat’ 
(393). This is more similar to Aristotle’s practice of using Socrates in his examples rather 
than his own name (e.g. De Int.7.17b28-9 cf. 2.16.b1; 7.17b2). Varro uses his own name in 
his own work ‘ut ex his feminae declinarentur, ut est ab Terentio Terentia’ (L.L.8.7 cf. 8.14) 
as well as the names of others for the same kind of examples, for example: nunc fieri in 
multis rebus binas, ut Metellus Metella, Aemilius Aemilia (L.L.9.38.55). In light of the two 
previous notes relating to Platonic dialogues in this chapter (191.16, 16-17), it is also 
relevant to point out that in the Sophist, the Stranger presents Theaetetus with two 
examples involving his own name as examples of true and false statements, ‘Theaetetus 
sits,’ and ‘Theatetetus flies’ (263a-c). The presence of Apuleius’ name in this text therefore, 
cannot reasonably be used to argue either for or against genuine Apuleian authorship as it 
is clearly a common feature of texts both to use one’s own name and of someone else in 
examples in order to demonstrate a feature of language or logic.  
191.18-19   quod aut verum aut falsum … propositio est: The causal force of ideo reinforces 
the idea that being true or false is a defining feature of a proposition (OLD s.v.1 (with causal 
clause) and 2 (absol.): ‘for the reason that’). Compare veritati aut falsitati obnoxia (190.4) 
which was used to similar effect alongside the introduction of the term (see note on 190.5-
6).  
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191.19-20   unde quidam … perfecta oratio: It is unclear to whom quidam refers (191.19). 
Based on the description of the belief that a noun and a verb can create a complete 
sentence, it is possible that it implies grammatici, who are mentioned on the following 
Teubner page (192.3). Plutarch describes the same and equally anonymous belief (Quaest. 
Plat. 1010b). Cherniss includes a list of other works which mention the same view (Cherniss, 
1976: 112-3 n.b – of particular note is Ammonius ‘who with explicit reference to the 
Cratylus and the Sophist asserts that Plato anticipated Aristotle in holding it (De int. 40,26-
30)’). Given that this view and the view about the parts of speech which grammarians count 
are complementary rather than contradictory to each other, autem (192.2) serves to 
introduce an additional, explanatory note meaning, for example, ‘indeed.’ (OLD s.v. 3, 4 cf. 
L&S s.v. B5) rather than to create a contrast between two views. By using oratio (191.20) 
rather than propositio at this point the author is making the point that a noun and verb can 
form a complete statement but cannot necessarily form a complete proposition since the 
combination does not necessarily create a meaning which is true or false – propositions are, 
by definition, either true or false (see 190.3-4; 191.18-19). In this way, oratio here 
corresponds to the way in which Aristotle uses λογός. Martianus Capella provides a more 
comprehensive explanation: 
 
Quod ergo fuerit iunctum ex nomine et verbo, si plenum nomen et plenum verbum 
sit, necessario facit sententiam, sed non necessario facit proloquium, si nihil est 
quod iam et affirmari et negari potest. Et supra diximus multa dici plena sententia 
quae tamen affirmari et negari <non> possint (392). 
 
As shown in the passage above, proloquium is the term used by Martianus Capella for what 
our author calls propositio (see 190.5 where proloquium is ascribed to Varro). propositio 
however, is used consistently by Martianus (414; 416; 422) to mean the major premise (OLD 
s.v.4b cf. L&S s.v. III ‘the first proposition of a syllogism). This suggests that, on this point, 
our author and Martianus Capella are drawing from different traditions. Sullivan dismisses 
this distinction as ‘one of relatively few differences in terminology between Martianus and 
Apuleius’ (Sullivan, 1967: 171). Since, however, propositio is introduced as a more familiar 
synonym for Varro’s proloquium, meaning a statement, and thereafter seems to become 
the established term for a complete ‘statement’ or ‘utterance’, this difference in 
terminology would appear to represent a more significant difference as well as its own 
linguistic one.   
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192.1   abunde sententiam comprehendant: This phrase recalls the first half of the 
definition of a proposition found in Chapter 1 (absolutam sententiam comprehendens 
190.2-3). Only by comparing these two passages does the idea, which Martianus Capella 
explains (see note above), become clear. 
192.1-3   adverbia autem et pronomina … quae grammatici numerant: Diogenes Laertius 
(7.71-4) explains the importance, according to the Stoics, of conjunctions in forming a 
complete statement. This is at odds with what the author reports Plato as saying at the 
beginning of Chapter 4 - he also goes on to emphasise the irrelevance of words like 
conjunctions ‘which the grammarians count’. The generalising cetera suggests that there is 
a level of uncertainty in the actual number of parts of speech. In a similar vein, Quintilian 
writes that there was disagreement about how the parts of speech ought to be counted 
and that the Stoics added to a list of three which Aristotle and Theodectes originally 
counted (Inst. 1.4.1-5); his phrase ‘quamquam de numero parum convenit’, in particular, 
suggests that this was a somewhat arbitrary matter. Daniel Taylor outlines the development 
of the number of parts of speech. He agrees with our author in saying that ‘Plato is the first 
to divide sentences into nominal and verbal components’ before Aristotle added 
σύνδεσμος ‘which means roughly “connective” but which includes prepositions as well as 
conjunctions, and ἄρθρον... “article”’ (Taylor, 1996: 13). As well as a level of uncertainty, 
cetera also conveys the idea that these other parts of speech are irrelevant to the present 
study which focuses on logical propositions rather than the grammatical structure of 
sentences and so the distinction between noun and verb made by Plato is the only one 
which matters. 
192.4   navium aplustria: aplustre, which is a calque from the Greek ἄφλαστον, is relatively 
uncommon and is generally only found in verse where it refers to the ornamental stern of 
a ship (e.g. Lucr. 2.551, 4.436; Manil. Astron. 1.681; Sil. 10.321, 14.421; Juv. 10.133). The 
implication of its use here indicated both by its meaning (OLD s.v. ‘the ornamented 
sternpost of a ship’) and perhaps also by the fact that it is a term found more commonly in 
poetry than prose is that it is ornamental rather than having a useful role, which could be 
seen as an example of a typically Apuleian rhetorical flourish (For other examples of such 
rhetorical flourishes see e.g., the list of gerunds at the beginning of Chapter 1 189.5-8). The 
comparison between parts of speech and unnecessary ornamental additions is one which 
Plutarch uses in describing Homer’s verse: 
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‘Homer too, who excelled in marshalling words, attaches articles to few of his 
nouns, as it were crests to helmets or handles to goblets that do not require them’ 
(Quaest. Plat. 1010d. Trans., Cherniss, 1976). 
 
This passage comes just after Plutarch’s discussion about the fact that the Romans have 
eliminated all prepositions and admit none of the words called articles. Since this is a 
comparison between Latin and Greek, it may be possible that here our author is 
emphasising the irrelevance of such words, not only because of their uselessness in a logical 
context, but also because they are redundant in Latin language in general, since his aim in 
this work is to Latinise logic.  
 
192.4   pilos: This word, meaning hair, is frequently used to denote insignificance in Classical 
Latin (OLD s.v. b cf. L&S s.v. II B). It is possible, based on the context, that this is the 
implication here. However, the term is only used as a designation of insignificance when 
the noun is singular and when it is joined with a negative particle e.g. ‘ne pilum quidem’ 
(Cic. Att.5.20.6). Other examples of the noun in the plural (OLD s.v. cf. L&S II B in plural, ‘a 
garment or fabric made of hair’) do not appear to be used with this metaphorical meaning. 
In which case, it is possible that the comparison with hair is being used with a different 
effect. ‘Hair of men’ is put alongside ‘navium aplustria’ which is mentioned for its decorative 
appearance (see note above) – it is likely, therefore, that pilos hominum is also being used 
to convey the idea of decoration rather than use. The disregard of decorative hair is 
completely at odds with Apuleius’ treatment of the aesthetic qualities of hair in his 
authentic works. Englert and Long (1973: 236) refer to Met.2.9.1-3 which demonstrates 
Lucius’ obsession with hair. Walsh writes that this interest of Lucius reflects Apuleius’s own 
interest (Walsh, 1970: 152). Similarly, Finkelpearl compares the way in which ‘Lucius loves 
hair in all its styles and is adamant about the need for hair as adornment’ and Apuleius’ writing 
style, which ‘is in no way unadorned’ (Finkelpearl, 1998: 66). In this way, the mention of men’s 
hair as analogous to the parts of speech which only adorn a sentence rather than adding to 
its function, could be a direct reference to Apuleius, previously mentioned (191.18), one 
which Apuleius would be unlikely to make himself based on his treatment of hair in his 
authentic works. Although mainly in poetry, the use of hair as an analogy for literary style is 
fairly common, ‘even Cicero, in the course of very straightforward prose, explicitly compares 
unadorned women to “true” Atticist oratory’ (Finkelpearl, 1998: 65) in Orator 23.78. The 
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description of the hair of the personified Dialectic in Martianus Capella is also significant in 
this regard: 
 
Cui crines tortuosi decentique inflexione crispati et nexiles videbantur. Qui tamen 
deducti per quosdam consequentes gradus ita formam totius capitis circulabant ut 
nihil deesse cerneres, nihil superfluum detineres (328). 
 
With regard to this passage, Ferré suggests that Apuleius’ description of feminine hair in 
the Metamorphoses may have served as a model, although the description is an inversion 
of the one found here. He also says that the hair described here is Greek and in this regard, 
it reflects the fact that logic is of Greek origin (2007: 68 n.17, 18). Based on the hair analogy 
given above, it would seem that this is a commonly used image and it gives further impetus 
to the argument that, by comparing the uselessness of men’s hair to the uselessness of 
grammatical particles in a proposition, the author of the Peri Hermeneias is trying to 
distance the logic he writes about from Greek as far as possible in order to fully integrate it 
into Latin (see 192.4). 
192.5-6   in universa compage … deputanda: compages (192.5) is used by Apuleius to mean 
the structure of the stars and the world (De mundo 1; 32 cf. pseudo-Apuleius, Asclepius 
10.49). Gellius uses it in a similar way to mean the structure of the world (N.A. 7.1.7). It is 
perhaps possible that the combination of universus here, in the sense of ‘general’ or 
‘collective (L&S s.v.; cf. OLD s.v. 1, 3), and compages is a pun on the use of these terms in 
De mundo, which would explain why compages is never otherwise found in a linguistic or 
logical context. This could either be an indication that Apuleius himself wrote the Peri 
Hermeneias and transferred the meaning of the terms from a cosmological context, as he 
had used it before, to a logical context or that a pseudonymous author, who was familiar 
with De mundo, used this ‘Apuleian’ combination to complement the use of Apuleius’ name 
as an example in a similar way to the analogy involving hair above (192.4). There are no 
examples of compages cited in either L&S or OLD which show that it was ever used in the 
sense of the ‘general structure of speech’ outside of this text, which suggests that it is 
intended to continue the construction metaphor which began with navium aplustria 
(192.4). 
192.5-6   vice clavorum … glutinis deputanda: The analogy used here, which continues the 
construction metaphor (see note on 192.5-6), between nails, pitch, and glue and the parts 
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of speech which act as ‘connectors’ is popular. As Barnes says, ‘it is one of several similar 
metaphors which Plutarch uses in his essay on the parts of speech (Quaest. Plat. 1009f-
1010d); and it is elaborated by Ammonius’ (Barnes, 2007a: 232). It is also found in Dexippus’ 
Questions and Answers on Aristotle’s Categories (in Cat. 32.17-26). 
192.6-7   ex duabus praedictis … velut subdita: Baldassarri comments that the author 
borrows the Stoic term pars and he extends the original meaning of the term, ‘le parti del 
discorso,’ to also include ‘gli elementi funzionali della proposizione’ (Baldassarri, 1986: 72 
n.12). It is quite a stretch to suggest that pars is a Stoic term; there is no Latin word which 
conveys the same meaning as the Greek term μέρος, in any context, more appropriately 
than pars. Furthermore, the Greek term is not used exclusively to denote Stoic concepts; 
Aristotle, for example, refers to ‘τὰ μέρη τῆς λέξεως’ (Arist. Poet.1456b). Besides, the 
author has qualified his use of the term here by adding the adjectives subiectiva, subdita, 
and declarativa which, after their introduction here, are used as substantives on their own 
without pars (192.13; 197.18; 204.3, 7; cf. however, 193.10; 196.16-18; 207.1, 21, 22; 
208.21 where they qualify particula). Of the two terms which are introduced to denote the 
subject term, subiectiva is used throughout the rest of the text whereas the few uses of 
subdita are confined to this chapter (192.19, 20, 21; 193.5); this second term was perhaps 
only added pleonastically in order to clarify the exact meaning of subiectiva (compare the 
two uses of illativum rogamentum in Chapter 7, which was introduced to enhance 
understanding of illatio 199.9-10) and to emphasise the focus of this chapter, which is the 
relationship between the subject and the predicate; a given subject is said to ‘belong to’ or 
to be held ‘under’ the particular group of things which is expressed by the predicate (for 
the introduction of these terms with the particle velut see introduction section 5). The 
prefix sub- in these terms reinforces the subordinate role of subjects and this is continued 
by the preposition sub used below where the author explains that many subjects other than 
Apuleius can be contained ‘under’ the same predicate (192.15-16). In this way, the terms 
successfully convey the idea behind Aristotle’s use of the verb ὑπάρχω to describe the same 
relationship between a subject and its predicate. The difference in subject matter and 
terminology between Aristotle’s De interpretatione and Prior Analytics (see note on 191.17) 
is represented in this text which draws from both works, and this point in the text marks 
the transition between them. Here the author refers back to nomen and verbum introduced 
above (praedictis 191.17) which are the consituent parts of a statement as discussed in De 
interpretatione and now maps them onto subject (subiectiva vel subdita) and predicate 
(declarativa see below 192.7-9) as they will be identified in the part of the Prior Analytics 
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which contains the exposition about syllogistic combinations (see note on 191.17. Compare 
Martianus Capella: Nam sunt proloquii partes duae: quae in nomine, una, subiectiva dicitur, 
quae in verbo, altera, declarativa 393).  
192.7-9   altera declarativa … faciat Apuleius: Compare the use of faciat to the description 
of a Stoic proposition in which quid evenerit ei was used to describe the subject and 
therefore to affirm its existence (191.8). 
192.9-10   eadem vi … verba protendere: Τhe term verba is used here in a non-grammatical 
sense to mean simply ‘words’ (compare the use at 191.17); either part of a proposition 
(utramvis partem), that is, the subject (subiectiva velut subdita) or the predicate 
(declarativa), can be expressed with more words and still retain the same meaning (eadem 
vis manente). The author is required to revert to technical grammatical terminology further 
on when he explains that the declarative, or predicate, part is always expressed by a verb 
and never by a substantive (193.6). The use of vis in the context of language and with the 
meaning ‘meaning’ appears to have originated in Cicero, who commonly combined the 
term with verbi (e.g., Orat.72, De inv.1.17; De fin.3.51). This corresponds to the use of the 
Greek δύναμις found in, for example, Plato Crat. 394b1 (LSJ s.v. III). The elementary and 
non-technical nature of this description and the examples which follow suggest that this 
text was intended for a non-specialist audience (see introduction section 6). This 
explanation and the example which follows (see note 192.11) would appear to correspond 
to Aristotle’s discussion about the distinction between single words and phrases or 
sentences (De int.16a21 ff), which Ackrill describes as brief and obscure (1963: 115). 
192.11   philosophum Platonicum Madaurensem: About the Aristotelian passage which 
corresponds to this example (De int.16a21ff. See note on 192.9-10 above), Ackrill says that 
Aristotle ‘does not explain what he means by saying of a part of an expression that it does, 
or that it does not, have significance in that expression ‘in its own right’ or ‘in separation’’ 
(1963: 115). Although Aristotle’s discussion centres around examples of compound nouns 
whereas our author’s own example is in the form of a series of separate terms, it is clear 
that it is this aspect of Aristotle’s discussion which our author has in mind. The way in which 
he has interpreted this point of Aristotle’s discussion, which Ackrill describes as ‘obscure’, 
is also made clear from the form of his example. Aristotle gives two examples to illustrate 
his point; the first involves a noun meaning ‘good steed’ (κάλλιππος) and the second ‘pirate 
vessel’ (ἐπακτροκέλης); both compound nouns in Greek. About the parts of both of these 
terms, he says the following: 
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‘The steed (ἵππος) has no meaning apart, as it has in the phrase ‘a good steed’ 
(κάλλιππος). It is necessary to notice, however, that simple nouns differ from 
composite. While in the case of the former the parts have no meaning at all, in the 
latter they have a certain meaning but not as apart from the whole. Let us take 
‘pirate-vessel’ (ἐπακτροκέλης), for instance. The ‘vessel’ (κέλης) has no sense 
whatever, except as a part of the whole’ (De int.16a22-28). 
Aristotle surely cannot mean that either ἵππος or κέλης have no meaning whatsoever at all, 
since both terms are established nouns in their own right, but rather, he means that they 
are not sufficient to accurately designate the good-steed or the pirate vessel respectively 
on their own. In our author’s example, philosophus expresses a meaning when used on its 
own, as does Platonicus and Madaurensis but each of these terms alone does not 
adequately designate Apuleius because each of them can designate far more than just 
Apuleius; in this way, what the author says about predicates (alias quoque subiectivas 
comprehendens 192.14) also applies to the extent of terms when not used in conjunction 
with others. Only when they are combined do they provide an expression which is 
equivalent in meaning to ‘Apuleius’ (for these types of desginations see also 197.18-198.1). 
The point, therefore, is that only the combination of the three adequately represents 
Apuleius as well as the designation ‘Apuleius’ itself. It appears that this is the way in which 
Ammonius also took Aristotle’s passage: 
‘Thus, in the case of the name ‘Kallippos’ the ‘(h)ippos’ by no means signifies an 
animal of this kind [i.e. a horse], although in the phrase ‘kalos hippos’ it happens to 
signify it, nor in ‘ekpaktrokeles’, which is the name of a piratical boat, does ‘keles’, 
nor in any other such name. For such names signify simple thoughts, even if some 
seem to have composition in their word-structure, just as sentences signify 
compound thoughts, according to what was previously defined about them 
(18,22ff)’ (in De int.33,15-20. Trans., Blank: 1996). 
philosophum Platonicum Madaurensem is unlike any reference Apuleius makes to himself 
in his works of confirmed authenticity. In Met.11.27, the character Lucius is identified as ‘a 
man from Madaura.’ The designation philosophus, in reference to Apuleius, appears 
frequently throughout the Apology, although this is usually used in a way which suggests 
that he is simply repeating the charges made against him using the same words as his 
accusers rather than unambiguously calling himself philosophus (see however, ‘philosophus 
debet’ in Apol.103, which is the only reference Apuleius makes to himself as a philosopher 
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without any apparent irony). Elsewhere he refers to Plato and Platonists but usually from a 
detached point of view. For example, he is criticised for owning nothing but a wallet and 
staff, which he says is untrue at any rate, and then goes on to say that this is not even the 
mark of Platonic philosophers but of the Cynic school (Apol.22). Elsewhere he refers to 
Platonists with varying degrees of attachment and detachment: meminerit (Apol. 39) could 
either mean that he simply has in mind (OLD s.v.1) or that he is remembering from 
experience (OLD s.v.2). He refers to Platone meo adhortante (Apol. 41) but he never 
describes himself with the adjective ‘platonicus’. The lengthy designation found here is 
more similar to descriptions of Apuleius found in the works of other, later authors than 
references in Apuleius’ own texts, e.g.: ‘platonicus Apuleius’ (Aug. Civ.47.8.24, 47.9.3, 
47.10.27); ‘fertur etiam Latino sermone et Apuleium Madaurensem instituta huius operis 
effecisse’ (Cass. Inst. 2.5.10); ‘platonicus philosophus Apuleius’ (Anon. Contra phil.). This 
could suggest that the author of the Peri Hermeneias is creating an epithet which 
amalgamates all of those by which Apuleius has previously been known (for a discussion 
about this designation in relation to the authenticity of the text, see introduction section 
7).  
192.11-12   dicas eum uti oratione: For other uses of the second person singular which 
convey the didactic tone of this text see 190.11-12; 198.16-17; 205.4 and introduction 
section 6. oratio was previously synonymously with ars disserendi (see note on 198.4).  
192.13   subiectiva minor … declarativa maior: The author explains that, on the whole, the 
subject part of a proposition is the smaller part (minor) and the predicate is the larger part 
(major). This text does not refer to premises or, more correctly, terms as being either major 
or minor. Alexander of Aphrodisias’ comprehensive description of the distinction between 
these types of premises (in An.Pr.47,29-48,7) elucidates the orignal Aristotelian passage 
where a definition is given of the major and minor terms within a combination: λέγω δὲ 
μεῖζον μὲν ἄκρον ἐν ᾧ τὸ μέσον ἐστίν, ἔλαττον δὲ τὸ ὑπὸ τὸ μέσον ὄν. (An.Pr.26a22-23). 
Tredennick (1949: 212-213 n.a) boils down Aristotle’s definition into the same idea as our 
author’s explanation of major and minor in Chapter 4 (192.13); the extension of the term is 
the feature which defines it as major or minor, not its position in either of the premises or the 
conclusion. Although the author does not refer to premises as containing either the major or 
the minor term, he acknowledges this important aspect of syllogistic validity by being 
consistent in his ordering of the premises and then by referring to either the first or second 
premise (see note on 204.3-6 from which point onwards the position of the major and the 
126 
 
minor term becomes relevant for the purpose of conversion). The point being made here, 
however, relates not to this aspect of formal logic but to the extent of the predicate term; 
these predicates often (plerumque), but not always (see note below 192.16-18), represent a 
larger (maior) group than the subject which belongs to a smaller (minor) category which falls 
under the predicate (see 197.8-198.4 and notes 197.10-13 to 198.1 for the types of 
predicates, their extent, and the way in which they can affect conversion). 
192.16-18   nisi forte … equi hinnire: If the predicate happens to be a property (proprium) 
of the subject, as neighing is of a horse, it is not the case that the subject is smaller and the 
predicate is larger (192.12-13) because a property such as ‘neighing’ is equal in extent to its 
subject ‘horse’. forte looks forward to the explanation of the five predicables (197.9-17) 
where it is explained that there is a one in five chance that a predicate will be a property. 
The contrast conveyed by the normal use of at is unexpected at this point where the author 
is providing an explanatory note rather than a point of contrast. It seems, however, to 
match the use of the Greek adverb ἔτι when it denotes continuation (LSJ s.v. 1. See 
introduction section 5 v for the Greek style of this text) – at used with this sense in Latin 
generally belongs to the Vulgar period (L&S s.v. I A, ‘often uses at as a mere continuative, 
where even et or atque might stand’) which could indicate that the date of composition was 
much later than the time of Apuleius. 
192.18-22   et idcirco … equus est: When the predicate of a subject designates a property 
(proprium cf. proprietas 197.10) of that subject, the two terms are equal (par) in extent (see 
note above 192.16-18) and the predicate part does not have a larger (maior) extent than 
the subject as it usually does (see note on 192.13). In these cases the two terms may swap 
positions and the truth value of the proposition would remain the same. This is also the 
case when the predicate denotes the definition (definitio) of the subject; this is explained 
more fully in Chapter 6 where the author sets out the rules for material conversion which 
are based on the five types of predicables (197.17-20. Compare Arist. Top.102a19-32 where 
he describes a property as belonging to a subject alone and as being ‘predicated convertibly 
(ἀντικατηγορεῖται τοῦ πράγματος) of it’). For subdita (192.20, 21) see note on 192.6-7. 
Quintilian also uses the participle hinniens as an example of a property of a horse and 
comments on how commonly ‘horse’ was used for such examples: ‘ut si finias equum (noto 
enim maxime utar exemplo) hinniens,’ (Quint. 7.3.3; see also Varro: ‘vocabula et verba ut 
homo et equus et legit et currit’ L.L.8.11).  This example must have become notum since it 
has its roots in Plato and Aristotle: Plato gives an example to demonstrate the 
127 
 
consequences of the suggestion that names belong to things only according to custom and 
habit rather than nature, i.e., that which a private individual calls ‘ἄνθρωπος’ and which the 
state names ‘ἵππος’ is the same thing (Crat.385a). A similar example is introduced into the 
context of properties used in propositions by Aristotle, who offers the word ἱμάτιον used 
to mean both horse and man as an example of an affirmation which is not single when a 
word has two meanings (De int. 8.18a20ff). The adjective hinnibilis only appears in this 
work. Harrison has cited this linguistic innovation as an example of typical Apuleian style 
(Harrison, 2002: 12 n.45). The presence of this kind of idiosyncrasy could support the 
argument for authentic Apuleian authorship but it could equally be an example of another 
author giving an example with an intentionally Apuleian flavour (see note on 189.4-8 for 
another example of this) to complement the use of his name in the examples given above 
(191.18; 192.7, 10, 15). 
192.22-23   at non itidem … vices possis: The swapping of terms described above, with the 
same meaning remaining, cannot be done when the subject and predicate terms are not 
equal (impares) in extent, specifically, when the predicate is either a genus, difference, or 
an accident (see 197.20-198.1). The use of the verb convertere (192.23 see also 192.25) 
anticipates the fuller discussion about logical conversion in Chapter 6 (196.15-198.17). The 
type of conversion referred to here is, quite clearly, conversion of terms (see Barnes, 1983: 
303, who points out that Alexander distinguishes it from other sorts of ‘conversion’ as 
‘ἀντιστροφὴ τῶν ὅρων’. Galen sensibly uses a separate term, ἀναστοφή, for this form of 
‘conversion’, and he warns against the danger of confusing it with ἀντιστροφή proper, or 
contraposition: Inst. Log. vi. 3-4’. Our author does not have a specific way of referring to 
the conversion of terms; he only distinguishes between ‘simple’ conversion, which involves 
converting only the conclusion and the conversion of the premises which he refers to in a 
non-technical way, ‘altera propositionum conversio’ (see notes on 198.7-8, 9). This 
corresponds to Aristotle’s discussion about the transposition of nouns and verbs (De 
int.20b1-13) where he says that such a change does not alter the meaning. In his 
commentary on this passage, Ackrill points out that ‘Aristotle does not make clear here 
what in general would count as transposing the name and the verb in a sentence. Nor is his 
account of names and verbs elsewhere sufficiently clear and comprehensive to enable one 
to say whether he is justified in claiming that no such transposition affects significance’ 
(Ackrill, 1963: 145. Compare Boethius who, when commenting on the same passage, 
explains that for philosophical purposes, changing the order of nouns and verbs should not 
alter meaning but such a change may have a different impact in oratory and poetry in De 
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int.344,28-345,6). This discussion, however, differs from that given by our author at this 
point since he has now made the transition from noun and verb to subject term and 
predicate term in his text (see note on 191.17). 
192.23-193.3   non enim … alia innumera: Although the proposition ‘Every man is an 
animal’ is true, the proposition in which the subject and predicate terms swap position 
‘Every animal is a man’ is false because the extent of each of the terms is unequal (see note 
above on 192.22-23). This is because animal (animal) is not a property (proprium) of man 
in the way that neighing (hinnibile) is a property of horse (equi), rather, it is the genus of 
man (see 197.15) and therefore it could also be predicated of a number of other (alia 
innumera) subjects.  
193.3-4   agnoscitur hic … proponatur: The verb agnoscitur suggests that the author’s aim 
was to teach students how to recognise particular parts of a proposition, in a similar way to 
the use of the verb discernitur further on (193.7-8). hic must mean ‘here’ in this context 
(L&S s.v. D2; OLD s.v. 3a) as there is no obvious masculine noun for it to agree with as a 
demonstrative pronoun. By saying ‘here’, the author is presumably referring to the 
examples he has just given above. He is about to explain to his audience how to distinguish 
a predicate term from a subject term even when the order in which they are presented has 
been changed and, as in the previous example, when the predicate and subject are equal 
parts because the predicate describes a property of a subject. The phrase converso ordine 
rogamentum is, of course, referring back to the change in order demonstrated in the 
previous examples but it also shows that the author is using a consistent order for 
presenting the subject and predicate within a premise (see note on 212.7-8). This is one of 
three uses of the term rogamentum, which was introduced in Chapter 1 as a verbum e verbo 
rendering of ἀξίωμα (190.6-7). The third use appears in Chapter 7 where it is qualified by 
the adjective illativum to create a synonym for illatio meaning ‘conclusion’ (199.10). 
193.4-5   plura comprehendere … quam subdita: This explanation demonstrates the 
comparison which was drawn previously between the subject which is minor and the 
predicate which is larger; the first of these is minor and the second is maior (192.13) 
because many subjects can be contained within one predicate (192.15-16). 
193.6   numquam vocabulo … terminatur: The author made the point earlier that a 
predicate, which is represented by a verb, says what a subject does e.g., quid faciat Apuleius 
(192.8-9). Compare the previous, non-technical use of verba to mean ‘words’ (192.10). The 
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distinction between the author’s use of vocabulum and nomen is unclear. See L&S 
vocabulum s.v. II, in grammar a substantive, both in gen. and as an appellative noun in 
partic. (in contradistinction to nomen, as denoting a proper name). Varro also describes 
Aristotle’s distinction between noun and verb using vocabulum and verbum (L.L.8.4.11, 
8.4.12) but then appears to treat nomen as a synonym of vocabulum (8.4.13). Quintilian 
(1.4.20) shows that there is some disagreement about the extent to which the terms 
nomen, vocabulum and appellatio ought to be distinguished. However, for our author’s 
purpose, vocabulum could refer to a linguistic element which is taking the place of a subject 
within a proposition without being a proper name. In this case, it is likely to be an attempt 
at naming the indefinite particles which are introduced and described below (193.9-11). 
Compare the characteristic by which Aristotle distinguishes nouns and verbs; nouns are 
without a connotation of time, i.e., as opposed to verbs (De int.16a20-21. See Ackrill’s note: 
115). 
193.6-8   praecipue etiam … discernitur:  a pari refers back to the part of the previous 
Teubner page where the author first gave an example of this (192.18-19). For discernitur 
see 193.3 above. 
193.8-12   id etiam … non animal: It seems that id here is, unusually, being used in a 
‘forward looking’ sense and refers to the similarity between propositions and their terms 
which are about to be described (see Panhuis, 2006: 36-37 for uses of the pronoun is and 
its declined forms. For the use here see L&S s.v. D. See also Pinkster, 2015: 1145-1146 for 
other examples of the cataphoric use of id). In this case, however, there is no particular 
substantive which follows. Compare illo 200.18 which also appears to be ‘forward looking’ 
although this is a more normal use for this pronoun. See note on 200.18-19 and introduction 
section 5). Since the author is about to describe the way in which propositions are similar 
to the terms within them because both can be either definite or indefinite, this indicates 
that it possibly refers back to the neuter noun vocabulo (193.6), a term which the author 
likely introduced to encompass subjects which could be denoted by indefinite particles as 
much as definite particles (see note on 193.6). Aristotle uses the same example to 
demonstrate indefinite nouns (οὐκ ἄνθρωπος) which, he says, are used for all kinds of 
things, those which are non-existent as well as those which exist (De int.16a30-33. For 
indefinite verbs see De int.19b9). 
193.12-13   non enim … praeter hoc esse: Martianus Capella defines indefinite terms in the 
following way: 
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‘ideo indefinitum est, quia negas tantum hoc esse, non dicis quid sit’ (399).  
This corresponds to only half of our author’s definition of indefinite terms, namely, cum hoc 
non sit (193.12). This shows that Martianus Capella interprets the force of the particle non 
the same way in which it was used by the Stoics to negate whole propositions (see note on 
191.10-11). Our author, on the other hand, acknowledges the possibility that the thing 
which is designated by the indefinite particle could be an infinite number of other things 
instead of what it is not by saying aliud praeter hoc esse (193.13). The particle non, 
therefore, is being used in a different way to the negative particle which is homonymous. 
In this respect, is in line with Aristotle’s definition of indefinite nouns which he calls ὄνομα 
ἀόριστον (see note on 193.8-12 above). This is also the way in which negatives are treated 
in Plato’s Sophist as is most clear from the following two passages which are close in 
succession: 
 
STR.: ‘When we say not-being, we speak, I think, not of something that is the opposite 
of being, but only of something different’ (Soph.257b3-4. Trans., Fowler: 1921). 
 
STR.: ‘Then when we are told that the negative signifies the opposite, we shall not 
admit it; we shall admit only that the particle “not” indicates something different 
from the words to which it is prefixed, or rather from the things denoted by the words 
that follow the negative’  (Soph.257b9-4c2. Trans., Fowler: 1921). 
 
This similarity is significant in light of the reference to Plato’s Theaetetus at the beginning 
of this chapter and which is also similar to a passage from the Sophist (see note on 191.16-
17). These passages therefore, along with the relevant passage from Aristotle cited above 
(De int.16a30-33), provide much needed guidance on how to interpret this clause which 
Sullivan says he has been unable to do (1967: 38-39). They give grounds to his speculation 
that the author ‘gave positive existential import to infinite (negative) terms’ (op. cit.: 39). 
However, they also show that he is incorrect to conflate infinite with negative terms in this 
way. It is clear that the force of non as part of an indefinite term is to be distinguished 
sharply from the negating force of the particle as it is applied to Stoic negative propositions 
(see note on 191.10-11). In this way, it would appear that on this point our author 
represents a different strand of logical tradition to Martianus Capella, specifically, one 
which is more Platonist and Peripatetic than Stoic in origin. 
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Chapter 5 
193.14-196.14 
The author describes the ways in which each of the four types of propositions can be shown 
to be either true or false based on their relationship with each of the other propositions. 
He describes the formation of a square diagram to demonstrate each of these relationships. 
After the description of the square of opposition diagram, the rest of the chapter focusses 
on the ways in which each of the four types of propositions can be proven to be either true 
or false by the truth value of the other propositions within the square. He then explains 
what he means by ‘equipollent’ propositions and demonstrates how a pair of such 
propositions can be created by prefixing a negative particle to one of a pair of contradictory 
propositions.  
193.14-15   quattuor illae … affectae sint: This is the first time the author states definitively 
that there are four (quattuor illae) types of premise after discussing the possible variations 
in quantity and quality, including indefinite as a possible quantity, and giving examples of 
each in Chapter 3 (190.17-191.4). The use of ‘inter se’ with the passive form of this verb 
‘affectae sint’ is rare and only two parallel examples can be found in Martianus Capella (342; 
400. For other examples of vocabulary shared by our author and Martianus Capella see 
introduction section 7). The expression in both texts denotes how the premises relate to 
each other and, in this way, corresponds to Aristotle’s use of the expression ‘πῶς ἐχουσῶν 
πρὸς ἀλλήλας’ (e.g. An.Pr.28a1-2; 43a16) which he uses to describe both how the terms 
within premises relate to each other as well as the premises themselves. Similarly, 
Alexander writes: ‘he shows which of the propositions we have mentioned convert from 
one another and which do not’ (in An.Pr.29,30-31. Compare διατίθημι which Baldassarri, 
1986: 101 suggests as the equivalent original Greek term without any justification). 
193.15-16   quas non … formula spectare: In their translation, Londey and Johanson say 
that they have taken non ab re est ‘in the positive sense of “useful”, which is quite 
consistent with the introduction of a novel heuristic device’ rather than ‘in a less positive 
sense (say, as “not irrelevant”)’ which they see as being ‘more consistent with his giving the 
Apuleian stamp of approval to something already in use’ (1984: 173. See also Londey and 
Johanson, 1987: 112, which is a condensed version of the former). The distinction they 
describe between these two senses is not particularly convincing; their ‘positive’ sense of 
the phrase could equally be said to convey the idea they say is conveyed by the ‘less positive 
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sense’ and vice versa. The use of this phrase is more significant in terms of the style it 
conveys. Such use of litotes could be seen as an example of Apuleian rhetorical flourish 
(compare, for example, the use of litotes at Met.11,27,7: ‘minime/non alienum nomen’ 
(Nicolini: 2012, 29). For other perceived examples of Apuleian flourish see introduction 
section 5). The use of such literary creativity, however, is more characteristic of Apuleius’ 
strictly literary works rather than his philosophical handbooks (for a discussion which 
compares the colourful style of Metamorphoses, Apologia, Florida, and De Deo Socratis 
with the dry and technical style of De Platone and De Mundo see Harrison, 2000: esp. 13-
14). This suggests that its use in this text which is of a strictly technical nature is rather out 
of place and is therefore evidence of imitation of Apuleian style rather than of authentic 
Apuleian authorship. This rhetorical device is described in terms of logic over the page 
where the author explains that applying a negative particle to any proposition forms the 
equipollent of that proposition’s contrary (196.8-13); it would be out of place for the author 
to discuss this further in terms of its use as a rhetorical device. formula here refers to the 
squared (quadrata) diagram but the same word is used later in the text for the three 
syllogistic figures (see e.g., 199.2; 203.11; 206.7; 207.16).  
193.16-19   sunt igitur ... bonum non est: The frequent use of the subjunctive in the 
description of the square diagram (subnotentur 193.20; dicanturque 193.21-22; ducantur 
193.22) would suggest that sint (WF Thom.) is more appropriate here than the indicative 
form (CABSD). The comparative form superiore is primarily used here to indicate the higher 
position (L&S s.v. II A) of the line marking the universals over the particulars (see note on 
193.19-22 below) in the diagram but it also serves to highlight the superiority (L&S s.v. II 
B3) in terms of logical value held by premises which are universal in quantity rather than 
particular (the inferiority of particulars in terms of physical position and of logical worth is 
conveyed in the same way by the use of inferiore below 193.19). Now that the author is 
introducing the syllogistic theory behind the relation of premises he gives examples of 
propositions which more clearly demonstrate a subject term and a predicate term joined 
by the copula est as opposed to those with a noun and a verb which he described in the 
previous chapter and which relate more closely to Aristotle’s discussion in De 
interpretatione than to the Prior Analytics (for this difference see note on 191.17).   
193.19   dicanturque … incongruae: For the use of the subjunctive dicanturque see note on 
193.16-19 above. The reason why the two universal premises are referred to as incongruae 
is explained below (194.6-8). 
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193.19-22   item in ... se hae suppares: For the use of inferiore see note on 193.16-19. 
Aristotle tends to use the prepositional phrase ἐν μέρει to describe premises with a 
particular quantity (e.g., An.Pr.24a19, and Alexander follows him in this regard, e.g. in 
An.Pr.34,24; 37,1, 21; 95,12). Compare the adjective μερικός, which Baldassarri, 1986: 105 
suggests as the equivalent term). Galen used the adverbial form of this (16.411) but there 
are no uses of the adjective cited in LSJ which are earlier than the third century A.D. 
Baldassarri gives πάρισος as the equivalent Greek term for suppares, which is found in Arist. 
Rhet.1410b1. The Latin term appears as a variant reading in Apu. Met.6.12: ‘musicae 
suppari gressu’ (L&S s.v.) for ‘musicae superingressa formosa saltavit’ (Teubner, 1931 and 
Budé, 1941). The use of the term in the Peri Hermeneias is its first use in a logical context in 
Latin and it does not appear to have become established as such. It is not even used in the 
later logical texts which make explicit use of the Peri Hermeneias (e.g., Cassiodorus’ 
Institutiones or Isidore of Seville’s Etymologiarum Sive Originum). The meaning behind this 
term becomes clear further on when the author describes the circumstances when each of 
the two suppares can be true (194.8-9). The term is used with more or less the same 
meaning by Aulus Gellius to describe Publilius as being ‘about equal’ to Laberius (N.A.14.1), 
which suggests that the author was purposefully using a familiar term and applying it to a 
technical context.  
193.22-194.2   deinde obliquae … universalem abdicativam: Both of the lines are described 
as starting from the affirmative side of the square, which reflects the priority placed on 
affirmation rather than negation in Peripatetic logic (see introduction p30 and note on 
209.3-5 for the overall prority of quantity over quality). The meanings of pertingo (AS) and 
pertineo (CWBD) do not differ significantly enough for either one of these variants to alter 
the sense of this passage. 
194.2-4   quae inter se … veram esse: Thomas includes contrariae (194.3) in the diagram of 
the quadrata formula as a synonym for incongruae as well as the term subcontrariae as a 
synonym for suppares although there is no evidence for this term having been used before 
Boethius (In PH.2.7). Similarly, he labels the relationship between the universal affirmative 
and the particular affirmative and the relationship between the universal negative and the 
particular negative as subalternae, which is not found anywhere in the Peri Hermeneias but 
first arises in Mar. Vict. Advers. Ari. (1A.23.29) and is used frequently by Boethius. Londey 
and Johanson point out that the Goldbacher diagram, which Thomas followed, deviates 
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from the ‘Apuleian terminology’ (1987: 108-109. See note on 194.18-195.2 for a discussion 
about the labelling of the square diagram in the manuscripts). 
194.4-5   quae dicitur … et integra: Londey and Johanson see pugna, which is a rendering 
of the Greek μάχη, as indicative of ‘a Stoic way of viewing relations between propositions’ 
as ‘μάχεσθαι is certainly a well-attested Stoic verb for expressing that propositions are in 
conflict (e.g., Diogenes Laertius, Vitae VII, 73; Sextus Empiricus, Hyp. Pyrrh. II)’ (1984: 172. 
See also Baldassarri, 1986: 105 s.v. pugna). There is no doubt that pugna is a rendering of 
the Greek μάχη but it seems clear that this term was part of the nomenclature of dialectic 
which was present more widely than only in the Stoic tradition; Alexander, for example, 
uses the noun μάχη (in An.Pr.11,20) and its cognate verb (in An.Pr.17,16; 52,23) to denote 
the conflict between contradictory propositions. Furthermore, the Stranger in Plato’s 
Sophist 260d, for example, refers to the sophist as ‘not keeping up the fight’ in the dispute 
about the nature of ‘not-being’ and Theaetetus, in his reply to the stranger, talks about the 
opponent of a sophist having to ‘fight through’ his defences (Soph.261a. See Herrmann, 
1995 for a detailed discussion about the fighting metaphor Plato uses in this dialogue and 
in the Theaetetus). In the later Peripatetic tradition, the terms μάχη and ἀκολουθία are 
used by authors such as Alcinous (Didask. 158.16-17) and Alexander of Aphrodisias (in 
An.Pr.11.19-20) to distinguish the two types of hypothetical propositions which indicate a 
conflict and a connection respectively (for a discussion about the ways in which these terms, 
which were originally Stoic, were adopted by Peripatetics and Platonists for use which was 
at odds with Stoic logic see Bobzien, 2002: 388 n.82). Although pugna on its own is widely 
attested in logical contexts which are not specifically Stοic, the combination of perfecta 
pugna quite clearly resembles the Stoic τέλεια μάχη. This is a phrase found in Galen (Inst. 
9.7-10.3) to describe the ‘complete incompatibility {which} obtains when p and q cannot be 
both true and cannot be both false’ (Burnyeat, 2012: 194 n.115); this is exactly the situation 
the author of the Peri Hermeneias describes between the two sets of alterutrae (194.13-
15. Compare pugna dividua below). 
194.5   at inter ... pugna dividua est: The adjective dividuus is not included in either of the 
glossaries of Baldassarri or Londey and Johanson. It must mean ‘half’ rather than ‘divisible’ 
(L&S s.v.1) or ‘divided’ (L&S s.v. 2) in a general sense. As a comparable example, see Pliny 
the Elder, who uses the term to refer to a ‘half moon’ (Nat. Hist. 2.215. See L&S s.v.), which 
is also the way in which Apuleius uses the adjective in DdS. 1.7. It is specifically a half conflict 
because, out of the two sets of differences in propositions, it is only one in terms of quality 
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not quantity. This means that in a give set of suppares or incongruae both may not be true 
at the same time but they may be simultaneoulsy false (see 194.11-13 and note on 194.13-
15 below). Ιt corresponds, therefore, to the Greek ἐλλιπὴς μαχή which Galen uses to refer 
to ‘contrariety’, or, ‘incomplete incompatibility’ (Inst. 33,6-14. See Burnyeat, 2012: 194 
n.115. Compare perfecta pugna, for which, see note on 194.4-5). Another inter before 
incongruas would make it clearer that the conflict is one between the two incongruae and 
another one between the two suppares rather than one between the incongruae and the 
suppares. 
194.6-8   quod incongruae … simul mentiuntur: A contrast is drawn between incongruae 
and suppares by the balancing phrase introduced by quidem and closely followed by autem 
(for other examples of this see 190.18-191.1; 196.1-2; 213.18-214.1). The equivalent Greek 
term for mentior, ψεύδεσθαι, which Baldassarri suggests in his glossary (1986: 104) is 
indeed used by Aristotle (De int.16a3) to mean ‘make a false statement’. Cicero, in fact, 
uses the adverbial form of this verb to render the adverbial form of the Greek verb above 
(Div. 2.4.11) to refer to the ‘liar fallacy’. At this point, the meaning behind the term 
incongruae, which was previously introduced in the description of the square diagram 
(193.19), is made clear; they can never become true at the same time (numquam fiunt simul 
verae. Compare the use of the verb congruo to describe the condition upon which the 
convertibility of a given proposition relies 197.8-9). The privative prefix in- (L&S s.v. III) 
supplies the same part of the meaning as numquam. In a similar way, the sub- prefix of 
suppares is not only reflective of the position of this pair of propositions in relation to the 
incongruae (L&S s.v. 1), but in its transferred sense (L&S s.v. III. B 3) it is also indicative of 
the propositions being a little less than equal as they have the potential to become true at 
the same time but only in some cases. The author previously used the phrase mutata vice 
in Chapter 4 where he discussed the possibility that the subject and the predicate of a 
proposition could switch places with one another (mutata vice) and, only when the 
predicate of the original proposition happens to be a property or a definition of the subject, 
have exactly the same meaning as before (192.16-22). Here, he uses the phrase to point 
out that the situations in which the suppares are either true or false are the direct opposite 
of the situations in which the incongruae are either true or false. His repeated and mirrored 
use of the terms numquam and interdum serves to highlight this parallel of opposites. 
194.8-11   interdum tamen ...revincit alteram:  This hapax legomenon ‘revictio’ is not listed 
in Londey and Johanson’s glossary of terms. The way in which it is paired with the verb 
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confirmat mirrors the way in which the cognate noun of the verb confirmat is paired with 
revincit below (194.10. For other uses of this verb see 194.16; 17). This point of style may 
explain the reason for the choice of revictio over the established refutatio which has the 
same meaning. This term was first used by Cicero in Top.93 and adopted by Quint. (passim, 
see esp. 3.9.1 and 5.14.21 where the term is defined) and found in Martianus Capella (507). 
This type of third-declension feminine noun is typical of the kind of coinage Apuleius makes 
in his philosophical works (see introduction section 5), which may either suggest genuine 
Apuleian authorship or imitation of Apuleius. 
et is the second in a pair (see 194.9 for the first). It is not uncommon for one of such a pair 
to introduce a negative word or statement (L&S s.v. et I2) however the placement of non in 
the second part of this pair is rather unusual. Another phrase in which non is positioned in 
a similar way is found in Chapter 7 where it is difficult to reach a satisfactory sense by 
treating non as prepositive to idem (201.4-5). Given the subject matter of this text, it is 
plausible that the author is using the negative particle in the way that he describes its use 
in negative propositions. By prefacing the entire sentence, or clause, non may be translated 
as ‘it is not the case that…’ rather than simply ‘not’. The author ascribes this use of the 
negative particle to the Stoics (191.10-11) but it seems clear that he is using it himself in 
this text. 
194.11-13   de incongruis qui … alteram ponit: The verbs pono and tollo were later used to 
form the names of types of hypothetical propositions modus ponens and modus tollens etc. 
Although this type of hypothetical logic is not in itself treated in the Peri Hermeneias (for a 
discussion of the origin of these terms and the origin of these types of arguments see 
Bobzien, 2002), the methods by which the author shows that a given proposition can be 
either accepted or refuted can be seen to be a proto-form of these modi. For example, qui 
utramvis posuit, utique alteram tollit (194.11-12) describes a modus ponendo tollens type 
of argument and, similarly, qui utramvis tollit, utique alteram ponit (194.12-13) describes a 
modus tollendo ponens type of argument. The use of the relative pronoun in lines 11 and 
12 clearly creates the context of a dialectical argument as it is presented in Aristotle and in 
Plato’s Sophist (see also 195.3).   
194.13-15   enimvero de alterutris ... alteram comprobat: The intensifying prefix co- on the 
verb ‘comprobat’ (L&S s.v. cum 3b2) reflects the complete way in which one alternative 
refutes the other and, therefore, there is a perfecta pugna between them. This is also the 
case for the use at 194.15 and for the perfect participle comprobata, which describes the 
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way in which a universal proposition is able to confirm its particular (194.16). This is in 
contrast to the way in which a particular proposition is not able to confirm its universal, for 
which the same participial verb, probata, is used without the intensifying prefix (194.18). 
This reflects the incompleteness of the pugna between these two types of proposition (see 
notes on 194.4-5 and 194.5 for the two different types of pugna). This distinction is perhaps 
comparable to that found in Alexander between δείκνυμι and ἀποδείκνυμι; the former is 
sometimes used in its general sense meaning ‘to show’ but is sometimes also used more 
specifically to mean ‘to demonstrate’, whereas the latter is always used in the specific sense 
‘to demonstrate’ (Barnes et al., 1991: 20. See Alexander in An.Pr.32,33-34 where the two 
verbs are used in a discussion about the way in which Aristotle conducted proof using ‘of 
every’ and ‘in as in a whole’, i.e., universals, as opposed to particulars). Compare the use of 
the verb approbatur, which is reserved for proof which is carried out per impossibile 
(207.13-14; 208.27). 
194.15-16   ceterum universalis … utique infirmat: If either universal premise is true 
(universalis comprobata), then the particular premise of the same quality will also be true 
(particularem suam confirmat. See also 196.2-3). However, if either universal premise is 
false (revicta), then the particular premise of the same quality will not necessarily also be 
false (non utique infirmat). Sullivan sees the inclusion of these laws of subalternation as ‘an 
advance of logical doctrine when compared to that of the Stagirite’ (Sullivan, 1967: 148). 
Rose, however, points out that these laws are not entirely absent from Aristotle: ‘in spite 
of the absence of any doctrine of immediate inference in Aristotle, he does take 
subalternation for granted in the sense that he realizes that if the universal statement is 
true, the corresponding particular statement is true. The clearest indications of this are in 
the Topics 109a3-6; 119a35-36’ (Rose, 1968: 85). Rose also points out that Aristotle uses 
the rules of subalternation in the Prior Analytics (Rose, 1968: 88). In the following passage, 
for example, he shows how a universal proposition implies the particular statement of the 
same quality: 
 
‘Again, let us take the premises as affirmative, and let the universal relation be the 
same as before; i.e., let M apply to all N and to some O. Then it is possible both for N 
to apply to all O and for it to apply to no O. Examples of terms where it applies to 
none are white – swan – stone; but it will be impossible to find examples where it 
applies to all O, for the same reasons as before; and our proof must be drawn from 
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the indefinite nature of the particular premise’ (An.Pr.27b23-28. Trans., Tredennick, 
1973).  
 
Throughout our text the introduction of a logical rule or a specific part of a proposition is 
signposted by an explanation of the function of the given rule or part and a name which 
encompasses the definition (see for example, substitutiva 190.11-14; indefinitae 190.20-
21; dedicativae 191.1-2; abdicativae 191.3-4; declarativa 192.8-9; incongruae 193.19; 
suppares 193.22; alterutrae 194.2-3; aequipollentes 196.5-6). Our author simply refers to 
the relation between the subalterns with the possessive adjective, particularem suam 
(194.15) and universalem suam (194.17). The lack of a more technical definition of the 
relation of subalterns suggests that the author did not recognise this as a significant law. 
Furthermore, the use of utique throughout his explanation of the subalterns (194.16 bis; 
17-18; 18) suggests that, like Aristotle, he took these relations for granted (L&S s.v.1), but 
it also emphasises the necessity by which these relational rules exist. Alexander, however, 
refers to the subalterns as ὑπάλληλοι; this, as well as his term for the subcontraries, 
ὑπεναντίαι, are found first as logical terms in his commentary (Barnes et al., 1991: 106 
n.29); these terms compared to the distinctly non-technical designation for subalterns in 
our text quells the suspicion, which may be provoked based on the striking number of 
similarities shared by these works, that the Peri Hermeneias may postdate the 
commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias (see introduction section 4). For revicta (194.16; 
17) see note on 194.8-11.  
194.17-18   particularis autem ... non utique confirmat: The phrase versa vice (194.17) 
provides clarification in a similar way to mutata vice used above (194.7-8). The phrase may 
lead a scribe to think that the situation is a complete and direct opposite of the one 
regarding universals, which was described before, which may have led to the omission of 
non (194.18) in some manuscripts (CABSD). The parallel in the situations described here, 
however, is not as direct as the one described above. As described above (194.8-9) both 
types of particular premise can sometimes be true at the same time, therefore, if both 
‘Quaedam voluptas bonum est’ and ‘Quaedam voluptas non bonum est’ are true at the 
same time, it is the truth of the second proposition which makes the universal of the first 
false because the particular negative is the alterutra of the universal affirmative. For the 
use of probata for this type of particular see note on comprobat above (194.13-15). 
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194.18-195.2   haec omnia … infra scriptis: It is clear from the way in which the author 
introduced the quadrata formula and described the lines which joined it up (193.16-194.2) 
that it is not simply the propositions which are written below, as Moreschini’s text and 
Londey and Johanson’s translation both suggest, but rather the form of the square diagram 
(quadrata formula 193.15-16) which demonstrates the relationships between the 
propositions. haec omnia refers to these relationships which the author has just described 
(193.19-194-18), what is ‘drawn below’ is surely the diagram which explains ‘these things’ 
not just the propositions themselves. In this way, scripta (BCFADSW), as a neuter plural, 
would be a more appropriate reading than scriptis, which Moreschini has, agreeing with 
propositionibus. Thomas’ edition and Sullivan’s work give a different diagram to that given 
in Londey and Johanson’s text (1987) and Moreschini’s edition (1991). Thomas uses Latin 
vocabulary in his diagram which is not found in our text but which is found in the versions 
of the diagram which appear in most manuscripts (AWBSD). Londey and Johanson are 
consistent in using the same vocabulary as our author and their diagram would seem to be 
an honest portrayal of the square of opposition as it is described in this chapter. It is this 
diagram which is reproduced in Moreschini’s edition. Londey and Johanson say that 
although scholars disagree on the precise details of the square diagram, they agree that its 
position ought to follow the words, ‘haec omnia ita esse, ut dicimus, ex ipsis propositionibus 
facile ostenduntur infra scriptis’ (after 195.2 in Moreschini’s text). Ferré’s comments, that 
the diagram ‘ne figure qu’à l’état de glose marginale dans les manuscrits DHNV et ces 
manuscrits ne représentent pas l’état de l’archétype puisque l’archétype, on peut le penser, 
se reconstitue par l’accord des manuscrits ABDR,’ (Ferré, 2007: 110 n.239) and Moreschini’s 
assertion in his apparatus criticus that no square diagram matches the description given in 
text are mystifying since five out of the seven digitised manuscripts have one and 
Radiciotti’s article (2008: 123) contains a plate of the diagram as it appears in M (for details 
about the manuscript M see introduction section 3 n.73). For reference to diagrams of the 
arrangement of terms in the different syllogistic figures see Alex. 72,10-15; 78,1-5. 
195.3   certum est enim … proposuerit: The use of the pronoun qui reinforces the idea of a 
dialectical context (for a similar instance see also 194.11-12). For the aspect of dialectical 
practice alluded to here, which relies upon agreement between the interlocutors, see 
199.12-13 where the meaning of the term propositio is compared to acceptio and is 
explained using its cognate verb which is also used here (proposuerit). 
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195.4-6   destruitur autem ... sive subneutra: Either of the two types of universal premises 
can be destroyed in three ways (this point is made again in the context of proof per 
impossibile, for which see note on 211.18-212.3); either if its particular (particularis eius) is 
false, or the other universal premise (incongrua), or the particular which is its contrary not 
only in quantity but also in quality (subneutra), is true.  This is the first of only two uses of 
the term subneutra, which is unique to this text (see 196.4 for the second use). Londey and 
Johanson say that this is simply a synonym for alterutra (1987: 79. See also Moreschini’s 
apparatus criticus which shows that four manuscripts have been corrected from subneutra 
to alterutra). Londey and Johanson themselves comment on the care with which the author 
uses and introduces technical terminology into this text (1987: 50. See my introduction 
section 5); it seems unlikely therefore that he should introduce a synonym in this way 
without good reason. It does appear that the two terms denote two different types of 
contradictory expressions; the two uses of subneutra (195.6; 196.4) involve a relation of 
alternates where the universal proposition is false and therefore the particular, which is of 
weaker value, is true. It seems that alterutra, on the other hand, is reserved for the same 
relation of alternates but when the universal is true and the particular is false. ἀνασκευάζω 
is used by Aristotle in the same way in which destruitur is being used here (An.Pr.43a2. See 
Baldassarri, 1986: 103 and LSJ s.v. A5. cf. κατασκευάζω s.v. A8 for instruitur 195.6). 
195.6-7   instruitur autem ... falsa ostenditur: Either of the two types of universal premises 
is proved to be true (instruitur) if the particular which is its contrary not only in quantity but 
also in quality (alterutra eius) is false. For the Greek equivalent of instruitur and for the use 
of alterutra to denote this particular type of contrary relationship, in which the universal is 
true, see note on 195.4-6. 
195.7-196.2   contra particularis ... vera ostenditur: Either of the two types of particular 
premises are only destroyed if the universal premise which is its contrary not only in 
quantity but also in quality (alterutra eius) is proved to be true (vera ostenditur). For the 
pairing of quidem with autem see 190.17-191.1; 213.17-18; 194.6-8. For the use of alterutra 
to denote this particular type of contrary relationship, in which the universal is true, see 
note on 195.4-6. 
196.2-4   instruitur autem ... sive subneutra: If the universal affirmative premise is true, 
then the particular affirmative premise will also be true (see also 194.15-16). Similarly, if 
the universal negative premise is true, then the particular negative premise will also be true 
(si universalis eius vera est). Either particular premise will also be true if the other particular 
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premise is false or if the universal premise, which is its contrary not only in terms of quantity 
but also in quality (subneutra), is false. For the use of this term to denote this particular 
type of contrary relationship see note on 195.4-6). 
196.5-7   eadem servabimus … simul falsae: The term aequipollens is introduced here as a 
definition for propositions which carry the same meaning but are expressed using a 
different set of words. The author uses his usual method of introducing a new abstract noun 
or adjective which is to combine a verb form which is cognate with the noun he is defining 
(see for example, indefinitae 190.20-21; dedicativae 191.1-2; abdicativae 191.3-4; revictio 
194.9. For full discussion on this characteristic of the text see introduction section 5). Here, 
however, the verb used (possunt) is not a direct cognate of the noun, which would be 
polleo; cf. valeo (196.12). The inclusion of this definition suggests this idea is being 
introduced for the first time; Baldassarri’s glossary gives ἰσοδυναμοῦσα as the equivalent 
term, which means ‘to have equal power’ (LSJ s.v.). ἰσοδύναμος is a term used by Alexander 
of Aphrodisias in his Quaestiones 1.135 but apparently not in the sense in which it is used 
here. enuntiatione here means a set of words in very general terms (see note on 207.2-3 
for its use meaning ‘premise’. See 190.5 where the cognate term enuntiatum is ascribed to 
Cicero). 
196.7-8   altera ob ... et particularis: The phrase altera ob alteram shows that the author 
considered the relation between these two to be one of implication or inference. As the 
author stated previously in Chapter 3, indefinites can be taken to have the same value as 
particulars; that is to say that if an indefinite proposition is true, this implies that the 
particular form of it is also true and vice versa (190.21-22). 
196.8-9   item omnis … eius aequipollens: in principio negativam particulam recalls the Stoic 
view discussed in Chapter 3 that, in order to make a proposition negative, the negative 
particle (non) must be placed at the very beginning of the proposition (191.10-11). This is a 
rule which the author follows himself (see 194.10; 201.4-5). To create equipollent 
statements out of a pair of contradictories, the author advises placing a negative particle 
before either one of the two contradictory propositions to make it equal in meaning to the 
other, thereby changing the quality from affirmative to negative. In the example given, 
‘every’ becomes ‘not every’ and is equipollent to ‘some’ and he says that this must apply to 
the other three types of premise (196.13-14), so that ‘not every’ becomes ‘not not every’ 
and is equipollent to ‘some’, ‘some’ becomes ‘not some’ and is equipollent to ‘not every’ 
and ‘not some’ becomes ‘not not some’ and is equipollent to ‘every.’  It can be said, 
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therefore, that the specific difference between two equipollent propositions is one of 
quality, which is no doubt what led our author to remind us of indefinite and particular 
propositions at this point (196.7-8).  
Sullivan says that, ‘in his direct treatment of the squared formula, Apuleius does not present 
the laws of contradiction (the laws pertaining to “eithers”) in the form of equivalences; 
when he deals with equipollent propositions later in his treatise, however, he does put 
them forward as logical equivalences’ (1967: 68), but is unclear why the author would put 
the laws of contradiction across in the form of equivalences at all since the kinds of 
propositions created out of equipollence in the way that he describes have no use in his 
explanation of the valid moods in each of the three figures. Sullivan also says that ‘regarding 
Apuleius’ theory of equipollence (namely, that the negation of a proposition is logically 
equivalent to that proposition’s contradictory opposite), we have not found (as yet) any 
corresponding doctrine stated explicitly by Aristotle’ (1967: 148-149). As mentioned above, 
the inclusion of a definition of aequipollens suggests that it is a new idea. However, this 
explanation of equipollent propositions appears to correspond in part to Aristotle’s 
discussion in De Interpretatione about terms; the Kneales say that ‘Aristotle considered the 
use of privative terms and allowed that ‘Every man is not-white’ could be said to entail ‘No 
man is white’ (De int. 20a20), but rejected the converse entailment, which is required for 
obversion, on the ground that ‘is not-white’ might be taken in a narrower sense than ‘is not 
white’ (n.2: An.Pr.51b8) (Kneale and Kneale, 1962: 37).  
196.9-11   ut cum sit ... negatio praeponatur: The earliest uses of the term negatio are 
found in Cicero and then in Apuleius (a number of other such shared terms are found in the 
authentic works of Apuleius, for which, see introduction section 5). In Cicero the term is 
used to denote a negative statement as a whole (L&S s.v. and OLD s.v. 1; cf. 2 ‘the action of 
negativing’ as in Cic. De inv. 1.42), it is used in a similar way by Apuleius to mean a ‘refusal’ 
(Met.10.4.239). This is also the term Boethius uses to translate Aristotle’s ἀπόφασις and to 
refer to a negative statement (in De int.13,25ff). The text here, however, and Londey and 
Johanson’s English translation (cf. Baldassarri’s Italian translation, 1986) interpret negatio 
as a synonym of negativa particula which came before (196.9). It is hard to see why the 
author would use an already established term in this slightly transferred sense as a synonym 
for negativa particula. It seems more likely that he is using this term in its established sense 
as a definition of that which has taken place to change the affirmative proposition (assumat 
in principio negativam particulam 196.8-9). This is more in keeping with the way in which 
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the author introduces concepts at each stage in the work, that is, to provide an explanation 
of a particular aspect or topic using a verb alongside a cognate substantive which 
encompasses the whole idea (see introduction section 5); it is not his practice to introduce 
terms simply for variatio (see note on 195.4-6 for the distinction between suppar and 
subneutra which modern scholars tend to consider as entirely synonymous). This use of 
negatio would in turn make it more likely that proponatur (PD), ‘is put forward’ rather than 
praeponatur, ‘is placed first’ is the correct reading, and that the abbreviation has been 
misread (for the different but consistent uses of these two verbs see note on 213.14-15. 
CASW abbreviate this verb to ‘pponatur’ and do the same for the noun ‘propositio’ which 
makes it likely that the verb, similarly, has pro- as its prefix) and also that ei is an abbreviated 
form of eius which has been mistaken for the dative. A translation of this would then be ‘if 
its negation is put forward, it would be...’.  
196.12-13   tantundem valens … est bonum: For other uses of the verb valeo in the sense 
of logical equivalence see 190.21-22 for the equivalence of indefinites and particulars. See 
also 213.17; 214.5, 17 for valid, as opposed to invalid combinations of premises; cf. the 
synonymous use of possunt above (196.6). 
196.13-14   hoc in ceteris … intellegendum est: The intention that this work should provide 
a brief introduction to syllogistic logic and should provide students with the opportunity to 
practise what they are learning is evident in statements such as this which leave it up to the 
audience to fill in the gaps themselves. A similar statement is made at the very end of the 
work, where the author invites anyone to test the validity of the syllogisms he has 
demonstrated using the five predicables (215.7-8). 
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Chapter 6 
196.15-198.17 
Our author’s explanation of conversion, which is the topic of this chapter, differs in 
presentation from the traditional explanation which distinguishes conversio simplex from 
conversio per accidens and both of these from obversion. The order of composition in this 
chapter is interesting in that the author blends aspects of formal and material conversion 
together. Aristotle’s doctrine on the conversion of the four types of propositions, which 
comes from An.Pr.1.2.25a5-26, is concerned only with formal conversion, that is, according 
to the quality and quantity of the premises. The author’s discussion about the five types of 
predicables, which relates to material conversion, has its origins in Aristotle’s Topics (e.g. 
102b2-19) where only four predicables are introduced: definition, property, genus and 
accident.  
He begins by saying that the universal negative and its alternate, the particular affirmative, 
can always swap their subject and predicate terms with the truth value of the proposition 
remaining the same and so these propositions are said to be ‘convertible’ (conversibiles). 
He then explains that this is not always possible for the other two types of propositions; 
their capacity for this sort of conversion depends upon the type of predicable which forms 
the predicate term. This type of material conversion was first mentioned in Chapter 4 where 
the author points out that the proposition ‘qui equus est, hinnibile est’ can be converted to 
‘quod hinnibile est, equus est’ with the truth value remaining the same because the 
predicate hinnibile happens to be a property of the subject equus and is therefore equal to 
it (192.16-22. There is a similar ‘preview’ of conversion in Martianus Capella 375 before the 
topic is discussed in detail in 397-400). In this chapter, the author adds that this is also the 
case for propositions which have a definition of the subject as their predicate. Property and 
definition are two of the five types of predicate; the other three are genus, difference and 
accident. The author says that each of the four types of propositions, which were discussed 
in the previous chapter, must be tested with each of the five types of predicate to see if the 
proposition still has the same truth value after the conversion of its terms. Since universal 
affirmative and particular negative propositions are only convertible if the predicate is a 
property or definition, and not if it is a genus, difference or accident, they cannot be said to 
be convertible (conversibiles) in this way. He then explains that testing propositions in this 
way shows that particular negatives cannot be converted at all and that universal 
affirmatives can be converted but only particularly (particulariter). He spends less time 
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discussing the second type of conversion which involves a combination of obversion and 
contraposition in traditional logic and which can be used for those propositions which do 
not conform to simple conversion; the terms of a proposition are changed from definite to 
indefinite as well as the order of the terms. 
196.15-19   conversibiles propositiones ... aut falsitatis: The term conversibiles is 
introduced in the way that is usual for neologisms; it is closely followed by the established 
cognate verb which reveals its meaning, in this case, the verbal expression is inter se versare 
vices (196.18. See introduction section 5). The author defines only universal negative and 
particular affirmative propositions as being convertible because their truth value 
(condicione veritatis aut falsitatis) remains the same if their subject and predicate parts are 
switched. He later says that, because the subject and predicate parts of universal 
affirmative and particular negative propositions can only occasionally be converted with 
the truth value of the proposition staying the same, they are not called convertible (197.6-
7). Londey and Johanson cite the term vices as one of a number of examples of words ‘often 
associated with Apuleius,’ they say that ‘various derivatives of vices, which seem to be a 
favourite of Apuleius (vicem, invicem, vices, vice, vicissim- all occur quite frequently)’ (1987: 
16). The entries for vicis in L&S, however, and a word search on the Library of Latin Texts 
reveal that this term and its various derivatives are commonly used by a very wide range of 
authors; it is not at all restricted to uses in Apuleius or even to the sort of archaic uses which 
Apuleius may have borrowed and cannot, therefore, be used to argue for the authentic 
Apuleian authorship of this work (see introduction section 5 for a discussion about Stover’s 
analysis of function words as a more effective method of testing the authorship of texts. 
For condicione veritatis aut falsitatis (see note on 197.7-8 below). 
196.21-197.2   item ut ... animal homo: This example of a universal negative proposition, 
in which the predicate animal is the genus of the subject homo, clearly demonstrates the 
author’s point that the form of a universal negative proposition allows conversion even if 
the subject and predicate parts are unequal. In this case, the extent of the predicate is larger 
than the subject (see below 197.17-198.1).  
197.2-4   pari ratione ... grammaticus est: Even though the predicate grammaticus in this 
example is an accident of the subject and is therefore smaller than the subject homo, the 
form of this proposition, a particular affirmative, means that it can always be converted and 
retain its truth value (see below 197.17-198.1) in the same way as in the universal negative 
propositions above (pari ratione). 
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197.5-7   quod duae … conversibiles dicuntur: The two other types of proposition, the 
universal affirmative and the particular negative cannot always (semper) convert in this way 
and so they are not defined as convertible (conversibiles) in the way that universal negatives 
and particular affirmatives are although (quamquam) they can sometimes be converted; 
interdum, therefore, refers both to the instances in which the predicate of these 
propositions is equal to the subject, that is, when it is either a definition or a property (see 
below 197.17-20) and to the fact that universal affirmative propositions can convert if their 
quantity is changed to particular, which is explained below (see 198.3-4). 
197.7-8   nam quod ... certe repudiatur: The passive form of this verb fallitur is most 
frequently used of persons (L&S s.v. 1). The English, ‘to be declared falsely’ (L&S s.v. 2a), 
rather than ‘to be false or mistaken’ (L&S s.v. 1a, 1B), best conveys the author’s meaning 
here. As shown above, the author takes false propositions into consideration in his account 
of convertible propositions; a proposition need not necessarily be true, but in order to be 
convertible it must be so if the original proposition from which it was converted was true 
(as in 196.20-21; 197.3-4), likewise, a proposition which was originally false must produce 
a false proposition by conversion (as in 196.21-197.1). This is also why he uses condicione 
with the genitives veritatis aut falsitatis above (196.18-19) rather than simply saying veritas 
aut falsitas. The moralising tone conveyed by repudiatur (L&S s.v.) contributes to the 
didactic purpose of the work, for which see introduction section 6.   
197.8-9   ergo unaquaeque ... conversa congruat: Each of the four types of predicative 
proposition (unaquaeque propositio) which were introduced previously (193.14-15) ought 
to be tested against the five different types of predicables in order to check that it is still 
either true or false after conversion (see note on 197.7-8). In particular, this applies to the 
universal affirmative and particular negative, which are not convertibiles in themselves (see 
note on 197.5-7). The use of the verb congruat recalls the use of the cognate but 
antonymous term incongrua to describe contrary relations on the square of opposition 
diagram (193.19; 194.5, 11; 195.6).  
There is great variation in the way in which the five predicables are referred to, which our 
author calls significationes here (see also 215.8 cf. species 198.17). Baldassarri gives 
σημασία as the equivalent Greek term (1986: 106) which shares the same general meaning, 
‘expression’ as significatio (cf. L&S s.v.1 and LSJ s.v. 2.2. The Latin term is also used in various 
technical senses; e.g. in rhetorical language meaning ‘emphasis’ L&S s.v. II C or in a 
grammatical sense meaning ‘sense’, ‘meaning’ or ‘import’ L&S II D,  neither of which could 
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usefully be applied here). In their general senses, neither this Latin term nor the Greek term 
convey the concept which the author is trying to convey here; he does not mean to say all 
of the expressions themselves but all of the types of expressions. In this way, his use of the 
term significatio is synecdochical of the established general sense; the cognate verb below 
serves to explain the way in which he is using this noun here (quicquid de eo dixeris, aut 
proprium eius significaveris … ut orator 197.14-17. For other examples of this method of 
explaining his use of new terminology see introduction section 5). In this instance, the use 
of this term has an added benefit for introducing the predicables to an audience of 
beginners in logic, who are familiar with the idea of significationes themselves but not yet 
the groups into which they are divided.  
Martianus Capella refers to the group as a whole as haec quinque (398). Boethius uses res 
(in Isag.1 10.17; in Isag. 2 348.2). Cassiodorus refers to the topic of Porphyry’s Isagoge as 
de partibus quinque (Inst.2.8). In Greek, Porphyry himself rarely refers to the predicables 
collectively, and when he does, he simply uses a demonstrative pronoun (e.g. αὕται 
Isag.22,12). Aristotle, who originally counted only four types of predicables, refers to them 
not by any specific name but as ‘the four’ (Top.101b25; 108b21). Similarly, Alexander has 
no collective term for what he first introduces as ‘the four species of problems’ (τέσσαρα 
εἴδη ὄντα τῶν προβλημάτων. See Van Ophuijsen, 2001: 154 n.339).  
Moreschini has placed a crux before reperienda (BCFADSW have repperienda); Thomas’ 
conjecture, experienda, seems entirely plausible in light of the context and the definition of 
this term (Compare L&S: s.v. experio ‘To try, prove, put to the test’ with s.v. reperio ‘to 
procure’ or ‘to find again’). Furthermore, as Lumpe points out, the author refers back to 
this topic in the final chapter (Lumpe, 1982: 39) where he says: facile est experiri per illas 
supradictas quinque significationes (215.7-8). The author is very consistent and formulaic 
in his use of vocabulary (see introduction section 5), which suggests that Thomas is correct 
in positing experienda here. 
197.9-10   nec universe … sunt istae: The meaning of this statement is not entirely 
unambiguous. This is not helped by the great variety of readings for nec universe verae 
(unum vere C : unum verae W2DB : unum vere P : universales vere A : universaliter verae S : 
tantum verae W). Lumpe discusses the variety of ways in which editors have dealt with this 
passage (Lumpe: 1982, 39) all of whom, of course, predate that of Moreschini. In spite of 
the obscurity of this expression, the point being made becomes clearer when it is 
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considered in light of the following passage from Aristotle’s Topics in which he discusses 
the role of the four different types of predicables within a statement: 
‘But we must not for this reason seek for a single (μίαν) method of inquiry which is 
generally (ἐπὶ καθόλου) applicable to all of them; for it is not easy to discover, and if 
it were to be discovered, it would be wholly obscure and difficult to apply to our 
present treatise’ (Top. 1.6.102b37-38).  
This comment comes after Aristotle has said that every type of predicable, which would be 
classed among genus, property or accident, can also be applied as a definition. Whether or 
not the author had direct access to this text, it seems clear that this is the original idea to 
which he is referring here. This relevant passage does not help with the textual variants in our 
own text, however, since it contains Greek terms, indicated by parentheses, which 
correspond to both unum and readings involving universal- . The case is the same for 
Alexander’s comments on this passage (in Top.55,2). It seems that the point has been boiled 
down in our text to the extent that it no longer makes sense without knowledge of the wider 
context of Aristotelian logic and dialectic. It is interesting, however, that shortly after 
discussing this section of Aristotle’s text cited above, Alexander ascribes the method of 
treating all predicables as one and the same to Theophrastus (in Top.55,23-26). Huby 
compares this passage with a passage of Proclus’ commentary on Plato’s Parmenides (635.2-
12; 124B in Huby), in which Theophrastus is said to link accident and property together. Huby 
puts this difference in presentation of Theophrastus’ treatment of the predicables down to 
the fact that, while Alexander is a ‘reliable witness with a profound knowledge of Peripatetic 
logic’, ‘Proclus’ account is detailed and plausible, and these views might have been held at 
different times’ (Huby, 2007: 165-6). Alexander of Aphrodisias serves to unpack our author’s 
point here: 
‘Anyone who tries in this way to bring <the predicables> all under one single 
method will embark upon an indistinct treatment that is hard to use. For by 
Aristotle’s earlier claim, it was impossible to find, but by the present one the 
method would, as we have explained, be unclear and hard to use even if it could be 
found. But if a method is given for each one in particular of the four kinds here set 
out, proceeding from the things peculiar to each of them, distinguished and defined 
along clear cut lines, this will be easier and clearer: it is more convenient and clearer 
to speak of the accidental in particular through the means by which it can be 
established or disproved, than to say, as if one were attacking by argument levelled 
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at the definition, ‘of all the things said about the definition these ones also serve to 
establish the accidental, and these to disprove it’, and so with the other 
predicables’ (in Top.56,30-57,8). 
Further manuscript evidence is required to fully understand this passage. Based on the 
passages discussed above, however, which clearly refer to the same point, it is reasonable 
to guess that the original text contained more words than we have in the transmitted 
versions and that, at one point unum was included as a contrast to quinque (197.10) and 
that universe was also used adverbially to qualify the act of testing every predicable in one 
way which Aristotle advises against (this is not at all unlikely in light of Expositio 29.6 in 
Stover’s edition where, in the context of the synopsis of Plato’s Parmenides ‘universum et 
unum’ appear in conjunction). The point is clearly that the convertibility of every 
proposition must be tested and that there is no single way which applies universally to all. 
197.10-13   sed quinque solae: The introduction of the five predicables at this point marks 
the shift in the topic of conversion from formal logic, according to the quality and quantity 
of a proposition, to material logic, according to the type of predicate contained within the 
proposition.  Aristotle’s Topics lists only four predicables, property, definition, genus and 
accident (Top.101b40). To this, Porphyry adds a fifth predicable, species, which is also found 
in Cassiodorus who refers directly to the Isagoge (Inst. 2.8). The use of solae suggests either 
that the author was aware that, at some stage, others counted more than five by the time 
he was writing or that the five were considered to be canonical. However, his list differs 
from that of Porphyry and that of Quintilian in the earlier Latin tradition. Barnes lists a variety 
of sets of predicables which shows the variety of ways in which they were interpreted and 
used. He also highlights the use of νῦν (Top.101b24) at the point where Aristotle identifies 
the four different predicables as showing that this was not necessarily intended to be 
definitive (Barnes, 2003: 30-31). In a similar way, solae here perhaps serves to show that the 
current list is specifically intended to serve the purpose of the text at this point which is to 
demonstrate and to test conversion (see also note on 197.12-13). 
Alexander’s explanation as to why Aristotle omitted species from his list of predicables, on 
the grounds that species can only be predicated of individuals (in Top.39.2-10), also serves to 
explain why our author would have omitted this group. Martianus Capella refers to haec 
quinque (398) but includes species as well as the five described by our author giving a total 
of six (344-348). However, he explains that formae (more commonly referred to as species 
in the context of predicables) are subordinate to genus (subditae generi) (345), which 
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explains why he also does not take species into account in the list at 398. He also discusses 
them again in his chapter on rhetoric (476-481) (for species and differentia as types of 
predicables see note on 197.15-16). 
Barnes (2003: 31 n.36) and Lumpe (1982: 24) both assert that our author is not indebted to 
Porphyry for his treatment of the predicables. Lumpe’s suggestion that our author’s 
treatment was influenced by a later Peripatetic tradition such as Herminus’ commentary on 
Aristotle’s Topics is plausible in light of the fact that there are a number of similarities 
between the Peri Hermeneias and Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentaries (see 
introduction section 4). 
197.10-12   aut enim ... aut accidens: The introduction of the five predicables as a method 
for testing the convertibility of propositions calls for the more technical term proprietas 
(L&S s.v. 2) as opposed to the more general proprium which was used in Chapter 4 to 
describe the predicate hinnibile which, as a property, is equal to its subject equus (192.16; 
18). In a similar way finis (197.11) is used interchangeably with definitio (197.29) but there 
is not a detectable distinction between these. Quintilian uses both finitio and finis to mean 
‘definition’ and says that either of these terms is acceptable (Inst.5.10.54). Similarly, Van 
Ophuijsen (2001: 155 n.340) comments on the way in which Alexander appears to use horos 
and horismos largely interchangeably even within the same line (in Top.41,22). 
197.12-13   nec praeter haec … in ulla propositione: The qualifying phrase here, in ulla 
propositione, serves the same purpose as the use of solae above (197.10) that is, to clarify 
that, while the author may recognise that further divisions of the predicables could be 
made, such as genus into species, these are not relevant for his purpose of explaining the 
conversion of propositions. In this way, he is limiting the information he gives to that which 
is necessary to the topic at hand (see introduction section 6). 
197.13   ut si hominem ... eo dixeris: The verb substituo usually means ‘to set, put, place or 
lay under’ (L&S s.v. 1) or ‘to substitute’ (L&S s.v. 2). It was used in Chapter 2 to refer to the 
condition which is ‘set next to’ a simple proposition to create a hypothetical proposition 
(190.13). Based on this earlier use, we can infer that here, the author means ‘to put forward’ 
man (hominem) as the subject of a proposition. The prefix of the verb sub- recalls the earlier 
uses of the same prefix to explain the subordinate relation of subject to its predicate (see 
192.7, 15-16). Similarly, the use of dixeris recalls the earlier definition and explanation of 
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the function of a verb or predicate term, that which says something about the subject (quae 
dedicant aliquid de quopiam 191.2).  
197.14-15   aut proprium … cachinnabile: cachinnabile only appears elsewhere in Apuleius 
Met.3.7.57 where it is used to qualify the action of laughing risu rather than to denote the 
action itself. cachinnabile is close in form to the Greek καχάζω (see Ernout-Meillet: s.v. 
cachinno - ‘Quelquefois, en poesie, employé pour rideo, risus, a l’imitation du grec καχάζω’). 
Porphyry uses γελαστικός, which, as Barnes points out, is not an Aristotelian example but 
became a stock example of a property (Barnes, 2003: 208). It is not clear where this example 
would have originated ‘(although Aristotle affirms that ‘man alone of animals laughs’: PA 
673a821)’ (Barnes, loc. cit.). Thomsen-Thörnqvist cites the following Greek examples of the 
use of γελαστικός to compare with Boethius’ use of risibile: Amm. In De int.108.10; Alex. in 
An.Pr.25.9; Philop. in An.Pr.39.22 (2008b: 137 n.24.8). Martianus Capella also uses the same 
adjective to denote the capacity for laughter as a property which is unique to man (348; 
354; 398 ter). Our author’s use of this unusual calque from the Greek rather than the more 
common risibilis is indicative of a Greek source (see introduction sections 2 and 3). 
197.15-17   aut genus ... ut orator: The example of a genus, animal, is the same as in the 
example given above (197.1-2).  
197.15-16   differentiam … rationale: Compare the following passage from Quintilian in 
which he discussed examples of predicables in a similar way: 
‘‘homo est animal’ non est satis, id enim genus est: ‘mortale’ - etiam si est species 
cum aliis tamen communis finitio: ‘rationale’ - nihil supererit ad demonstrandum quod 
velis’ (Inst. 5.10.56).  
Although the authenticity of the above passage has been questioned (Russell, 2001: 394 
n.54), it helps to elucidate the meaning of differentia which our author has in mind. Further 
on, Quintilian defines differentia in the following way:  
‘illud quoque differens vocant, cum genere in species diducto species ipsa discernitur. 
Animal genus, mortale species, terrenum vel bipes differens’ (Inst. 5.10.61). 
Genus is a group of ‘many things which are different in species’ whereas species is usually 
taken to be the definitive word here. Our author, however, has used differentia, which he 
perhaps saw as more useful for his own purposes in that the term is more transparent in its 
function as a predicable than species. ‘Differentia in Cicero, like Aristotle’s διαφορά can 
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mean the specific difference which marks out the forma/εἴδος as well as the various 
formae/εἴδη which are distinguished by their “specific differences”’ (Reinhardt, 2003: 269. 
See also Arist. Top.102a31-2). Our author’s use of differentia to denote this type of 
predicable rather than the more traditional species would help to avoid confusion since he 
has already used this term elsewhere in the text to refer to predicables collectively (198.17) 
and in a general sense (189.2, 5; 190.10; 200.13). 
197.16   definitionem … mortale: This example of a definitio is the same as that given by 
Quintilian (Inst.5.10.56) and a number of others (Lumpe, 1982: 40). For the origin of this 
stock example of a definition see DeDurand, 1973. 
197.17-198.2   quippe omne … esse conversibilis: For Londey and Johanson’s thoughts 
about the term vicissim with regard to Apuleian authorship see note on vices 196.18. This 
is one of the three features of a premise which Aristotle lists (An.Pr.25a1-3), the other two, 
that it is either affirmative or negative and is either universal or particular or indefinite were 
discussed separately by our author in Chapter 3 (190.17-191.2). Our author then splits the 
five predicables into two groups, the first of which contains definition and property, which 
can be swapped with the subject and be converted to a proposition with the same truth 
value, and the second of which includes the genus, difference and accident, which cannot 
be swapped with a subject and be converted. In the passage mentioned above Aristotle 
makes a similar division into three types: applies, necessarily applies or possibly applies. 
The method of presentation used by the author to demonstrate which predicables can 
become the subject and which cannot bears resemblance to disjunctive (aut potest ... aut 
non potest 197.16) and conjunctive (si potest ... sin autem non potest 197.19-20) forms of 
argument; each of the two possibilities are set out with the kind of markers which are found 
in connective syllogisms through which (per haec) the conclusion that particular negative 
premises are not convertible is reached and is introduced by igitur: 
Every (omne) predicate can either become a subject or it cannot: 
If (si) it can, it is a definition or it is a property, 
If (si) it cannot, it is either (aut) a genus or difference and belongs to the definition, or 
(aut) it is an accident. 
Therefore (igitur) particular negative premises are not convertible. 
By using this method of division, the author comes close to splitting the predicables into 
just two groups; those which allow conversion of the terms regardless of the type of 
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premise and those that do not (compare the two accounts about the way in which 
Theophrastus categorised the predicables discussed in note on 197.9-10). 
198.3-7   universalis autem ... animal homo: Universal affirmatives may be converted if 
their quantity is changed to particular; this is conversion per accidens (this is not the way in 
which the author refers to it himself but see Sullivan, 1967: 72) and is based on the following 
inference: If all men are animals, although not all animals are men, it must be the case that 
some animals are men. This can be explained by the fact that, as discussed in the previous 
chapter (194.15-16), universal propositions, if true, imply that the particular statement of 
the same quality is also true and particular affirmative propositions are convertible into 
themselves. The Kneales question whether this mode of inference ‘to subalterns is valid 
within the scheme now under consideration’ (Kneale and Kneale, 1962: 58), but Aristotle 
himself does seem to be using this method in his explanation of conversion. He says that 
‘the affirmative [universal], though necessarily convertible, is not so as a universal but as a 
particular statement: e.g., if every pleasure is good, some good must also be pleasure’ he 
then goes on to state the validity of converting particular affirmative statements, like the 
one just inferred from the valid universal affirmative ‘if some pleasure is good, some good 
will also be pleasure’ (An.Pr.25a8-12). Particular negative propositions, on the other hand, 
are not convertible at all, Aristotle says that this is because ‘it does not follow that if “man” 
does not apply to some animal, neither will “animal” apply to some man’ (An.Pr. 25a13-14).  
Since the predicate animal is the genus of the subject homo and is therefore unequal to it, 
this is an ideal predicate for showing that a universal affirmative proposition in itself is not 
convertible. If, for example, the predicate were cachinnabile, to take the author’s example 
of a property, this type proposition could be converted and retain its truth value; just as it 
is true that: 
Omnis homo cachinnabilis est is true 
The following is also true: 
Omne cachinnabile homo est. 
This is because, as a property of homo, the predicate cachinnabilis is equal to it. Similarly, 
if the predicate were a definition, this would also be equal to the subject homo and, 
therefore, would allow this type of proposition to be converted and retain its truth value. 
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198.7-8:   verum hoc … reflexio nominatur: This is the first occurrence of the term illatio 
which is used to mean ‘conclusion’; it is defined as such in the next chapter where, in the 
usual way, its meaning is explained by its cognate verb infertur (199.9-11). The term 
conclusio was previously used to mean ‘conclusion’ as opposed to the propositions which 
come before it (190.9), the use here, however, means a whole ‘syllogism’, and this word is 
used frequently, although not exclusively (see, for instance, 201.10-11), throughout the rest 
of the text with this meaning (see 200.7-9 where conclusio is defined as ‘syllogism’ rather 
than ‘conclusion’ and see note on 200.2-9. Compare Londey and Johanson’s glossary: 1987, 
75). This simple type of conversion (in simplici conversione) is applied to the conclusions of 
syllogisms (in conclusionum illationibus). This is elucidated in Chapters 9-11 (203.11-208.27) 
concerned with the syllogistic combinations in each of the three figures. By referring to this 
type of conclusion as reflexio here, the author makes it perfectly clear exactly what is taking 
place when he says reflexim inferas each time the conclusion of a combination is indirect. 
For the first figure, for example, see 203.14-15, 21; 204.11-12 (see also the definitions of 
reflexim and directim 200.4-7). 
198.9-12   altera propositionum ... indefinita est, definita: This ‘other’ type of conversion 
is a combination of what is commonly referred to as obversion and contraposition. 
Martianus Capella distinguishes between this and simple conversion in a similar way, by 
referring to the latter as prima conversio and conversion by obversion as secunda conversio 
(400). The non-technical way of referring to this type of conversion as simply ‘another 
conversion of propositions’, suggests that it was not an established method at the time 
when this text was written (for the types of conversion and the ways of distinguishing them 
and referring to them by other authors see note on 192.22-23). The laws of obversion and 
contraposition are never used or mentioned by Aristotle (Patzig, 1963: 144) although he 
does discuss some instances of obversion in De interpretatione (Parsons, 2012). As the 
author says, definite terms become indefinite ones; homo, for example, becomes non homo 
and animal becomes non animal. Once again our author is perfectly in line with the Greek 
Aristotelian commentary tradition (see introduction section 4); as Thomsen-Thörnqvist 
notes, ‘conversion by contraposition is never explicitly mentioned by Aristotle, but both 
Alexander and Philoponus deal with it (Alex. in An.Pr.46,6-8 cf. Philop. in An.Pr.42,9-13) and 
may ultimately be drawing on Arist. Top.113b19-23’ (2008b: 166). The distinction between 
this type of term and non when used as a negative particle is made clearer in English by the 
use of a hyphen; ‘man’, for example becomes ‘non-man’ rather than ‘not man’ (see note on 
193.12-13 for Sullivan’s interpretation of indefinite terms).  
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198.12-13   hanc conversionem ... particularis abdicativa: These two types of propositions 
are referred to as ‘reliquae’ in the sense that they are not conversibiles because they are 
unable to convert ‘formally’ (compare 196.15-19).   
198.16-17   id ita esse ... per illas quinque praedictas species: The use of the second person 
singular in the verb explorabis is one of a number of verbs in this person which is indicative 
of the didactic purpose of this work (see introduction sections 3 and 4). species here 
denotes the group of predicables which are referred to as significationes elsewhere (see 
197.8; 215.8. Compare Cassiodorus who lists species as one such predicable in Inst. 2.8). 
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Chapter 7 
198.18-202.15 
This chapter describes the formation of syllogisms. The author begins by describing a 
syllogistic pair which he calls coniugatio propositionum; a combination of two premises 
share a common term and produce a conclusion. These three statements form a syllogism 
which our author usually refers to as conclusio. The common term will either be the subject 
in both premises, or the predicate in both premises, or it will be the subject in one and the 
predicate in the other. The author discusses how these possible positions of the common 
term in each of the two premises affect the truth value of the conclusion. The author 
provides a word-for-word translation of Aristotle’s Prior Analytics 24b18-20 which defines 
a syllogism, and he analyses the meaning of each part of it in a style which is similar to 
Alexander in his commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics. Based on this Aristotelian 
definition of a conclusion, he goes on to refute the Stoic Antipater of Tarsus for counting 
single premise-syllogisms as valid. He also criticises the Stoics more generally for using non-
differently concluding arguments and duplicated arguments. He also highlights the 
difference between proper syllogistic argumentation and induction, namely that necessity 
is lacking in the latter. The contents of this chapter and the style in which it is written bear 
striking resemblance to Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on Aristotle’s Prior 
Analytics.  
198.18   coniugatio autem … se copulantur: The English translation of the term coniugatio 
is considered to be ‘syllogism’ (L&S s.v. 2C), but it is quite clear that, in fact, the term refers 
to only a part of a syllogism, namely, the combination of two premises which form a 
syllogistic pair. Our author refers to the whole syllogism further on as tota ratiocinatio 
which he defines as collectio vel conclusio (200.7-8). Aristotle himself did not have a 
dedicated technical term for what our author calls coniugatio. This is made clear by 
Alexander’s explanation of Aristotle’s use of διὰ τίνων καὶ πότε καὶ πῶς in his explanation 
about how syllogisms are effected (An.Pr.1.4.25b26-8): 
Since syllogisms come about by means of a particular compounding of premises, he 
added ‘when’ and ‘how’ to ‘by what means’. ‘When’ signifies the combinations and 
figures: in the figures and combinations in which syllogisms come about the 
premises must share a term. (In An. Pr. 42.2-5).  
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Alexander calls a syllogistic pair συζυγία (in Top.21.5, 11, 15; 74.32; 76.3; 91.28-9; 95.14). 
He also uses the term συμπλοκή in the same work to refer to non-syllogistic pairs 21.18, 
25; 26.16. 
198.18   conexio: Earlier examples of this term are almost entirely confined to Quintilian 
(L&S s.v.B e.g. Inst. 5.14.6; 17; 19; 22) where it is used to mean, ‘a conclusion, a logical 
sequence’. Although the use here, which is the only one in this text, shares the same logical 
context as those in Quintilian, it does not share the same technical application; rather than 
as a technical term for the conclusion which results from the two premises, it is simply being 
used to refer to the link between the two premises. Examples of this term used in this 
general sense of ‘connection’ are very late (e.g. Isid. Orig. 18.12.6; Serv. Ad Verg. A. 9. 517).  
198.18   aliam communem particulam: aliam (BCFADSW), which refers to the middle term, 
may have been used to refer to the fact that, unlike the subject and the predicate terms in 
a proposition, which have already been described (192.6-9), the middle is ‘another’ term 
which binds two such propositions together. However, the fact that the defining part of this 
term is that it is ‘communis’ and that the middle term could be either a subject or a 
predicate, an indefinite pronoun is perhaps to be expected; Martianus Capella’s 
comparable description of the common term provides good reason for taking aliquam 
instead of aliam: praedicativus <syllogismus> est in quo sumpta ita sibi nexa sunt ut aliquo 
extrinsecus addito suppleantur (408) and Thomas’ apparatus criticus reports that one 
manuscript from Chartres, for which he uses the siglum C (Klibansky and Regen, 1993: 142), 
has aliquam (see Appendix A). The common term corresponds to Aristotle’s μέσον, ‘middle 
term’, which Aristotle defines in the following way: ‘by “middle term” I mean that which is 
both contained in another and contains another in itself, and which is the middle by its 
position also’ (An.Pr.25b36-37). The fact that our author calls this particula communis rather 
than using a term which is etymologically linked to the Greek μέσον appears to have led 
Baldassarri to believe that the author is referring to something other than Aristotle’s middle 
term (1986: 79 n.27). It is clear, however, from the way in which the author goes on to 
describe the position of the common term in each of the three figures that the common 
term denotes the term which is shared by a syllogistic pair in each of the three figures just 
as Aristotle’s middle term denotes the term which is shared by a syllogistic pair in the first 
figure. Alexander’s general description of the middle term (in An.Pr.53, 5-8) is comparable 
with the one found here. He also points out that Aristotle does not give a general account of 
the middle term and that the definition quoted from Aristotle (An.Pr.25b32-6) refers only to 
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syllogisms in the first figure as this is the only figure in which the middle term actually occupies 
the middle position (in An.Pr.53, 5-8). Our author’s choice of communis particula, rather than 
a term with connotations of position, appropriately conveys this. In a similarly useful way, 
Barnes refers to the way in which the three figures are determined by the ‘role’ of the middle 
term, as well as the position (1983: 296). See also Barnes et al., 1991: 108 n.39 for Alexander’s 
use of τάξις to refer both to the role of a term and its position. 
particula is used here to denote what Aristotle calls a ‘term’; this is the meaning of the 
majority of uses of this word throughout the text but there are a few instances where it is 
used in the established, grammatical sense to mean ‘particle’ (L&S s.v.B), specifically, 
‘negative particle’ (191.11; 196.9; 210.7, 14). 
198.20   possunt ad … consentire: For this use of conclusio to mean the ‘conclusion’ of a 
syllogism see also 190.9; 201.11, 12; 202.2, 7; 210.4. Elsewhere, however, the author uses 
the same term to mean a whole syllogism (see note on 198.7-8; 200.2-9. See also 199.5, 7; 
200.18; 202.9-10, 17-18; 203.5; 209.15). Since there are certain combinations which 
produce more than one type of conclusion, and therefore, more than one type of syllogism 
(see, for example, the direct and converse moods of the first figure 203.11-204.14), it is 
clear that the meaning of conclusionem here is ‘conclusion’ and not ‘syllogism’. 
198.21-199.1   necesse est … subiecta sit: This is the case for the syllogistic pairs in the third 
figure, which are enumerated in Chapter 11 (207.16-208.27).  
199.1   in utraque declarans: This is the case for the syllogistic pairs in the second figure 
which are described in Chapter 10 (206.7-207.15). 
199.1-2   aut in altera subiecta, in altera declarans: In spite of this description, the 
examples of the moods of the first figure, which are set out in Chapter 9, show that the 
common term in this figure is in fact the predicate in the first premise and the subject in 
the second (this is pointed out by both Sullivan, 1967: 81, and Londey and Johanson, 1987: 
45). The example Martianus Capella gives of a syllogistic pair from the first figure matches 
the order in which the middle term is presented in our author’s example of moods from the 
first figure: 
‘Omnis voluptas bonum est; omne bonum utile est’. videmus utique nec totum quod 
supra positum est dictum, sed unam inde partem sumptam declarativam quae 
secundo proloquio facta est subiectiva (408). 
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His description of the position of the common term in the first figure below, however, 
shows that he considered both of the possible orders to be valid and the order in the 
example above to be one of two possibilities: 
prima est in qua declarativa particula superioris sumpti sequentis efficitur 
subiectiva, aut subiectiva superioris declarativa sequentis (408). 
Our author’s description mirrors Aristotle’s usual presentation of the terms within a 
syllogism more than his own; in Aristotle, it is the case that the common term is the subject 
in the first premise and the predicate in the second but it is also the case that, unlike in our 
author, the predicate term usually comes before the subject term in each proposition. For 
example, where our author would say: 
Every A is B 
With A being the subject and B the predicate. Aristotle presented the same type of 
proposition in the following way: 
A is of every B 
In this example, A is the predicate and B is the subject. Alexander makes it clear that 
Aristotle’s convention is a result of his use of ‘of every’ and ‘of none’ as a way of making the 
subject and the predicate better known but normal syllogistic usage is the other way round 
(in An.Pr.54,22-29). 
199.4   non numeri ratione … conclusionum dignitate: The Greek ἀξίωμα is generally used 
to mean ‘worth’ or ‘quality’ (e.g. LSJ s.v. A4), which is conveyed accurately by the Latin 
dignitas (L&S s.v. 1). Chrysippus used ἀξίωμα to denote a ‘logical proposition’ (LSJ s.v. II.2).  
There is a great deal of discrepancy among the manuscripts over non numeri ratione. 
Although it is syntactically balanced with what follows (genitive ablative conclusionum 
dignitate), it is not an entirely satisfactory reading in terms of its sense, the banality of which 
is conveyed by Londey and Johanson’s translation of the phrase: ‘This ranking is not 
numerical but rests on the worth of the conclusions’ (1987: 93). In the following chapter of 
our text the author tells us the number of moods and syllogistic combinations which lead 
to true conclusions (intra certum numerum 202.17). Since the first figure contains six 
different pairs of premises and nine moods (202.18-203.1) as opposed to three pairs and 
four moods in the second figure (203.1-2) and five pairs and six moods in the third (203.2-
3) the first figure would still be ranked first if considered in terms of the number of valid 
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conclusions it contains. Compare Martianus Capella, who explains the order of the figures 
only in terms of the worth of conclusions (409). In the following chapter, however, he lists 
the number of moods within each formula in a way which makes it clear that the first mood 
exceeds the other two in this respect as well (410). Our author also introduces the number 
of moods and combinations within each figure intra certum numerum (202.17) which 
suggests that this was taken into account in the ranking of the figures; he lists the total 
number of possible pairs of premises in Chapter 14 and eliminates those which are not 
syllogistic pairs in each of the three figures (213.11-215.4). In this way, based on our 
author’s presentation, the figures are ranked according to the worth of their conclusions as 
well as, not instead of, the number of syllogistic combinations. Alexander repeatedly refers 
to the number of moods being ‘this many’ within each figure (for example, in An.Pr.51,24; 
34). The combination of these factors makes a strong case for the reading accepted by the 
editor Colvius (1588): ‘non tantum enumeratione’ (W), so that the passage would mean: 
‘This order is not only directed by a counting up but also by the worth of the syllogisms’.  
conclusio has been taken to mean ‘conclusion’ here by Londey and Johanson (loc. cit.) but 
the meaning of conclusio in the majority of uses within this text is ‘whole syllogism’ (see 
notes on 198.20; 200.7-9). There is a similar crossover in terminology perceived by 
Alexander in Aristotle; he says that ‘here he calls the conclusion a syllogism’ (in 
An.Pr.53,19). This instance is entirely analogous to the use of conclusio in this passage; 
Aristotle says: 
‘When three terms are so related to one another that the last is wholly contained 
in the middle and the middle is wholly contained in or excluded from the first, the 
extremes must admit of a perfect syllogism (συλλογισμóς)’ (An.Pr.25b32-6. Trans., 
Tredennick, 1973). 
Just as the worth of a syllogism depends upon the worth of its conclusion, in Aristotle’s 
passage, it is necessary for there to be a perfect syllogism because it is necessary for there 
to be a perfect conclusion from the combination. In Alexander’s commentary the ranking 
of the figures and propositions is considered in terms of whole syllogisms rather than only 
in terms of their conclusions: 
When both premises are universal and affirmative, the conclusion too is such. And 
it is reasonable for this syllogism to hold the first rank; for in its conclusion it 
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possesses both what is superior in quantity and what is superior in quality (in 
An.Pr.51,9-12). 
It is more than likely, therefore, that our author is also considering the worth of whole 
syllogisms, in which case conclusionum (199.5) ought to be translated as ‘syllogisms’ rather 
than as ‘conclusions’ as the former is implicit in the latter (see note on 200.7-9).  
199.5-8   quippe ultima … abdicativas tantum: See note on 207.17-20 where it is explained 
why only particular conclusions are possible in the third figure and why there may be 
universal conclusions in the second figure but they can only ever be negative because any 
combination of two affirmatives is invalid in the second figure (see 214.14-16). For the 
superior logical worth of universal, and therefore of the second figure over the third, see 
Alex. in An.Pr.48,13-15.   
199.8-9   et ideo … illationum concluditur: For the explanatory force of ideo (L&S s.v.1) 
compare Alexander’s language for justifying the primacy of the first figure:  
‘It is reasonable (εἰκότος) for that figure to be first in which the middle term is 
middle not only in its relation to the extremes but also in order and in position; for 
since (γὰρ) the middle term explains the generation of the figures, it is reasonable 
that it should also be authoritative in the matter of their order’ (in An.Pr.47,20-25).  
Every type of conclusion (omne genus illationum) refers to all of the four types of premise 
described above, which also apply to conclusions (see 190.9); universal affirmative and 
negative and particular affirmative and negative. 
199.9-11   dico autem … et infertur: Although the term illatio was first used in the previous 
chapter (198.8), the author’s usual method for introducing a neologism alongside its 
cognate verb is applied here to explain its meaning, ‘conclusion’; infero indicates that the 
illatio is literally that which is inferred from the acceptances. The use of the adjective 
illativum to qualify the already established term rogamentum (190.7; 193.4) also serves to 
elucidate the meaning of this term. Compared to the way in which terms are usually 
introduced in this work by a passive verb such as nominatur (198.8) or dicatur (198.18), the 
first person singular verb dico suggests that illatio is a departure from standard terminology. 
Indeed, this is likely to be the case since, other than this text, its first use is found in the 
fourth-century pseudo-Marius Victorinus, De Physicis 4.1297 and Augustine, Serm. 
280.1282.17. 
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199.11-15   acceptio est propositio … appellatur propositio: The use of acceptio in this text 
is more technical in contrast to its earlier use in, for example, Cicero's Topica 8.37 where it 
is defined in a general sense as ‘a taking, receiving or accepting’ (L&S s.v. 1). Here it 
specifically means that which has been accepted as a proposition (L&S s.v. B). The relevance 
of the sense of this term and how it compares to propositio can be seen more clearly from 
its use in the context of proof per impossibile in Chapter 12. Indeed, it is only in this chapter 
in which it is first introduced (199.10, 11, 14, 16; 200.8, 16; 202.6, 11) and in Chapter 12 in 
the context of demonstrating proof per impossibile (209.17-18; 210.6, 13) that acceptio is 
used since it is this aspect of a proposition, that it becomes such after being accepted by an 
interlocutor, which is most relevant and, in this way, it serves to emphasise the absurdity 
of those who do not agree to a conclusion which is formed from propositions which they 
themselves have accepted (see 209.17-18). This explains why everywhere else, as he says, 
propositio is used. This is a particularly clear example which demonstrates the care with 
which the author chose and used his terminology (see introduction section 5). For the first 
time in the text the term propositio appears alongside its cognate verb propono at this point 
which clarifies its meaning and qualifies the sense in which it has hitherto been used and 
will be used throughout the rest of the work. communiter appellatur recalls the way in 
which the term was first introduced (190.7-8). Here it explains specifically that propositio is 
commonly used in place of the term acceptio, which more accurately represents the 
process of agreement the premise has gone through to become a valid premise as part of 
a syllogism. Boethius calls the same thing a propositum (in Top. Diff. 1177C7), that which is 
put forward (propono) in the form of a question to be either accepted or denied by the 
interlocutor. In this way, it is comparable to Aristotle’s use of the Greek term πρότασις as 
described by Ross (1949: 288 n.16. See also 190.5-6). 
199.16-17   huic iunge … et concessam: The imperative iunge expects involvement on the 
part of the audience (see also 202.4 in this chapter. For a full discussion about the didactic 
language used in this text see introduction section 6). propositam and concessam are the 
two requirements for a propositio to become an acceptio (see note on 199.11-15).  
199.18-200.2   primi modi ... honestum est: primi modi is to be understood specifically as 
the conclusion of the first mood of the first figure. According to the definition above 
(199.10-11), illativum implies illativum rogamentum, ‘the concluding premise’. The 
examples given of a conclusion drawn directly (directim 199.18-200.1) and conversely 
(reflexim 200.1-2) are those which will be described in Chapter 9 (hence mox ostendemus) 
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as the first and fifth moods of the first figure respectively where it is explained again that 
the second of these is inferred from the same combination but conversely (203.11-16). The 
term reflexim, which corresponds to the Greek κατ’ἀνάκλασιν, ‘may go back to 
Theophrastus’ (Barnes et al., 1991: 136 n.157), who was responsible for adding the five 
additional moods to Aristotle’s perfect four in the first figure.  
Compare the use of modus here to the diminutive form modulus used later in this chapter 
(201.4). If the use of these two forms is intended to indicate any sort of distinction, this is 
unclear (see note on 201.4-5).  
200.3-4   quia particulariter … universalis dedicativa: See 198.3-4; 203.16-17. 
200.4-7   dico autem ... versa vice: As seen, for instance, in the combination and conclusion 
of the first mood of the first figure which is drawn directly (directim 203.13-14) where 
iustum is the subject term in both the combination and the conclusion and bonum is the 
predicate term in both the combination and the conclusion. The terms have swapped roles 
(versa vice) in the conclusion of the fifth mood which is drawn conversely (reflexim 203.15); 
bonum is now the subject term and iustum is now the predicate term. For this type of 
conversion (reflexio) see 198.5-8. 
200.7-9   tota ratiocinatio … conclusio nominatur: The author now makes a point of 
clarification in his use of terminology. Prior to the introduction of this definition, the term 
conclusio is used to mean ‘conclusion’ as distinct from the premises which form the 
combination (190.9. See also note on 198.20). Here, he suggests the term as one of two 
ways of referring to the whole syllogism. The disjunctive vel invites choice between the two 
terms as a matter of preference (L&S s.v.1. See introduction section 5ii). Since the 
conclusion in a syllogism is the result of the two premises which have come before it, its 
meaning is the result of the combination of them and it therefore would not be possible 
without them. In this way, the sense of ‘conclusio’ encompasses and represents the 
meaning of the whole syllogism and can therefore rightly be referred to by the same name. 
The author is not so much using the term in a way which is entirely distinct from what has 
gone before but is rather qualifying (or clarifying – he appears to use conclusio to mean 
‘syllogism’ without comment at 198.8) the full sense of the term which he has previously 
used (for further discussion on the use of vel to introduce new terminology see note on 
209.11-12 and introduction section 5). Sullivan recognises this use of conclusio to mean ‘an 
entire inference’ but does not draw this connection to its use meaning ‘conclusion’ and 
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treats the two uses as distinct (1967: 78). Londey and Johanson suggest that illatio is simply 
a synonym for conclusio but the author’s definition of the latter makes it quite clear that 
there is a difference. Whereas a conclusio, as described above, has a meaning which is the 
result of the combined meanings of the two premises before it, which is clear from the 
prefix con-, illatio simply represents the form of such a statement and its position within 
the syllogism, that is, after the coniugatio. This is a relevant distinction for the author to 
make since there are more possible combinations than there are true syllogisms (see 
202.17). 
In this text collectio appears only once more (200.16) whereas conclusio is the term most 
commonly used to mean a whole syllogism (see note on 198.20. In some cases, it is 
ambiguous whether the conclusion or the whole syllogism is being referred to, for example, 
see 199.5, 7; 202.17-18; 203.5), but, for the reason discussed above, this does not affect 
the author’s meaning (see note on 199.4 for Aristotle’s use of the term συλλογισμóς). 
200.9-12   secundum Aristotelem … ipsa concessa: This quote originates from Aristotle’s 
An.Pr.24b18-20. A similar definition taken from Topics 100a is found in Gellius (15.26. See 
note on 189.4) and is also cited at the beginning of the section of Alexander’s commentary 
on the Topics which is concerned with the syllogism as distinct from other types of 
argument (in Top.7,5 ff). It is also used by Alexander to introduce his section of commentary 
concerned with the structure of a syllogism (in An.Pr.16,19). Its use here is similar to this 
formulaic way in which Alexander introduces a section of his commentary with the relevant 
quote from Aristotle (see also note on 200.13-16. As made clear by Thomsen-Thörnqvist, 
2008a: xxv, this is a feature which is common to a number of Greek commentators on 
Aristotle and which is also present in Boethius’ work on the syllogism. See introduction 
section 4). 
200.13-16   in qua definitione … fit collectio: The orationis species are listed in Chapter 1 
(189.4-8), after which the author defines the term propositio as that which is pronuntiabilis 
(190.2-8) and as the only type of statement to be either true or false (190.3-4. See also 
191.18). The point that a syllogism cannot be made from only one acceptance is also 
discussed by Alexander who also explains Aristotle’s use of the plural in ‘things posited’ in 
a similar way (in An.Pr.17,11-12 see also in Top.8,15). The method of analysis of Aristotle’s 
text used here which involves verbs of speaking to refer either to Aristotle himself or to the 
quoted passage and which pick out and explain individual words in the passage closely 
resembles the style of commentaries of the likes of Alexander and Ammonius (pluraliter 
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dictum est quia... 200.15-16. See also idcirco in definitione dixit 201.2-4; quod in eadem 
definitione necessitas comprehensa est 202.1-2. For other similarities between our author 
and Alexander see introduction section 4). The repeated use of et (200.13, 15 introduces 
these two separate aspects of the definition in the way that καὶ ... καί does in Greek (L&S 
s.v. II I. For other examples of Greek style in this text see introduction section 5). 
200.16-18   Antipatro Stoico … vivis igitur: Compare Alexander in Top. 8.16-25 where this 
type of syllogism is similarly associated with the Stoic Antipater. Elsewhere, Alexander 
refers to those who accept single premise syllogisms in relation to the quote from Aristotle 
cited above (in An.Pr.17,13) as simply ‘more recent thinkers’, which suggests that other 
Stoics may also have held this view.  
200.18-19   cum sit illo … vivis igitur: Here the author demonstrates this syllogism in its full 
(plena) form; Alexander’s commentary explains the reason behind writing the single 
premise syllogism in this way:  
The so-called single-assumption arguments are sometimes thought to be syllogisms 
inasmuch as when you hear them you add the second premise because it is well 
known (in An.Pr.17,19-21). 
He gives the following, comparable, example: 
You are breathing, 
Therefore you are alive, 
seems to be a syllogism because the hearer himself adds the second premise: 
Everyone who is breathing is alive, 
which is well known. Were this not well known, no one would concede the 
conclusion 
Therefore: you are alive. (in An.Pr. 17,19-24). 
If following this method, the assumed second premise in our author’s example would be 
‘Everyone who sees is alive’ but instead he puts it into the form of the first Stoic 
indemonstrable, modus ponens: ‘If p then q; p; therefore q’. illo modo looks forward to the 
plena form of the syllogism which follows (OLD s.v. ille 3c, introducing a direct statement. 
Compare the forward-looking use of id 193.8 and see note on 193.8-12). 
200.19-201.2   item quia concludere … sed quod negatum: Again, the author’s point is 
opaque without the clarification offered by Alexander’s more comprehensive treatment of 
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the same topic. It is clear from the repeated praeter illa (201.3) which was included in the 
Aristotelian quote cited above (200.10-12) that the conclusion of a syllogism must say 
something other than that which had been conceded in the two preceding premises 
(compare Alexander in An.Pr.13-14). Alexander’s comment on the purpose of a syllogism as 
a means of justification is required to clarify what our author means by ‘we want to 
conclude what has been denied’ (201.2): 
‘A syllogism is a type of justification; for when you syllogize something, you justify 
and prove it by means of certain things – that is to say, when you syllogize, you 
justify a disputed point by means of things which have been justified’ (in An.Pr.43.6-
9). 
This is further clarified by his summary of the way in which a justification is formed:  
‘So he produces a justification by way of the one part, which he uses to establish 
the other; and the argument proves an unknown and disputed (ἀμφισβητουμένου) 
part by means of a known and justified part’ (in An.Pr.43,25-27). 
Sullivan (1967: 159) uses Mates’ description of a Stoic type four undemonstrated argument 
to explain the author’s point here, which Mates defines as follows: ‘that which, employing 
a disjunction (exclusive) as one premise and one of the disjuncts as the other, infers the 
contradictory of the remaining disjunct as its conclusion’ (Mates, 1961: 72). Since our 
author is criticising the Stoics and creates distance between their views and his own by use 
of the first person plural form of volumus (201.1. Also by the particle at before Stoici 191.6), 
it seems highly unlikely that he is referring to the Stoic fourth indemonstrable in the way 
that Sullivan suggests (loc. cit.). Furthermore, it seems clear that the use of negatum clearly 
points towards the ‘disputed part’, which is proved by means of syllogistic justification, to 
which Alexander refers in the passage above (see also in An.Pr.43,6-9). It seems more likely 
that the author of the Peri Hermeneias had this in mind rather than the Stoic disjunctive 
argument which Sullivan suggests. It is perhaps the case that the author is actively 
demonstrating the point that the practice of condensing arguments in the way that the 
Stoics do makes them incomprehensible. At any rate, it is clear that he is condensing the 
point from a fuller treatment, the sort of which is found in Alexander, who, aside from this 
text, offers the earliest extant example of criticism of this sort directed towards the Stoics. 
201.2-4   idcirco in definitione … necessario evenire: For the commentary style of this 
explanation see also 202.1-3 and notes on 200.9-12; 200.13-16.  
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201.4-5   supervacanei sunt … differenter peragentes: This word order is atypical, but the 
example which follows makes it clear that the author is referring to what Alexander calls 
‘non-differently concluding arguments’ (ἀδιαφόρος περαίοντες) (in An.Pr.18,17. See 
Bobzien, who suggests that the {Greek} name of these arguments is 'presumably based on 
the fact that it is irrelevant for their validity what comes in as second disjunct', 2003: 109-
110). In this case non clearly goes with differenter rather than idem as Londey and Johanson 
(1987: 95) and Sullivan (1967: 159) have taken it in their translations. Furthermore, the 
repeated use of idem (for the second see 201.6) makes it clear that it is not being used as 
the declining pronoun meaning ‘the same’ but as a particle to introduce a comparison 
between two things. Sullivan has 'inserted "namely" into [his] translation to indicate that 
Apuleius is not rejecting all Stoic moods as superfluous, but only those which he 
exemplifies' (loc. cit.), but this is indicated clearly enough by this repeated use of idem, 
which, in each case, introduces an example of the mood which is being rejected; two types 
of Stoic arguments, on the one hand (idem) non-differently concluding ones, and on the 
other (idem) duplicated ones. A comparable use of repeated idem is found in Cicero who 
uses it to draw a comparison between two different characteristics both belonging to 
speeches: videmus enim fuisse quosdam qui idem ornate ac graviter, idem versute et 
subtiliter dicerent (Orat.22. See L&S s.v. II B2; cf. OLD s.v.8 although there are no examples 
of its repeated use). The choice of this expression, which is identical to the Greek expression 
in terms of its syntax, over an established Latin term, indifferenter for instance, is indicative 
of a Greek source (see introduction section 5). Frede (1974b: 184 n.21) comments that the 
Greek term διαφόρος is found in the manuscripts of some texts (Alex. in Top.10,8; 10,10; in 
An.Pr.18,17; 164,30; Ammon. in An.Pr.27,36; 28,8; 32,13) but ἀδιαφόρος is found 
elsewhere in Alexander (in Top.566,26) and elsewhere in Ammonius (in An.Pr.28,5), in 
Galen (De Hipp. et Plat. dog. II 3 S.182) and in scholia on the Topics (294b26). Furthermore, 
Wallies (1883) has ἀδιαφόρος rather than διαφόρος in his edition of Alex. in Top.10,8. He 
goes on to say that Prantl supported this reading based on the way in which our author has 
rendered the phrase here as non idem differenter and also suggests that idem should be 
before non and that this was due to the non being added at a later stage above the line and 
subsequently being positioned in the wrong place in the line; it is entirely plausible that this 
kind of correction occurred in one of the earliest manuscripts. Pinkster, however, gives four 
examples of the negation non used in Cicero’s Latin to show that this particle is sometimes 
placed ‘before the word(s) they have as their scope’ and are ‘sometimes separated by one 
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or two words’ (2015: 731), which shows that a textual emendation is not necessarily needed 
to understand that, here, non applies to differenter.    
The diminutive moduli is usually used in senses which are technical but which are 
completely unrelated to the meaning of modus as it is being used in this text: e.g. in 
Vitruvius 5.9.3; 3.3.7 'a module' (L&S s.v.2), in Fronto, Aquaed.36 'a water metre' (s.v.3). 
There is no evidence that the Greek diminutive τροπάριον, which Baldassarri tentatively 
suggests as the equivalent was ever used in this logical sense to mean ‘mood’ (1986: 104). 
Diminutives are a common feature of Apuleius’ style (Harrison, 2000: 18 n.71: ‘For Apuleian 
diminutives see Koziol: 1872, 260-6 (still the best collection).’). They do not commonly 
appear in his philosophical works but they are something of a trademark feature in his novel 
(for another example of Apuleian style which is out of place in a philosophical context see 
note on 193.15-16. See also introduction section 7). This context, which is geared towards 
criticising the Stoics, may suggest that the force of the diminutive here is derogatory. This 
option gains plausibility when it is considered in light of the way in which Alexander 
describes such forms of argument: 
‘This sort of thing may indeed have a syllogistic figure and a syllogistic combination, 
but it is certainly not a syllogism. For syllogisms are instruments, and they are 
introduced for some useful purpose – for proving something. Hence what is not 
useful is not a syllogism’ (in An.Pr.18,19-22). 
This passage suggests that our author’s use of the diminutive modulus is intended for those 
forms of argument which have the appearance of a syllogism but which lack a useful 
purpose. This, however, leaves the use of modulus to refer to moods belonging to the 
Peripatetic figures unexplained (see 202.18; 203.1, 2). These few uses may simply be 
employed by analogy to this use before the term modus is consistently used throughout 
the chapters in which the syllogistic combinations in each figure are demonstrated. 
Compare Martianus Capella who calls a mood ‘modus’ (passim but esp. 411-413), and a 
figure ‘forma’ (e.g., 409-413). There are four instances of formula throughout Martianus, 
which Ferré says could be understood to mean syllogistic figure in a metaphorical sense 
(2007: 69 n.19. See introduction section 7). 
201.5-6   aut dies est aut nox … dies est: The conclusion is missing from this example with 
begins in the form of a Stoic fourth indemonstrable. Based on the above description of this 
type of argument, it was perhaps considered too obvious to be included. 
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201.6-8   idem geminantes … ultro conceditur: For idem see note on 201.4-5. geminantes 
are duplicated arguments, which, as is the case here, are often discussed alongside non-
differently concluding arguments (Bobzien, 2003: 109. See Alexander who describes them 
as 'included' in the latter in An.Pr. 18.17). sine controversia, in the same way as quod 
negatum (201.2), reinforces the purpose of a syllogism which is to prove something which 
is disputed by means of things which are known or undisputed (cf. Alex. in An.Pr.43,11-12), 
which is not accomplished by these types of Stoic arguments. 
201.8-11   illud potius … et in propositione: The variety of manuscript readings for nam 
aliud collegi (201.10) make it difficult to make sense of this part of the text. For nam aliud: 
nam male est Z ; nisi aliud S ; non male cett. codd. Gold., and for collegi: colligi S ; colligere 
cett. codd. Gold. Based on the author’s use of direct questions in other parts of this text it 
is quite possible that such a question is being posed here and that num precedes aliud 
collegi praeter quod accepi rather than nam (201.10. See note on 205.13-15. Compare 
Alexander in An.Pr.18,22-30 for similar uses of direct questions in his commentary. The 
passage in English would then be as follows (compare Londey and Johanson’s translation, 
1987: 95): 
‘When I say ‘If it is day, it is light, but it is day: Therefore it is light,’ did I conclude 
anything beyond what I accepted? 
This in turn makes sense of the transition into the refutation of the syllogism which follows 
(201.12) and it is also in keeping with the dialectical method described previously where 
the author explained that a syllogism begins with propositions which are put forward as 
questions (si quis ita proponat 199.12) to be agreed to by the interlocutor in order to 
become the kind of acceptances (acceptio 199.14) from which a valid conclusion may be 
drawn (I am very grateful to Carlotta Dionisotti who suggested num for the first of the two 
instances of nam in this line on the grounds of possible textual error without having the 
point of reference of the preceding passage, regarding the distinction between propositio 
and acceptio, the context of which, as well as the other use of direct questioning in the text, 
provides a great deal of plausibility to this conjecture).  
201.11-15   hoc tamen ita refutabimus … utique et luceat: hoc refers to the rhetorical 
question in the suggested reading which the author posed above, ‘Did I conclude anything 
beyond the acceptances?’ as was the case with the previous syllogism, idem geminantes 
(201.6-7). The conclusion, igitur lucet, in this syllogism appears to be the same as was in the 
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premise, lucet, but is, in fact, different. In the conclusion lucet is the accepted premise 
which states that ‘it is now light’ (nunc lucere). In the first premise, however, lucet is 
included only as a consequent of the conditional (tantum consequens esse) and not as a 
premise in its own right. In this way, the syllogism is an example of a Stoic first 
indemonstrable; this type of argument ‘is composed of a conditional and its antecedent (as 
its premises), having the consequent of the conditional as its conclusion’ (see Bobzien, 
1994: 136. See also Sextus M.8.224 and Diogenes Laertius 7.80). The conjunction ut and the 
subjunctive verb luceat go together to form a purpose clause which is split by the separate 
conditional clause introduced by si: 'so that, if it is day, it is certainly also light'. 
201.15-202.1   multum autem refert … aliquid quiddam praecesserit: To affirm (affirmes) 
is to assert something as either true or false (L&S s.v. 1; 2) and therefore to create a valid 
syllogistic premise (see 191.3-4; 191.18-19) as opposed to a well-known consequence. 
praecesserit is to be understood in the sense of ‘precede’ as an occurrence rather than as a 
premise in a syllogism in that it follows necessarily but not syllogistically (see note above 
on 201.11-15). 
202.1-3   quod in eadem … inductionis distingueretur: For this commentary style of analysis 
see also 201.2-4 and note on 200.13-16 (see also introduction section 4 for its use in the 
Greek commentary tradition). The author is about to describe, with an example, how the 
type of syllogistic argument with which his work is concerned is distinguished 
(distingueretur) from induction. 
202.3-4   nam et … quaedam conceduntur: The difference between syllogistic justification 
and induction is that in induction ‘certain things are accepted’, specifically, parts of things 
rather than whole things, as demonstrated in the example which follows (202.4-8). 
Compare Alexander’s explanation of induction (in An.Pr.18,9-12; 43,30ff). 
202.4   ut puta: For the instructional use of the imperative see note on 199.16 (see also 
introduction section 6). 
202.4-8   homo inferiorem malam … malam movet: Alexander uses the same stock example 
to demonstrate induction and points out that it results in a plausible conclusion but not a 
necessary one: 
‘Induction is a path by way of known and justified particulars toward the universal 
which is unknown. Both these things (induction and paradigm) contain plausibility 
but not necessity (in An.Pr.43,27-44,2).  
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Other uses of this example are found in Sextus, PH II 185; Ammonius in An.Pr.28,32-29,2, 
2; Philoponus, in An.Pr.34,21-6 (Barnes et al., 1991: 104 n.12). 
202.8-11   quod cum sit … acceptionibus continetur: The author uses the example of the 
crocodile (as the stock example usually does. See note on 202.4-8 above) to show that 
because an induction is based on parts (homo, equus, bos, canis) rather than on the whole 
as syllogistic justification is (see note on 202.3-4), the conclusion, which must be accepted 
if the premises are accepted (in conclusione non licuisset recusare), will be fallacious (potes 
... illationem ipsam non recipere) because there is at least one other part for which the 
conclusion is not true (sit in crocodilo falsum). 
202.11-12   et ideo ... necessario evenire: in ea refers to the definition cited previously 
(200.101-12) and is one of a number of instances of the author referring back to the 
quotation as he analyses and explains the reason behind Aristotle’s use of particular words 
or phrases (see also 200.13; 201.2; 202.1, 12). For this method of exposition see also 201.2-
4; 202.1-3 and note on 200.9-12. Necessity is what distinguishes syllogistic from the type of 
induction described here (cf. Alex. in An.Pr.44,1), which is why the term (necessario) was 
included in Aristotle’s definition. 
202.12   ne ultima quidem ...non fore: The preposition ex highlights the point that the 
conclusion of a syllogism derives ‘out of’ the propositions which precede it. Compare in ipsis 
acceptionibus continetur (202.10-11). 
202.14-15   ac de his quidem satis dictum: This closing phrase matches the way in which 
Alexander ends his discussion on induction after he says that justification through induction 
is discussed by Aristotle at greater length in the second book of Prior Analytics (in 
An.Pr.44,5); he has said enough ‘for present purposes’ of discussions about categorical 
syllogisms. We can assume that this is also the force behind our author’s comparable closing 
comment. This formulaic expression is used frequently in Cicero’s De inventione to mark 
the end of particular topics of discussion (1.26; 1.30; 2.115, 166, 178), including induction 
(1.56) and in Boethius (De Arith. 2.43.183; in Porph. 2ed. 5.24.347; in Cic. Top. 1.273.11; 
3.317.9; 3.320.46; 5.363.9 (for an account of the didactic features of this text see 
introduction section 6).  
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Chapter 8 
202.16-203.10 
This very brief chapter outlines the number of different moods and different syllogistic pairs 
or combinations from which moods can be formed in each of the three figures which were 
introduced in Chapter 7 (199.2-9) and acts as an introduction to the next part of the work. 
The following three chapters treat each of the three figures in order. The author also 
describes the kinds of combinations from which valid conclusions cannot be made; those 
which contain only particulars or only negatives. He also explains that if any affirmative 
premise is combined with one negative premise the conclusion will be negative and that if 
any universal premise is combined with one particular premise the conclusion will be 
particular. 
202.16   nunc tradendum ... et coniugationibus: Martianus Capella has a similarly brief 
chapter to this which opens in the same way (410). Cassiodorus also introduces the 
different moods within each figure in a similar way and he refers his readers to the Peri 
Hermeneias, which he ascribes to Apuleius, for a fuller treatment (Inst.2.12). Our author 
distinguishes combinations (coniugationibus), that is, syllogistic pairs of premises, from 
moods since it is the case that certain syllogistic pairs can produce two separate moods (see 
198.18). For example, the combination which forms the first mood of the first figure 
produces a conclusion directly but the same combination produces a conclusion indirectly 
to form the fifth mood of the first figure. For the use of modus see note on 201.4 which 
compares the use of modulus (202.18; 203.1-2). One suggestion for the interchangeable 
use of the two terms in this chapter could be the very similar ways in which this chapter 
and a number of other texts begin which suggests that this was a standard way to introduce 
new chapters in a work. It is therefore possible, that the author lifted this set phrase ‘nunc 
tradendum est quibus modis…’ from another text and returned to using his own moduli, 
which he introduced in the previous chapter (201.4), throughout the rest of the chapter. 
202.17-18   fiant intra certum … verae conclusiones: certum numerum refers to the fact 
that there are more possible combinations than those which produce verae conclusiones 
(202.17-18). This is also presumably the reason behind the use of soli (202.18). This is made 
clearer in Martianus Capella’s comparable account: nam recipiunt intra certum numerum, 
extra quos modos quicquid conclusum fuerit non est temere concedendum (410) and in 
Alexander’s preliminary discussion of the ways in which syllogisms come about before his 
treatment of each of the three figures: 
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For syllogisms come about by means of certain kinds of premises and in figures 
(which he will discuss), and in these figures they come about according to a 
particular conjunction of the premises with each other. For in each figure there are 
both non-syllogistic and syllogistic combinations, depending on the particular 
compound of the premises (in An.Pr.42,10-14).  
In this way, certum numerum in our text is comparable to κατὰ ποιὰν τῶν προτάσεων πρὸς 
ἀλλήλας συμπλοκήν in Alexander’s text above. Our author, however, enumerates and then 
eliminates the non-syllogistic pairs in the final chapter (213.11-215.7) and only presents the 
valid moods in each figure in Chapters 9 – 11. 
202.18-203.3   in prima formula … coniugationes quinque: For soli see note on 202.17-18. 
reperiuntur indicates that the moods and combinations ‘are found’ (L&S s.v. II B1) by means 
of testing all of the possible ones. Similarly, Alexander often uses the passive form of 
εὑρίσκω to refer to the syllogistic combinations and syllogisms as ‘being found’ (e.g., in 
An.Pr.51,24-25, 26; 61,20), which suggests that it is up to one who is engaged in logic to 
find them. Aristotle, on the other hand, does not refer to specific combinations which lead 
to certain moods, he only says whether or not there will be a syllogism; he uses various 
verbs with connotations of ‘being’ to denote the presence of a valid syllogism in the Prior 
Analytics (e.g. συλλογισμὸς ἔσται τέλειος An.Pr.32b5; ὁ αὐτὸς γίγνεται συλλογισμός 33a13). 
203.3-6   de quibus hic … falsa conducere: The order of the figures (suo ordine) was 
described in the previous chapter (199.4-5). The use of the reflexive possessive pronoun 
(suo), rather than the genitive eorum, is surprising given that the verb demonstrabo is first 
person singular and so order (ordine) is not its subject. It may be suggested that such a use 
of the reflexive pronoun is colloquial, but De Melo points out that, for this to be the case, 
we would expect to see more instances of the reverse situation; eius being used where we 
would expect suus (2010: 91). De Melo also refers to a number of instances where Plautus, 
whom we know Apuleius was fond of imitating, uses ‘suus where one might expect eius’ 
(2010: 99), which he says are more likely to be true colloquialisms. The context of the use 
here, in fact, lends itself well to the third context in which suus is used over eius which De 
Melo describes: ‘The third context in which suus rather than eius is used has to do with the 
original meaning of suus, which seems to have been ‘his own’ rather than just ‘his’. Thus if 
speakers want to emphasise the close connection between two elements, they can use suus 
non-reflexively’ (2010: 90. See also Woodcock, 1959: 24 and Palmer, 1994: 40-44 for the 
use of suus when it refers not to the grammatical subject but to the logical subject); the 
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author previously described the rationale behind the order of the figures (199.2-9) which 
he refers back to (202.18-203.3) just before saying that he will now set out the 
combinations and moods within these. In this way, he emphasises a distinction between 
the order of the figures and the order of the combinations and moods; although both orders 
are based on the same principles, the order of the figures is concerned only with the worth 
of the conclusions which can be drawn in each figure (see 199.5-9) whereas the worth of 
the premises within the combination is also taken into account in the order of moods. A 
translation such as ‘in their own order’ for suo ordine rather than simply ‘in their order’, 
according to De Melo’s comments, fits this context well. 
The combinations which are referred to by neque ex particularibus solis … falsa conducere 
(203.4-6) are those which are possible but which are omitted from the descriptions of each 
figure because they do not produce a valid conclusion. There are 16 possible different types 
of combination of each of the four types of premise, for which reason the moods are 
counted intra certum numerum (202.17) and soli is used when enumerating the nine moods 
in the first figure (202.18). These invalid combinations are enumerated and discounted 
systematically in Chapter 14 (213.11-215.7). The expression ratam fieri conclusionem is 
similar to one used in the previous chapter, in which it was said that, in order to be ratam, 
the conclusion of a syllogism must be formed from the premises which precede it (202.14. 
Compare the use of inrita to denote an invalid combination at 205.16). The phrase here is 
comparable to Aristotle’s συλλογισμὸς ἔσται τέλειος both in meaning and in syntactical 
structure (e.g., An.Pr.26a27-28; 32b39; 33a22; 35a34). Based on the author’s usual method 
of introducing and defining terminology throughout this text (see introduction section 5) 
concludere (W) is to be preferred to conducere (BCFADS) (203.5-6) owing to the proximity 
of the cognate term conclusio (203.5). For the unusual placement of et see note on 194.10; 
198.3; 200.13-15; 203.5. 
203.6-8   item quamlibet … ceteris praevalet: It is made clear by Aristotle and Alexander 
that a single premise is not sufficient to produce a conclusion and that a syllogism must 
consist of two premises (e.g., Arist. An.Pr.34a16-19; 40b30-7; 53b16-23; Alex. in An.Pr.17,10; 
cf. this text 200.10-12, 15-16). Elsewhere, however, it is made clear that one syllogism must 
consist of no more than two premises, otherwise there will be several syllogisms (Arist. 
An.Pr.41b36-42a40). Ross’s explanation of this passage makes it clear why this is the case: 
‘Every proof requires three terms and no more; though (1) there may be alternative middle 
terms which will connect two extremes, or (2) each of the premises may be established by 
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a prior syllogism, or one by induction, the other by syllogism. In both these cases we have 
more than one syllogism’ (Ross, 1949: 376). There is no indication within our text that the 
author took polysyllogisms into account (See, however, note on 203.11-12); he defines a 
combination of premises (coniugatio) as that which possunt ad unam conclusionem 
consentire (198.20) without mentioning any exceptions to this. The phrase quamlibet multis 
dedicativis (203.6), therefore, must simply serve as hyperbole to emphasise the force of a 
negative to cancel out an affirmative and of a particular to cancel out a universal (203.9-
10); no matter how many premises of the stronger quality or quantity were to be added to 
a premise of the weaker quality or quantity, the conclusion is only ever as valid as the 
weakest quality and quantity within the combination. 
203.8-10   similis etiam … facit illationem: For the plural universalibus see note on 
quamlibet multis dedicativis (203.6-8). 
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Chapter 9 
203.11-206.6 
Chapters 9 to 11 describe and give examples of all the valid moods in each of the three 
figures. This chapter begins with the first figure in which, the author says, there are nine 
moods and six different syllogistic combinations. That this is the longest of these three 
chapters is due both to the fact that the first figure has the largest number of moods (see 
note on 199.4) and to the fact that in Chapters 10 and 11 the author shows that the majority 
of moods in the second and third figures can be ‘reduced’ to the first four indemonstrable 
moods. At the beginning of Chapter 7 the author tells us that the syllogisms (collectiones) 
in the first figure are those in which the middle term is the subject term (subiectiva) in one 
of the premises and the predicate term in the other. The author’s method is to describe 
each of the four indemonstrable moods in turn and to show in each case which other mood 
is produced when the conclusion is converted or, in the case of the fourth mood, which two 
other moods are produced when the two premises in the combination are converted. This 
makes very clear the way in which the imperfect moods are related to the indemonstrables. 
Whereas Aristotle and Alexander systematically deal with all possible combinations in turn, 
both valid and invalid, our author does not mention the invalid combinations until Chapter 
14 (213.11-215.7) because at this point he is only concerned with the moods produced from 
valid combinations. He also waits until Chapter 13 to make reference to the commonly 
recognised fact that Aristotle listed only four moods for the first figure and that 
Theophrastus added the other five (212.12-14 cf. Alex. in An.Pr. 69,26-70,21). At the end of 
this chapter he clarifies by the use of two analogies what it means for a mood to be 
‘indemonstrable’. 
203.11-12   igitur in prima formula … dedicativum universalem directim: The author’s use 
of formula corresponds to Aristotle’s σχῆμα meaning syllogistic ‘figure’, which Londey and 
Johanson (1987) systematically translate as ‘formula’. An example of this mood was given 
previously to demonstrate the way in which a conclusion is drawn from a given combination 
of two premises to form a syllogism (199.15-200.1). Martianus Capella specifies that the 
universal affirmative comes from precisely two universal affirmatives (411). The author 
does not explicitly spell out this number in the way that he enumerates, for example, the 
number of types of propositions (duae species 190.10), parts of speech (duabus paucissimis 
orationis partibus constat 191.16-17), the number of types of predicables (quinque solae 
197.10), the number of figures of syllogisms (tres igitur formulae fiunt 199.2) and the 
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number of combinations and moods within them (in prima formula novem soli moduli, sex 
autem coniugationes reperiuntur; in secunda quattuor moduli, tres coniugationes; in tertia 
sex moduli, coniugationes quinque 202.18-203.3). Although each of the syllogisms 
described here have two premises, compare the use of quamlibet multis in the previous 
chapter when referring to the way in which a negative premise will make the quality of the 
conclusion negative no matter how many affirmative premises are added to it (203.6-7), 
which I suggest is a form of hyperbole. Aristotle’s definition of perfect syllogisms, however, 
is followed by a description of imperfect syllogisms which, he says, require more 
propositions than those from which a necessary conclusion follows (An.Pr.24b22-26), which 
the author may also have had in mind when he used quamlibet. 
203.14-17   at si reflexim inferas ... quintus modus: The use of the verb inferas makes it 
clear that the only part of the syllogism which changes when it is collected reflexim as 
opposed to directim is the conclusion, that which is designated by the verb’s cognate noun, 
illatio (see also 203.21; 204.11-12). This is in contrast to the use of the verb conducere which 
describes the conclusion of moods which are collected directim (203.12, 19; 204.9, 15-16). 
For the eighth and ninth moods (205.6-7, 11) the verb conduco is used to explain how their 
conclusion is drawn (205.6, 11) even though they are converse moods of the fourth 
indemonstrable. In these cases, however, this verb is more appropriate than infero because 
the conversion which takes place does not involve the conclusion (illatio), rather, the 
combination is converted (205.2-3). reflexim was defined above, in contrast with directim, 
as the mode of conclusion in which the terms change their positions (see also the use of 
reflexio to describe this type of conversion earlier 198.7-8); a predicate term in the 
combination becomes the subject term in the conclusion and a subject term in the 
combination becomes the predicate term in the conclusion (200.4-7). 
203.16-17   nam sic tantum … supra docui: sic refers specifically to the fact that the 
universal affirmative premise must change its quantity to particular when it is converted. 
This was described above as the ‘simple’ type of conversion (198.3-7. See also 200.3-4).  
203.17-204.1   secundus modus est … sextum modum effeceris: The second and the sixth 
mood share the same combination of premises but whereas the second mood collects its 
universal negative conclusion directim (200.4-6), the sixth mood collects a conclusion of the 
same quality and quantity reflexim (200.4-7). 
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204.1-2   nam ut dictum est … universalis abdicativa: The indirect conclusion of the sixth 
mood has the same quality and quantity as the direct conclusion of the second mood 
because universal negatives such as this convert into themselves (in se), that is to say, unlike 
the universal affirmatives, their quality and quantity remain the same but their subject and 
predicate terms are switched over, as was explained previously (196.19).  
204.3-6   tantum meminisse … prior intellegatur: The way in which this point begins with 
the caveat ‘meminisse debemus’ continues the didactic tone which is notable elsewhere in 
the work (see introduction section 6). The subject term is taken from the affirmative 
premise in the second mood because, in this premise, the predicate term is the middle term 
and since this mood is collected directly (directim), the subject term in the conclusion must 
come from a subject term in the combination just as the predicate term in the conclusion 
must come from a predicate term in the combination (compare the way in which the 
conclusion is drawn reflexim as discussed in the note below on 204.6-7). With this rule in 
place, the order of premises within a given syllogism is unimportant; our author clearly 
acknowledges this by saying: licet ante abdicativa enuntietur. The use of licet paired with 
the subjunctive verb puts this order of presentation across as a mere possibility but one 
which will not be demonstrated because it does not reflect the order in which the terms 
will appear in the direct conclusion. This consistency in the presentation of the order of 
premises has been mistaken by some as the author’s belief in a set premise order; 
Lukasiewicz reports that Waitz, for example, believes there to be a set rule for the order in 
which premises are presented and criticises Apuleius for changing this order (Lukasiewicz, 
1957: 33). The consistent order of the premises in this work, however, is not due to the 
author’s belief about such a rule, but rather, it is due to the didactic purpose of the work; 
the given order makes the relation between the terms in each syllogism as clear as possible 
to beginners in logic and the case is the same in Aristotle. Patzig explains that ‘it is not by 
chance that Aristotle generally held to the order in which the first premise contains the 
middle term and the predicate of the conclusion and the second premise the middle term 
and the subject of the conclusion. For if the order of the premises is of no account for the 
validity of a syllogism, it is extremely important to its evidence’ (Patzig, 1968: 60. See also 
Rose, 1966). In the same way as Aristotle, our author presents the premises in the order 
which demonstrates their validity most evidently. In this way, in ceteris (204.5) ought to be 
understood as ‘in the rest of the examples given in this very text and specifically those with 
a direct conclusion’, rather than as the rest of the possible moods more generally. Indeed, 
it is the case for all of the examples in this text that the premise containing the minor term, 
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that is, that which is to be the subject in the conclusion, comes before the premise 
containing the major term, the predicate of the conclusion, in moods collected directly and 
the premise containing the major term comes before the minor term in moods collected 
conversely. This is an inverted form of Aristotle's presentation which our author discusses 
further on (212.4-10). Therefore eam (204.4), that is, the affirmative premise (dedicativa 
204.3) is to be considered first (priorem) because in this text the first position in a 
combination represents the minor premise and in moods with direct conclusions the 
subject term in the conclusion is taken from the subject term in the minor premise.  
204.6-7   in sexto autem … ex abdicativa: The subject term in the conclusion is taken from 
the negative premise in the combination in the sixth mood. What is not made clear by the 
text is that this subject term has come from the predicate term in the negative premise 
because it has been collected conversely (reflexim) and therefore the terms have swapped 
positions (compare the way in which the conclusion is drawn directim as discussed in the 
note above on 204.3-6); the subject term for the conclusion has been taken from the 
predicate term in the combination. This is the only difference (sola differentia) between the 
two moods because negative premises, such as the conclusion produced in the second 
mood, convert into themselves (see 196.15-19; 204.1-2). When concluded reflexim, 
therefore, their terms simply swap positions and there is no change in the quantity of the 
proposition.  
204.8-13   tertius modus qui … modum feceris: For the use of conducit for conclusions which 
are drawn directly (directim) as the third mood is and inferas for those which are drawn 
conversely (reflexim) as the seventh mood is see note on 203.14-17. 
204.13-14   nam ut dictum est … particularis dedicativa: See 196.16-19. 
204.14-16   quartus modus est … abdicativum particulare directim: For conducit and 
directim see note on 203.14-17 and on 204.8-13.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
204.18   ex hoc modo contrariae vices inveniuntur prioribus: This statement is in contrast 
to Alexander of Aphrodisias who does not describe the eighth and ninth moods as 
conversions of the fourth in this way (in An.Pr.110,12-21) and to Martianus Capella (411) 
who says that the fourth mood cannot be converted because its conclusion, a particular 
negative, cannot be converted (see 198.2). I have not found any other texts where the 
eighth and ninth moods are presented as being generated from the fourth indemonstrable. 
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204.19-205.2   octavus et nonus … fiat abdicativa: illationem, non and reflexam all go 
together as in, ‘the eighth and ninth moods preserve the conclusion of the fourth mood 
unconverted’. eius illationem refers to the conclusion of the fourth mood (204.17-18), 
which is shared by the eighth and ninth moods. It is not converted (non reflexam) as is the 
case with the other, previously mentioned converse moods (ut illi), because particular 
negatives such as this cannot be converted (see 198.2). Instead, the premises in the 
combination, which precedes the conclusion, are converted to equipollent propositions; 
the terms in the negative premises are simply swapped over (for this type of conversion see 
196.19; 204.1-2, 6-7).  The order of the combination is changed (mutatoque ordine) so that 
the negative premise is placed first (prior fiat) for no reason other than to serve as a 
teaching aid to show how the conclusion is drawn conversely (reflexim) in these moods as 
opposed to the conclusion which is drawn directly (directim) in the fourth mood. For an 
explanation about the reason behind the order of premises in this work see note on 204.3-
6. In the fourth mood the subject in the conclusion is taken from the subject of the middle 
term in the combination whereas in the eighth and ninth moods, the subject in the 
conclusion is taken from the predicate of the middle term in the combination.  
205.4-7   nam et si … abdicativum reflexim: For similar uses of et see 194.10; 198.3; 200.13-
15; 203.5. The use of the second person singular convertas (205.4) serves the didactic 
purpose of the text (for other examples of this see introduction section 6). Londey and 
Johanson (1987: 97) correctly translate subicias as ‘place under’ (L&S s.v. 1) as opposed to 
‘substitute’ (L&S s.v. B2) since the negative premise of the fourth combination takes the 
first position for the eighth and ninth moods and the particular affirmative is placed 
beneath it (see notes on 204.3-6, 19-205.2).  
The phrase, ‘quam converterat particularis eius dedicativa’ is rather obscure (205.5). About 
the verb converterat Londey and Johanson say: ‘Apuleius has us obtain the conjugation of 
the eighth mood from that of the fourth by placing under the converse of the universal 
negative universalem dedicativam, quam converterat particularis eius dedicativa. In order 
to make both logical and grammatical sense of this, we have been forced to take convertere 
to mean ‘to be the converse of’’ (1987: 96 n.6). They therefore translate this line in the 
following way: ‘place under it a universal affirmative, of which its particular affirmative [i.e., 
that of the fourth] had been the converse’ (1987: 97). The Latin verb convertere is 
frequently found in the passive voice in this text (197.3, 6; 198.4, 5; 200.3; 205.20) with the 
noun propositio as its subject. This is also the case in Martianus Capella and in Boethius. 
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The other, active uses are either second person singular (192.25; 196.20; 197.1; 205.4, 18) 
or, on a couple of occasions, first person plural (205.16; 207.7-8), which implies that 
conversion is a process undertaken by those engaged in logic (compare the use of the verb 
ἀντιστρέφειν in Alexander described by Barnes et al., 1991: 31, which ‘sometimes takes a 
personal subject’ but ‘more often the subject is a proposition’). The third person singular 
use here is a one-off. Furthermore, it is unclear why the pluperfect tense would be used 
and why the change from a particular affirmative to a universal affirmative took place when 
particular affirmatives usually convert into themselves (196.15-19). Just as this phrase is 
obscure, it is strange and perhaps erroneous to describe the eighth mood as being 
‘produced’ from the fourth in such a way (see notes on 204.18; 205.4-7). Other authors only 
ever describe the syllogistic combination associated with this mood as being ‘reduced’ to 
the fourth but not produced or generated by the fourth.  
Comparing Alexander’s discussion of this type of syllogism helps to unravel our author’s 
comments: 
‘Take first the non-syllogistic combination in the first figure with ‘A holds of every 
B’ and ‘B holds of no C’. In this combination there is no deduction from A to C. This 
is why the combination is non-syllogistic, being of no use with regard to the point 
at issue. Yet something can be deduced syllogistically from the minor to the major 
term’ (in An.Pr.109, 30-110, 1). 
As mentioned previously, Alexander presents the invalid as well as valid syllogisms in his 
discussions about each of the figures. The combination Alexander describes above is that 
of the eighth mood described in our text, formed from a universal negative and a universal 
affirmative. ‘B holds of no C’ corresponds to Nullum turpe honestum (205.7-8) and ‘A holds 
of every B’ corresponds to omne honestum iustum (205.8). The combination is non-
syllogistic because the minor premise (B holds of no C) is negative and so a conclusion 
cannot be drawn directim (see Arist. An.Pr.26a39-b10 and Alex. in An.Pr.63, 9-14). The type 
of deduction referred to in the extract above, ‘from the minor to the major term’ 
corresponds to what our author refers to as reflexim (see also 200.4-7; 203.14-17; 204.6-
7), whereby the subject term in the conclusion comes from the predicate of the middle 
term in the combination and the predicate term in the conclusion comes from the subject 
of the middle term in the combination. Alexander goes on to explain that the reason 
something can be deduced from this combination is because, when converted, a syllogistic 
combination is produced from which a conclusion can be drawn directly: 
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‘If both premises are converted, we get ‘C holds of no B’ and ‘B holds of some A’ 
(since the universal affirmative converts with the particular). From these premises 
it can be deduced that C does not hold of some A, where C takes the place of the 
major term in the conclusion and A that of the minor, conversely to how they were 
supposed’ (in An.Pr.110,1-5). 
The converted combination described above is of the same form as the fourth mood as it is 
described by our author; ‘C holds of no B’ corresponds to ‘Nullum honestum turpe’ (204.16-
17), ‘B holds of some A’ corresponds to ‘Quoddam iustum honestum est’ (204.16) and the 
conclusion ‘C does not hold of some A’ is of the same form as ‘Quoddam igitur iustum non 
est turpe’ (204.17-18). Alexander’s presentation makes clear the conversion from the 
universal affirmative in the eighth mood to the particular affirmative in the fourth mood 
and, in this way, successfully shows the way in which the eighth mood can be reduced to 
the fourth. The relation as it is explained in our text, that is, by the conversion of the 
particular to the universal, however, is hard to accept. This begs the question whether our 
author was mistaken in saying that the fourth mood generates the eighth. Indeed, it 
appears that he is alone in describing their relation in this way (see notes on 204.18; 205.4-
7). If iam below (205.19) is taken to refer to the present point in time as opposed to the 
specific point in the text above (205.3-6), it suggests that this is an innovation. The use of 
iam with immediate reference is more likely based on the other uses of this particle in the 
text (see note on 212.12-15).  
The use of the pluperfect tense in converterat is puzzling. The most plausible explanation 
for this would be that it represents the order of exposition in the source the author was 
using. As Patzig discusses, ‘in each figure Aristotle surveys the sixteen pairs of propositions 
which can be constructed by permutation of the constants, a, e, i, and o. He always 
investigates first the pairs consisting of two universal propositions… Then come the pairs 
constructed from one universal and one particular proposition… and finally the purely 
particular pairs’ (1968: 168). Alexander follows this order in his commentary (see especially 
in An.Pr.53,30-61,5 for the combinations referred to here). Accordingly, the combination of 
the eighth mood, which is invalid for Aristotle’s first figure (An.Pr.26a2-9), is described 
before the combination of the fourth, perfect mood of the first figure (26a26-30), the first 
having a universal affirmative, containing the major term, and the second having a 
particular affirmative, containing the minor term. It is possible then, that the pluperfect 
converterat reflects this sequence. Although Aristotle’s method of presentation is not 
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reflected in our text, it is likely to be the case that a passage similar to those cited from 
Alexander above was exactly the sort of passage our author was working from and which 
he inverted to describe the generation of the eighth mood from the fourth. In which case I 
would take the particle quod (WPD) here instead of the relative quam (AS) since its 
explanatory force seems more appropriate in light of the comparable use of (ἐπεί) ‘since’ 
in the passage from Alexander cited above (in An.Pr.110,1-5) and would translate the clause 
in the following way: ‘because its particular affirmative had converted’ that is, from the 
universal affirmative which was in the immediately preceding invalid mood.   
Sullivan says that our author does not appear to recognise the fact that ‘the substitution of 
MaS for SiM in this deduction is justifiable only by appeal to a rule corresponding to the law 
of propositional logic’ (Sullivan, 1967: 95). The rule to which Sullivan refers comes from 
Chapter 8 (203.4-6), where the author says: neque ex particularibus solis neque ex 
abdicativis solis ratam fieri conclusionem, quia saepe possunt et falsa conducere. About this 
rule, Sullivan says: ‘It is a necessary condition for the validity of a collection that at least one 
of the propositions in its conjugation be a universal one, and it is necessary that at least one 
of the conjugation’s propositions be affirmative. Apuleius requires, moreover, that if one of 
the premises is negative then the illation inferred must be negative; and, further, he 
demands that if one of a conjugation’s propositions is particular then that collection’s 
conclusion must likewise be particular’ (op.cit. 84). It is hard to see how exactly this law 
relates to the issue at hand since neither the eighth mood nor the fourth mood consists of 
negatives alone nor of particulars alone. The form of the eighth mood is invalid because the 
minor premise is not affirmative but negative. This problem is solved when the premises 
are converted, that is, when they swap positions and when the universal negative converts 
into itself and the universal affirmative converts particularly. The substitution of MaS for 
SiM, then, is justifiable due the terms of the rules pertaining to reduction to the 
indemonstrables, but it cannot be justified as the result of the fourth mood producing the 
eighth because the conversion of a particular affirmative results in another particular 
affirmative and never in a universal affirmative. This is further evidence that our author was 
incorrect in saying that the fourth mood produces the eighth (see note on 204.18).   
205.9-11   nonus quoque … conducti reflexim: The types of premises which form the 
combination of the fourth mood, universal negative and particular affirmative, are both 
convertible in themselves (196.15-19), and so the terms within each premise simply switch 
positions to form the ninth mood and the order of the premises is inverted for the purpose 
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of clarity (see note on 204.3-6). This makes the conclusion which is shared with the fourth 
mood one which is drawn conversely (reflexim) from the combination rather than directly 
(directim) as it is in the fourth mood. 
205.13-15   cur autem … ratio est: The placement of cur which is closely followed by quia 
(205.15) suggests that the author is posing a rhetorical question, to encourage involvement 
on the part of his audience: ‘But why does the fourth mood alone produce two moods and 
the rest one? The reason is this’ (for another example similar to this see note on 201.8-11).  
205.15-17   primi modi … aut tertia: The combination of the first mood consists of two 
universal affirmative premises (203.11-12). Converting both of these would produce a 
combination of two particular premises which cannot lead to a valid conclusion (see 203.4-
5). It is for this reason that it is described as inrita as opposed to rata (for uses of this 
antonym in the sense of a valid conclusion see 202.14; 203.4-5). The comment 'fiet aut 
secunda formula aut tertia' (205.17) refers to the fact that in the second figure (secunda) 
the middle term (communis particula) is the predicate term in both premises (199.1), which 
would be the case if the second premise of the first mood is converted and that in the third 
formula (tertia) the middle term is the subject term in both premises (198.21-199.1), which 
would be the case if the first premise of the first formula is converted. The comment is 
generalising rather than specific because converting the first mood in the ways described 
does not, in fact, produce any valid moods belonging to the second figure. If, however, only 
the first premise of the first mood is converted, this would create the second mood of the 
third figure (207.24-26) and if only the second premise is converted this would create the 
third mood of the third figure (208.2-3). 
205.17-19   ita secundi … quarto gigni: Converting both of the premises of the second 
combination would produce a particular affirmative from the universal affirmative and a 
universal negative from the universal negative with the position of the terms switched over. 
This is the form of the ninth mood as it is described above (205.9-11) and where it is shown 
that this mood is 'generated' from the fourth mood (ex quarto gigni. See also 204.18-205.3, 
9-13). For iam ostendimus see note on 205.4-7 and 212.12-15. The use of gigni corresponds 
to the Greek γίγνεσθαι which Alexander uses to refer to the 'generation' of the imperfect 
moods (see also 206.5-6). On two occasions the author uses the verb nascor from the same 
root (gnascor) as gigno for the same purpose (207.9; 208.23-4). Aristotle uses the verb 
γίγνεσθαι but this is to refer to whether or not a valid syllogism is ‘produced’ form a certain 
set of premises (e.g. An.Pr.26b18; 27a16) or to the production of a syllogism belonging to a 
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certain figure (e.g. An.Pr.27a13) and Themistius records that, ‘the view that the two figures 
are generated from the first is held neither by Aristotle nor Theophrastus nor Eudemus, but 
by the modern Peripatetics.’ (Max. 314. For a discussion about our author’s view of 
generation and reduction see introduction section 4). Barnes et al. report that Alexander 
took an ‘interest in the generation of the syllogistic figures’ and that he ‘may have 
contributed something to the method of ‘reducing’ all syllogisms to the first two syllogisms 
of the first figure’ (1991, 11-12. See e.g. 71,12-21; 94,10-17; 95,14-24; 97,14-30 cf. 136,1-
2). Lee (1984: 121) believes that Alexander’s use of πάλιν (in An.Pr.97, 27-30) shows that 
he considered genesis to be logically prior to analysis. Maconi (1985: 96), who discusses 
Lee’s view, does not agree that this particle implies logical priority. As Barnes et al. (1991: 
171 n.24) point out with reference to the same passage, ‘Alexander, in trying to correlate 
generation with analysis, conflates figures with syllogisms: the figures, properly speaking, 
are generated but not analysed or proved (it makes no sense to speak of proving a figure); 
the syllogisms, properly speaking, are analysed or proved but not generated’. Maconi takes 
a more sympathetic view towards Alexander’s approach in saying that the passage cited by 
Lee (in An. Pr.97,27-30) ‘shows that Alexander has understood a fairly simple logical truth 
about proof procedures. If a second or third figure syllogism can be proved from a first 
figure syllogism by conversion, then the second or third figure can be generated from the 
first figure by interchange of terms’ (1985: 97). It is not clear whether the conflation 
described by Barnes et al. originated with Alexander; at any rate it appears that our author 
has been misled by the same kind of conflation evident in Alexander, whereby he sees 
generation and reduction as straightforwardly reciprocal; when discussing analysis, or 
‘reduction’ as he calls it, this is always with reference to the moods - this is correct by all 
accounts - but he also discusses generation with reference to the moods within the figures 
and never to the figures themselves (205.14; 207.9; 208.3-4). The error in this approach is 
most evident from his explanation about the eighth mood being generated from the fourth 
indemonstrable (for discussion on this point see note on 205.4-7). 
205.19   quia universalis… converti potest: For the conversion of universal affirmatives to 
particular affirmatives see 198.3-4. 
205.21   sin alteram … aut tertia: If only the first premise of the second mood, the universal 
affirmative, is converted to its particular affirmative, this makes the middle term the subject 
term in both premises and forms the fifth mood of the third figure (208.9-13). If only the 
second premise of the second mood, the universal negative, is converted, this makes the 
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middle term the predicate term in both premises and produces the combination of both 
the first and second moods of the second figure. As the author points out when he gives 
examples of these moods, they share the same syllogistic combination and only differ in 
the order in which their premises are presented (206.16-207.3).  
205.21-206.2   ex hisce … indemonstrabiles nominentur: Out of these (ex hisce 205.21) nine 
moods (modis novem 206.1), the first four, which were drawn directim (203.13-14, 19-21; 
204.10-11, 16-18), may be called ‘indemonstrables’. The subjunctive nominentur which 
introduces the term indemonstrabiles suggests that this was not established technical 
vocabulary in Latin before this text. Indeed, the earliest examples of this term other than in 
this text are found in Boethius (in. Peri Herm. 5.10.351; De top. diff.1.4.31; 2.3.11), 
Martianus Capella does not have a term to refer to indemonstrable moods. The author’s 
explanation of the term which follows is also suggestive of its novelty. It clearly corresponds 
to the Greek ἀναπόδεικτος which, as Mates (1961: 63-4) shows, was used to mean two 
different things by the Stoics: ‘it is used both of arguments that simply have not been 
demonstrated and also of arguments that do not need to be demonstrated.’ The second of 
these Stoic uses corresponds to the definition given here. Aristotle uses ἀναπóδεικτος to 
mean ‘impossible to demonstrate’ (An.Pr.57b33) which corresponds to the first of the two 
Stoic definitions Sextus Empiricus gives of the term (Adv. Log. II.223). He uses the adjective 
τέλειος to refer to the moods which are perfect and do not require demonstration; this 
corresponds to the second of Sextus Empiricus’ two definitions (loc. cit.). Alexander’s 
commentary on the Prior Analytics provides an example of the conflation of Peripatetic and 
Stoic terminology: ‘The word was used by the Stoics of the basic arguments in their logical 
system, and it is generally supposed that the Peripatetics came to adopt Stoic terminology. 
We are told that the Stoics used the word ἀναπóδεικτος in the sense of ‘not needing 
demonstration’ and it is likely that it should be construed in the same way in Alexander’ 
(Barnes et al., 1991: 21 cf. Bocheński, 1947: 58). Lloyd points out that using the originally 
Stoic term in this way ‘mistakenly suggests that the imperfect moods required 
demonstration, that they were theorems whose necessity derived from axioms (the perfect 
moods), in other words that the perfect moods corresponded to the Stoics’ famous 
‘indemonstrables’ or ‘undemonstrated’ and reduction to the Stoic ‘analysis’’ (Lloyd, 1990: 
24-5). Alexander, in fact, tends to describe such moods as both ‘perfect and 
indemonstrable’ (24, 4; 54, 11; 55, 4; 113, 6). In this way he is appropriating what the Stoics 
call ‘indemonstrable’ (see Mates, 1961: 64 n.30; 132) with Aristotle’s perfect syllogisms, 
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that is, those which do not require any additional premises to make the conclusion apparent 
(see Arist. An.Pr.24b23-25. See also Patzig, 185 n.12; Lukasiewicz, 1957: 43-47). 
206.3-5   universi maris … manifesti sint: In order to explain the term indemonstrabilis, the 
author refers to an estimation of the whole sea and the squaring of a circle as comparable 
examples in terms of their capacities for demonstration. I have not found any other 
analogies which involve an estimation of the whole sea. Thomas’ apparatus criticus, 
however, reports that Meiss considered universi maris to be the title of a book (1908: 188). 
Aristotle uses the example of squaring a circle in his Categories in a discussion about objects 
which exist and knowledge about these objects which exists but which cannot exist without 
the object itself existing. He says: 
‘Take the squaring of the circle, for instance, if that can be called such an object. 
Although it exists as an object, the knowledge does not yet exist’ (Cat.7b31). 
This passage is often referred to by the ancient commentators. For example, by Ammonius:  
‘He therefore says that if indeed the squaring of the circle is something to be known 
although the knowledge of it does not yet exist’ (Cat.75, 11-19). 
And by Simplicius: 
‘He demonstrates this in the case of squaring the circle; for since this had not yet 
been discovered’ (in Arist. Cat. 192.12-29). 
The squaring of the circle is also discussed by Boethius (in Cat. Arist. II 231B) who, according 
to Chadwick (1981: 149), follows Porphyry (in Arist. Cat. 120, 15) in saying that a method 
has since been found. The key word which each of these passages have in common when 
referring to the squaring of the circle is οὐδέπω; it is a type of knowledge which does ‘not 
yet’ exist. Only a handful of manuscripts have non in this line (only W from the digitised 
manuscripts) which all of the editors have followed in spite of the majority reading being 
nondum (BCFADS). This is surely the correct reading, not only due to its being a likely lectio 
difficilior to non, but also in light of the passages above which all refer to knowledge about 
squaring a circle in the same way. The miscopying of non for nondum can easily be explained 
as a case of haplology between -dum and dem- with which the following verb begins. This 
particle would however, require a tense other than demonstrentur. Moreschini’s apparatus 
criticus records five variant readings for demonstrentur, which suggests that in the 
manuscripts the end of this verb was abbreviated and hard to decipher (demonstrans 
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CWPBSD : demonstratum A : demonstrabiles W2). However, following this, the majority 
reading is ‘ei sit ut’ (BCADSW. See also Moreschini’s apparatus criticus) rather than sicut 
which the editors have (206.4). This leads towards a plausible solution in forming a perfect 
passive tense with demonstr-. This, of course, would require sint rather than sit as above 
(which W has as a correction above the line. See also CaK in Moreschini’s apparatus 
criticus); this could realistically be conveyed in an abbreviated form which was mistaken for 
sit (I am grateful to Professor Jonathan Powell for suggesting this emendation). In which 
case, the passage should read:  
‘quod nondum demonstrati sint ut circuli quadratura’ 
‘Which have not yet been demonstrated like the squaring of the circle’.    
In this way, it is clear that the author is presenting two different forms of comparison to 
indemonstrable moods rather than presenting his audience with an apparent tautology as 
appears in the printed text. This, in turn, corresponds to the twofold way in which he 
describes these moods: tam simplices quam manifesti (206.4-5). Simple, as opposed to the 
estimation of the whole sea which is not possible and clear as opposed to the squaring of 
the circle which is possible but has not yet been demonstrated. I take the reading sunt in 
206.5 (W) rather than sint (PBD) as it more appropriately introduces what the 
indemonstrables actually are as opposed to the types of knowledge to which they were 
compared and which they are not (206.5-6).  
206.5-6   ipsi ceteros … ex se impertiant: ceteros refers specifically the rest of the moods, 
rather than the rest of the figures. For the use of gignant see also 205.14. For a discussion 
about the ‘generation’ of imperfect moods see note on 205.17-19. 
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Chapter 10 
206.7-207.15 
This chapter describes the types of syllogisms which form the four moods in the second 
figure in the same way as the moods of the first figure were described in Chapter 9. The 
author also demonstrates the way in which the first, second, and third moods of the second 
figure can be reduced to the second, third and fourth indemonstrable moods respectively. 
He mentions that the fourth mood can be proved only per impossibile and promises to 
return to this subject once he has finished listing all of the moods.  
206.7-8   primus modus … formula est: Without the introductory phrase, nunc formulae 
modos trademus secundae, the chapter would begin in a way which is more similar to the 
beginnings of Chapter 9 about the first figure (203.11) and Chapter 11 concerning the third 
figure (207.16). It is clear enough from the sentence which follows (primus modus in 
secunda formula est 206.7-8) that the chapter is concerned with the moods of the second 
figure. For these reasons, it seems unlikely that it formed part of the original text (see 
Appendix A). It is possible that it was added to bring the focus back to the exposition of the 
figures and their moods after the diversion at the end of the previous chapter about the 
indemonstrables (206.1-6).     
206.8-9   qui conducit … directim: For the use of conducit with the adverb directim see note 
on 203.14-17. Sullivan points out that the form of second figure combinations means that 
an emendation to the requirements for a conclusion to be drawn directim is needed: 
‘Apuleius appears to consider that the fact that the particle occurring as the subject of the 
illation likewise occurs as the subject in its premise constitutes a sufficient condition for 
saying that the illation is inferred “directly” in the second formula’ (Sullivan, 1967: 98). Due 
to the placement of the middle term in the second figure (199.4), it is, of course, not 
possible for the predicate term in the conclusion to be drawn from a predicate term in the 
combination (see note on 207.17-20 where the text makes it clear how directim and 
reflexim apply to the second and third moods). 
206.11-12   hic redigitur … secunda propositione: Since the second premise is a universal 
negative, it converts into itself (196.16-19); it retains the same quantity and quality but its 
terms change position. As a second figure combination, the middle term is initially the 
predicate term in both premises (199.4), but once the universal negative premise has been 
converted, the middle term is the subject term in this premise, and so the combination 
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demonstrates the criterion of the first figure that the middle term be the subject in one 
premise and the predicate term in the other (199.1-2). In second figure moods which can 
be reduced to one of the indemonstrables, it is the premise which contains the major term 
which is converted. In each case, this is the premise which takes the second position in the 
combination based on our author’s order of presentation (see also 207.7-8). The verb 
redigo corresponds to ἀνάλυσις in that it is used to refer to imperfect moods which are 
‘reduced’ to indemonstrable moods as a way of proving their validity (for other uses see 
208.18, 23, 26; 209.7; 215.3-4). See note on 205.18-21 for a discussion about the relation 
between reduction and generation. 
206.12-207.2   secundus modus … ad illationem: As the example syllogism of the second 
mood shows (206.14-16), the combination of this mood is the same as that of the first 
except that the premises are presented in the opposite order. In the second figure the 
middle term is the predicate term in both premises in the combination (199.4), for this 
reason, both terms in the conclusion must be taken from the subject terms in the 
combination. This means that there are two possible options for the subject term and two 
possible options for the predicate term in the conclusion. The result is two possible 
conclusions, both of which are drawn from the same combination directly. That the first 
and second moods share the same combination and the third and fourth have their own 
explains why there are only three conjugations in the second figure. Sullivan, however, 
believes that the author is incorrect in this matter since ‘in terms of the basis on which 
Apuleius originally distinguished conjugations… these two combinations of premises are 
logically distinct (since order of premise is one of the factors defining a conjugation); the 
first combination of premise instantiates Conjugation 2, whereas the second exemplifies 
Conjugation 6’ (1967: 99). It is Sullivan, however, who is mistaken in saying that the order 
of premises is a factor which defines a conjugation. The author himself does not say this. In 
fact, at one point he says the exact opposite (204.5). He orders the premises in each 
combination in a certain way purely for didactic purposes (see note on 204.3-6). There is a 
rule about the order of terms within premises but not of the premises themselves, and even 
this only applies to the first figure in which a discernible order is present because the middle 
term is the subject in one premise and the predicate in the other. The author does not 
explicitly demonstrate the validity of the second mood in the way that he does for the 
others but hic coniugatione non differt a priore (206.16-207.1) implies what Sullivan makes 
clear: ‘that it {the second mood} can be reduced to the first mood of this formula and 
through that mood to the second indemonstrable’ (1967: 100). To go back to our author’s 
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definition of a combination, it is the quality and quantity of each premise and the position, 
or role (see note on 198.18), of the middle term in each of the two premises which 
characterises the combination, he makes no mention of the order of these premises 
(198.21-199.8). For this reason, the syllogism of the third mood as a whole is logically 
distinct from the second but the combination shared by each, as our author says, is not.  
207.2-3   quoniam ita … non potest: enuntiatio was previously used in a more general sense 
to mean ‘expression’ and was paired with alia as a way of explaining what it means to be 
an equipollent proposition (196.6). Here it is being used in a more technical sense to mean 
premise. Its cognate term, enuntiatum, was ascribed to Cicero in Chapter 1 (190.5-6). quod 
refers to the practice of changing the order of the premises (variatus est enuntiationis ordo). 
It is not, in fact, the case that the order cannot be changed but rather that the order cannot 
be changed with the result of a different conclusion. This can be seen if we take the second 
indemonstrable and present it in the order opposite to that in which our author presented 
it, but without converting the premises (203.19-21): 
Nullum honestum turpe, 
Omne iustum honestum: 
Nullum igitur iustum turpe. 
Even though the order of premises has changed, the same conclusion results due to the fact 
that the middle term is in the same position in each premise as it was beforehand. The 
subject term in the conclusion is still taken from the subject of the middle term and the 
predicate term is still taken from the predicate of the middle term in the combination. It is 
clear then that the author uses the order of premises simply as a demonstrative tool which 
makes the position of the middle term clear and consistent to learners of logic (see note on 
204.3-6 and introduction section 6). In this way, the conjunction quoniam combines a 
temporal and a causal notion (OLD s.v. 2); the action ‘variatus est enuntiationis ordo’ has 
been carried out visually before his audience. The subject term is now drawn from the 
negative premise, this is not as a result of the change of order but the change of order 
serves to make this clearer. 
207.3-9   tertius modus … ex quo hic nascitur: So far, in this chapter the author has 
described the way in which the first two moods of the second figure can be converted or 
‘reduced’ (redigitur) to the second indemonstrable of the first figure. fit here can be 
understood to convey the same process as redigitur (cf. 206.11 for redigitur. See 205.16, 
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17, 18, 21 for comparable uses of forms of fio). As was the case for the first mood of the 
second figure, it is the premise containing the major term, universalem abdicativam here, 
which is converted in order to reduce the mood to an indemonstrable (cf. 206.11-12 for the 
first mood). For this mood the author also states that it was ‘generated’ from the fourth 
indemonstrable as well as saying that this is the mood to which it is reduced. It is unclear 
why the same point was not made about the generation of the second mood of the second 
figure from the second indemonstrable. For ex quo hic nascitur see note on 205.17-19.  
207.9-14   quartus modus … per impossibile approbatur: The conclusion of the fourth mood 
is a particular negative which cannot be converted (see 198.2). The combination contains 
another unconvertible particular negative and a universal affirmative, conversion of which 
would result in an invalid (inrita) combination of two particulars (see 205.16). For this 
reason the validity of this mood must be proven per impossibile (for a description of this 
method of proof see Chapter 12, 209.9-212.1). 
207.12   quoddam iustum non est malum: igitur after quoddam, which Goldbacher’s and 
Thomas’ editions include (CAS2) is reasonable in light of the fact that this is the way in which 
the conclusion of a syllogism is normally indicated in this text. This is the same practice as 
is found in Martianus Cappella (e.g. 411-413) and in Cassiodorus (e.g. Inst. 2.12). In Greek, 
Alcinous uses ἄρα (158,40-159,5) where he reports Plato’s use of the different figures in 
the Alcibiades and the Parmenides. Diogenes Laertius (e.g. 7.78) also uses ἄρα to introduce 
the conclusion of Stoic arguments where igitur would be used in Latin (for the use of igitur 
and ἄρα in syllogistic logic see note on 212.6-7). Since this would be the only instance in 
the text where a conclusion is not introduced by igitur it seems correct to add it here. This 
marks an important distinction from the way in which our author presents syllogisms 
compared to Aristotle; Lukasiewicz states a general rule that ‘no syllogism is formulated by 
Aristotle as an inference with the word ‘therefore’ (ἄρα), as is done in traditional logic… We 
do not meet them until Alexander. This transference of the Aristotelian syllogisms from the 
implicational form into the inferential is probably due to the influence of the Stoics 
(Lukasiewicz, 1957: 21). Lukasiewicz points out one example of such a syllogism in 
Alexander (in An.Pr.47,9) where ‘we find a syllogism in concrete terms with ἄρα’ (21 n.1), 
but Barnes et al. delete the concluding statement (1991: 108 n.35, 217). Alexander does, 
however, introduce conclusions with ἄρα when describing Stoic syllogisms (for example, in 
An.Pr.17,21-25; 18,5, 17, 19) and later in his commentary where he discusses the way in 
which different conclusions may come about from the same combination in the different 
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figures (in An.Pr.382,11 ff). Furthermore, contrary to Lukasiewicz’s assertion that ἄρα is 
never used by Aristotle to form an inference, Patzig highlights some exceptions to this: ‘such 
forms do in fact sometimes occur in Aristotle, in places where interpolation is inconceivable 
(e.g. An.Pr.49a32-5; An.Post.75a9-11; 78b24-8). The majority of these cases, however, 
concern arguments with concrete terms’ (1968: 4). Another such example occurs at 
An.Pr.64a1-4. These instances, however, fall outside of the systematic treatment of the 
syllogism in the first seven chapters of the Prior Analytics. Our author’s examples of 
syllogisms are only ever demonstrated using concrete terms which would explain his use of 
igitur and the inferential form of his syllogisms can, like those of Alexander, be put down to 
Stoic influence. His exclusive use of concrete terms to demonstrate syllogistic moods might 
suggest that here we have work from a later stage in the development of logic than 
Alexander. The way in which our author describes the types of premises used to form each 
mood and introduces the examples of them with either ut or velut can be seen to display 
his awareness that what he is presenting are mere examples of rules rather than the 
paradigms themselves.  
207.13-14   hic solus ... impossibile approbatur: Proof per impossible is explained and 
demonstrated in Chapter 12 (209.1-212.3). For the use of the verb approbatur for this type 
of proof see note on 194.13-15 (see also 208.27). 
207.14-16   de qua propositione … tertiae formulae: The use of the first person plural verb 
dicemus, as well as the withholding of more complex information about the proof of the 
fourth mood per impossibile until Chapter 12 (209.10-210.4) is indicative of the didactic 
purpose of this text. Rather than being used in the technical sense in which it is used 
throughout the text to mean ‘premise’ or ‘proposition’ (L&S s.v. III), propositione here is 
being used in the general sense to mean ‘subject’ or ‘theme’ (L&S s.v. III B1). A comparable 
use of the cognate term propositum is found in Chapter 1 (190.2).    
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Chapter 11 
207.16-209.1 
The six moods of the third figure are set out in this chapter and examples of each are given 
as before. The author then points out that the first three moods of this figure are reduced 
to the third indemonstrable, that the fourth and fifth are reduced to the fourth 
indemonstrable, and that the sixth mood can only be proved per impossibile just like the 
fourth mood of the second figure. In the third figure, the middle term is the subject term in 
both premises.  
207.16   in tertia … modus est: For the introduction of this chapter see note on 206.7. 
207.17-20   tam directim … bonum honestum: It was explained previously that the term 
directim refers to the types of conclusions in which the subject term is also the subject of 
the middle term in the combination and the predicate term is the same as the predicate of 
the middle term in the combination (200.4-6). The term reflexim is used when the opposite 
is the case (200.7). This definition cannot stand for the third figure in which the middle term 
is the subject term in both premises (198.21-199.1) and, therefore, both terms in the 
conclusion must come from the predicate terms in the combination. Nor can the original 
definition of directim apply to the uses in the second figure; all of the four moods listed in 
this figure are said to be drawn directly even though both terms in these conclusions are 
drawn from the predicate of the middle term in both premises. In this way, the antonymous 
terms as they are used here must have a slightly different application to how they were 
defined and used with reference to the first figure. Sullivan suggests that the author now 
wants to say that ‘a conclusion is inferred directly if and only if either the particle that occurs 
as subject in the conclusion occurs as subject in its premise or the particle that occurs as 
predicate in the conclusion likewise occurs as predicate in its premise or both’ (1967: 103. 
See also 98 for the amended definition with reference to the second figure). Sullivan adds 
that ‘if the second conclusion as well as the first one… were considered to be inferred 
directly (as the former, as well as the latter, is in terms of the amended definition), then 
Apuleius’ subsumption of these two conclusions in one mood would have greater 
plausibility’ (loc. cit.). The only difference being that in the ‘directly’ drawn conclusion the 
subject term in the conclusion comes from the predicate in the first premise and the 
predicate term comes from the predicate in the second premise and in the ‘conversely’ 
drawn conclusion this order is reversed. Since our author does consider the second 
195 
 
conclusion to be drawn reflexim, Sullivan’s solution does not suffice and so another solution 
is required. It is best to begin by considering why the author considered all of the moods in 
the second figure and all of those in the third figure, apart from the second conclusion of 
the first mood, to be drawn directim in spite of the fact that the position of the middle term 
in each of these figures means that they cannot fulfil both criteria described above for their 
conclusions to be drawn directly.  An important point about each of these figures is omitted 
by our author but is clearly explained by Alexander: 
‘Given that the first figure has both its premises determined, the major in quantity 
(it is universal) and the minor in quality (it is affirmative), it stands to reason that 
the other figures (I mean the second and third) should preserve the proper 
characteristic of the premise by the conversion of which each of them was 
generated. The second figure was generated by conversion of the major, and it 
preserves the proper characteristic of that premise in syllogistic combinations – in 
the second figure, too, the major premise is universal in the syllogistic conjunctions. 
The third figure was generated by conversion of the minor and retains its proper 
characteristic – for in this figure the minor is again determined, as we said, 
inasmuch as it is affirmative’ (in An.Pr.95,14-24). 
Based on the above, when the premise containing the major term is converted in the 
second figure it is reduced to a first figure indemonstrable. Similarly, in the third figure, 
when the premise containing the minor term is converted, it is reduced to a first figure 
indemonstrable. In each case, the terms are then in such a position that the conclusion is 
drawn directly. To go back to the first mood of the second figure with the direct conclusion: 
Omne iustum honestum 
Omne iustum bonum 
Quoddam igitur honestum bonum 
Our author only refers to the premise to be converted as either the first (208.19, 24) or 
second (206.12) or by the form of the premise in the particular example (207.7-8) rather 
than that which contains either the major or the minor term. Further on he explains that 
the first three moods of this figure are reduced to the third indemonstrable by converting 
the first premise (208.18-19). This is in contrast to the process of reduction of the moods in 
the second figure to indemonstrables by converting the second premise (206.12). Although 
it is not obvious from the combination above which premise contains the major and which 
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premise contains the minor term, our author systematically presents the minor before the 
major which makes it clear that it is the first premise which must be converted in order for 
the mood to be reduced to an indemonstrable. After the particular conversion of the 
universal affirmative first premise (198.3-4) the syllogism is as follows: 
Quoddam honestum iustum 
Omne iustum bonum 
Quoddam igitur honestum bonum 
After the combination is converted in this way, it is reduced to the third indemonstrable of 
the first figure (204.9-11). In the first figure, the subject of the conclusion is taken from the 
subject term in the first premise, and the predicate term in the conclusion is taken from the 
predicate term in the second premise; each term retains the same function in the 
conclusion as it had in its premise and is presented in the order in which it appeared in the 
combination. Conversion to this figure, therefore, makes it clear that the conclusion is 
drawn directly in a way which could not be done in the third figure form. It has been 
demonstrated, therefore, that it is essential to reduce the moods in the second and third 
figures in order to test whether their conclusions are drawn directly or conversely as it is 
not evident from the form of the moods in these figures. This makes it apparent why the 
author’s definition of directim and reflexim can only apply to the form which is characteristic 
of the first figure. The second of the two conclusions of this mood, which is described as 
reflexim, results not from converting the minor premise in the way that is correct for the 
third figure but from converting the major. When the universal major premise of the 
combination is converted it becomes a particular premise (198.3-4). This is acceptable for 
the third figure, in which there is only a requirement on the minor premise to be affirmative 
(see Alex. in An.Pr.95,14-24 cited above), but it is not valid for the first figure in which, not 
only must the minor premise be affirmative but the major premise must also be universal. 
This means that the third figure cannot be directly reduced to the first figure by conversion 
of the major premise. For this reason, the second conclusion is drawn reflexim as opposed 
to directim.      
The author’s use of directim and reflexim with reference to the second and third figures 
shows that he is exploiting the systematic way in which he orders the premises in each 
syllogism throughout the text; although he says at a number of points that the order of 
premises is irrelevant (see, for example, 204.5 cf. 205.1-2; 207.22), he consistently presents 
the minor before major where the conclusion is drawn directly, and the major before minor 
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where the conclusion is drawn conversely. This presentation has no impact on the resulting 
conclusion but simply provides the clarity required for didactic purposes (see note on 204.3-
6). In a superficial way, therefore the definition of directim in the context of the second and 
third figures could be seen to refer to conclusions in which the terms simply appear in the 
same order as they do in the combination, that is, the subject term from the first premise 
and the predicate term from the second premise, even if the predicate term in the 
conclusion came from the subject term in the combination of the second premise, and 
reflexim refers to conclusions when the terms appear in the opposite order. Rather than 
refining the terms at this point as Sullivan suggests, the author now uses them only by way 
of analogy to their meaning as they are applied to the moods in the first figure. This is an 
acceptable use of the two terms since it is essential to reduce each mood to the first figure 
in order to test its validity and, in this way, it is possible to tell whether the conclusion in 
this mood is drawn directly or conversely.       
207.20-22   quippe non … utram prius enunties: Goldbacher, Thomas, and Moreschini 
suggest deleting que which is added to utra (207.21) so that the meaning would be 
‘whichsoever of the two’ rather than ‘each’ (utraque BCFADSW). The fact that a syllogism 
consists of precisely two and in light of utram which follows (207.22), which would be an 
example of the consistency and symmetry with which the author usually writes, there is no 
doubt that this correction is justified. The author has trained his audience to treat the first 
term in relation to the middle term in a combination as the subject term of the conclusion 
(for the introduction of this rule see note on 204.4-6). In moods with direct conclusions in 
the first figure, the subject term of the conclusion comes from the subject in the first 
premise and is therefore also the first term. Similarly, the predicate term appears in the 
second premise and is the second term to appear in the conclusion as the predicate. The 
reverse is the case in moods with conclusions drawn conversely. The order of premises is 
changed for the eighth and ninth moods of the first figure so that this rule is retained (205.1-
2). Following this rule does not make the conclusion of the first mood of the third figure any 
more obvious than it would be if it were not followed; both premises are universal 
affirmatives and both terms in the conclusion come from the predicate of the middle term 
in both premises. The two possible resulting conclusions are equipollent propositions which 
are logically equivalent. For these reasons, it does not matter which premise is stated first. 
It would have been helpful for the author to add that it does not matter which premise is 
converted in order to reduce the mood to an indemonstrable as this is the way to 
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demonstrate that the first conclusion is drawn directly and the second conversely (see note 
above on 207.17-20). 
207.23-24   non recte … duos esse: It is clear from what the author of the Peri Hermeneias 
says above (207.21-22) that the two possible conclusions from the first combination do not 
constitute two distinct moods as Theophrastus is said to believe. Sullivan believes that 
Theophrastus’ position is the correct one and criticises our author for not being consistent 
in the way in which he treats conclusions drawn conversely, saying that ‘heretofore he has 
held consistently that two conclusions inferred diversely (i.e., directly or conversely) from 
the same conjugation produce different moods’ (1967: 102). As examples of this perceived 
inconsistency, Sullivan compares the mood described here to the second and sixth moods 
and the third and seventh moods of the first figure, which draw direct and indirect 
conclusions respectively from the same combinations (1967: 102 n.107; 92-95). The author 
cannot be accused of inconsistency in his presentation of converse moods in the first figure 
and the third figure because the form of the moods themselves is not consistent. In the 
examples from the first figure to which Sullivan refers, the order of the terms within each 
premise and within the conclusion follow the pattern set out above both for direct and 
indirect conclusions (see note on 207.21-22); the premises are differentiated by the 
position of the middle term in each case. In the first mood of the third figure both premises 
are undifferentiated in their quantity and quality (universal dedicative) and both have the 
middle term as their subject term. In this case, without term variables, there is no way of 
distinguishing one order of presentation from the other. The conclusion which is drawn 
from these directly is a particular affirmative (see 207.17-20). This type of premise is 
convertible within itself to an equipollent proposition (196.15-19), which can also be 
obtained by taking the terms from the premises into the conclusion in the opposite order 
to how they appear in the combination. In this way, it is clear that Sullivan has mistaken an 
inconsistency in the way moods produce indirect conclusions in two different figures for an 
inconsistency on the part of the author. The expression the author uses to explain that the 
first combination of the third figure produces one mood with two equipollent conclusions, 
tam directim quam reflexim (207.17-18), is in contrast to the usual way in which he 
introduces an additional mood with an indirect conclusion: si reflexim inferas (203.14-15, 
21; 204.11-12). The formulaic manner in which our author expounds the moods within each 
figure makes the difference in expression a clear indication of this difference between the 
conversely drawn conclusion of this mood and of those in the first figure as described 
above.  
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The view that the converse conclusion implies an additional mood is also discussed by 
Alexander who ascribes it, not to Theophrastus, but only to ‘some’ (τίνες). Huby argues that, 
since there is no evidence that Theophrastus himself counted seven rather than six moods 
in the third figure, he may have discussed this additional mood outside the context of the 
third figure (2007: 69). She goes on to say that ‘it is clear from PA 2.1 53a8-14 that Aristotle 
was thinking about all three figures in connection with the point that certain combinations 
of premises give more than one conclusion’ (loc. cit.). ‘Rose thinks that the case of Darapti 
was not all that he covered, but since the other valid indirect moods in the second and third 
figures which he explored would be syllogisms already, Alexander did not comment on 
them. Rose suggests that the whole of section 1-7 of Galen 11 could be a summary of 
Theophrastus’ account’ (Rose, 1968: 116 n.12).  
207.24-208.5   secundus modus … honestum bonum: The second and third moods each 
contain the same types of premise in their combinations but each presents them in a 
different order.  
208.11-15   ut : quoddam iustum … particulare directim: Moreschini’s apparatus criticus 
indicates that these lines are omitted by the earliest known manuscript of the text (M. For 
details about this manuscript, see introduction section 3 n.73). The omission of these lines 
is a case of haplology; the words in line 15 have been mistaken for the same words in line 
11. Cassiodorus’ words regarding the repetitive nature of this text are particularly pertinent 
in light of this type of omission: 
‘has formulas categoricorum syllogismorum qui plene nosse desiderat, librum legat 
qui inscribitur Perihermeneias Apulei, et quae subtilius sunt tractata cognoscit. nec 
fastidium nobis verba repetita congeminent; distincta enim atque considerata ad 
magnas intellegentiae vias praestante Domino nos utiliter introducunt’ (Inst.2.12). 
208.17-19   ex his sex modis … propositione primi et secundi: The first three moods of this 
figure are reduced to the third indemonstrable mood (see 204.8-11) by converting the first 
premise. In each case this is the premise which, once converted to the third mood of the 
first figure, contains the minor term. This is in comparison to the moods of the second figure 
which, in order to be reduced to the indemonstrable moods, convert the second premise 
(206.12; 207.7-8) which contains the major term. The formation of the second and the third 
figure by the conversion of the major premise and the minor premise of the first figure 
respectively is explained by Alexander (e.g. in An.Pr.94,12-17; 95,20-24).  
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208.19-23   tertius enim … ad tertium: Sullivan says that ‘it is not the case that the second 
and third moods have the same conjugation- because the second mood’s conjugation is an 
instance of our conjugation 10 (I A) whereas the third mood’s conjugation exhibits 
conjugation 3 (A I); hence Apuleius’ claim is mistaken’ (1967: 104). It is Sullivan, however, 
who is mistaken both in this and more generally in saying that ‘Apuleius’s trouble here, as 
in some other places, is caused by his failure to keep in mind that the order of premises is 
a logically important factor in identifying possible moods as well as possible conjugations’ 
(1967: 106). The author has already said that the order of premisees does not matter with 
regard to this figure (207.22). Furthermore, he has also made it clear that even in the first 
figure, where the middle term takes a different position in each of the two premises in a 
combination, the order of premises may be changed without altering the resulting 
conclusion (204.5. See explanation in note on 204.3-6 for the author’s systematic ordering 
of the premises and his recognition that this has no logical importance). In this respect, the 
combinations of the second and the third mood are the same because they both contain a 
particular affirmative premise and a universal affirmative premise and, in each case, the 
middle term is in the same position as the subject term in both premises. The only 
difference (uno differens) is that, in the third mood, the subject term in the conclusion is 
taken from the universal premise as opposed to the particular as it was in the second mood. 
In third figure moods the minor premise is converted in order to be reduced to a first figure 
indemonstrable (see note on 207.17-20). Accordingly, in the second mood the first premise 
(particular affirmative) is converted for the mood to be reduced to the third 
indemonstrable. Even if the order of premises is reversed, this particular affirmative 
premise still contains the minor term, the conversion of which reduces the mood to the 
third indemonstrable by one step. The universal affirmative premise, on the other hand, 
contains the major premise. Since this is the premise which is converted to reduce the third 
mood to the third indemonstrable, the conclusion must also be converted. These moods 
are explained by Alexander (in An.Pr.96,29ff), who places them as third and fourth in order 
rather than as second and third.  
208.23-25   item quartus … propositionibus eorum: For a discussion on the use of the verbs 
redigitur and nascuntur see note on 205.18-19. For prioribus propositionibus see note on 
208.17-19. 
208.25-209.1   sextus autem … novissimi numerantur: If each (utraque) premise in the 
combination of the sixth mood were converted, this would form an invalid combination of 
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two particular premises (see 205.16). As for converting one or the other (altera), the same 
invalid combination would result if only the universal premise were converted, and the 
particular negative premise, owing to its form, cannot be converted (see 198.2). This is also 
the case for the fourth mood of the second figure (207.9-13). The author previously 
explained the rationale behind the order of the figures (199.4-5); here he refers to a 
criterion for the order of moods (compare Martianus Capella who says that the order of the 
moods is the same as that which is followed by the figures themselves 409). The sixth and 
final mood of the third figure and the fourth mood of the second figure (207.13-15) are 
ranked last because they can only be proved through the impossible (per impossibile) and 
this is the least direct form of reduction to the indemonstrables (for the use of the verb 
approbatur with reference to this type of proof see also 207.13-14 and note on 194.13-15). 
In the following chapter the author explains the reason behind the ranking of the rest of 
the moods in each figure (209.2-9) based on the ways in which they are reduced to the 
indemonstrables. Alexander gives a similar justification for the ranking of the final two 
moods which are proved per impossibile (in An.Pr.97,11); this is in contrast to Aristotle who 
presented what our author, and Alexander, call the fifth and sixth moods in reverse order. 
This change in order is ascribed to Theophrastus by Philoponus; ‘il {Philoponus} donne 
comme raison de ce changement que les preuves des modes Disamis et Bocardo étaient 
respectivement plus compliquées que celles de Datisi et Ferison’ (Bocheński, 1947: 65). 
Sullivan lists the different orders as they are presented by Aristotle, Theophrastus and our 
author (1967: 153 n.60). It appears from his note that he bases the Theophrastean order 
on the evidence from Philoponus. Alexander is, in most cases, a good representative of 
Theophrastus’ amendments to Aristotle’s logic (Bocheński, 1947: 16-19) but his order 
differs from the one ascribed to Theophrastus by Sullivan; Alexander presents Ferison 
before Bocardo in the way that Theophrastus is said to have prescribed, but his order is 
otherwise unchanged from that set out by Aristotle in An.Pr.31a18-32a6. It is clear that 
there were a number of different ways in which to order the moods in the third figure in 
antiquity. It is, in fact, quite possible that Theophrastus himself set out the order in different 
ways for different purposes and in different works (for a discussion on the evidence for 
Theophrastus’ orders see Huby, 2007: 69). At any rate, our author makes the reason for his 
own order in this work clear; the moods are ordered in terms of those which are most easily 
reduced to the four indemonstrables, and those which are reduced to the third 
indemonstrable (208.18-19) come before those which are reduced to the fourth (208.23-
25), and all of these come before the sixth mood which can only be proved per impossibile.  
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Chapter 12 
209.1-212.3 
After describing the reason behind the order of the moods in each of the three figures, the 
author uses this chapter to give the explanation of proof per impossibile which was 
promised previously (207.14-15). He also says, for the first time, that this type of proof is 
common to all the moods in every figure, including the four indemonstrables. He gives a 
Stoic definition of this type of proof and describes how the same thing is defined by the 
‘veteres’, who are likely to be Peripatetics. The author explains why this type of proof was 
invented and dedicates the rest of the chapter to demonstrating how proof per impossibile 
works using the first indemonstrable as his example. 
 
209.1-3   ceterorum autem … et illationum: Leading on from the previous chapter in which 
the final, sixth mood of the third figure was compared to the final, fourth mood of the 
second figure since both can only be proved per impossibile, ceterorum refers to all of the 
other valid moods which can be proved in other ways. The position of coniugationum 
before illationum not only mirrors the order in which these parts appear in a syllogism but 
can also be seen to imply the more significant role of the combination than the conclusion 
in the ordering of the moods. That both parts of the syllogism are taken into account for 
their ranking is made clear by et (209.3. Sullivan’s analysis of the ranking appears to miss 
this point, for which, see below in note 209.3-5).  
209.3-5   nam cum … universales particularibus: I suggest dicere (BCFADW) in place of 
dedicare (S) since it is a more likely counterpart to negare which follows (see 191.7-8 for 
the same change) whereas dedicare would surely expect abdicare (see 191.1-5). Sullivan 
criticises the author for not following the rules he sets out for the order of moods within 
each figure; with regard to the fifth and sixth moods of the first figure he says, ‘the 
arrangement of these two moods appears to be inconsistent with the enunciated principles 
and with the ordering of the indemonstrables – with the principles, since in terms of them 
a universal takes precedence over a particular regardless of whether the particular is 
affirmative; with the ordering of the indemonstrables, since if a universal abdicative is to 
yield to a particular dedicative… then {the second} should come after {the third}’ (1967: 
125). Sullivan also complains that the author ‘has placed {the sixth mood} between two 
particular dedicatives both of which are reducible to an indemonstrable through one 
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conversion… according to the principles, these two particulars {five and seven} should be 
adjacent to one another and not have a universal abdicative inserted between them’ (loc. 
cit.). Our author, however, is not guilty of either of these charges.  
Sullivan’s error lies in focusing on the conclusions of syllogisms in his analysis of this passage 
rather than considering the combinations from which these are drawn (see note on 199.4 
where it is made clear that the worth of a syllogism takes into account the whole entity 
including the combination, not just the conclusion. See also note on 209.1-3). When setting 
out the author’s principles upon which the order of moods is based Sullivan says, ‘one 
principle concerns the quantity of a mood’s illation, another its quality; and the third 
principle, to be applied to moods the illations of which have the same quantity and quality’ 
(1967: 124. For Sullivan’s interpretation of the third principle see note on 209.5-6 below). 
The author, however, makes it very clear through the use of et that the order of moods is 
based on the types of premises in the combinations as well as the types of conclusions (see 
note on 209.1-3). In this respect, although the fifth mood has a particular negative 
conclusion and the sixth has a universal negative conclusion, the fact that the fifth mood 
has a combination of two universal premises which are affirmative means that, according 
the author’s rules (in utrisque dedicativae 209.5-6), it is justifiably placed before the sixth 
mood; although this mood has a combination of two universal premises, one is negative. 
With regard to the order of the second and third indemonstrables, which Sullivan believes 
to be incorrect, the rule about the priority of universals over particulars (209.4-5) applies 
not to the conclusion in the way that Sullivan has taken it but to the combination; although 
the third indemonstrable has an affirmative conclusion and the second a negative, the 
second mood comes before the third because its combination contains two universal 
premises as opposed to the third which contains a particular. From this, it is made clear that 
the priority of universal over particular is not of equal importance to the priority of 
affirmative over negative, rather, it is the quantity and then the quality which is taken into 
consideration; this is highlighted by in utrisque (209.5-6. See also Alexander in An.Pr.49,1-5 
who makes clear the priority of quantity over quality where he states that syllogisms owe 
their generation to universals).  
209.5-6   et in utrisque … similes sunt: Sullivan’s explanation of the third principle upon 
which our author ranks the moods, which he says applies to moods which have conclusions 
with the same quantity and quality (1967: 125) is questionable in light of the textual issue 
with the line concerned (209.6). Of the seven manuscripts I have been able to consult (see 
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introduction section 3 n.73) none have any notation to support the addition of si included 
by Prantl, Goldbacher and Thomas and bracketed by Moreschini. With the variety of 
manuscript readings in mind (dedicationibus et illationes similes sunt C : dedicatio et illatio 
similes sunt APBSD : et abdicatio similes sunt W), my own conjecture, ‘dedicativa abdicativo 
et illationes similes sunt’ is in keeping with the presentation of the other set of variables 
and is also based on the supposition that it seems unnecessary to mention the situations in 
which two or more moods may share the same conclusion. Based on the following 
comparable passage from Alexander, it would be more relevant in this context to mention 
the fact that the conclusion will be similar in terms of quality and quantity to the 
combination from which it is drawn: 
‘Thus that syllogisms depend on what has been posited is clear from the fact that 
the conclusion is similar (ὅμοιος) to what has been conceded and not to what holds 
by necessity. Moreover, if the conclusion were similar to what is determined in the 
premises, one and the same thing would always be deduced… Further, in this way 
it turns out that the conclusion is similar to the inferior assumption’ (in An.Pr.51,1-
9). 
This discussion from Alexander’s commentary about the ranking of moods gives greater 
plausibility to the reading et illationes similes sunt since he repeatedly points out that the 
conclusion is always similar (ὅμοιος) in quality and quantity to the premises from which it 
is drawn, with regard to the first figure (cf. for example in An.Pr.51,31-32). It is possible that 
the si which has been posited by the editors is a misreading of the plural ending on 
illationes. 
209.6-7   his praeponitur … indemonstrabilem redigitur: The inclusion of the conditional 
particle si before similes sunt in the text of previous editors appears to have led Sullivan to 
believe that the principle described here is used only in cases where the conclusions of two 
or more given moods are the same. This principle, in fact, has universal application and is 
the fundamental reason behind the order of the moods; they are ranked according to which 
is most quickly reduced to an indemonstrable, and also, to which indemonstrable according 
to their own ranking. Sullivan considers this possibility but does not fully recognise its 
significance and implication; he suggests that ‘perhaps the reason why {the fifth mood in 
the first figure} was placed ahead of {the sixth} is that the former reduces to the first 
indemonstrable and the latter to the second one. In fact, if all of the moods are looked at 
from this angle it will be seen that there is perfect agreement between the order of the 
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indemonstrables and the ordering of the derived moods according to which 
indemonstrable they are reduced to’ (1967: 126). It is clear, however, that the order of 
moods which are made up of different combinations and conclusions is intrinsically linked 
to the position of the particular indemonstrable to which it is reduced since the four 
indemonstrables themselves are ordered on the rules set out in this chapter (209.3-6. For 
the examples of the moods themselves see 203.13-204.18). Sullivan concludes that this 
‘may well have served as the real operative principle for the arrangement of the derived 
moods’ but seems to consider it to be in contrast with the rules presented here as he adds, 
‘notwithstanding Apuleius’ claim that it was done “…on account of difference of 
conjugations and illations”’ (1967: 126). It is, however, implicit in the reasons the author 
has already given but this is only brought to light by the text with the removal of si and the 
conjecture suggested above (209.5-6). 
209.7-9   qui celerius … modos esse: The fifth, sixth, and seventh moods of the first figure 
demonstrate this point in that they are reduced to their respective indemonstrables quicker 
(celerius 209.7) than any other moods because they require only one conversion (una 
conversione), specifically, the conversion of their conclusion (203.14-16; 203.21-204.1, 11-
13). certos eos modos refers to the four indemonstrable moods (for other uses of certos in 
the sense of ‘valid’ with reference to moods see 213.11; 215.1). I would prefer the reading 
cludendum (APBSD) to concludendum (CW) since, in terms of meaning, concludo is more 
likely in this context due to its logical sense (L&S s.v. II D ‘to conclude, infer, make an 
inference, to argue, demonstrate’) which is not shared by the more general and non-
technical uses of the term claudo (L&S s.v.). Furthermore, cludo is a shortened form of 
claudo as it appears when it forms part of a compound, making the inclusion of the prefix 
con- here entirely plausible. It is most likely that con- has dropped off, or rather, has been 
abbreviated in some manuscripts.  
209.9-10   est et altera … per impossibile: See 206.1-6 where it is explained that the 
indemonstrable moods do not require any proof. The author appears to be alone in pointing 
out that this type of proof can be applied to the indemonstrables and in using the first 
indemonstrable as an example to demonstrate this type of proof (see below 210.15ff). 
209.11-14   appellaturque a Stoicis … contrarium reliquo: This is the only surviving source 
for the first of the four Stoic themata (Bobzien, 1994: 143. See also Mates’ references for 
θέμα in his glossary of terms, 1961: 133). Mates remarks on the similarity between the 
author’s description of this rule and the inference-schema proved by the Stoics of the form: 
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‘If the first and the second, then the third. Not the third. The first. Therefore, not the 
second’ (1961: 77 n.74). Bobzien notes that this ‘first {Stoic} thema resembles the 
Peripatetic conversion rule for syllogisms’ (1994: 144 n.20) and criticises Mignucci’ 
interpretation that ‘the Peripatetic rule covered contradictories only, and the Stoic rule had 
‘negation’ instead of ‘contradiction’ (Bobzien, 1994: 144 n.20. See also Mignucci, 1993: 226-
228). Bobzien says that the wording of this rule ‘is in terms of contradiction and not of 
negation’ (1994: 144), which, as she points out, Mignucci does also concede (Mignucci, 
1993: 226). The word which both Bobzien and Mignucci interpret as ‘contradictory’ 
(contrario) is used elsewhere in the Peri Hermeneias with a general sense (see 194.3; 
198.10; 204.18; 210.2, 3 and 210.12 where it is specifically used to refer to opposition by 
negation and by contradiction). The consistency with which the term is used in these 
instances and the fact that the author of the Peri Hermeneias is very systematic in his use 
of vocabulary more generally allow further light to be shed on his explanation of the first 
Stoic thema here. It is clear from the use of alterutra (209.16) in the description of the 
Peripatetic equivalent of the rule that, according to the author of the Peri Hermeneias, that 
this rule is formulated with regard to contradictories; this is the way in which alterutra is 
used systematically elsewhere throughout the text (see 194.4, 13; 195.7; 196.1, 9, 12, 16; 
210.6, 10, 15; 214.16 and see 194.2-3 where it is defined). Bobzien and Mignucci interpret 
contrario as ‘contradictory’, as described above, however, our author’s standard term for 
‘contradictory’ is alterutra. He uses incongrua to refer to ‘contraries’ (193.19; 194.5, 6, 11; 
195.6). His uses of contrarius elsewhere in the text, which were mentioned above, suggest 
that it is also being used with a  general application here; that is to say, the author uses 
contrario to imply that both of the types of opposition he has already mentioned (alterutrae 
and incongruae) are taken into account in the first Stoic thema.  
The ways in which the phrases prima constitutio and primum expositum are used outside 
this text suggest that what the author is referring to here was not an established way of 
referring to these rules. The use of vel to join the two phrases is comparable to the way in 
which the author used this particle previously to join the two terms collectio and conclusio 
as a way of referring to a whole syllogism (200.8-9. See also introduction section 5 on the 
use of Latin terminology and for this method of introducing new terms. Compare Kneale 
and Kneale, 1962: 19 who say that constitutio vel expositum ‘sounds like a phrase of the 
Roman imperial administration; perhaps ‘guiding principle’ or ‘directive’’). Mates’ 
description of the Stoic rules for analysis is as follows (1961: 77): 
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‘By the “analysis” of an argument the Stoics meant the procedure of reducing the 
argument to a series of the basic undemonstrated arguments. They had four 
general rules (θέματα) by which these analyses were to be carried out’. 
Our author perhaps felt that neither of the two terms, nor any other single Latin term, 
sufficed to adequately describe this Stoic θέμα, which, on the one hand is a rule which has 
been set out (expositum) and, on the other, is a process of analysis (constitutio), and so he 
used the two terms in combination. 
209.14-16   veteres autem … tolli reliquam: In Cicero, veteres is used to denote both 
contemporaries of Plato and those who were taught by him as at De fin.4.2.3., and to mean 
members of the Old Academy in e.g., Luc.132. The consensus in modern scholarship 
appears to be that here the author is referring to the older Peripatetic school which he is 
comparing to the more recent Stoics. ‘These are, of course, the older Peripatetics.’ (Barnes, 
2012: 483 n.11. See also Long and Sedley, 1987: Vol. 2, 221, I, n.4). The veteres are 
compared to the Stoics again at 210.9. For a discussion on the use of conclusio in this text 
to mean syllogism as a whole see note on 200.7-9. Alexander’s explanation about proof per 
impossibile is similar to the one ascribed to the veteres here: 
‘We have a reduction to the impossible when we hypothesize the opposite of what 
we wish to prove, co-assume one of the items agreed and supposed, and reject 
syllogistically something which is evident’ (in An.Pr.31,11-14). 
For Aristotle’s own introduction and use of this type of proof (An.Pr.25a14-26) see Patzig 
(1968: 144-156) and Lukasiewicz (1957: 54-9). See note on 209.11-14 above for discussion 
about the difference between this rule and that ascribed to the Stoics. 
209.17-18   quae res … impudenter recusant: res refers to the other type of proof (altera 
probatio 209.9) which is carried out per impossibile (209.10). The definition of the technical 
term acceptio is given alongside its first use (199.11-14) where it is compared to propositio. 
The term is more appropriate here than the more commonly used (communiter appellatur 
199.14-15) propositio since it emphasises the fact that active agreement is required on the 
part of the interlocutor in order to proceed with the argument, and it highlights the 
irrational inconsistency of not accepting a conclusion which was drawn from premises 
which were accepted. It also suggests that this work was intended to encourage the 
practical application of logical argument rather than to simply set it out as theory. The use 
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of impudenter could be seen to convey a certain moralistic tone (L&S s.v. ‘shamelessly, 
impudently’. See introduction section 6).  
210.1-3   dum ex eo … ante concesserant: This section is rather convoluted but it simply 
represents the author’s attempt to rework the Stoic and Peripatetic definitions of proof per 
impossibile he has cited above into his own words as applied to the scenario outlined above 
(209.17-18).   
210.3   porro contraria … ad conclusionem: See 194.11-12. conclusionem appears to refer 
specifically to the conclusion of the syllogism in this case, but this comment also implies the 
whole syllogism (see note on 200.8-9).  
210.4-8   nec frustra … alteram tolli: Barnes (2012: 483-484) argues against Ebert that the 
particle at (210.6) ‘does not contrast the Stoics with the dialectici. Rather, it indicates that 
the double-barrelled sentence (quidem/vero: μέν/δέ) which it introduces is a qualification 
of what has just been said: ‘The logicians were quite right to introduce their rule; but 
whereas the Stoics formulated it thus and so, the Peripatetics preferred a different 
version’’. This makes good sense of the passage in which the author is clearly referring to 
dialecticians as a whole and to Stoics and Peripatetics as two particular groups of this whole. 
It was previously noted that the Stoics believed that a proposition was only truly negative 
when a negative particle was put at the very beginning of the proposition (191.10.11).  
210.9   omnis, non ... non quidam: This list shows each type of quantifier, omnis and 
quidam, followed immediately by the same quantifier to which a negative particle has been 
prefixed, thus each quantifying particle is negated in the manner described above (210.7-
8). 
210.9-11   veteres vero … non omnis; quidam: For the denotation veteres see note on 
209.14-16. That only three quantifiers are included in the Peripatetic list in Moreschini’s 
text (210.10-11) is in contradiction to the use of bifariam (210.10) and to the total number 
of eight possible contraries to any syllogism counted below (210.12). The addition of non 
quidam (BFDSW) after quidam (210.11) is plausible in light of the modes of refutation of 
the universal negative which were described in the context of the square of opposition 
diagram (aut utravis ex duabus ceteris vera, sive incongrua sive subneutra 195.5-6) and also 
in light of the example proposition given as the alterutra of the universal affirmative 
(quoddam iustum non est bonum 210.19). per alterutram recalls the description of the 
diagonal lines placed on this diagram (193.22-194.5) and makes it clear that for the first two 
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variables in this list there must be a further two variables which are the contraries of each. 
The square of opposition diagram shows that the Peripatetics thought that ‘omnis’ could 
be contradicted by its alterutra ‘quidam ... non’ as well as by ‘non omnis’ and that ‘non 
omnis’ could be contradicted by its alterutra ‘quidam’ and that is exactly what is being 
described here. This is made clear by the addition of the negative particle non after quidam 
and then a further quidam (210.11) as suggested above. Whereas the Stoic list pairs each 
type of quantifier with its contrary, which is the same quantifier with a negative particle 
prefixed to it (210.9), this Peripatetic list pairs the two variables which are represented in 
the top two corners of the square diagram followed by the pair of subneutrae which are 
their respective contraries; quidam non contradicting omnis and quidam contradicting non 
omnis. The use of ellipsis between the first quidam and non would help by representing 
how this form of negation is used in premises, that is, quidam homo non grammaticus, 
which would contradict omnis homo grammaticus. 
210.11-16   fiunt igitur … primus indemonstrabilis: After explaining that there are eight 
contraries to any given syllogism (unamquamque conclusionem) because there come to be 
four sets of two conclusions (conclusiones bis quaternae) the author then demonstrates 
how the rules are applied to the first indemonstrable (210.15-16ff). The number eight is 
emphatically placed at the end of the clause with its verb as the first word in the sentence, 
perhaps suggesting that the author wishes to encourage his audience to try to work out the 
total number for themselves based on the information he has just given, introduced by ut 
puta in each case (210.8-11). 
210.15-16   exemplo sit primus indemonstrabilis: For the practice of proving the 
indemonstrable moods per impossibile see note on 209.9-10.  
210.17-19   qui hanc … non est bonum: qui refers to the type of person denoted by eos 
(209.17). The contrary relationship between the particular negative statement and the 
universal affirmative is described in Chapter 5 as alterutra (193.23-194.3) and is 
demonstrated by diagonal lines in the diagram of the square of opposition included in 
Moreschini’s edition (195. See also note on 210.9-11 above for this form of contradiction). 
The sense of compulsion to follow the logical rules conveyed by necesse est can be 
compared to the effect of the uses of compelluntur (210.1, 4) in this context. 
210.19-22   huic si … non est bonum: See 208.13-17 for the example of the sixth mood of 
the third figure in full and 208.25-27 where the author says that this mood can be proved 
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only per impossibile. The contrary of the conclusion is joined to the first premise and the 
first premise retains its first position (compare the form of contradiction in which the 
contrary of the conclusion is joined to the second premise 211.6-8). The reason why it is the 
sixth mood of the third figure which is produced from proving the first indemonstrable in 
this way, and similarly, the fourth below (211.8-10) is made clear by Ross’ comments on the 
passage from Aristotle which discusses the same type of reduction (An.Pr.63a8): ‘Any 
proposition proved by a reductio can be proved ostensively, by the use of the same terms; 
and vice versa. If we take the contradictory of the conclusion of the ostensive syllogism we 
get the same new syllogism which was indicated in dealing with conversion of syllogisms; 
and we already know the figures in which these new syllogisms must be’ (Ross, 1949: 456-
7). In this way, when the second premise is paired with the contrary of the conclusion, a 
mood in the second figure is produced since this is the premise containing the major term 
and from which the second figure is generated (see note on 206.11-12), and when the first 
premise is paired with the contrary of the conclusion in the same way, a mood in the third 
figure is generated since this is the premise containing the minor term from which the third 
figure is generated (see note on 208.17-19).   
211.1-2   quod repugnat … honestum bonum: See 210.16-17. 
211.2-3   haec per … conclusio est: This syllogism, being the first indemonstrable (210.16-
17), has been entirely opposed (for conclusio meaning a whole syllogism see note on 200.7-
9).  
211.3-5   si isdem … duae conclusiones: The equipollent premise of the particular negative 
(210.22) is formed by prefixing a negative particle to its alterutra, the universal affirmative 
(see 196.8-9). This type of contradiction, now used as the contrary of the conclusion of the 
first indemonstrable, is included in the Stoic list above (210.7-9) whereby a negative particle 
is prefixed to the original conclusion (210.17). Two more conclusions will result from a 
combination including this type of contrary premise in the same way as before, one with a 
negative particle and one which is the alterutra of the original conclusion. 
211.6   sic assumamus posteriorem: Londey and Johanson translate assumamus as ‘we 
assume’ (1987: 103) which gives the general idea that the second premise will now be 
involved, but it seems that more of a contrast is intended between this verb and 
praeposuimus which was used to denote the positioning of the first premise (210.19-20; 
211.5). When the first premise of the first indemonstrable is transposed into the syllogism 
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by which it will be proved per impossibile, it takes up the first position in this new syllogism. 
In a similar way, it seems that the use of assumamus is intended to carry a similar 
significance for the second premise, which retains its second position when transposed into 
the syllogism to be proved per impossibile. Lewis and Short give a technical definition of the 
verb assumo, which is the opposite of what we would expect in light of its use in the context 
here: ‘in logic to add, or join to a syllogism the minor proposition e.g., Cic. Inv. 1.63; id. Div. 
2.106; 2.108’ (s.v. II.C). Our author’s systematic ordering of the premises within a syllogism 
places the premise containing the major term in the second position in all moods with a 
direct conclusion. This incongruity may be explained in the following way: our author’s 
method is an inversion of the standard Greek practice to place the major before the minor 
term (see note on 204.3-6), in which case the use of assumamus with reference to the 
second premise at this point may betray a Greek source for this part of the text. A clearer 
translation of this passage would therefore be: ‘If, as we just placed the first premise first, 
in the same way we add the second {premise} beneath.’ 
211.8-11   fit illatio ... propositioni repugnat: See 207.8-14 for the example of the fourth 
mood of the second figure which can be proved only per impossibile. The two (duplex) 
conclusions, universal negative and particular negative, are equipollent (cf. aeque 211.11) 
propositions because, without the negative particle, the universal premise is the alterutra 
of the particular negative (see 196.8-9).    
211.12-16   his quattuor … isdem mutationibus: These four syllogisms refer to (1) the one 
in the form of the sixth mood in the third figure (210.22), (2) the one with a conclusion 
which is equipollent to this (211.4) both of which were produced from the contrary of the 
conclusion paired with the first premise (210.19-21), (3) the particular negative contrary of 
the first indemonstrable conclusion paired with the second premise to give, on the one 
hand, a universal negative conclusion (211.7-9), and, on the other, (4) the same 
combination with the equipollent, a particular negative premise as the conclusion (211.9-
10). A further four syllogisms would result if, instead of the particular negative (alterutra) 
as the contrary of the first indemonstrable conclusion, the same premises were paired in 
the same way (isdem mutationibus) with the conclusion after a negative particle has been 
prefixed to it (see 210.7-9). The future tense erit (BCFDSW) is to be preferred over erat (A) 
since the changes described here (211.13) are hypothetical and have not actually been 
carried out. Patzig discusses Aristotle's use of the future tense of εἶναι which, he says, he 
often uses to express the necessity of a consequence (Patzig, 1968: 18. For a discussion on 
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syllogistic necessity in Aristotle see note on 212.6-7). The systematic and consistent use of 
terminology in this text supports the reading mutationibus (BCAW) more than 
immutationibus (PSD) owing to the regular use of the cognate verb muto in a comparable 
sense (192.20; 194.7, 12; 205.1; 211.13). 
211.16-18   item si … sublata illatio: pro eodem (BCFDSW) is to be preferred to eadem (A) 
as it clearly refers back to the previous use of pro eo (211.13). The contrary premise given 
here is the incongrua of the conclusion of the first indemonstrable (210.17). This 
relationship is described in the form of the square of opposition diagram in Chapter 5 
(193.17-19; 195.4-6); the two universal premises are incongruents (incongruae) and cannot 
both be true at the same time. The author reiterates this point below, without referring 
back to these comments in Chapter 5. 
211.18-212.3   erunt tertiae … quod proposuimus: The third set of four conclusions will 
make a total of twelve conclusions. This set applies only to those syllogisms which have a 
universal conclusion because, as described previously (195.4-6), this is the only type of 
premise which can be destroyed in three ways. This concerns five of the valid moods set 
out in this text: the first (203.13-14), second (203.19-21) and sixth (203.21-204.1) moods of 
the first figure and the first (206.10-11) and second (206.14-16) moods of the second figure. 
The remaining (ceteris) 14 valid syllogisms have only eight contraries (solae octo). The use 
of the future tense in habebunt and erunt can be explained by the fact that the author has 
not given examples of these conclusions, instead, he invites students to write out each 
mood for themselves along with their contraries in the way he has done for the first 
indemonstrable (212.1-3). This is in keeping with the didactic purpose of the work (see 
introduction section 6). 
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Chapter 13 
212.4-213.10 
In this chapter the author gives some background information about the ways in which 
syllogisms have previously been presented. He describes the way in which the Peripatetics 
used letters and the Stoics used numbers to convey each premise and the conclusion. The 
author shows awareness of the development of the syllogistic theory since Aristotle as he 
points out the fact that Theophrastus ‘and others’ list five indemonstrables unlike Aristotle 
who only listed four. He also criticises Aristo the Alexandrian and ‘some more recent 
Peripatetics' for counting additional moods with particular conclusions where a universal 
conclusion has already been established; three in the first figure and the two in the second. 
This, he says, is entirely senseless. 
212.4-6   *** ut etiam… indemonstrabilis: Lukasiewicz names Alexander as the first to state 
explicitly that Aristotle ‘presents his doctrine in letters, στοιχεῖα’ (1957: 8. See introduction 
section 4 for discussion about the concordance between our author and Alexander). The 
particle ut which is followed by the subjunctive verb (212.4-5) suggests that the lacuna at 
the beginning of this chapter contained a verb introducing a result clause (compare Londey 
and Johanson’s translation, 1987: 105). This type of consecutive clause could plausibly 
follow from a general explanation about the way in which a specific type of conclusion relies 
only upon the combination of premises and the role of the middle term in accordance with 
the figure to which this combination belongs (see 198.21-199.8) and not to the meanings 
of the terms which act as the subject term and the predicate term. The author would then 
demonstrate this point by saying ‘so that even (etiam) after it has been set out in the 
manner of the Peripatetics, with the order of premises and the parts changed around but 
with the function remaining, the first indemonstrable would be…’. In this way, the form of 
the syllogism given with letters which follows (212.6-7) acts as a form of proof for the 
example of the first indemonstrable the author gave earlier with the terms iustum, 
honestum, and bonum (203.13-14; 210.16-17). Alexander also uses the first indemonstrable 
mood as his example when he first discusses Aristotle’s use of letters in his exposition of 
syllogistic moods. The context surrounding this discussion lends plausibility to this 
suggestion about the contents of the lacuna: 
‘He uses letters in his exposition in order to indicate that the conclusions do not 
depend on the matter but on the figure, on the conjunction of premises, and on 
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the modes. For so-and-so is deduced syllogistically not because the matter is of 
such-and-such a kind but because the combination is so-and-so. The letters, then, 
show that the conclusion will be such-and-such universally, always and for every 
assumption’ (in An.Pr.53,29-54,2).  
Aside from this, it is hard to determine the actual extent or the rest of the contents of this 
lacuna. The author may also have included a discussion about the primacy of universals; 
this is a topic which also arises alongside Alexander’s discussion about the use of letters (in 
An.Pr.53,1-55,6). This is an aspect which is alluded to elsewhere in our text (see note on 
209.1-7) but which lacks the full treatment it is given in Alexander. It would also provide the 
background information required to explain the Peripatetic formation of the syllogism given 
below (212.6-7) which uses the expression de omni, which is otherwise unexplained. It is 
reasonable, therefore, to imagine that these matters were covered in the lacuna in a similar 
manner to Alexander’s text. 
212.6-7   A de omni … omni Γ: Two important differences between the presentation of 
syllogisms by our author and by Aristotle are highlighted in this example. Firstly, our author 
represents syllogisms in the way associated with traditional logic, that is, either by using the 
copula est to join the subject and predicate terms (for example, when he sets out the four 
different types of propositions in the square of opposition diagram, 193.17-21), or, most 
frequently, by simply presenting the subject and the predicate terms in an order which 
takes the copula as read. Aristotle, on the other hand, has a more idiosyncratic way of 
presenting premises; he begins his syllogistic with the words ‘A is predicated of all B’, but 
shortly he changes these words into the phrase ‘A belongs to all B’ (Lukasiewicz, 1957: 18). 
The author avoids the difficulty of explaining this by not supplying any Latin verb as the 
equivalent of either καταγορεύω or ὑπάρχω. Nevertheless, he still adequately represents 
Aristotle’s method of presentation since, in some cases, Aristotle himself neglects to use 
any verb (See e.g. Arist. An.Pr.24b17-18 and Lukasiewicz, 1957: 18. See note on 212.8-9 for 
Alexander’s discussion about these forms of presentation and the reason behind Aristotle’s 
presentation). Secondly, the use of the conjunction igitur to introduce the conclusion of this 
syllogism as an inference is the same as the way in which the author introduces the 
conclusion to all of the examples of moods throughout the text. It does not, however, 
reflect the way in which the conclusion is introduced in either Aristotle or Alexander in the 
way that this example suggests (see note on 207.12). Aristotle usually conveys syllogistic 
necessity, that is, the necessary consequence of a certain conclusion from a particular set 
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of premises through his use of ‘must’ (ἀνάγκη). Our author appears to be aware of the 
requirement for a conclusion to be drawn by necessity from its combinations since this is a 
point which he highlights from Aristotle’s definition of a syllogism (200.10-12; see also 
202.1-3, 10-12), but this is not represented in any way in his examples of Peripatetic 
syllogisms (202.1-3. See also the use of debere 202.13. The same point is discussed by 
Alexander in An.Pr.20,30-21,9). In addition, Aristotle’s syllogisms show that a conclusion 
only necessarily results if two premises are combined; he uses the particle εἰ in combination 
with ἀνάγκη for this purpose. As Patzig points out, this is an important indicator of relative, 
as opposed to absolute, necessity (Patzig, 1968: 19). Our author, however, does not use si, 
or any other form of expression to convey this aspect of Peripatetic syllogisms in his 
examples. The regular use of the verb infero (199.11; 202.6-7; 203.15, 21; 204.11-12; 211.3-
4; 213.9) would suggest that he was aware that he is presenting moods in the form of 
inference. 
212.7-8   incipiunt a declarante ... secunda propositione: Rather than ‘A is B’ as the 
proposition would naturally be expressed in Latin (or English) with a subject followed by a 
predicate, in Aristotle, the traditional order is 'B is (said) of A'. As the author says, incipiunt 
a declarante, rather than a subiectiva as is the case in this text, and in Latin more generally. 
The particle ideo has more of a causal force than Londey and Johanson's translation ‘and 
also’ (1987: 105) suggests; it seems that the point here is that the Peripatetics start with 
the second premise because of the fact that they begin with the predicate term rather than 
the subject. The phrase ‘secunda propositione’, therefore, ought to be understood only 
within the context of this work; it is simply ‘the second premise’ according to the author’s 
method of presenting the moods. This order is the one which most clearly demonstrates 
the relation of the terms in the combination to the terms in the conclusion (see note on 
204.3-6).  
212.8-9   hic adeo modus... talis est: Londey and Johanson translate these two lines as: 
'Moreover, this mood, according to them, is woven backwards in this way: Every C B, every 
B A; therefore every C A (1987: 105).' Neither of the senses of pertexo cited in the OLD (s.v. 
'To weave in full, finish weaving, b (transf.) to complete the composition of (a speech, 
writing etc.’) help to make sense of the passage with the reading pertextus. A number of 
manuscripts, however, abbreviate the prefix so that it is unclear whether it stands for per- 
or prae- (CAPSD), and some have prae- rather than per- (WB). The two meanings of 
praetexo (OLD s.v. 2 'To set up or place in front’; 4 'To put forward as a pretext, pretend'), 
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in fact, make more sense in this context than pertexo in which the same syllogism is ‘put 
forward’ in reverse order (retro). Barnes points out that a similar passage, in which the 
order of the subject and the predicate terms in syllogistic language and in normal language 
is described, can be found in Alexander of Aphrodisias (Barnes, 2007a: 330):  
Aristotle uses 'of every' and 'of no' in his exposition because the validity of the 
arguments is recognizable by way of these formulas, and because the predicate and 
the subject are more recognizable when things are stated in this way, and because 
'of every' is prior by nature to 'in as in a whole' (as I have already said). But syllogistic 
usage is normally the other way about: not 'Virtue is said of every justice' but the 
other way about - 'Every justice is virtue'. That is why we should exercise ourselves 
in both types of utterance, so that we can follow both usage and Aristotle's 
exposition. 
(in An.Pr.54,21-29) 
As in the passage above, the point being made here is that whether the syllogism is 
presented with the predicate term coming first or the subject term coming first, its 
conclusion is derived from the combination in exactly the same way and that this method 
of proof does not change according to the specific terms which act as the subject and the 
predicate. Our author makes it implicitly clear that every example he gives of a mood is just 
an example by introducing them in each case with the particle ut (in the first figure, for 
example, 203.13, 19; 204.9, 16 cf. velut 205.7). 
212.9-10   Omne Γ B … igitur Γ A: This inverted form of the paradigm above mirrors exactly 
the form that the author's own example of the first indemonstrable takes when written out 
in full with concrete subject and predicate terms in Latin (203.13-14); the middle term is 
the predicate in the premise in the first position and is the subject term in the second. As 
the author mentioned above (212.7-8), the Peripatetics, on the other hand, present the 
same syllogism in such a way that the middle term is the subject in the premise in the first 
position and the predicate in the second. It is worth remembering that when the author 
first describes the layout of the moods of the first figure in Chapter 7 he says that the 
common particle i.e., the middle term, is in altera subiecta, in altera declarans (199.1-2); it 
is this order, which he ascribes to the Peripatetics at this point in the text, which he 
describes. The reason for describing this order becomes puzzling when he begins to 
introduce examples of the moods in each figure in which the middle term is predicate in 
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the first and the subject in the second. Alcinous describes the middle term in the first mood 
as being 'predicated of the first term and the subject of the other' (Didask.158.32-34) which 
matches the practice of our author. Dillon points out that Alcinous, Apuleius and Galen are 
the earliest surviving exponents of this so-called Classical form which, he suggests, was 
'perhaps developed first by Ariston' (1993: 80), who is mentioned later in this chapter 
(213.5-6). This suggests that at the earlier point in the text where he describes the 
presentation of syllogisms and the position of the middle term, he was relying on an earlier 
Greek source which represented Aristotle’s own practice whereas in his own presentation 
of the examples of moods in each figure he represents a shift from Aristotle’s original 
presentation to expressions which were more natural in the common parlance of both 
languages. 
212.10-12   Stoici porro ... secundum igitur: This comment suggests that the Stoic numbers 
perform exactly the same function as Aristotle's letters but this is not the case. Barnes 
(2007a: 323) discusses the different ways in which each of these 'symbols' were used: 
‘Aristotle's letters represent only the terms within a proposition and are used simply to 
illustrate the 'structure' of a syllogism; they have no meaning or value in themselves. The 
Stoic ordinal numbers, on the other hand, represent entire premises or statements’. 
Reference to 'the first' or 'the second' grew out of an attempt to avoid unnecessary lengthy 
repetition when forming an argument according to Diogenes Laertius, from whom Barnes 
cites the following passage: 
‘An argumode (λογóτροπος) is what is compounded from both [sc. from an 
argument and a mode], for example: 
If Plato lives, Plato breathes; but the first: therefore the second.  
Argumodes were introduced so that, when the components of an argument were 
rather long, you did not have to state the co-assumption, which was long, and also 
the conclusion- rather, you could continue briefly: 
But the first: therefore the second'’ 
(Diog. Laert. 7.77. Trans. Barnes, 2007a). 
Our author's comment then, is rather misleading, since, unlike the Peripatetic letters which 
are used to illustrate only the position and function of a given term within a proposition, 
the Stoic numerals represent whole statements themselves which 'must have a 
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determinate reference' (Barnes, 2007a: 325). Barnes says that 'there is rather little positive 
evidence in support of Apuleius' statement that the Stoics used numerals' but 'there is no 
evidence against it and no one doubts it' (Barnes, 2007a: 322). This, as well as the author’s 
presentation of Peripatetic letters and Stoic numerals as entirely analogous, suggests that 
he, or his source, was not aware of these fundamental differences between Peripatetic and 
Stoic logic (see introduction section 4). 
212.12-15   verum Aristoteles ... illationem indefinitam: Huby points out that although she 
has translated ceteri as 'the rest' here, 'the others' is also possible (2007: 63), presumably, 
that is to say, the difference between all others as in, ‘everyone else’ and a certain set of 
others. The complete absence of evidence for this fifth indemonstrable outside of this text 
makes it seem more likely that ceteri refers to a select few in the way implied by the latter. 
This absence of external evidence for Theophrastus' fifth mood is one of the reasons why 
Bocheński strongly believes that the author is mistaken here and that he is confusing the 
additional five moods which Theophrastus added to the first figure with one new fifth 
indemonstrable mood (1947: 16). Sullivan and Huby, however, both believe that it is 
Bocheński who is mistaken. Sullivan questions why the author gives no indication as to 
whether the fifth indemonstrable 'corresponds to the indemonstrable Darii (1.3) or to the 
indemonstrable Ferio (1.4)' and comments that 'given that the indemonstrable is an 
indefinite mood, no indication is given as to why there is only one such indemonstrable 
rather than two – one to correspond to Darii and the other to Ferio' (1967: 156). Huby 
presents a solid case for this mood being formed from the third indemonstrable (Darii) 
rather than the fourth (Ferio) which also contains a particular premise (1977: 147-8).  She 
argues that Theophrastus would be concerned that the indefinite conclusion, which the 
fourth indemonstrable would create, 'would be taken most naturally as a universal negative 
(C belongs to no A), rather than an indefinite negative' and also that 'the conclusion of Ferio 
itself is already indefinite' because 'Alexander … tells us that both Aristotle and 
Theophrastus regarded 'tini oux huparxei' as indefinite’ (id. 148; see Alex. in An.Pr. 66,1-10). 
The participial phrase which follows is, I would argue, directly linked to the main verb 
(enumerant) in that it explains the means by which Theophrastus (et ceteri) carried out the 
formation of a fifth indemonstrable, by exchanging the particular premise in one of the 
moods for an indefinite one and inferring an indefinite conclusion. According to this 
context, I see Theophrastus et ceteri as the subjects of the plural participles iungentes and 
colligentes (W), which I have taken in place of their singular counterparts (BCFADS), and I 
propose the use of a comma after enumerant (212.14), rather than the full stop which 
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Moreschini has, to make this clear. It is reasonable to suppose that the proposed lacuna 
which follows contained a demonstration of the formation of this indefinite indemonstrable 
and pointed out the other three moods in the first figure which contain a particular premise 
(1.4, 1.7, 1.9). This would explain the author’s use of iam below (213.2), which suggests that 
he has only just showed them as opposed to referring back to Chapter 9 where he last 
showed them; when referring to parts of the text further back he tends to use expressions 
such as supra diximus (in Chapter 7, 200.14 referring back to Chapter 1, 190.3-4); supra 
docui (in Chapter 9, 203.17 referring back to Chapter 6, 198.5-7); supra ostendimus (in 
Chapter 14, 213.12 to refer back to Chapters 9-11 cf. 215.2-3 ) or supradictas (in Chapter 
14, 215.7 referring back to Chapter 6, 197.10-12). This is the expression we would expect if 
he were in fact referring back to the last time moods in the first figure were referred to 
collectively. iam as we have here, on the other hand, is used to refer to points either in the 
immediate past (205.19) or the immediate future (203.3). This strongly suggests the ‘four 
moods’ referred to below (213.2-3) were specifically the group of moods with particular 
premises in the first figure which were listed in the lacuna.  
212.15-213.2   supervacaneum est ... sunt ex particularibus: Presumably, as suggested in 
the note above, the missing text contained a demonstration of the way in which moods 
containing particulars can be doubled as moods containing indefinites. Following this 
lacuna (212.15), the author explains that what has gone before is unnecessary 
(supervacaneum see also 201.4) and this would appear to be the view of the majority. 
Alcinous, for instance, omits indefinite propositions entirely from his list of types of 
propositions which Dillon suggests is because he was aware that 'they were equal to 
particulars' (1993: 78). This type of explanation might have led to the omission of such detail 
from the transmitted text, particularly if it was being used for scholastic purposes. The 
author has already explained that indefinites should always be taken as particular (190.20-
191.1), and they are only brought up at this point because this chapter is concerned with 
the treatment of the syllogism by different groups of people; this is a point of historical, 
rather than logical interest. The author makes it clear that Theophrastus considered 
indefinite propositions as distinct from particular propositions since he posited another 
indemonstrable with an indefinite conclusion. That Theophrastus paid particular attention 
to indefinite propositions is clear from the numerous fragments concerned with this topic 
in Huby's volume (1992: 140-153). This is the second of two direct criticisms the author 
makes against Theophrastus (see also 207.23-24). eidem (BF2W; cf. eiusdem C) should be 
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preferred over idem (ASD) in order to agree with modi in light of the sense of the passage; 
‘the same moods will come about’. 
213.2-5   item iam ... octo et viginti: For iam see note on 212.12-15. With ‘si quis velit’ the 
author invites his audience to do some of the work for themselves (see also 212.1-3 for a 
similar instance. See also introduction section 6). Here he says that it is possible to create 
another, indefinite mood for every particular, although it is not worth doing because they 
will have the same truth value as the particular. If however, the particular moods were 
doubled in this way, he says there will be a total of 28 moods. In a footnote to their 
translation of this sentence, Londey and Johanson say that 'the correct number is 29, since 
ten of Apuleius' 19 valid moods have a particular premise. In the translation, we have 
followed the Thomas text's octo et viginti. Earlier editors (Oudendorp, Hildebrand) have 
novem et viginti, as found in some MSS' (1987: 104 n.7). Londey and Johanson do not say 
which manuscripts contain this reading, and no variants are recorded in either Thomas’ or 
Moreschini’s apparatus criticus for octo et viginti to suggest this (but see AWPB. See also 
introduction section 3 n.73). Londey and Johanson are correct in saying that ten of the 19 
moods contain a particular premise (1.3, 1.4, 1.7, 1.9, 2.3, 2.4, 3.2, 3.3, 3.5, 3.6) and that by 
doubling these the total number is 29. However, surely a further four moods which, 
although they do not have a particular premise in their combination but have a particular 
conclusion which could also be taken as indefinite ought also to be taken into account (1.5, 
3.1 with one particular conclusion inferred directly and one conversely, and 3.4). This can 
be assumed from indefinitamque subiciens illationem (213.4-5) as the inclusion of these 
moods, with universal premises but a particular conclusion, is not spelt out explicitly in the 
text as it stands but we can reasonably assume that detail of this nature was included in the 
missing text indicated by the lacuna which appears to lead into a discussion about 
particulars and indefinites (see note on 212.14-213.2 for discussion about the contents of 
the lacuna at 212.15). This gives a total of 14 which, when doubled, adds up to 28, the total 
number given by our author in the received text. At any rate, the total number of syllogisms, 
including those obtained indirectly from the direct ones, seems to have been far from 
definitive. This number is never made clear by Aristotle himself (Barnes, 2007b: 535). 
213.5-9   Aristo autem ... particulares inferunt: Barnes points out that this is the only known 
evidence for Aristo adding to the number of syllogisms in this way (2007b: 535) and goes 
on to comment that 'the phraseology suggests that Aristo was not taken to be a Peripatetic' 
and that 'our other sources say that he began life as an Academic and then translated to 
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the Lyceum' (op. cit. 536). The historical details which Barnes gives about Aristo's 
conversion to the Lyceum are commonly accepted; Chiaradonna mentions Philodemus' 
Index Academicorum (xxxv. 11-16) as an ancient source for this (2013: 38. Evidence for 
Aristo is collected in Mariotti, 1966 and his ‘role in the early history of Aristotelian exegesis’ 
is discussed by Hatzimichali, 2011: 41-50). I am not sure that the phraseology creates a 
distinction between Aristo and the Peripatetics in the way that Barnes suggests; the particle 
et could just as well be implying an addition: ‘Aristo as well as the other more recent 
Peripatetics’ as it could be drawing a contrast: ‘Aristo and then some more recent 
Peripatetics’. At any rate, it is unlikely that such a distinction would be relevant to the 
author of Peri Hermeneias whose text nowhere suggests that he distinguished between the 
Peripatetics and the Academics. Barnes reads praeter eos for praeterea (213.7) with eos 
agreeing with modos. Rather than universalis illationis (AS), which Moreschini has printed, 
I consider universales illationes (BCFDW) to be the more likely reading, which could then be 
an accusative plural to be paired with the preposition praeter (L&S s.v. II B2b ‘in addition 
to’) rather than the printed praeterea. On account of this, rather than eos after praeter as 
Barnes has conjectured, I suggest eas (213.7) to agree with universales illationes because 
this is precisely the characteristic of the five additional moods; they have particular 
conclusions in addition to those universal conclusions (praeter eas universales illationes ) 
from which they have been inferred. 
213.9-10   quod perquam ... minus concludere:  This statement, that it is useless to conclude 
less when more has been conceded, is an inversion of the statement made earlier which 
advised the acceptance of indefinite premises as particular ones because it is safer to accept 
less from what is uncertain (see note on 190.21-191.1). Barnes says that it is this criticism 
from the author which is inept and not the moods since the subaltern mood from the first 
indemonstrable (Barbari) is a perfectly valid way to prove the particular form of the 
conclusion (Barnes, 2007b: 536). The brevity of our text, however, and its didactic purpose, 
which values practical utility over formal completeness (cf. Sharples, 2010: 96), explains 
why our author should present these moods in this way. The adjective ineptum (OLD s.v. 
‘having no sense of what is fitting, lacking in judgement, foolish, silly; cf. L&S s.v. 
‘impertinent, improper, tasteless’ etc.) conveys a moralising tone, similar to that suggested 
by impudenter (see note on 209.17-18), which was used to describe those who refute a 
conclusion after having accepted both premises, and also to the effect of the use of verbs 
such as ‘compelluntur’ and ‘necesse est’ (see note on 210.17-19). The maxim-like quality of 
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these statements and this sort of language make clear the didactic purpose of the text (for 
which, see introduction section 6).  
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Chapter 14 
213.11-215.12 
In this final chapter of the text, the author systematically lists all 34 of the invalid 
combinations out of the 48 possible combinations of each of the four types of propositions, 
the universal affirmative, universal negative, particular affirmative and particular negative 
as labelled on the Square of Opposition diagram (195.2). Having shown examples for all of 
the valid combinations in each of the three figures in Chapters 9, 10 and 11, in this chapter, 
the author lists the 34 combinations which can conclude something false from true 
premises. This, he says, can be demonstrated by using the five predicables which were 
introduced in Chapter 6 (197.10-198.17) and that the conclusions of each of the established 
combinations show that there can be no more than 14 valid moods. Grouping and 
enumerating all of the invalid combinations together in this way differs from the method of 
exposition of Aristotle and Alexander, who both present all of the combinations 
systematically for each of the three figures and identify the invalid combinations as they 
come up in the order (for Aristotle’s systematic method of expounding all of the possible 
premise pairs see Patzig, 1968: 168-170. See also note on 205.4-7).  
213.11-12   Omnes autem modos ... ostendimus, comprobatur: For other uses of certos to 
mean valid and applied to syllogistic combinations see 209.8; 215.1. Moreschini’s apparatus 
criticus indicates that there are a number of variants for undeviginti in the manuscripts. 
Either unum de viginti (S) or the more common contracted form undeviginti (A) is clearly 
the correct reading since the total number of valid combinations is, indeed, 19. At any rate, 
the et or ampersand symbol in the reading unum et viginti (BCFADW) could easily be the 
result of a misreading de for et. The author listed how many combinations there are in each 
figure and how many moods there are in each of these earlier in Chapter 8 (202.18-203.3). 
213.13-14   quattuor sunt ... duae universales: The four different types of proposition were 
first introduced in Chapter 3 (190.17-191.5). It is unclear why the author only mentions the 
difference in quantity (duae particulares duae universales) and does not mention 
affirmative (dedicativa) and negative (abdicativa) as their different qualities here. In a 
similar way, Aristotle defines a premise at the very beginning of his Prior Analytics as ‘an 
affirmative or negative statement of something about some subject. This statement may 
be universal or particular or indefinite' (An.Pr.24a16-18. Trans., Tredennick, 1949). In this 
passage, whether a statement is affirmative or negative is part of the definition of what a 
premise is. The types of this statement are then divided according to the quantity of the 
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subject to which they refer. Furthermore, the priority of universals and thereby of the 
quantity of a proposition over its quality has already been highlighted in our text (see note 
on 209.1-7). Our author’s omission of qualitative differences here may reflect this definition 
of Aristotle’s. It may also, however, simply demonstrate the author’s effort to keep the text 
concise when, by this point, the distinction in quality ought to be well known. 
213.14-15   harum unaquaeque … scilicet coniungitur: Moraux presents a clear case for 
Aristoteles as the correct reading (213.14) as opposed to Prantl, who ‘was inclined to ascribe 
one further fragment to Aristo regarding the problem of the possible combinations of 
premises in each syllogistic figure' (Chiaradonna, 2013: 40); this was due to the fact that no 
statements similar to the one ascribed to Aristotle in this text are found in Aristotle’s works 
themselves. Prantl therefore believed incorrectly that Aristoteles ought to be corrected to 
Aristo. Firstly, Moraux points out that the total number of valid moods given in this chapter 
is 19, which clearly does not take into account Aristo’s five additional subaltern moods. 
Secondly, he rightly points out that although Aristotle nowhere describes that 16 possible 
combinations belong to each of the three figures because there are four ways of combining 
the four types of premise, anyone who reads chapters 4-6 of the Prior Analytics will notice 
that Aristotle demonstrates 16 combinations for each of the three figures – 12 of which are 
invalid in the first figure and four are valid and the same procedure is carried out for the 
second and third figures. He puts the comments in the text here down to the author’s lack 
of exactitude and to changes in meaning which may have taken place between the original 
and his own text. It is therefore conceivable, he says, that our author’s source gave the 
number 16. He concludes that the reference in 213.14 was mistakenly linked to the use of 
Aristo’s name in the previous chapter (see Moraux 1973: 190-1). Alexander’s comments are 
representative of the sort of source which Moraux suggests our author was using; 
Alexander first of all counts the total number of possible combinations in each figure 
including indeterminates which is 36 (in An.Pr.51,35) and he then gives the total number 
having set aside the indeterminates as 16 (in An.Pr.52,18). The table set out by Patzig shows 
these 16 combinations which Aristotle systematically works through in his Prior Analytics 4-
6 (1968: 169). With regard to sibi et (213.15), which is omitted by a number of manuscripts 
(BCFDSW), it is worth noting that the only type of premise out of the four which can be 
paired with another of the same kind (sibi et) to form a valid combination is the universal 
affirmative (see 203.4-5), furthermore, the author states definitively that ‘nothing can be 
concluded from two particulars or two negatives’ both later in this chapter and elsewhere 
(214.2-3 cf. 203.4-5). 
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The possible variants praepono and propono can both be used to mean ‘to place first’ (L&S 
s.v. praepono 1; s.v. propono G2 ‘to state the first premise of a syllogism’; OLD. s.v. 9d) 
which is clearly the intended meaning to be contrasted with sit subiecta (213.14). In this 
text propono is used only twice elsewhere; the first use (193.4) applies to premises being 
put forward in a general sense with no implication of prior position, and the second (199.12) 
is used in the sense which defines the meaning of propositio (see notes on 190.5-6; 199.12-
15). The verb praepono, on the other hand, is consistently used throughout the text in the 
sense described above and which this context requires; it is used of negative particles which 
are placed before premises (191.11; 196.11; 210.7, 14), of moods which are ranked before 
others (209.6-7), and, as is the case here, of premises which are placed before another in a 
given combination (210.19-20; 211.5; 214.6; 215.1). 
213.16-17   atque ita senae ... formulis erunt: There will be 16 possible combinations in 
each of the three figures. Aristotle does not state this number. It is, however, the total 
number given by Alexander after the indeterminates have been discounted from his total 
of 36 (in An.Pr.52,17-18). 
213.17-18   harum sex aequaliter... alteram praecedit: Six out of the 16 possible 
combinations (harum) are not valid in any of the moods. quidem corresponds to autem 
(214.1) in the way that μέν precedes δέ in Greek (see note on 190.17-191.1; for other 
examples see 194.6-7; 196.1-2). The reading abdicativis, which Moreschini has, does not 
have any support in the manuscripts I have consulted (see introduction n.73 and Appendix 
A); it must, nevertheless, be correct by analogy to ex particularibus in the contrasting clause 
which is introduced by autem (214.1) and about which there is no discord in the 
manuscripts. A combination in which one negative premise precedes the other is not valid 
(see 203.4-5; 214.2-3).   
213.18-214.2   quattuor autem... praecedit subditur: For autem see note above (213.17-
18). 
214.2-3   nihil enim concludi... duae abdicativae: See 203.4-5. For an invalid combination 
of two particulars see 206.16. 
214.4-6   porro ex … particulari praeponitur: A combination with a universal affirmative 
before a particular is not valid in either the first or the second figure. As made clear by 
Alexander (e.g. in An.Pr.94,12-17; 95,20-24) and as implied by our author (see note on 
208.17-19), being universal is the criterion for the premise containing the major term and 
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being affirmative is the criterion for the premise containing the minor term, which must 
both be fulfilled for a combination to be valid in the first figure. In the second figure only 
the major must be universal and in the third only the minor must be affirmative. Our author 
systematically presents syllogisms with the minor premise placed before the major premise 
(see note on 204.3-6). In this way, the invalid combination which he describes here does 
not fulfil the criterion, required in the first and the second figures, for the major to be 
universal and, for this reason, is invalid in both of these figures. In contrast, this combination 
forms the third and sixth valid moods of the third figure because the only criterion for 
validity in this mood is that the minor premise is affirmative. 
214.6-7   similiter et ... duae repudiantur: similiter suggests that the author is using the 
same reasoning to justify the elimination of the following combinations from the first and 
the third figures as he used to eliminate the combinations from the first and second figures 
above, even though this reasoning is not made at all clear in the text (see note above for 
the reasons for eliminating the combination described above from the first and second 
figures 214.4-6). repudiantur (214.7) is the most plausible correction to ‘ruridantur’ since 
this verb is used with the same sense elsewhere in the text (197.7-8; 215.6). 
214.7-9   quibus particularis … dedicativam antecedit: The author has already categorically 
ruled out combinations consisting of two negatives, and two particulars in all figures, both 
in this chapter (214.2-3) and earlier (203.4-5), which suggests that the omission of aut 
universalis … universalem aut (214.7-8) is correct (BCFADW). In this case the combinations 
which are eliminated in the first and the third figures are those in which a particular 
negative comes first (antecedit) because the minor premise, which is placed first, is not 
affirmative as it is required to be in the first and third figures (see note above 214.4-6). Since 
this criterion is not fulfilled, it will still be an invalid combination in these two figures no 
matter what type of premise comes next. The reading universalem (214.9), which 
Moreschini has accepted and which specifies a universal affirmative, does make sense in 
that the only other affirmative is a particular which, of course, would lead to a combination 
of two particulars and the author has repeatedly said that this type of combination is invalid 
(203.4-5; 205.16; 214.2-3). However, the only valid combination consisting of a particular 
negative before a universal affirmative is found in the fourth mood of the second figure; it 
is valid in this figure because the major is universal (see note on 214.4-6). The reading 
utramvis (BCFADW), in this way, creates a more accurate account than universalem, which 
Moreschini has accepted, as it makes good sense and gets the point across correctly.  
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214.9-11   quo fit … adhuc octonae: The author first of all says that, as a result of the 
eliminations so far, there remain six combinations in the first figure. It is made clear by the 
distributive sense conveyed by the adjectival form of the word (L&S s.v.), that the eight 
which are left in the second and the third figures each are a result of the six in the first since 
these two figures, and the combinations in them, owe their generation to the first (see note 
on 205.18-19. See also the explanatory force of cum 215.3-4), otherwise why would the 
author not have simply used octo in the same way as he used sex (214.10)?. Londey and 
Johanson’s translation of octonae as simply ‘eight’ does not highlight this (1987: 105). 
214.11-13   ex quibus … particularem dedicativam: A combination in which a universal 
negative comes before a particular affirmative is not valid in either the second or the third 
figure because neither is the minor premise affirmative nor the major premise universal 
(see note on 214.4-6). This, however, is the combination of the ninth converse mood of the 
first figure which draws its conclusion reflexim (for the proof of the validity of this mood 
see note on 205.9-11).  
214.13-16   ex his septenis … praecedit alterutra: Londey and Johanson rightly point out 
that Prantl, Goldbacher, and Thomas are mistaken in reading alterutra ‘since the fourth 
valid mood of the second formula is precisely that in which the alternate of the universal 
dedicative precedes it’ (1987: 106 n.8. See also Alexander in An.Pr.85,1-5). This is also the 
reading Moreschini has accepted. Londey and Johanson’s reading ‘altera’ must be correct 
in light of the previous comparable use of the same pronoun to denote the second of two 
negative forms (213.18). Nevertheless, they say that it is hard to make sense of ‘what fourth 
case is being rejected’ (loc. cit.). This can be explained in the following way: the use of vel 
twice in line 15 serves to contrast the different types of premise which form an invalid 
combination in the second figure when joined to a universal affirmative (L&S s.v. vel B1). 
The use of vel in line 16, on the other hand, serves not to add to this list but to provide a 
point of clarification to utrovis loco (L&S s.v. vel 2a). In which case, the four combinations 
which are false (quattuor falsae) in the second figure are (1) a universal affirmative and 
another universal affirmative (sibimet ipsi), (2) a universal affirmative and a particular 
affirmative (particulari suae). They can be arranged in either way (utrovis loco) and still be 
invalid and so (3) and (4) are the same combinations but in the opposite order (praecedit 
altera).  
Sullivan points out that 'Apuleius does not supply a name for the relation obtaining between 
universal propositions and the particulars under them' (Sullivan, 1967: 66). Thomas labels 
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the relation between these types of propositions as 'subalternae' on the diagram of the 
Square of Opposition in his text (180.19 which matches the diagrams found in BCFADSW). 
The term alter is used twice (213.18; 214.16) to denote this type of opposition in this 
Chapter (see OLD s.v. 8 'opposite in quality (to something implied in the context') which 
serves the purpose of the technical term which Sullivan believes to be missing, although 
alter has a more general application than this throughout the rest of the text. However 
technical its use is intended to be here, it is not to be confused with the term used only in 
a technical sense in this work, alterutra, which denotes the opposing relation between a 
universal affirmative and a particular negative and between a universal negative and a 
particular affirmative which are described in Chapter 5 and are indicated by the two 
diagonal lines on the square of opposition diagram (see 193.22-194.5; 195).  
214.16-215.1   item propriae … dedicativae praeponitur: The two combinations which are 
not valid in the third figure consist of either a universal or particular negative (utravis 
abdicativa) placed before a universal affirmative (universali dedicativae). This is because 
the minor premise, that is, the premise placed first in our author’s presentation (see note 
on 204.3-6), must be affirmative in third figure combinations in order for them to be valid 
(see note on 214.4-6). 
215.1-4   reliquas certas ... redigemus: For other uses of certas to mean ‘valid’ see 209.8; 
213.11 (see An.Pr.29b1-26 for Aristotle’s description of the reduction of all syllogisms to 
the universal syllogisms of the first figure). The three combinations in the second figure and 
the five in the third figure were listed above (supra ostendimus) in Chapter 8 (202.18-203.3). 
The causal force of cum makes clear what was implied earlier; that these valid combinations 
in the second and the third figures result from the six in the first figure (214.9-11). The 
conversions which take place in order for the second figure moods to be reduced 
(redigeremus) to the first figure moods were demonstrated with examples of the moods in 
Chapter 10 (206.11-207.9); the third figure moods and their reductions were demonstrated 
in Chapter 11 (208.17-25). It is interesting that, at this point, the author says that the second 
and the third figure moods are reduced to the six combinations (sex coniugationes) in the 
first figure since, in Chapters 10 and 11, he only describes their reduction to one of the four 
indemonstrables. The two additional combinations which give a total of six are those of the 
eighth and ninth moods which share the same conclusion as the fourth indemonstrable 
(204.19-205.3). It is likely that six is given as the total here for completeness because the 
author previously described the way in which the conversion of both premises of a mood 
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in the second figure produces the ninth mood (205.17-18) which, in turn, is reduced to the 
fourth indemonstrable.  
215.5-7   ceterae triginta … falsa concludere: The choice of the verb repudio here adds to 
the moralising tone found elsewhere in the text (for example, compelluntur 210.1,4; 
necesse est 210.18; impudenter recusant 209.18 and the terms used in the examples of 
moods, especially iustum, honestum, turpe).  
215.7-8   quod cuivis ... [generis proprietatis]: These five predicables (significationes) were 
introduced above in Chapter 6 (197.9-198.17). Moreschini and Thomas have bracketed the 
words generis proprietatis (BCFADSW) to indicate that they do not belong here. These two 
specific predicables provide a clear point of comparison between the two factors which 
make conversion possible, the types of terms contained within the premise and the form 
of the premise itself. A property as a predicate term will allow a premise to be convertible 
no matter what quality or quantity it has because the extent of a property is equal to the 
subject of which it is a predicate (192.17-19). A premise with genus as a predicate term, on 
the other hand, is not convertible unless the premise is either a universal negative or a 
particular affirmative, which are convertible themselves (196.15-19), because the extent of 
a genus is greater than the subject of which it is a predicate. They are also the first two 
predicables given in the list in Chapter 6 (197.10-12). The mention of these two alone, 
therefore, would be enough to make clear the value of the predicables in testing the validity 
of combinations.  
215.8-11   at ex illis … passa est: The six combinations in the first figure (215.3), three in 
the second (215.2), and five in the third (215.2) give a total of 14 (quattuordecim) valid 
combinations which were proved (probavimus) in Chapters 9, 10, and 11. That there are no 
more than these (non plures) is made clear (docent) by the conclusions (illationes) which, 
when they are drawn both directly and conversely (cum directim tum reflexim), give a total 
of 19 moods (213.11-12). Instead of sumitur, I would put forward sumantur as a conjecture 
with illationes as its subject means that the description of the way in which the moods are 
drawn both directly and conversely then makes clear why there are more possible moods 
than combinations, some direct and some converse, and therefore why it is the conclusions 
themselves which demonstrate the total number of combinations. This reading also solves 
the perceived problem with ut (215.10) indicated by a crux in both Moreschini’s and 
Thomas’ texts, as it simply serves to introduce an additional point with the verb taking the 
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same plural subject (ipsae illationes) as it did in the previous clause. Thus the meaning 
would be ‘as they are drawn both directly and conversely’. 
215.12   praeterea eorum... numerus augeri: praeterea eorum is the reading preferred by 
Goldbacher, Thomas and Moreschini, and it is the reading which Londey and Johanson have 
accepted in their translation: 'Their number cannot be increased beyond this' (1987: 107). 
The author has just said, however, that it is the conclusions themselves (ipsae illationes 
215.10) which show that there are no more moods than have been proved above (215.9-
10). The editors presumably take eorum as referring to the modos, but this chapter has 
focused on the number of valid combinations rather than on whole moods. In light of this, 
the final sentence of the text seems more likely to have begun with ‘quapropter earum' 
(CW) or ‘propter earum’ (APBSD) referring to the illationes and, in this way, the causal force 
of these, which was explained above, is continued. Barnes makes the comment, which I 
have mentioned previously (see note on 213.2-5), that Aristotle never explicitly states the 
total number of valid syllogisms. The way in which the text ends suggests that its aim was 
to accomplish this task. This final sentence is conclusive in its tone and gives no reason to 
suspect that the work was left unfinished. 
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Appendix A 
Proposed Textual Variants 
 
Below is a list of divergences from Moreschini’s edition. References are given to the page 
and line numbers in Moreschini’s edition and to the sigla of the manuscripts I have been 
able to consult in digital form. These manuscripts are listed below the order in which they 
are recorded in Klibansky and Regen.414 A small number my own conjectures are also listed 
here and are justified in the relevant lemmata throughout the commentary.  
 
B Bamberg 
C Corpus Christi Cambridge 206 
F Paris 6288 
A Paris 6638 
D Paris 7730 
S St Gallen 64 
W Valenciennes 406 
 
189.1   quam (A) rather than quod (BFDSW) 
189.9-10 angusta late, nova usitate, usitata nove, vulgata decenter, decens vulgariter 
rather than angusta late, vulgate decenter, nova usitate, usitata nove (conj.) 
191.7-8   dicit rather than dedicat (BCFW) 
191.9 et rather than ei (conj.) 
191.14   non nullam rather than nullam (BAS2) 
195.2   scripta rather than scriptis (BCFADSW) 
196.10   eius rather than ei (conj.) 
196.11 proponatur rather than praeponatur (CASW) 
197.9   experienda rather than reperienda (conj. Tho.) 
197.9-10   unum verae rather than universe verae (BDW2) 
                                                          
414 See also introduction section 3 n.73. 
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198.18 aliquam rather than aliam (BCFADSW) 
199.4   non tantum enumeratione rather than non numeri ratione (W Colv.) 
201.10   num aliud collegi (conj.) rather than nam aliud collegi (Moresch.) 
203.5   concludere rather than conducere (W) 
204.20   reflexim rather than reflexam (B) 
206.3   nondum rather than non (BCFADS) 
206.3-4   demonstrati sint ut rather than demonstrentur. (conj. from demonstrans 
CWPBSD and ei sit ut CAWBSD) 
206.7   nunc formulae modos trademus secundae (om.) 
207.12 quoddam igitur iustum (CAS2) rather than quoddam iustum 
209.4   dicere rather than dedicare (BCFADW) 
209.6   dedicativa abdicativae et illationes rather than dedicativa [et] illatio (conj.) 
209.9   concludendum rather than cludendum (CW) 
210.11   non quidam added after quidam (BFDSW) 
211.13   erit rather than erat (BCFDSW) 
211.16   mutationibus rather than immutationibus (BCAW) 
211.17   eodem rather than eadem (BCFDSW) 
212.14   iunguentes rather than iungens (W) 
212.14-15   colligentes quam rather than colligensque  (W) 
213.1   eidem rather than idem (BF2W) 
213.7   universales illationes rather than universalis illationis   (BCFDW) 
213.15   sibi et om. (BCFDSW) 
214.7-8   aut universalis abdicativa abdicativam universalem aut om. (BCFADW) 
214.9   utramvis rather than universalem (BCFADW) 
215.11   sumantur rather than sumitur (conj.) 
215.12   quapropter earum rather than praeterea eorum (CW) 
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Appendix B 
Glossary of terms 
 
The main purpose of this glossary is to collect the technical terminology used in the Peri 
Hermeneias and to indicate the English word or phrase with which the term is represented 
in the commentary. The list is not exhaustive but contains the terms which are either unique 
to this work, are used in a sense which is different to normal usage, or are used by the 
author with different senses in different places. Page and line references are given for all 
uses of each term. The references in bold indicate where the term is either first introduced 
or defined. Where a comparable context in Alexander of Aprhodisias makes the Greek 
equivalent term clear, this is also given.415 
 
abdicare: ‘to say that something is not of a given term’. Used to define abdicativa 191.5. 
abdicativa (ἀποφατικός): ‘a negative proposition’ 191.3-4, 10; 193.17; 194.1, 2; 196.16; 
198.2, 13; 199.8; 203.4, 6, 7, 18; 204.2, 5, 7, 15; 205.2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11; 206.9, 13, 14; 207.1, 
4-5, 8, 10 bis; 208.6-7, 7, 10, 11, 14, 15; 213.18; 214.3, 8 bis, 9, 12, 17-215.1. 
acceptio (λῆμμα): ‘a proposition which, after being posed as a question has been accepted’ 
199.10, 11, 14, 16; 200.8, 16; 202.6, 11; 209.17-18; 210.6, 13. 
alterutra (ἀντικειμένον): ‘a contradictory’ – used to describe the relationship between 
propositions which differ in both quantity and quality, specifically when, of the two 
contradictories, the universal premise is valid 194.3; 195.7; 196.1, 9, 12, 16; 209.16; 210.6, 
10, 15; 214.16; cf. subneutra. 
approbo: ‘to prove’, specifically per impossibile.  207.13-14; cf. comprobo; probo. 
certus – a – um: ‘(logically) valid’ 209.8; 213.11; 215.1. 
collectio (συλλογισμός): ‘a syllogism’ consisting of two premises and a conclusion 200.8, 
16.  
colligo (συλλογίζομαι): ‘to collect’. Used to define ‘collectio’, which suggests that it can also 
mean ‘to conclude’   199.10-11; 201.7; 209.13, 18; 212.14-15. 
                                                          
415 The Greek – English index of Alexander’s terminology given in Barnes et al. (1991, 234-240) has 
been used for this purpose. This glossary gives English into Greek as well as Greek into English. Page 
and line references of the uses which relate to Wallies’ 1883 edition of the Greek text are given for 
the Greek terms. 
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communis particula: ‘the middle term’ – the term which the two premises in a syllogism 
have in common. The author uses this phrase for this term in the second and third figures 
where the common term does not take the middle position as it does in the first figure 
198.19, 21; 199.3. 
comprobo (ἀποδείκνυμι): ‘to demonstrate’, particularly when the proof is a result of the 
validity of a universal proposition; cf. ‘probo’, which is used when the proof is a result of the 
validity of a particular proposition. 194.13, 15, 16; 213.12; cf. ‘approbo’ and ‘probo’. 
concludo: ‘to conclude’ an argument, therefore forming a whole syllogism, hence conclusio 
199.6, 9; 201.1; 213.10; 214.2; 215.6-7. 
conclusio (συλλογισμός): ‘a syllogism’ 198.8; 199.5; 200.9, 17-18; 202.2, 6, 17-18; 203.5; 
209.15. In some cases, the author also uses this term to refer specifically to the conclusion 
of a syllogism (σύμπερασμα) 190.9; 198.20; 199.7; 201.11, 12; 202.9-10; 210.4, 12; 211.3, 
5, 12, 16, 18. 
conduco: ‘to draw (a mood) together’ 205.6. Usually used of moods which draw their 
conclusions directly 203.11, 18; 204.8, 14; 205.2, 6, 11; 206.8, 13; 207.4, 9, 16, 25; 208.2, 6, 
10, 14 as opposed to conversely, for which the verb infero is used.  
coniugatio (συζυγία): ‘a combination (of two premises)’ which share a particular term in 
common (see communis particula) 198.18; 199.17-18; 200.5; 202.16; 203.1, 2 bis, 16; 
204.20; 205.2-3, 16, 18; 206.16; 208.20; 209.3; 213.16; 214.4, 10; 215.3, 4. 
conversio (ἀντιστροφή): ‘a conversion’ 196.15; 198.7, 9, 12; 205.3, 10; 208.22-23; 209.8. 
converto (ἀντιστρέφω): ‘to convert’ – usually of propositions and used in the passive voice 
197.3, 6; 198.4, 5; 200.3; 205.20. Also used in either the first person plural or second person 
singular of those engaged in logic 192.23, 25; 196.20; 197.1; 205.4, 16, 18; 207.7-8. Used 
once in the pluperfect with the third person singular active ending 205.5, hence conversio. 
declarare (κατηγορέω): ‘to predicate something of a term’. Used to define ‘declarativa’ 
192.8. 
declaratio: ‘the predicate part of a proposition’ 192.15-16. 
declarativa (κατηγορικός): ‘the predicate part of a proposition’ 192.8, 13, 19, 21; 193.3, 5, 
10; 196.17-18; 197.17.  
dedicare (κατηγορέω): ‘to say that something is of a given term’. Used to define ‘dedicativa’ 
191.1. 
dedicativa (κατηγορικός): ‘an affirmative proposition’ 191.1, 6, 8; 193.17, 23; 196.10, 16; 
197.3; 198.3, 13; 200.4; 203.6, 7, 12 bis, 17, 18; 204.3, 8, 9, 13-14, 14-15; 205.4, 6-7, 11, 19-
20; 206.8-9, 14; 207.4, 10, 16-17, 17, 25 bis; 208.2, 3, 6, 10, 14; 209.6; 214.6, 9, 13, 15; 
215.1. 
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directim: Used of moods which have direct conclusions; those in which the subject term is 
the same as the subject of the middle term and the predicate is the same as the predicate 
in the combination 199.18; 200.4-6; 203.12, 19; 204.9, 15-16; 206.9, 14; 207.5, 11, 17, 26; 
208.3, 7, 11, 15; 215.11. 
formula (σχῆμα): ‘a (syllogistic) figure’ 199.2, 5-6; 202.18; 203.11; 205.17, 21; 206.1, 7, 8; 
207.3, 15, 16; 209.1, 2; 210.21-22; 211.8; 212.2, 12; 213.3, 8, 11, 16; 214.5, 7, 10, 14, 17; 
215.2. Also used to refer to the square diagram displaying the relationships between the 
four types of proposition 193.16. 
geminans (διαφορούμενος): ‘duplicating (argument)’ 201.6. 
gigno: ‘to generate’ 205.19; 206.6 cf. nasco. 
illatio: ‘a conclusion’ of a syllogism 198.8; 199.9; 200.6, 8; 202.9, 10, 14; 203.7, 10; 204.3, 
19; 207.2; 208.22; 209.3, 6, 13-14, 15; 210.6, 8, 15 bis, 18, 21; 211.8, 15, 18; 212.15; 213.5, 
7; 215.10. 
incongrua (ἐναντίος): ‘contrary’ – used to describe the relationship between the two 
universal propositions which differ in quality 193.19; 194.5, 6, 11; 195.6. 
indemonstrabilis (ἀναπόδεικτος): ‘an indemonstrable (mood)’ – one which is perfect in that 
it does not require any demonstration 206.1-2; 206.12; 207.8; 208.18, 24, 26; 209.7, 10; 
210.16; 212.6, 13.  
infero (ἐπιφέρω):  ‘to infer (a conclusion)’ hence the cognate noun illatio ‘conclusion’. This 
verb tends to be used in the passive voice for conclusions which are drawn reflexim rather 
than those which are drawn directim 199.11; 200.4; 202.6-7 and the active voice is used for 
those who are engaged in logic and draw conclusions conversely 203.15, 21; 204.11-12; 
211.3-4; 213.9; cf. ‘conduco’. 
irritus – a – um: Of a syllogistic combination, ‘invalid’ 205.16; cf. ratus – a – um.  
maior (μεῖζων):  ‘bigger’ – an adjective used to describe the predicate part of a proposition 
which is usually bigger than the smaller subject term as it incorporates more types of things 
192.13. In this way, it corresponds to the later use of this comparative to denote the major 
term or premise within a syllogism, this is also the case for ‘minor’ below. 
minor (ἐλαττῶν): ‘smaller’ – used to refer to the subject term in a proposition which usually 
has a smaller scope than its predicate 192.13. 
modulus: ‘a mood’ perhaps specifically, an invalid or non-syllogistic one 201.4; 202.18; 
203.1-2, 2; cf.modus. 
modus (τρόπος): ‘a (syllogistic) mood’ 199.18; passim in Chapters 9-11. 
nasco: ‘to generate’ 207.9; 208.23-24; cf. gigno. 
non differenter peragens (ἀδιαφόρως περαίοντες): ‘non-differently concluding 
(argument)’ 201.4-5. 
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particula: Used with negativa to denote a ‘negative particle’, i.e., non, in a grammatical 
sense 191.11; 196.9; 210.7, 14 but also the standard designation in this text to denote ‘a 
term’ within a premise. 193.9-10; 196.17; 198.10, 19, 21; 199.3; 200.5; 207.1; 208.21. 
probo: ‘to be proven’. Usually used in the passive voice of syllogistic combinations 214.12; 
215.5 or of propositions 194.18 which are proven. Used once in the active voice of those 
engaged in logic 215.9 cf. approbo, comprobo. 
propositio (πρότασις): ‘a proposition’ 190.7-8; passim, but also ‘a premise’ within a 
syllogism. 
protensio: a calque of πρότασις which Alexander uses to mean both ‘proposition’ and 
‘premise’ 190.2. 
pugna (μαχή): ‘a conflict’ between two propositions in which they differ in quantity or 
quality or both. 194.4, 5. 
(tota) ratiocinatio (συλλογισμός): ‘the whole of an argument’ i.e., a ‘syllogism’ 200.7-8; cf. 
collectio and conclusio. 
ratus – a - um: ‘valid’ – used of conclusio 202.14; 203.4-5. 
reflecto (ἀντιστρέφω): ‘to be converted’ (mostly used in the passive voice of propositions) 
hence reflexim 203.16; 204.1-2, 13. Used once in the active voice with the eighth and ninth 
moods as its subject 204.20. 
reflexim: to draw a conclusion ‘conversely’; the predicate in the combination becomes the 
subject term in the conclusion and the subject in the combination becomes the predicate 
in the conclusion  200.1-2, 7; 203.14, 21; 204.11; 205.7, 11; 207.18; 215.11 cf. reflecto. 
significatio: ‘a predicable’ of which there are five: property, genus, difference, definition, 
and accident 197.8; 215.8; cf. species 198.17. 
species: Used in a general sense to mean ‘a type’ of philosophy 189.2, of speech 189.5; 
200.13, of proposition 190.10. Also used to denote ‘a (type of) predicable’ 198.17; cf. 
significatio 197.8. 
subdita: ‘the subject part of a proposition’ 192.7, 19, 20, 21; 193.5; cf. subiectiva. 
subiectiva: ‘the subject term’ 192.7, 13, 14; 193.7, 10; 196.17; 197.18; 204.3, 7; 207.1, 22; 
208.21;   cf. subdita. 
subneutra (ἀντικειμένον): ‘a contradictory’ – used to describe the relationship between 
propositions which differ in both quantity and quality specifically when, of the two 
contradictories, the particular premise is valid 195.6; 196.4 cf. alterutra.  
suppar: ‘nearly equal’ – used to describe the contrary relationship between the two 
particular propositions which differ in quality but which are less opposed to each other than 
the universal propositions are to each other 193.22; 194.5, 7; 196.3. 
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verbum (ὄνομα): ‘a word’ 190.6 bis; 192.10. Also used in a grammatical sense to mean 
‘verb’ (ῥῆμα) from which the predicate part of a premise is formed 191.17; 193.6 as 
opposed to vocabulum from which the subject part is formed (see below). 
vocabulum (ὄνομα): ‘a name’ or ‘a noun’ from which the subject part of a premise is formed 
193.6. 
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